



# V. M. MOLOTOV

## PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY

SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS

*April 1945—November 1948*



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PROBLEMS  
of  
FOREIGN POLICY



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## SPEECH AT THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE IN SAN FRANCISCO

*April 26, 1945*

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I would like in the first utterance of the Soviet delegation at this historic conference to express deep gratitude to the Government of the United States of America and to Secretary of State Mr. Stettinius personally for the tremendous preparatory work carried out prior to this conference and for the exemplary organization of the United Nations Conference. At the same time I take this opportunity to convey the Soviet delegation's most sincere gratitude to the Mayor of San Francisco, Mr. Roger Lapham, for the cordial hospitality extended to the delegation in this city.

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the International Conference in San Francisco. The end of the war has drawn near—at least in Europe. The rout of Hitler Germany, the principal aggressor in this war, has become a fact. The time has come to take care of the postwar period—of the future.

This conference is called upon to consider the problem of setting up an organization to protect the general peace and security of nations after the war. Hence the responsibility resting upon this conference is very great indeed.

Today as on many other occasions we must recall once again the great name of President Franklin Roosevelt. His services in the struggle for the achievement of lasting peace and in the preparation of this historic conference have been widely acknowledged among all peace-loving nations.

The second world war by far surpassed the first world war in the scope of military operations and in the size of the armies involved, in the number of casualties, in the immeasurable destruction, and in the unprecedentedly severe consequences for the life of many peoples. Hitler Germany which unleashed this war shrank from no crimes in the attempt to impose her domination on Europe and to pave the way for the world supremacy of German imperialism. The mass murders of children, women and old men; the extermination of entire nationalities; the wholesale destruction of peaceful civilians who were not to the liking of the fascists; the barbaric destruction of culture and of unsubmitting cultural leaders; the destruction of many thousands of towns and villages; the collapse of the economic life of entire nations, and other incalculable losses—all these are things that must not be forgotten....

German fascism not only openly prepared its armies and armaments for piratical attack on peaceful countries; Hitlerism cynically geared the mentality of many millions of people in its country to the aim of establishing domination over foreign nations. This too was the purpose of the illiterate misanthropic theory of "the German master race," which other nations supposedly had to serve.

Long before it directly attacked its neighbours Hitlerism had openly prepared for a criminal war, which it unloosed at a moment of its own choice. We know that Hitlerism found unscrupulous abettors and sanguinary accomplices. We also know that when German fascism, which until then

had freely promenaded through Europe, invaded the Soviet Union it encountered an unflinching adversary. The Soviet country, which in bloody battles against German fascism saved European civilization, has now every reason to remind the governments of their responsibility for the future of the peace-loving nations after the termination of this war. This is all the more necessary because before this war the warning voice of the Soviet Republic was not heeded with due attention.

This is not the time to go at length into the reasons for this. It cannot be proved that there was no desire to prevent war. But it has been fully proved that the governments which once claimed a leading part in Europe manifested their inability, if not their reluctance, to prevent this war, whose consequences it will be not so easy to undo.

This conference is called upon to found the organization of the future security of nations. This is a great problem, which it has hitherto been impossible to solve successfully. Everybody knows that the League of Nations did not cope with this problem in the least. It betrayed the hopes of those who believed in it. Obviously, no one now wishes to restore a League of Nations which had no rights or power, which did not hinder any aggressor in hatching war against peace-loving nations, and which sometimes even positively lulled the vigilance of the peoples with regard to impending aggression. The prestige of the League of Nations was especially undermined when unceremonious attempts were made to turn it into a tool of reactionary forces and privileged Powers. If the sad lessons of the League of Nations have to be recalled here, it is only so that the errors of the past may be avoided in future; these errors must not be allowed to be committed again, even under the mask of new florid promises. But one should not count indefinitely on the patience of the peoples, if the governments again betray an inability to

set up an international organization to safeguard the peaceful life of people, their lands and their younger generations against the horrors and calamities of new piratical imperialist wars.

The Soviet Government is a sincere and firm advocate of the establishment of a strong international security organization. Whatever may depend upon it and its efforts in the common cause of creating such a postwar organization for protecting the peace and security of nations, the Soviet Government will readily do. We will fully cooperate in the solution of this great problem with all other governments which are genuinely devoted to this noble cause. We are confident that, in spite of all the obstacles, this historic goal will be achieved by the joint effort of the peace-loving nations.

A big contribution to this cause was the work done at Dumbarton Oaks last year, with which we are all familiar. There the representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union worked out principles for an international security organization that constitute an important basis for an international organization of a new type. Quite recently at the suggestion of the great American President, Franklin Roosevelt, the Crimea conference adopted important supplements to this draft. As a result, this conference has a sound basis for successful work.

Quite naturally, the new international security organization will be built on the foundation laid by the United Nations in this war.

We know that in the strenuous struggle against the common enemy a great coalition of democratic Powers came into being in Europe. The formation of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition ensured the demolition of German fascism and its abettors. The other nations of Europe fought

or are fighting for their liberation led by this coalition. The coalition of great Powers, with their inflexible will to defend their national rights, as well as to promote the liberation of all other nations which fell victim to sanguinary aggression, is consummating the defeat of the enemy—the foe of all the United Nations. It has been able to do this both because it was conscious of its historical responsibility and because it possessed immense manpower and material resources, which were unswervingly employed in the way demanded by the struggle against the common enemy. But we must always bear in mind that the prestige won may be easily squandered, if certain elementary things are forgotten, such as the lessons of the League of Nations, or the lessons of this war, in which the democratic nations united against an imperialist Power which fancied itself the master of Europe and which wanted to impose its will well-nigh on the whole world.

This coalition was forged in the fire of struggle, and has already rendered great service to the cause of the United Nations. It must be admitted that the presence in this coalition of such a country as the Soviet Union, where the problem of relations between big peoples and small has been consistently solved on a basis of equality and true democracy, is of extreme and fundamental importance. Nor is it possible to overrate the active part played in this coalition by the United States of America, which formerly remained aloof from the problems of an international organization, but which is now contributing to this cause its initiative and its enormous international prestige. This coalition would have been simply impossible without Great Britain, which holds a prominent place in the international association of democratic countries. China in Asia and France in Europe are the great countries which strengthen this coalition as a powerful factor in the postwar world too.

If the leading democratic countries demonstrate their ability to act in harmony in the postwar period as well, this will mean that the peace and security of nations have at last found their most effective bulwark and defence. But this is not enough. Are other peace-loving nations ready to rally around these leading Powers and create an effective international security organization?—this is the question which must be settled at this conference in the interest of the future peace and security of nations.

The question is one of creating an international organization endowed with definite powers to safeguard the general peace. This organization must also have certain means necessary for the military protection of the security of nations.

Only if such conditions are created as will guarantee that no violation of the peace, or threat of such violation, will go unpunished, and that the necessary punitive measures are not too belated, will the security organization be able to shoulder responsibility for the cause of peace. Thus the question is to create an effective organization to safeguard the general peace and security of nations, for which all sincere partisans of the peaceful development of nations have long been yearning, but which has always had many irreconcilable enemies in the camp of the more aggressive imperialists.

After the countless sacrifices of this war, after the sufferings and hardships of these past years the longing of the peoples for such an organization has become particularly poignant. But the opponents of such an international-organization have not laid down their arms. They are carrying on their subversive activities even now, though in most cases in veiled and camouflaged form. For this purpose they frequently use ostensibly the most democratic watchwords and arguments, even going so far as to verbally uphold the

interests of small nations or the principles of justice and equality of nations. But, when all is said and done, it is not what reasons or pretexts will have been used to sabotage the establishment of an effective security organization of nations that matters. If this time, too, no such effective organization is created to protect the postwar peace, this will be one more indication of inability to cope with this great problem with the given forces. But it will be no proof that the need for such an organization is not ripe, or that such an organization will not be set up ultimately.

We must not minimize the difficulties of creating an international security organization. We shall not find the right road with our eyes closed. We must give warning of these difficulties in order to overcome them and, avoiding illusions, to find at last a reliable road for our march towards this noble objective.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, I should like to assure this conference that the entire people of our country are brought up in a spirit of faith in, and devotion to, the cause of creating a firm organization of international security. I should also like to assure this conference that the Soviet people will lend a responsive ear to the voices, wishes and suggestions of all sincere friends of this great cause among the nations of the world.

You know that in the Soviet Union there are millions of people capable of defending their country arms in hand to the last. At the same time, let it be marked, the people of our Soviet country are devoted heart and soul to the cause of lasting general peace and are ready to support with all their strength the efforts of other nations to create a reliable organization for the peace and security of nations. You should definitely know that in the matter of safeguarding the peace and security of nations, the Soviet Union can be relied upon. This great cause is resolutely backed by our

peace-loving people, by the Soviet Government and the Red Army, and by our great Marshal Stalin. To voice these sentiments and thoughts of the Soviet people is one of the cardinal tasks of the delegation of the Soviet Government.

I shall conclude my statement by expressing the fervent wish that our joint work at this conference may be crowned with success.

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## RÁDIO BROADCAST FROM SAN FRANCISCO ON THE OCCASION OF THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY

*May 9, 1945*

Today the act of unconditional surrender of Germany was made public in Moscow. We have reached the long-awaited day of victory over Hitler Germany. On this day all our thoughts go out to those who by their heroism and with their arms ensured the victory over our enemy, the mortal enemy of the United Nations.

The memory of the fallen warriors and the countless victims of German fascism will remain sacred to us forever.

We shall honestly fulfil our great obligations to the disabled soldiers and the orphaned families.

On the day Germany launched her piratical attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government declared: "Ours is a just cause. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours."

This we have now achieved, in a long and stern fight. The Soviet people bent all their energies to expel the invader from their country and to uphold their liberty and independence, as the immortal Lenin taught us.

Together with our democratic Allies we have brought the war of liberation in Europe to a victorious conclusion. The

victory over German fascism is of supreme historic importance.

Under the leadership of the great Stalin, we have won this glorious victory and shall go forward to the building of enduring peace.

We must consolidate our victory for the sake of the freedom of nations, for the welfare, cultural development and progress of mankind.

SPEECH ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING  
OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION  
AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC ON  
THE TRANSCARPATHIAN UKRAINE

*June 29, 1945*

Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen.

The Treaty just signed between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union on the Transcarpathian Ukraine is of great political significance.

For a thousand years the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine were severed from their mother country, the Ukraine. As far back as at the close of the ninth century they fell under the sway of the Hungarians. The Hungarian landowners and capitalists, and later the Germans, imposed upon them a regime of tyranny, oppression and colonial exploitation. They penalized the Ukrainian language and prohibited the opening of Ukrainian schools, and did everything in their power to shatter and destroy the national culture of the Carpatho-Ukrainians. Many inhabitants of the Transcarpathian Ukraine were compelled to quit their homeland for other countries.

However, despite everything, the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, in ethnographical features, language, mode of life and historical destiny, were and remain a part of

the Ukrainian people. It is generally known how great their desire has always been to reunite with their blood-brothers, the Ukrainians. This was the age-old dream of a much suffering people.

After the first world war, the Transcarpathian Ukraine became part of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Carpatho-Ukrainians improved, but they remained severed from their people, from the Ukraine.

Fulfilling its great liberating mission, the Red Army ejected the German and Hungarian invaders from the Transcarpathian Ukraine, delivering the Carpatho-Ukrainians from fascist bondage, thus beginning the liberation of the entire territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. The people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine received the opportunity to decide their own destiny.

On November 26, 1944, the First Congress of People's Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was held in the town of Mukačevo and unanimously adopted a Manifesto announcing the desire of the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine to reunite with the Soviet Ukraine.

The President and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic met the unanimous desire of the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine. Voicing the opinion of the entire Soviet people, and, in the first place, the opinion and sentiments of the people of the Ukraine, the Soviet Government notes with gratitude this friendly act of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which we have an example of a fraternal settlement of a problem affecting the interests of two neighbouring Slav nations.

The signing of this Treaty realizes the age-old dream of the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine. They are being reunited with their mother country, the Ukraine. For the first time in its history the entire Ukrainian nation is united within a single state of its own.

This Treaty is a vivid demonstration of sincere friendship between Slav peoples and of fraternal cooperation between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

Permit me to voice the certainty that all freedom-loving nations will welcome the present Treaty as signifying a strengthening of the policy of peace and of friendly relations among nations.

The Soviet Government warmly greets the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, who are now reuniting with their mother country, the Ukraine, and joining the fraternal family of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

May friendship and cooperation develop and strengthen between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, to the welfare of our nations and in the interest of world peace.

## SPEECH AT A MEETING OF VOTERS OF THE MOLOTOV ELECTORAL AREA, MOSCOW

*February 6, 1946*

Comrades,

You and the voters you represent have nominated me as a candidate to the Supreme Soviet, and the Election Commission of the Molotov Electoral Area of Moscow has registered my candidacy. Permit me to express my deep gratitude for the confidence you have thereby accorded to the Communist Party, for the confidence and honour you have accorded me personally as a representative of the Party. (*Loud applause. All rise.*) I thank you for the kind words you have said here about me and my work. (*Applause.*)

On my part I wish to assure you and all the voters that I remember well what Comrade Stalin said about a deputy's prime duty: to have the great image of the great Lenin always before him and to emulate Lenin in everything. (*Prolonged applause.*) To emulate Lenin means at the same time to emulate the great Stalin, the continuer of Lenin's cause. (*Prolonged applause.*) There can be no nobler task for a deputy than to emulate Lenin and Stalin and to be really worthy of this. Rest assured, comrades, that I have always striven with all my heart for this. (*Applause.*)

We are on the eve of new general elections. The entire adult population of the country is taking part in these elec-

tions. The attitude of all the many millions in the Soviet Union towards the leadership of the Communist Party and towards the policy of the Soviet Government is now being tested. Well, we have reason to look confidently ahead. One confirmation of this is the fact that the communist and non-party bloc has become still stronger and is working in great harmony. There may be people abroad who still dream that it would be a good thing if some party other than the Communist Party were to assume the leadership of our country. To these people one might reply in the simple words of the proverb: "If ifs and ands were pots and pans...." (*Laughter and applause.*) There is no need to say much about such people, people, so to speak, "from the other world." (*Laughter and applause.*) As for our people, they have their own opinion on the subject. What's to be done, when the Soviet people have formed bonds of close kinship and have identified themselves with their Communist Party? (*Loud and prolonged applause.*) And if there are people abroad who still do not like this, we can console them with the thought that nowadays in other countries, too, it is no rare thing to find the Communists, as leaders, enjoying the confidence of the broad mass of the people. (*Applause.*) This only goes to show that the lessons of life are not wasted. In short, the earth is not only revolving, but, one might say, is not revolving in vain (*laughter, applause*), and is pursuing a forward course towards a better future. (*Applause.*)

The four-year war with Germany, and then with Japan, was a supreme test for the young Soviet State. This war, which strained all the spiritual and material forces of the people, was an exceptionally severe test of the policy of the Bolshevik Party. More, it was a test of the stability of the very political system of the Soviet Republic. Now no one can deny that the Soviet State has passed this test with flying colours.

Compare Russia as she was before the October Revolution with what she has become today. We know that the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 caused upheaval in tsarist Russia. Everyone knows about the first Russian revolution, when the first thunderstorm burst over the tsarist regime. The war with Germany of 1914-17 snapped tsarism at its roots and ended with the abolition of the bourgeois-landlord system in Russia. At the time of the war with Japan, the tsarist government admitted its defeat and hastened to end the war. But tsarist Russia was unable to survive the war with Germany, thus demonstrating how utterly rotten and moribund the old regime had become.

Compare this with the present state of our country, after a most gruelling war with Germany and then the war with Japan. Both aggressors, together with their satellites, have been smashed, thanks chiefly to our Red Army. (*Applause.*) The Soviet Union achieved victory in the West and then in the East, which, as you see, is quite unlike the old pre-Soviet times. Having stood these supreme tests, the Soviet Union has advanced still further to the fore as a major factor in international life. The U.S.S.R. ranks today among the most authoritative of the world powers. (*Applause.*) Important problems of international relations cannot nowadays be settled without the participation of the Soviet Union or without heeding the voice of our country. The participation of Comrade Stalin is regarded as the best guarantee of a successful solution of complicated international problems. (*Prolonged applause.*) Without indulging in self-complacency, and always remembering how tenacious of life the reactionary forces in the capitalist countries still are, we must, nevertheless, recognize that the new position the Soviet Union now occupies in international affairs is not the result of fortuitous circumstances, that it corresponds with the interests of all peace-loving nations as well as with the

interests of all countries that are following the road of democratic development and assertion of their national independence.

The credit for all this belongs primarily to the heroic Red Army. (*Applause.*) Our Red Army men and Red Navy men, officers and commanders of all arms, have served devotedly, to the glory of our country. Our generals and marshals, with Generalissimo Stalin at their head, have brought fame and renown to the Soviet Union. The enemy was halted at the gates of Moscow, and this marked the turn of the tide on the Soviet-German front. The enemy surrounded Leningrad, but proved powerless to carry out his plan of capturing the city. The enemy was beaten at Stalingrad, and that marked the beginning of the utter rout of the German army on our front. These tasks were accomplished according to the strategic plan, and under the direct leadership, of our great captain, Comrade Stalin. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The defeat of the enemy came as a result of the efforts of the entire Soviet people, who ensured the victory. We had to lengthen the working day. Millions of women replaced men on collective farms and at mills and factories. Young people self-sacrificingly did the work of adults. We had to reconcile ourselves to serious restrictions of the most vital necessities, to a grave housing shortage, to evacuation to distant parts, and to other wartime hardships. And in spite of this our national economy coped with its main tasks. The needs of the front were satisfied unfailingly and uninterrupted. The urgent needs of the rear were also met, although with great restrictions. Comrade Stalin's call, "Everything for the front!" was responded to with unanimity by the entire Soviet people, and this ensured victory. (*Applause.*)

Overcoming all difficulties at the front and in the rear, we achieved victory. We were able to do so because not

only during the war, but in the years preceding the war, we pursued a correct course. We swept the internal enemies out of our way, all those saboteurs and subversive elements who in the end turned into a gang of spies and wreckers in the employ of foreign masters. We also know that the Soviet people had long damped all ardour for direct foreign interference in our internal affairs. In spite of all who tried to put spokes in our wheel, our people transformed their country and created a mighty Socialist State. (*Applause.*) The foundations of our victory were laid by the creation of the Red Army, the industrialization of the country, the reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of collective farming, the intensive work to raise the cultural level of the people, and the persistent training of engineering and other skilled personnel. And now we are able to review the glorious results: we have smashed a most dangerous enemy, scored a glorious victory, welded the family of Soviet nations still closer together, and raised the international prestige of the Soviet Union to unprecedented heights. Is any better test required of the correctness of the policy of the Bolshevik Party? (*Applause.*) After this, it is not difficult to understand why confidence in our Party has grown so immensely, why confidence in Comrade Stalin's leadership is so unshakable. (*Prolonged applause.*)

The termination of the war confronted us with new tasks, and this also lays new obligations upon us.

The time has come to take up the work interrupted by the war. We shall need some time to raise socialist industry to the level it had reached before the war. But a couple of years will pass and we shall have accomplished it, which is more than any capitalist country could do. (*Applause.*) This task will be an integral part of the new five-year plan, which we are launching this year and which in many respects will enable us to surpass the prewar level of our na-

tional economy. (*Applause.*) We are again developing the branches of industry which will provide agriculture with the necessary quantity of tractors, farm machinery and fertilizer, and also those which will furnish locomotives, rolling stock and everything else needed by the railways and other important branches of transportation—sea, river and automobile. Another task on the order of the day is an all-round improvement in the supply of consumer goods to the population of town and country. For that a number of our industries will have to be expanded. The housing problem to be coped with has become particularly acute in view of the aftermath of destruction left by the war with the German invader. The construction of schools and hospitals, colleges and laboratories, cinemas and theatres and many other cultural and social institutions must be duly expanded, bearing in mind the shortcomings of the past and the need to draw more extensively on the experience of other countries. The people of Moscow will again address themselves to plans for the reconstruction of the capital, and we shall all actively participate in this work of major state importance. (*Applause.*)

You will remember that shortly before the war the Party and the Government had recognized that the time had come to practically tackle and accomplish the cardinal economic task of the U.S.S.R. This cardinal task was formulated as follows: to overtake and outstrip economically the most highly developed capitalist European countries and the United States of America, and definitely to accomplish this task in the nearest future. Our country was to produce no less industrial goods per head of population than the most developed capitalist country—that was the task. (*Applause.*)

We made a good start in this work. But Germany's attack interrupted the great effort. Now we shall tackle the job again, and with a deeper realization of its importance, and

we shall try to make the pace of our work commensurate with the grandeur of the task. The crises, the industrial slumps, characteristic of the capitalist countries are unknown, and will be unknown, to us. We do not know and shall not know unemployment, for we have long discarded the fetters of capitalism and the rule of private property. It is conscious endeavour and socialist emulation in our mills and factories, on collective and state farms, on railways and in offices that are the mainsprings of our economic progress. (*Applause.*)

We must especially strive to make the labour of all more productive, for that is not only in the personal interest of every working man and woman, but in the common interest of the state. The time has passed when work was done to the strains of "Dubinushka." "Dubinushka," of course, is a good song; so is the Volga Boatmen's song. But there is a time for everything. In our age, the age of machinery and high technique—and especially when we are out to "overtake and outstrip"—new machinery must be introduced more extensively and effectively in all branches of our economy, so that the latest achievements of technology and science may play an ever greater part in the development of our industry and of our national economy generally. Then we shall accomplish our task—the task of overtaking and outstripping economically the most developed capitalist countries with that success which is required by the interests of our country and the interests of Communism. (*Applause.*)

Naturally, in order definitely to accomplish this colossal task, we need a lengthy period of peace and security for our country. The peaceable policy of the Soviet Union is not something transient; it springs from the fundamental interests and vital needs of our people, from their desire to raise their living standards as speedily as possible, from the tremendous urge felt by Soviet men and women to fashion their own

way of life—the new cultured socialist way of life—and from our people's profound conviction that the Soviet Union will successfully accomplish all these tasks, provided the hounds of aggression are kept on the leash. That is why the Soviet people are so vigilant with regard to possible seats of disturbance of peace and international security or to any intrigues along these lines.

Our people spring to the alert today, too, when circumstances require it. Can we, for example, close our eyes to such facts as, say, the preservation in one form or another of hundreds of thousands of German troops of Hitler's defeated army in an area administered by our ally? It cannot but be regarded as a good sign that our ally has admitted that this state of affairs must be ended.

Or take another fact. To this day tens of thousands of troops of the Polish fascist General Anders, who is notorious for his enmity to the Soviet Union and who is ready for any adventurous gamble against the new democratic Poland, are being maintained in Italy at the expense of the Allies. Facts like these certainly cannot be explained by concern for the peace and security of nations. Or take this instance. There still exists on Austrian territory, outside the Soviet zone, Colonel Rogozhin's Russian Whiteguard infantry corps, which during the war was in Hitler's pay and service. We have naturally demanded that this gang of degenerates be disbanded, again in the interest of peace and friendly relations among the Allies.

The Soviet Union has done no little to promote the building of a new and more effective organization to safeguard the peace and security of nations. The United Nations organization has already begun to function, and we wish it success in its important tasks. Our participation in this organization is aimed at making it effective in preventing fresh wars and in curbing all and every imperialist aggressor and

violator of the will of other nations. The Soviet Union is always prepared in the interest of general peace to work in concord and harmony with peace-loving countries, big and small. There are no bellicose adventurist groups in the Soviet Union, as there are among the ruling classes of certain other countries where rather dangerous talk is already being encouraged by insatiable imperialists about a "third world war." True friends of the peace and security of nations will continue to find the Soviet Union a faithful ally and a reliable bulwark. (*Prolonged applause.*)

This does not mean that we are not concerned for the might of the Red Army and our Navy. No, concern for our armed forces is unrelaxing. Our army has accumulated fighting experience, has grown strong and steeled as never before. In the course of the war it underwent a great reorganization and geared itself to the demands of modern warfare. The fighting spirit and Soviet patriotism of our troops are well known. The government and the leadership of the Red Army are doing everything to ensure that as regards the very latest types of armaments, too, our army may be in no way inferior to the army of any other country. It is enough to say that all these years the armed forces of the Soviet Union have been headed by the great soldier and farsighted leader of our country, Generalissimo Stalin. (*Stormy cheers.*)

All this determines our new, postwar tasks.

These include both major problems, domestic and foreign, decisive for the future of our country and of our cause, and current tasks that demand urgent solution. The Bolshevik Party teaches us the art of combining these tasks. Unless we concentrate the necessary forces and means on the fundamental tasks of the state, we cannot look ahead with confidence, not to mention the fact that the war has borne out with tremendous cogency the correctness of this Bolshevik policy, which throughout the past has been pursued in

the building of our state. (*Applause.*) One of the major achievements of our Party is the indisputable fact that our people have long grasped the profound import of this general line of Bolshevik policy. (*Applause.*) But the Party has always demanded that the available opportunities, and we have no few of them, should be used more widely and persistently to satisfy urgent needs connected with raising the standard of living of our population. The Party has always fought ruthlessly against bureaucratic disdain for what are called "minor" problems and has urged not only Bolshevik self-criticism, but active public criticism of the work of inefficient executives. And now that the war has left a whole crop of these "minor" problems, this is a fitting time to remind the executives of our organizations and institutions of this. 32465

Much depends, of course, on ability to work, and still more on a genuine desire to learn how to work. It is never too late to learn, as you know. This applies both to local and to central executive officials. Comrade Stalin has told us more than once how useful it is for people in authority to take daily stock of their work, to study more frequently and more deeply the results of their activity. After all, nowadays, a good deal depends in every sphere of activity on the executives. The same factory, the same collective farm, the same organization or institution yields certain results under one manager, and much better results under another, more efficient manager. The factory worker, as you know, takes stock of his or her work every day. Factory workers want to know, and do know, how much they have produced in the course of the day, what they have to show for their work. The same thing may be said of the men and women of the countryside. ~~The results of their work find expression in the number of collective-farm workday units; and we know what good care our collective farmers take to have as many of these units to their credit as they can, and how deeply~~

rooted this now is in the life of the collective farms. Executives, too, must develop the habit of taking stock of their work every day, and must learn to be properly self-critical of the results of their activity. Then there will be fewer shortcomings in the work of many of our respected comrades, and we shall achieve the modern Bolshevik tempo we need in the solution of all urgent problems.

The Party, in its policy, gives us the correct line to work on. And we in authority in local and central organizations must prove by our deeds that we know how to work. We must prove our Bolshevik desire to work better, more productively, with maximum benefit for the people. You will probably agree that this is the thing which all our voters want.

We have every ground to expect that at the elections to the Supreme Soviet our people will again demonstrate their confidence in the Bolshevik Party and will unanimously support the candidates of the Stalin communist and non-party bloc of workers, peasants and intellectuals. This only enhances the responsibility devolving on the deputies; they must prove themselves worthy of the confidence of our great people and must justify the confidence of their electors. (*Applause.*) So let the new elections serve to weld our people together still more strongly, and to promote our further advance under the tried leadership of the Bolshevik Party and of our great and beloved Stalin. (*Stormy and prolonged cheers. All rise. Cries of: "Long live our great Stalin!" "Long live Stalin's faithful colleague, Comrade Molotov!"*)

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## STATEMENT TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET PRESS ON THE RESULTS OF THE PARIS MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS\*

In connection with questions put by correspondents of the *Izvestia* and *Pravda* regarding the results of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, and in view of the construction which has lately been put on these results in other countries, V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., made the following statement:

The meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Council in Paris was held in accordance with the decision of the Moscow conference of the three Ministers last December. As is known, the Moscow conference, guided by the directives of the Berlin tripartite conference, adopted a definite decision regarding the preparation of the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Soviet delegation at the Paris meeting was guided by the principle that it was obligatory to adhere strictly to the decision of the Moscow conference, which provided for the convening of a conference to discuss the said peace treaties after the preparation of the corresponding drafts had been completed. The Moscow conference decision provided that agreement shall necessarily be reached among the Governments

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of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, and, with respect to Italy, France too, in framing the said peace treaties. This means that before the peace conference of representatives of the 21 states is convened, these governments must draw up agreed peace-treaty drafts. Any other interpretation might lead to a situation where, say, instead of one draft, two drafts of a peace treaty with Italy might be submitted to the conference. In that case one group of participants in the conference would be signing one peace treaty, and another group of participants, another peace treaty, which would in fact mean the collapse of the idea of a single peace conference. If we followed such a line, we should not have one peace conference, but two peace conferences, and the aspiration of the peoples for lasting peace would thereby be frustrated. The inadmissibility of such a situation is perfectly obvious. The Soviet delegation accordingly could not agree to the proposal made by the delegation of the United States of America to set the date for the conference irrespective of whether preliminary agreement is reached in preparing the peace treaties. It is also perfectly obvious that this proposal of the American delegation, which was supported by the British delegation, ran counter to the decisions of the Berlin conference and the Moscow conference, and in general was liable to lead to most undesirable consequences from the point of view of the further development of friendly relations among the nations seeking to establish enduring peace.

Accordingly, the efforts of the Soviet delegation at the Paris meeting were aimed precisely at achieving agreed decisions on the main questions of the draft peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. It should be recognized that certain positive results have been attained in this respect, although they cannot be regarded as sufficient.

As a result of the labours of the Paris meeting, the preparation of *peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary*

*and Finland*, with the exception of the economic clauses which have not yet been considered, may be regarded as in the main completed. The governments charged with preparing these treaties have agreed on all the basic questions—territorial, military restrictions, reparations and others. This was facilitated by the fact that, on the Soviet Government's suggestion, the basis taken for the said peace treaties was the armistice terms, in which only the chief obligations of the satellite states had been included, fully safeguarding the legitimate interests of the Allies, without, however, leading to outside interference in the internal affairs of these states. The questions on which agreement has not been reached in regard to the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland chiefly relate to the economic section of the treaties, which thus far has not been considered by the Council of Ministers, but was discussed in special commissions, in which differences came to light. Incidentally, the question of Danubian commerce and navigation, which involves vital interests of the Danube countries, has already been discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers more than once. The Soviet delegation maintains that this question cannot be considered and resolved without the participation of the Danube states, presuming that there is a desire to develop friendly relations with these countries. The question of the navigation regime on the Danube is primarily the affair of the Danube states themselves, and it cannot be settled in peace treaties with individual Danube states. It cannot be deemed proper that certain non-Danube states should arrogate the right to dictate their will to the Danube states and prescribe such a regime on the Danube as would not reckon with the interests of the Danube states, particularly of the Danube Allied states (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia).

As regards the *peace treaty with Italy*, the situation is considerably more complicated. Here differences have been

revealed on a number of basic issues, as, for instance, reparations, the future of the former Italian colonies, the Italo-Yugoslav frontier and the fate of Trieste, and certain other questions.

Let us take the question of *reparations*. In 1941-42, several hundred thousand fascist Italian troops invaded the territory of the U.S.S.R. Together with the Hitlerites, they devastated Minsk, the capital of Soviet Byelorussia, Kharkov and many other cities and villages of the Ukraine, went as far as the Don River and wrought tremendous damage to our country. By their invasion of Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, the Italian fascist forces inflicted immense calamities on these countries as well. Nevertheless, making allowance for the fact that fascism in Italy has been overthrown, and acknowledging the importance of democratic Italy's participation on the Allied side in the closing years of the war, the Soviet Union restricted its reparations claims to the very modest sum of 100 million dollars, to be paid over a period of six years, which is to serve at least as a reminder that aggression and invasion of foreign territory cannot be committed with impunity. At the same time the Soviet Union holds that the claim to reparations in the amount of 200 million dollars for Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania is just. These figures show that our reparations claims on Italy can compensate for only a small part of the damage she inflicted in the war years. The reparations claims of the Soviet Union on Italy were supported at the Paris meeting only by the French delegation. The American delegation, and with it the British delegation, did not fully support even these fair claims of the Soviet Union. It will suffice to say that the United States delegation proposed that the amount of reparations payable to the U.S.S.R. shall include the value of the warships which are designated for the Soviet Union out of the Italian booty, although even at the Berlin conference, when the German

problem was considered, the American, British and Soviet Governments acknowledged it as quite fair to regard the enemy's navy as war booty, not to be included in reparations.

This is not the first time, when considering the question of reparations, we find representatives of countries whose territories were not invaded by the enemy approaching this question in a different way from the Soviet Union. After all, one cannot just express sympathy for the nations which suffered foreign invasion and at the same time appeal to them to "forget about reparations." This would only be another proof of the Russian proverb that "the well-fed do not understand the hungry." Yet, it is known from official statements in the Italian press what enormous occupation expenses Italy is bearing in favour of Britain and the United States. Even a slight reduction of these occupation expenses, which run into several billion dollars, would suffice to enable Italy to meet the reparations claims of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, we are well aware that Italian industry is in need of orders. Meeting of the reparations demands of the Soviet Union would provide Italian industry with substantial orders for a number of years, without imposing any great burden on the Italian budget. But, for some reason, the principal objections of the American and British side are precisely to Italy's meeting the reparations by deliveries of goods to the Soviet Union. The assertion that such deliveries by Italian industry would be made at the cost of the financing of Italy by the United States and Great Britain is totally unfounded. On the other hand, it cannot be considered proper that Italian industry should be regarded as subservient to the interests of American and British industrial circles. Italy's national industry has a big past, and new and extensive prospects for development should now open before it. If we are not interfered with, the Soviet Union and Italy will

reach agreement on reparations without any particular difficulty.

The question of the former *Italian colonies* received much attention both at the London and the Paris meetings of the Ministers. We did not insist on the Soviet Union, alone, or at least jointly with Italy, being given the trusteeship over Tripolitania for several years, although this would have been of great importance to Soviet merchant shipping on the Mediterranean sea lanes, and would have fully ensured the establishment of Tripolitania's national independence within a short time. The Soviet Union, as well as France, considered it desirable that the former Italian colonies should be placed under the trusteeship of Italy herself, which, having now become a democratic state, could under the guidance of the United Nations organization, accomplish the task of preparing these countries for national independence. This proposal at first met with the support of the American delegation also, which, however, soon after abandoned this position, citing the objections of the British delegation. In view of this, the question of the future of the Italian colonies remained unsettled, and the concessions made by the Soviet Union on this question did not meet with due appreciation or fair recognition.

In the question of the former Italian colonies it was very obvious that the American and British delegations usually acted by previous private agreement, although this ran counter to the lawful interests of other countries. At the Paris meeting a British draft was submitted according to which nearly all the Italian colonies were virtually to come under Britain's control. It was proposed to proclaim the "independence of Libya," including Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but without the British troops being withdrawn from this territory. It was also proposed to form a "Greater Somaliland," by incorporating into it Italian Somaliland and two territo-

ries to be taken from Ethiopia (Ogaden and the "reserve territories"), and to place this "Greater Somaliland" under Great Britain's trusteeship. Thus Great Britain's colonial empire would obtain a new extension of rights in North and Northeast Africa. As we see, it was proposed to do this not only at the expense of vanquished Italy, but also of Ethiopia, which, as everyone knows, is a member of the United Nations organization. The realization of such plans would lead to the further consolidation of Great Britain's practically monopolistic position in the entire enormous area of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. These British plans encountered no criticism from the American delegation. On the contrary, any proposal which seemed undesirable to Great Britain from the point of view of the preservation and further consolidation of her monopoly position in the Mediterranean met with determined resistance from the Americans as well as the British. The question of the Italian colonies remained unsettled, and British troops continue to be the masters in these territories, and in certain territories of Ethiopia too.

The question of the *Italo-Yugoslav frontier and Trieste* must also be classed among the basic problems of the Paris meeting. Only the Soviet delegation supported Yugoslavia on this issue. The justice of Yugoslavia's claim to the Julian March was not disputed by anyone. No one defended the decision taken after the first world war to transfer the Julian March to Italy. It was clear to all that this is part of Yugoslavia's national territory, that Slovenes and Croats predominate in this area. Nevertheless, the American, British and French experts proposed that the Julian March be split into two parts: eastern and western. And together with the western part, which in the French proposal forms only a small part of the Julian March, Trieste, too, which is the head of the entire Julian March, was to be severed from Yugoslavia.

But the city of Trieste, although it is inhabited predominantly by Italians, cannot be separated from the Julian March without infringing upon important national interests of Yugoslavia and without grave economic prejudice to Trieste itself. The problem of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier remained unsettled. Yet it is perfectly clear that it demands immediate settlement in a manner answering to the national interests of Yugoslavia, our common ally.

The importance of the *economic problems* of the treaty with Italy cannot be underestimated either, the more so that analogous questions of an economic nature arise in other peace treaties too. In the process of preparing the peace treaties, a tendency dangerous to countries weakened by the war was revealed, inasmuch as Anglo-American capital is seeking to bring the economy of big and small states under its influence and to make so-called economic aid to these countries an instrument to this end. We encountered a desire to include in the treaties numerous economic, financial and other clauses which might be used by strong states to impose their will upon economically weak states which, moreover, have not yet recovered from the war. In support of such proposals, the desirability is usually argued of abolishing trade and other restrictions, of allowing free play to foreign capital, and so forth. The Soviet delegation, however, could not disregard the national interests of former satellite states which have now embarked on the road of democratic development and economic regeneration; for the Soviet Union cannot support the efforts of any state economically to enslave other countries, even such as were on the enemy side in the earlier years of the war. After all, Italy or any similar state cannot be regarded as a sort of colony, where the occupying Powers can do as they please without regard for the national interests of these states.

Much attention was given to the question of setting up a

“*Treaty Commission*” in Italy, composed of representatives of the United States, Britain, the U.S.S.R. and France. According to the American proposal the “*Treaty Commission*” was for a period of eighteen months after the conclusion of peace to discharge such functions as would be prescribed for it by the peace treaty in regard to various military questions, reparations, restitutions, war criminals, and so on. It was furthermore proposed that the commission should be invested with both executive and judicial competence, that is to say, should have extremely wide powers in the territory of a foreign democratic state. Its extremely wide powers would run counter to the sovereignty of the Italian State, to which, after the conclusion of the peace treaty, the way is to be opened to membership in the United Nations. The Soviet delegation considered that the establishment of a commission with both executive and judicial powers would resemble something in the nature of a capitulation regime for Italy, which is in no way compatible with the principle of Italian state sovereignty. We also pointed out that the establishment of such a commission would conflict with the proposal to mitigate the armistice terms signed in Paris. On this question, too, agreement could not be reached. It is to be presumed, however, that further meditation will convince the authors of this proposal of the inexpediency of insisting on the establishment of a “*Treaty Commission*.”

As we know, *the question of Germany* was also discussed at the meeting on the initiative of the French delegation. France again insisted on the Ruhr, the Rhineland and the Saar being severed from Germany; however, the discussion of this question was not developed at the Paris meeting. On the other hand, the American delegation suggested discussing the draft of a 25-year treaty between the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and France on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, in the spirit of the generally

known proposals of Senator Vandenberg. In this connection Mr. Byrnes remarked that last December, when he was in Moscow, he had asked Stalin what he thought of the possibility of concluding a treaty of this nature, and that Stalin had given his consent to it in principle. It should, however, be noted that Mr. Byrnes is not quite accurate, for in December Mr. Byrnes did not yet have the draft of such a treaty, and accordingly Stalin could not have given his "consent" to a non-existent treaty; the matter was at that time limited solely to a brief interchange of opinion on the idea of a treaty of *mutual assistance* in the event of a renewal of *German or Japanese aggression*. Yet, the draft of the treaty later submitted by Mr. Byrnes does not include the question of mutual assistance against German and Japanese aggression, deals only with disarmament, and for some reason or other ignores the highly important decisions regarding Germany adopted by the Allies in Teheran, Yalta and Berlin, and may lead to a relaxation of inter-Allied control aimed at preventing a resurgence of German aggression, the relaxation of which control is, of course, absolutely inadmissible. The Soviet delegation suggested that the draft treaty should be preliminarily studied by the governments concerned and that a decision on this treaty should not be taken in a hurry, the more so since Mr. Byrnes explained that this treaty could come into force only after the peace treaty with Germany was signed. But in Germany, as we know, there does not yet exist even the embryo of a government with which a peace treaty could be concluded. The Soviet delegation accordingly made a different proposal. It pointed out that before talking about a new treaty concerning the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, it was necessary to verify how previous decisions of the Allies regarding Germany's disarmament had been carried out. This proposal was, in the end, adopted. And now the Control Council in Germany

is considering practical steps to form a commission that will check up in all the occupation zones of Germany just how the disarmament of the German armed forces has been carried out in practice in the year since Germany's surrender. It is to be expected that this check-up will contribute to precise observance of the terms of Germany's surrender and to the elaboration of further measures for safeguarding security in Europe.

Literally on the eve of the termination of the Paris meeting, Mr. Byrnes submitted one more proposal—this time it was a proposal to call a conference of the Allies next November to consider a peace treaty with Germany. This proposal was all the more unexpected as hitherto neither Mr. Byrnes nor anyone else had made any proposals concerning such a peace treaty, quite apart from the fact that there does not as yet exist any German government with which a peace treaty could be concluded. In this connection it may be recalled that as far back as last July the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, made a proposal at the Berlin conference that some sort of central all-German administration be set up. The other participants in the Berlin conference were at that time against discussing this question. No one had raised this question since. That being so, Mr. Byrnes' proposal for a conference to consider a peace treaty with Germany naturally could not be accepted at the Paris meeting. Naturally this question either cannot be decided in a hurry.

What do the *results of the Paris meeting* show?

The results of the meeting show that in the discussion of the drafts of the first five peace treaties certain differences were revealed among the governments responsible for the preparation of these treaties. It was revealed that in regard to the draft peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, where the chief responsibility nat-

urally rests with the Soviet Union, only a few differences remain, which should not be exaggerated. On the other hand, as regards the peace treaty with Italy, where the chief responsibility rests with Great Britain and the United States of America, a number of issues of major importance remain unsettled. In this case too the Soviet Union made several steps for the achievement of general agreement. Perhaps in the end this will facilitate agreement on this draft too.

The Paris meeting has also shown that there are certain absolutely undesirable tendencies in the preparation of the peace treaties. It transpired that the so-called "peace offensive" proclaimed in certain American circles boils down in some cases simply to a desire to impose the will of two governments upon the government of a third state. Such was the case, for instance, with the question of the future of the former Italian colonies, when the Soviet Union waived its claims completely and yet the American and British delegations leagued together and made it impossible to reach an agreed decision. In the question of Italian reparations, we again encountered an Anglo-American bloc, which in this matter too did not conduct a "peace offensive," but an offensive against the Soviet Union. Having leagued together in their desire to impose their will upon the Soviet Union, the American and British delegations refused to reckon with the perfectly legitimate wishes of the Soviet Union and frustrated the possibility of an agreed decision on reparations as well.

The Paris meeting showed at the same time that the attempts of certain states to impose their will upon another state are meeting with natural resistance. Certainly no self-respecting allied state will allow another state to impose its will upon it. The Soviet Union is precisely such a state, a state, on the other hand, which has sufficiently demon-

strated its desire for concerted action with other countries, both in war—for the sake of allied victory—and after the war, for the sake of ensuring the lasting peace and security of nations.

It is sometimes said that it is difficult to draw a line between the desire for security and the desire for expansion. And, indeed, it is at times difficult. For instance, what security interests of the United States dictate the demand for military bases in Iceland? Evidently the point here is not the United States' security at all, but aspirations of quite a different sort. The world press is full of reports that certain circles in the United States, leagued with their friends in Great Britain, are seeking to establish naval and air bases in all parts of the globe—on Pacific and Atlantic islands and on the territories of states in the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. It is not for nothing that in certain countries advocates of a new imperialist domination of the world by one of the strong states have now acquired great weight, and, unrestrained by their official positions as senators or representatives, are trumpeting their plans of expansion, and instigating new aggressive wars, irresponsibly disregarding the lessons of the inglorious collapse of imperialist Germany and her schemes of world supremacy. The future is now not with these gentlemen but with those nations, which, like the Soviet Union, desire lasting peace and link their security interests with the security interests of other peace-loving nations. Efforts by strong states to impose their will upon other nations will occur in the future too, but in regard to the Soviet Union they are doomed to failure in the future as they have been in the past. Only a desire for friendly cooperation, in which there is no room for the imposition of the will of one state or two states on another, can serve as a reliable foundation for the development of relations between the Soviet State and other countries. There need be

no doubt that these principles of international cooperation will receive ever-increasing recognition in other democratic countries too.

It is known, that a definite procedure was evolved by the Allies during the war of arriving at agreed decisions. At the conferences at Teheran, Yalta and Berlin, as well as at the Moscow conference in 1943, unanimously agreed decisions were taken on very important questions. These decisions were not adopted by way of the imposition of the will of some governments on other governments, but by friendly accord and mutual understanding. This method of cooperation yielded positive results. Certain circles are now seeking to upset this method. Attempts are constantly being made to act contrary to this proved method of work. At the Paris meeting the proposal was made not to wait until peace-treaty drafts had been worked out by agreement among the governments which undertook to prepare these drafts. It was proposed to submit unagreed drafts directly to a peace conference consisting of representatives of 21 states, and to allow disputes and conflicts to develop there. The Soviet delegation would not countenance these attempts, which depart from the established principles of joint action by the Allies. Since the Paris meeting, Mr. Byrnes has advanced a new plan, which goes still further. It is proposed to refer any peace-treaty drafts on which agreement is not reached to the United Nations organization, although, as is commonly known, peace-treaty questions are no concern of this organization. This is one more attempt to destroy the method of concerted action established in these past years and to resort to methods of pressure, threats and intimidation. The ineffectiveness of using such intimidation against the Soviet Union is obvious, and has been proved time and again. However, such attempts indicate a strong desire on the part of certain foreign circles to depart from

the principle of joint action with the Soviet Union and other democratic states evolved in recent years, and to try to employ in relations with the U.S.S.R. and other countries methods alien to normal relations among states. That attempts are being made to drag the United Nations organization into such affairs is already generally known. Such things may be done if one does not consider the risk of undermining the prestige of the United Nations organization and resorts to ever new combinations of votes in the international organization. We have instances of this already, and there is no denying that the prestige of the Security Council has been subjected to severe trials.

All this goes to show that the preparation of the first peace treaties has already encountered no few difficulties. These difficulties are not fortuitous. There is a desire in certain foreign circles to oust the Soviet Union from the place of honour which it by right occupies in international affairs and to impair the international prestige of the U.S.S.R. But only nearsighted reactionary circles can act in such a way, and they are doomed to failure. They cannot understand that the Soviet State, which bore the brunt of the struggle to save mankind from the tyranny of fascism, now rightfully holds a position in international relations which answers to the interests of equality of countries, big and small, in their efforts for peace and security. Upholding the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the principle of friendly cooperation with other democratic countries, and repelling imperialistic reactionary efforts, no matter from what quarter they come, the Soviet Union is fully convinced of the correctness of its policy, which works to protect the cause of peace and the progress of humanity.

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**STATEMENTS AT THE PARIS MEETING  
OF THE COUNCIL  
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS**

*July 1946*



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## STATEMENT ON THE AMERICAN DRAFT TREATY ON THE DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY

*Made at the Sitting of the  
Council of Foreign Ministers*

*July 9, 1946*

The Soviet Government has studied with due attention the draft treaty of the four Powers on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany submitted by Mr. Byrnes.

The Soviet Government reaffirms that the disarmament and long-term demilitarization of Germany are absolutely essential. The Soviet Government holds that Germany should be kept disarmed and demilitarized not for twenty-five years, as suggested in the draft, but for at least forty years. Experience has shown that the short period during which restrictions on Germany's armaments were enforced after the first world war proved to be absolutely insufficient to prevent Germany's renascence as an aggressive force endangering the peoples of Europe and the world. Only twenty years had passed since the end of the first world war when Germany unleashed a second world war. It is obvious that it is to the interest of the peace-loving nations to keep Germany disarmed as long as possible.

The interests of world peace and security are given as the motives for the suggested draft treaty. The preamble

refers to the desire to make it possible for the peoples of Europe and the whole world to devote themselves single-mindedly to peaceful pursuits. Study of the draft, however, shows the complete inadequacy of the proposed measures to safeguard security and prevent aggression by Germany in the future. The aforesaid document is confined to an enumeration of certain military and military-economic measures, but even those measures are set out in a less comprehensive form than was done in the decision of the Berlin conference of the leaders of the three Powers, which, in addition, indicated other no less essential conditions for safeguarding security and lasting peace.

For this reason the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that if the treaty of the four Powers is confined only to what the draft says regarding Germany's disarmament it cannot be a reliable guarantee of security in Europe and the world as a whole. On the contrary, the inadequacy of the measures it sets forth might result in Germany's resurgence as an aggressor Power.

The question arises, what kind of treaty of the four Powers is needed so as to prevent a renewal of German aggression and thus really serve to safeguard durable peace and the security of the nations. To reply to this question one must turn to the joint decisions of the Allied Powers which were adopted while the war with Germany was still in progress.

Everybody knows that the joint decisions adopted by the Governments of the U.S.A., the Soviet Union and Great Britain at the Crimea conference and subsequently elaborated at the Berlin conference, and with which France, too, associated herself, outlined the main objectives in the matter of safeguarding Europe and the world against the danger of a renewal of German aggression. There is no reason for us to renounce these decisions. They must

form the basis for our further steps for the maintenance of peace.

First of all, it should be said that these decisions speak of the necessity to effect "the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production." (Berlin conference.)

Thus, the decision completely to disarm and demilitarize Germany was taken by our countries long before the appearance of the draft treaty under discussion. At that time, too, it was considered necessary to carry out the industrial disarmament of Germany; indeed, the Allies have always regarded the elimination of Germany's military-economic potential and the establishment of proper Allied control over German industries as their primary objective in safeguarding the security of the nations in the future.

The proposed draft, however, formulates these objectives in a curtailed and utterly inadequate form. If one examines the present position in this respect, the situation will prove to be entirely unsatisfactory. The Soviet Government has already proposed that a verification be undertaken in all the zones in Germany to see how the disarmament of German forces and disbandment of all other military and para-military organizations and establishments have been carried out in actual fact. To this day, this has not been done. But we continue to press for such a verification in order to avoid all possible misunderstandings in this sphere.

As regards the elimination of Germany's military-economic potential, the position is entirely unsatisfactory. Here there is as yet nothing even to verify, because up to now no plan for the elimination of Germany's war potential has been adopted and, apart from certain measures taken independently of a general plan, nothing has been accomplished in this respect.

The Soviet Government, therefore, considers that there should be no further delay in drawing up a plan and in establishing a procedure of measures for eliminating those branches of German industry which, producing enormous quantities of armaments for the German army, formed the military-economic base of aggressive Germany. Only a disarmament program that includes both the disbandment of the German armed forces and of all military and para-military organizations and the elimination of those German industries which supplied Germany's armaments—only such disarmament and demilitarization of Germany will correspond to the interests of lasting peace and the security of nations.

A four-Power treaty which is intended to safeguard peace and security must, above all, provide for the accomplishment of these tasks. The suggested draft, however, does not satisfactorily meet any of these questions.

At the same time we must bear in mind that the safeguarding of security and the prevention of fresh aggression by Germany does not depend only on military and military-economic measures. Of no less importance are the measures envisaged by the decisions of the Crimea and Berlin conferences which deal with political objectives in respect of Germany, the achievement of which has always been considered by the Allied Powers as absolutely essential for safeguarding future peace and the security of the nations.

The decisions of the Crimea conference referred to the necessity to "wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people." All this is set out in greater detail in the decisions of the Berlin conference which stress the necessity "to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis."

The suggested draft evades the question of eliminating the vestiges of German fascism and of reconstructing German political life on democratic lines, an omission to which one cannot agree.

Only yesterday we all admitted that our primary objective was not only to "wipe out the Nazi party" but also to remove the effects of the domination of Hitlerism in all spheres of public life in Germany. We regarded the accomplishment of these tasks as an essential condition for the reconstruction of the German state on democratic lines, in order that Germany might cease to exist as an aggressive force and become a democratic and peace-loving state which would then be able to cooperate peacefully in international affairs.

We all realized that this reconstruction would not be easy, that it would take some time, and would require us to give active support to those democratic forces among the German people which would undertake this task. It must be recognized that appreciable democratic forces have sprung up in Germany, and that they are already working with a certain amount of success for her democratic renascence. But, after all, this democratic reconstruction has only just begun; only a beginning has been made; the forces of fascism in Germany are as yet far from eradicated. It is well known that agrarian reform, involving the elimination of the big landowners who formed a reliable buttress of Hitlerism, has been carried out only in the Soviet zone, and has not even begun in the Western zones. Monopolistic associations of German industrialists, all those cartels, trusts, syndicates and the rest on which German fascism relied in preparing for aggression and in waging war, still exercise their influence, particularly in the Western zones. Consequently, if we want to have really reliable guarantees of security for the future, we have no reason to relax attention to the prob-

lem of eliminating the last vestiges of Nazism, and transforming Germany into a democratic country.

In view of this, how is one to interpret the fact that the draft does not say a single word about these important objectives for the maintenance of peace and the security of nations? It must be clear to us that all advocates of lasting peace are interested in the unreserved implementation of the afore-mentioned decisions of the Crimea and Berlin conferences. We must remember our joint decisions, which say that "German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world." (Berlin conference.)

The proposed treaty does not conform to these objectives. It avoids and disregards the extremely important prerequisites for ensuring lasting peace and the security of nations. Thus, from the point of view of the interests of security, the suggested draft treaty does not conform to its purpose, not to mention the fact that it conflicts with the earlier joint decisions of the Allies.

Despite the complete inadequacy of the measures proposed to prevent new aggression by Germany, the draft envisages the possibility of terminating the Allied occupation of German territory. It thus ignores the aims which guided the Allies when they established the occupation of Germany. It must not be forgotten that the presence of Allied and Soviet forces in Germany has three aims: first, to secure and complete the military and economic disarmament of Germany; secondly, to secure the democratization of the regime in Germany; and thirdly, to assure reparation deliveries. As long as these objectives have not been achieved, we hold that the presence of occupation forces in Germany and the maintenance of zones of occupation are absolutely essential.

It has already been indicated how unsatisfactory the draft is as a means of ensuring the complete military and economic disarmament of Germany, and also that it completely disregards the problem of securing the democratization of the regime in Germany. To this it remains to be added that Mr. Byrnes' draft totally ignores the necessity of ensuring reparation deliveries, an omission to which the Soviet Government is quite unable to agree.

It is necessary to dwell upon the question of reparations from Germany. It particularly affects the interests of those countries which were invaded by German armies and experienced exceptionally great suffering as a result of German occupation. Clearly, the Soviet Union cannot forget about reparations, as has been done in the submitted draft.

With respect to the total amount of reparations from Germany for the U.S.S.R., the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States already at the Crimea conference felt it possible to take the amount of 10,000 million dollars as a basis. At the Berlin conference the Soviet Government again insisted on fixing reparations from Germany in favour of the Soviet Union in the amount of 10,000 million dollars. At that time it was decided, on the suggestion of the United States, that the Soviet Union might draw its reparations mainly from its occupation zone of Germany and partly from the Western zones, and this was written into the decisions of the Berlin conference.

Naturally, these reparations must include not only equipment, but also commodities out of Germany's current production. But, as we know, the fulfilment of reparation deliveries is meeting ever new obstacles. Notwithstanding the obligations assumed by the United States of America and Great Britain, and subsequently undertaken also by France, the Berlin decisions concerning reparation deliveries

are not being carried out in the Western zones of occupation of Germany. New pretexts are constantly being found to postpone and frustrate the implementation of those decisions. The American General Clay recently issued an unlawful statement announcing a refusal to carry out reparation deliveries to the Soviet Union and other countries, even in pursuance of the initial and utterly inadequate decisions which were already agreed upon by the four governments in the Allied Control Council.

The Soviet Government can in no circumstances agree to such an attitude towards the joint decisions of our governments on the subject of reparations. All the more are we unable to agree to the proposal contained in Mr. Byrnes' draft which envisages the termination of the Allied occupation of German territory irrespective of the fulfilment of reparation deliveries. The Soviet Government insists that reparations from Germany to the amount of 10,000 million dollars be exacted unreservedly, because this amount covers only a small portion of the enormous damage suffered by the Soviet Union as a result of German occupation. It is possible that the U.S.A. and Great Britain, which did not experience the calamities of occupation, somewhat underrate the significance of reparations to the U.S.S.R. But the people of the Soviet Union who suffered German occupation cannot accept such an attitude towards their legitimate claims.

All that I have said makes clear the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the draft treaty submitted by Mr. Byrnes on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. It is obvious to us that the draft treaty in the form in which it has been submitted to us does not correspond to the interests of peace and the security of the nations. The draft needs radical revision. The observations I have made indicate the lines along which, in our opinion, revision is necessary.

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## THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND THE PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY

*Statement Made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers*

*July 10, 1946*

The time has come for us to discuss the future of Germany and the peace treaty with that country.

The Soviet Government has always held that the spirit of revenge is a poor counsellor in such affairs. Nor would it be correct to identify Hitler Germany with the German people, although the German people cannot divest themselves of responsibility for Germany's aggression and for its dire consequences.

The Soviet people experienced the unparalleled suffering of enemy occupation, as a result of the invasion of the Soviet Union by the German armies. Our losses are great and inestimable. Other peoples of Europe, and not of Europe alone, will long feel the heavy losses and hardships caused by the war which Germany imposed.

It is, therefore, understandable that the problem of Germany's future should be agitating the minds not only of the German people—which is only natural—but also of other peoples, who are anxious to safeguard themselves for the future and prevent a renewal of German aggression. One should also bear in mind that, thanks to her industrial

might, Germany is an important link in the whole system of world economy. Nor can one, on the other hand, forget that more than once this industrial might has served as the base for the arming of aggressive Germany.

Such are the premises from which we must draw our conclusions.

I proceed from the consideration that, in the interests of world economy and tranquility in Europe, it would be incorrect to adopt the line of annihilating Germany as a state, or of agrarianizing her, with the destruction of her main industrial centres.

Such a line would undermine the economy of Europe, dislocate world economy and lead to a chronic political crisis in Germany, which would spell a threat to peace and tranquility.

I think that, even if we were to adopt such a line, historical development would impel us subsequently to renounce it as abortive and groundless.

I think, therefore, that our purpose is not to destroy Germany, but to transform her into a democratic and peace-loving state which, alongside of agriculture, would have its own industry and foreign trade, but which would be deprived of the economic and military potentiality to rise again as an aggressive force.

While still engaged in the war the Allies declared that they had no intention of destroying the German nation. Even at the time when Hitler with overweening presumption openly proclaimed that he wanted to destroy Russia, the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, ridiculing this boastful stupidity, said: "It is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia. But we can and must destroy the Hitler state."

Germany has long held an important position in the world economic system. Remaining a united state, Germany

will continue to be an important factor in world trade—which corresponds to the interests of other nations as well. On the other hand, a policy of annihilating Germany as a state, or of agrarianizing her and wiping out her principal industrial centres, would turn her into a breeding ground of dangerous sentiments of revenge, and would play into the hands of the German reactionaries and deprive Europe of tranquility and stable peace.

One should look forward, not backward, and think what must be done so that Germany may become a democratic and peace-loving state, with a developed agriculture, industry and foreign trade, but deprived of the possibility of re-emerging as an aggressive force. The victory over Germany has placed in our hands powerful means for the achievement of this purpose. It is our duty to utilize them to the full.

It has of late become fashionable to talk about dismembering Germany into several "autonomous" states, federalizing her, and separating the Ruhr from her. All such proposals stem from this same line of destroying and agrarianizing Germany, for it is easy to understand that without the Ruhr Germany cannot exist as an independent and viable state. But I have already said that the destruction of Germany should not be our objective, if we cherish the interests of peace and tranquility.

Of course, if the German people, in a plebiscite taken throughout Germany, pronounce in favour of transforming Germany into a federal state, or, if as a result of a plebiscite in one or other former German state, the desire is manifested to secede from Germany, it goes without saying that we cannot object.

The idea of a federal structure for Germany is now not infrequently supported by the Allied authorities in the Western zones of occupation of Germany. But the attitude

of the Allied authorities is one thing, the real desire of the German people, or, at least of the population of one or other part of Germany, is another. We Soviet people hold it incorrect to impose any particular solution of this question on the German people. Such imposition would lead to no good anyhow, if only because it would be precarious.

While we must not stand in the way of the German people's legitimate desire to see their state resurrected on democratic lines, it is, on the other hand, our bounden duty to prevent Germany's restoration as an aggressive force. It would be a crime to forget this sacred duty of ours to the peoples of the world.

If the world is to be made safe against possible German aggression, Germany must be completely disarmed, militarily and economically; and as to the Ruhr, it must be placed under inter-Allied control exercised by our four countries, with the object of preventing the revival of war industries in Germany.

The program of complete military and economic disarmament of Germany is not something new. The decisions of the Berlin conference deal with it in detail. And it is natural that the Ruhr, as the main base of Germany's war industry, should be kept under the vigilant control of the principal Allied Powers. The aim of completely disarming Germany militarily and economically should also be served by the reparations plan. The fact that until now no such plan has been drawn up, in spite of the repeated demands of the Soviet Government that the relevant decision of the Berlin conference should be carried out, and the fact that the Ruhr has not been placed under inter-Allied control, on which the Soviet Government insisted a year ago, is a dangerous thing from the point of view of safeguarding future peace and the security of nations. We hold that it is impossible to put off the accomplishment of these tasks

without running the risk of frustrating the decision to effect the complete military and economic disarmament of Germany.

Such is the opinion of the Soviet Government regarding the war industry and war potential of Germany. These considerations cannot hamper the development of Germany's civilian industries.

In order that the development of Germany's civilian industries may benefit other nations that need German coal, metal and manufactured products, Germany should be granted the right to export and import and, if this right to engage in foreign trade is realized, we should not hinder Germany from increasing her output of steel, coal and manufactured products for peaceful needs, naturally within certain bounds, and with the indispensable proviso that inter-Allied control is established over German industry, and over the Ruhr industries in particular.

As we know, the Control Council in Germany recently fixed the level which German industry should attain in the next few years. Germany is still a long way from this level. Nevertheless, it should be recognized now that her civilian industries must be given the opportunity to develop more widely, provided only that this industrial development is really used to satisfy the peaceful needs of the German people and for the promotion of trade with other countries. All this calls for the establishment of proper inter-Allied control over German industry and over the Ruhr industries in particular, responsibility for which cannot rest upon any one Allied country alone.

The adoption of an appropriate program for the development of Germany's peace industries, which will also provide for the development of her foreign trade, as well as the establishment of inter-Allied control over the whole of German industry, is essential for the implementation of

those decisions of the Berlin conference which provide for treating Germany as an economic whole.

It remains for me to dwell on the question of the peace treaty with Germany.

Of course, we are in principle in favour of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. But before concluding such a treaty a single German government must be set up, sufficiently democratic to be able to extirpate all vestiges of fascism in Germany, and sufficiently responsible to be able to fulfil all its obligations towards the Allies, including more particularly those in respect of reparations deliveries to the Allies. It goes without saying that we raise no objection to the setting up of a central German administration as a transitional step towards the establishment of a future German government.

It follows from this that, before talking of a peace treaty with Germany, it is necessary to settle the question of setting up an all-German government. So far, however, not even a central German administration of any kind has been created, although the Soviet Government already urged this a year ago at the Berlin conference. But if at that time consideration of this question was postponed, it is now becoming particularly urgent as the first step towards the establishment of a future German government. But even when a German government has been set up, it will require a number of years before it can be verified what this new German government represents, and whether it can be trusted.

The future German government must be a democratic government which will be capable of extirpating the last vestiges of fascism in Germany, and at the same time capable of fulfilling Germany's obligations towards the Allies. And above all, it must ensure the delivery of reparations to the Allies.

Only when we are satisfied that the new German government is able to cope with these tasks, and is really honestly fulfilling them in practice—only then will it be possible seriously to speak of concluding a peace treaty with Germany. Failing this, Germany cannot claim a peace treaty, and the Allied Powers cannot say they have performed their duty towards the nations who are demanding that durable peace and security be assured.

Such is the view of the Soviet Union on the fundamental problems of Germany and on the question of the peace treaty with Germany.

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# **SPEECHES AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE**

*July-October 1946*



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## SPEECH AT THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

*July 31, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. Permit me to greet the Peace Conference on behalf of the Soviet Union, and to wish the Conference delegates success in their great and responsible work. The Soviet delegation expresses especial appreciation of the hospitable French Government and the friendly people of France.

The present Conference is to play an important part in the work of establishing peace and security in Europe. It will have to express its opinion and to offer its recommendations on the drafts of peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. One might say that the Paris Conference has to accomplish the tasks of five peace conferences, which emphasizes the importance and complexity of its work. We are dealing with five countries which entered the war as Germany's allies, as Hitler's satellites, but which in the course of the war broke with Germany, overthrew their fascist rulers and, as a rule, came out actively on the side of the democratic countries in the war for victory over Hitlerite Germany.

All of us will remember the course of events as they developed before our eyes during the last war in Europe, and this will help us to give a correct answer to the ques-

tion of securing a just, stable and lasting peace for the future.

Justice requires, in the first place, that we should genuinely take account of the interests of the countries which were subjected to attack and suffered as a result of aggression. The Soviet Union, which itself became the object of attack from various directions and bore the exceptionally heavy burden of invasion by the fascist hordes of Germany, as well as of Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Finland, deeply sympathizes with all nations which suffered from aggression.

From this platform the Soviet Union again greets the peoples of the Allied countries who waged a self-sacrificing struggle against our common enemies, and expresses its unshakable desire to render them support in their just demands for the punishment of war criminals, for compensation for damage inflicted on them, for the establishment of a just peace. The Soviet Union cannot regard its obligations to its Allies in any other way.

It should be clear to us that the attacking countries which fought in alliance with Germany should bear responsibility for the crimes of their ruling circles. Aggression and invasion of foreign countries must not go unpunished, if we really desire to prevent new aggressions and invasions. In such cases impunity, and refusal to protect the legitimate rights of the states which suffered from aggression, have nothing in common with the interests of a just and lasting peace, but can only play into the hands of those who are preparing new aggression in their predatory imperialistic interests.

The Soviet Union is one of those countries which work consistently to establish enduring peace and security for the nations. This determines the attitude of the Soviet Government in questions relating to the peace treaties with Ger-

many's former satellites. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. reckons fully with the fact that in the last period of the war, as a result of democratic transformations, the countries which had been allied to Hitler Germany took a new path, and in some cases rendered the Allied states no inconsiderable assistance in the struggle for the complete elimination of the German aggressor. For this reason the Soviet Union recognizes that these states should compensate the damage they caused not in full, but only in part, to a definite and limited extent.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union ~~discountenances~~ all attempts to impose upon Germany's former satellites any form of outside interference in their economic life, and bars such demands on these countries and such pressure on these nations as would be incompatible with their state sovereignty and national dignity. This will be easily seen from a perusal of the texts of the armistice agreements with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, which were published in full directly they were signed. During the past period, on the initiative of the Soviet Government, the terms of the armistice agreements were mitigated in a number of ways, which is explained by a desire to make it easier for these countries to set foot on the path of postwar economic and general national revival: The peace treaties with these countries should also be based on this principle.

It was not accidental that Germany's former satellites were countries of a fascist or semi-fascist type. The Italy of Mussolini, as we know, was part of the Hitler Axis. Rumania and Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland came under the control of Hitler agents ~~who drew these states into war against the democratic~~

The second world war was unleashed ~~by fascism~~, and came to an end only when fascism had been broken and defeated. Now we know that in our times fascism and aggres-

sion have become inseparable. In view of this it is logical that all the peace treaties submitted to the Conference lay special stress on the necessity of preventing a revival of fascism and of consolidating the foundations of democracy in states which were German satellites. In this respect the peace treaties of our times differ substantially from the peace treaties which followed the first world war—which is quite understandable.

It was also understandable that the Declaration on Liberated Europe adopted at the Crimea conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers—Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union—should specially emphasize the necessity “to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism” and to afford the liberated nations the opportunity to create democratic institutions of their own choice. Enduring peace and security cannot be assured unless the last vestiges of fascism, which kindled the second world war, are destroyed. If, however, we still have to deal with the problem of the fascist regime in Spain, the time should not be far off when the democratic countries will be able to help the Spanish people, now groaning under the Franco regime, to put an end to this survival, the creation of Hitler and Mussolini, which endangers the cause of peace. In any case, the interests of all peace-loving nations demand that we carry to a conclusion the struggle against fascism, which is the most dangerous aggressor in our times.

Drafts of five peace treaties have been submitted to this Conference. These drafts were prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers in conformity with the special decision on this subject. As we know, the Council of Foreign Ministers was set up at the Berlin conference last year. This decision was taken on the initiative of the United States of America. The Soviet Government, for its part, favoured this proposal from the very outset. Moreover, the Soviet Government

always recognized that the undeviating and precise implementation of this decision should be regarded not merely as a formal duty of the governments concerned, but as an essential prerequisite of the success of the work of this Council.

It is rightly said that big states should not impose their will on small countries, but this equally applies when powerful states attempt to impose their will on some other big state. Germany's example shows what menace is contained in the unrestrained imperialist striving to commit acts of violence against other nations, and to establish world supremacy. On the other hand, the democratic countries know of methods of cooperation which yielded positive results during the war, as well as after the war. The Council of Foreign Ministers was created for the very purpose of solving problems not by way of some states imposing their will upon other states, but by working out joint decisions and measures.

The drafting of the peace treaties is an illustration of the fact that the Council of Foreign Ministers has achieved definite positive results. We can state this, although we are not at all inclined to think that these drafts reflect fully enough the just aspirations of the Allied peoples. At the same time, however, one cannot ignore the fact that nowadays the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers are not infrequently assailed by all kinds of reactionary elements, who are stuffed with absurd anti-Soviet prejudices and who build their calculations on the disruption of great-Power cooperation. The drafts of the peace treaties submitted to the Conference deal a fresh blow to the exertions of these gentlemen. It is enough to read the proposals contained in the drafts to realize that the democratic countries which prepared them have performed a work which in the main meets the interests of the big and small countries that are anxious

for the promotion of general peace and the security of the nations.

The Conference will have the opportunity for broad discussion of all problems of the peace treaties. The delegations present at our Conference, representing 21 states, have equal rights. Every one of us here has the opportunity freely to state his opinion and express his agreement or disagreement with any part of any peace treaty. It has been ensured that every such opinion will be listened to with due respect; it may be of considerable assistance during the final examination of the draft treaties.

The opinions of the states which were Germany's satellites will also be heard here. The Soviet delegation does not doubt that all of us will listen to the voice of these states, too, with due attention. As a Soviet delegate I have all the more reason to say this, because the Soviet Union has established friendly relations with these countries since the time they broke with the enemy camp, came out against Hitlerism and took the path of democratic transformation and social reform in the interest of the masses.

All this gives us ground to hope for the real success of the work of the Conference in the interests of all peace-loving nations. (*Applause.*)

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## STATEMENT IN THE COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE

*August 5, 1946*

The Soviet delegation thought it necessary to listen to many of the delegates before making its own observations. The representative of the Union of South Africa, who was the first to speak, began his speech with the statement that we are now discussing a question of exceptional importance. This put the Soviet delegation on the alert, in order the more clearly to understand the motives behind such statements.

We are discussing the question of how we should vote at the Conference—by simple majority or by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes. We are thus discussing the question as to who should have the right to speak on behalf of our Conference and to adopt recommendations.

We are naturally interested in what weight these recommendations will have. If the recommendations of the Conference are adopted by a majority of two-thirds rather than a simple majority, it is clear to everyone that its recommendations will carry great weight. It is clear that when the Council of Foreign Ministers takes final decisions as envisaged by the Moscow conference, recommendations adopted by a two-thirds vote will be of greater significance than those adopted by a simple majority. Is it not obvious that

recommendations adopted by eleven votes to ten carry less weight than those adopted by fourteen votes to seven?

Again, let us turn to international practice. We may take the example of the Charter of the United Nations organization. There all decisions except those on procedure have to be passed by a two-thirds majority. This was not an accidental decision. It was passed with the consent of 51 nations. We know the experience of the San Francisco conference, which is the nearest example for us. At this conference decisions were passed by a majority of two-thirds and not by a simple majority. The San Francisco conference also decided that committees discussing amendments to the draft submitted by the four Powers could accept these amendments only by a two-thirds vote and not by a simple majority. Such is the example of the San Francisco conference of 51 nations. Why should we not adhere to this voting procedure which has yielded good results?

The Dutch delegation here moved an amendment suggesting the rejection of the Council of Ministers' proposal for the adoption of recommendations by two-thirds of the votes of the Conference delegates. I have already spoken against this amendment. However, in the course of the work of our Committee a new amendment was proposed by the British delegation.

It does not require long argument to prove that this amendment upsets the decision passed by the four Ministers' Council. Nor is it difficult to see that in essence the British amendment does not differ from the Dutch amendment, which is likewise aimed at upsetting and destroying the proposal of the four Ministers' Council. See what the British delegation's amendment would lead to.

Three weeks ago, in the four Ministers' Council, the British, American, French and Soviet delegates found it necessary to advise the Conference to adopt its recommenda-

tions by a two-thirds majority. Today, however, the British representative proposes that the Conference should adopt recommendations both by a two-thirds majority and by a simple majority. But this is exactly the amendment of the Netherlands delegation, which seeks to upset the decision of the four Ministers' Council.

The Soviet delegation regards the British delegation's amendment as unacceptable because it would destroy the decision for which we voted in the four Ministers' Council, for which the British delegate voted along with the three others. If he deems it possible to speak in the four Ministers' Council in favour of voting by a two-thirds majority at the Conference, while at the Conference itself he comes out with a proposal to vote by simple majority, that is his right. We cannot restrict or criticize his powers. But we can note here that his one stand contradicts the other, that the one destroys the other, that the second does not tally with the first.

Mr. Byrnes came out today with the view that on matters of procedure the American delegation is not bound by the voting in which it took part in the four Ministers' Council. But if today one or another delegation is not bound by its former voting on matters of procedure, why cannot this serve tomorrow as a precedent for some other delegation—and this time not on matters of procedure? After all, it is open to anyone to hold one opinion today and arrive at a different opinion tomorrow. This is the right of every delegation. We cannot, however, pass by the fact that one contradicts the other and one destroys the other. Here, too, we have a contradiction between the stand taken in the four Ministers' Council and the stand taken at the Conference. Such are the facts.

It has been rightly pointed out today that the draft peace treaties contain a whole list of questions on which agreement has not been reached. Every one of the four Ministers retained

his own opinion on these questions. Every one of them will vote on these questions in the way he finds necessary. Clearly, when we discuss a new question, which was not discussed in the Council of Ministers and is raised here by some delegate who did not take part in that Council, the four Ministers have their hands free. I believe, however, that as regards questions on which a certain opinion was agreed upon in the four Ministers' Council, the parties to the agreed proposal have a moral responsibility.

In any case, here is what the Soviet delegation thinks on this point: if in the four Ministers' Council the Soviet delegate voted for some proposal agreed with the three other Ministers, then the Soviet delegate will also cast his vote for this proposal at the Conference. This is how we understand being consistent. A different viewpoint may have any other quality, but it certainly cannot be called consistent.

Mr. Byrnes stated today that he supported the proposal moved by the Canadian delegate at the Conference concerning the desirability of convening the four Ministers' Council during the work of the Conference. This is good. I must say that as far back as July 30, the Soviet delegation proposed to the American delegation that agreement be reached to convene the Council of the four Ministers. Our proposal was rejected. We were told that in the opinion of the American delegation the four Ministers' Council should not meet after the Peace Conference had begun. One cannot, however, help being surprised by the fact that when this proposal was advanced by the Soviet delegation it was found unacceptable, but when the same proposal was moved by the Canadian delegation, Mr. Byrnes found it acceptable.

What then is the actual significance of the question we are now discussing?

I would remind you of the statement of the South African delegate, who said that we are discussing a matter of excep-

tional importance. I am prepared to agree with this opinion. This is why we should remember that world public opinion is closely watching our discussion of this problem, our approach to its examination, the proposals we make and our aims in discussing this problem.

How does public opinion understand the discussion on voting procedure at our Conference? I will recall the statement of the French Socialist newspaper *Populaire*, which wrote:

"As is known, the four Foreign Ministers proposed that decisions on procedure be passed by a simple majority and on main problems by a two-thirds majority. The latter condition naturally places the Anglo-Saxons at a disadvantage, as together with their client states they form a bloc possessing twelve or thirteen votes. Were all decisions to be taken by a simple majority vote, defeat of the Soviet Union would be assured on almost every occasion."

This is how public opinion understands our present discussion, when we are debating whether we should accept the principle of simple majority or the principle of two-thirds majority in the Conference voting. I will not argue that the newspaper counted the votes at the Conference with perfect accuracy, yet I will not close my eyes to the fact that there is a fraction of truth in its statement. And it is not accidental that if you read the French press, or the American, British and Soviet press, or the press of other countries, you will find quite a number of utterances similar to those of *Populaire*.

Indeed if, as *Populaire* says, the Anglo-Saxon bloc has twelve or thirteen reliable votes at this Conference, then acceptance of the principle of a simple majority of eleven votes is very convenient for this particular group. This group need not then work very hard to persuade anyone of the correctness of its views. It just has to do a bit of mobilizing, and a

minimum of twelve votes will accomplish what they are required to do. Thus, this group is guaranteed the adoption of any proposal at the Conference, even though it is absolutely unacceptable to nearly half the delegates. Of course, if one has even twelve votes and not thirteen, when only eleven votes are needed for a simple majority, then why exert oneself to persuade anybody, why attempt to prove the correctness of one's proposal, that the proposal is really well-founded?

It so happened, however, that when the Council of Foreign Ministers proposed that the recommendations of the Conference be passed by a two-thirds majority and not by a simple majority, there arose a complication. To have a recommendation accepted by a two-thirds vote, fourteen votes are needed. But how be sure of fourteen votes when one has only twelve or thirteen, when one or two votes are lacking? This one or maybe two missing votes is evidently the cause of so many objections being raised against the two-thirds majority recommendation of the four Ministers' Council.

The South African delegate said the question under discussion was one of exceptional importance. Public opinion, however, gets the impression that the whole thing centres around the one vote lacked by the group which the *Populaire* calls the Anglo-Saxon bloc—it appears to have twelve or thirteen votes, and one vote is lacking to secure a two-thirds majority. How, then, can one agree to a two-thirds majority when one vote is lacking for this?

This is the situation one gets if one pursues a group policy instead of striving to make our decisions as far as possible unanimous. This is what the "voting game" leads to. This is evidently how public opinion interprets the situation which was frankly described by *Populaire*, and not by that newspaper alone. For the overwhelming majority of the people who make up democratic public opinion it

will be incomprehensible and wholly unacceptable if we follow this path.

Instead of playing the “voting game,” which is impermissible in a democratic world, let us face the facts.

There are nine countries that suffered most from attack by Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, nine countries which were invaded by enemy troops of these states. I will enumerate them: the three Soviet states represented here, then France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece and Ethiopia. These are the nine states whose territories were invaded by troops of one or another of the states for which we are now drafting peace treaties. You understand what may happen if recommendations are adopted here by a simple majority. It may happen that these nine countries, although they suffered most of all, although they bore the heaviest burden, although they have the right to be listened to with special attention at this Conference, may find themselves in a minority. If decisions are taken by a simple majority, these countries may be simply isolated. If we are to vote twelve states against nine, all these states, which are most interested in the given peace treaties, may find themselves in a minority and still the recommendations will be adopted. What, then, will be the value of such recommendations in the eyes of world opinion? Whereas if a two-thirds majority is accepted, this cannot happen.

We must agree that even if we accept the proposal for a simple majority vote we may get such a “voting game,” as, far from enhancing the prestige of the Conference, may lead to very objectionable political results. That is why, when it is said here that the question we are discussing is of extreme significance, we should not merely think of how we shall cast our vote—in one combination of votes or in a different combination. We should reckon with the political consequences of this voting.

The Peace Conference should serve the interests of peace, and not some other purpose. What we should strive for is that the interests of peace, resting upon the maximum promotion of unity possible in our time among allies, at least among those who were allies during the war and who honestly wish to be in one democratic camp during peace—that precisely the interests of peace should dictate the decisions on important questions, in particular on the principle of voting at the Conference.

There is no point in concealing that differences do exist among us. The American delegate was right in pointing out that of unagreed questions alone, twenty-six still remain in the peace treaties. Hence we shall have a rather big job discussing merely the unagreed questions. There will also be not a few new questions which we shall have to examine.

But look what happens. Even decisions which were agreed in the four Ministers' Council, as, for instance, those dealing with the question of procedure, are being upset by certain members of the Council. Even questions upon which we were agreed, and on which agreed opinions were reached after long discussion—even as regards these questions things are not quite smooth, and even these decisions do not stand firmly on their feet.

It however seems to some of the delegates that if recommendations at the Conference are adopted by a majority of two-thirds and not by a simple majority, then there will not crop up all sorts of differences at the Conference, and the Conference will have few points of divergence with the Council of Foreign Ministers. But the one conclusion to be drawn from this is: look for a rift among the four Ministers, try to creep into it and widen it. And that is what the "voting game" leads to. But is that what we want? Let us hope that no one is interested in this nor desires it.

We should remember that when it is a question, after the hardest of wars, of contributing to the cause of peace, not by professions but by our work, then we should be as unanimous as possible in this matter. If we wish to take into account the nations on whose behalf we are speaking, we must think not of playing a "voting game" at the cost of the interests of peace, but of the real interests of peace.

Of course, there are today people who speculate on a new war. There are adventurers who proclaim it their aim to bring about a third world war. Yes, there exist such wretched and despicable people. They are the scum of their nations. In any event, they are people isolated from their nations, not to speak of the fact that their adventurist aspirations and their talk about a third world war contradict the aspirations of all the peace-loving peoples. That is why, discussing here the best ways of organizing the work of the Peace Conference, we should be concerned in the first place for the interests of peace, be concerned that our decisions and the entire procedure of our work shall contribute to the interests of peace and to the consolidation of our unity. All those who speculate on a new world war should be put in their proper place, in the pillory, and be completely isolated in the eyes of the whole world.

With these high aims before it, and concerned to secure a firm and lasting peace on the basis of enhanced unanimity among the democratic states, the Soviet delegation is in favour of our deciding upon such a voting procedure at this Conference as will correspond with this aim, the aim of enhancing unanimity at our Conference. It should be remembered that playing the "voting game" may lead to playing with the interests of peace, which we should not permit.

The Soviet delegation has listened attentively to the observations made here and believes that the considerations voiced should be taken into account.

In view of this, the Soviet delegation proposes an addition to the decision passed by the Council of Ministers. Here is this addition:—

"If the recommendation proposed fails to receive two-thirds of the votes, the states which voted for this proposal may refer it to the Council of Ministers, in which the said proposal will be examined."

This means that recommendations put forward in the name of the Conference should be adopted by two-thirds of the votes, but that the views which receive less than two-thirds of the votes should also be heard in the Council of Foreign Ministers as the views of the states concerned.

It would be highly desirable if this proposal were to unite us. This would meet the interests of our Conference and of the consolidation of peace.

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## REPLY TO THE SPEECH OF MR. BYRNES ON THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

*Made in the Committee on Procedure*

*August 6, 1946*

### 1. THE CONFERENCE AND THE COUNCIL OF FOUR MINISTERS

Mr. Byrnes' speech was militant and somewhat angry. I believe that the best way of replying to a speech of this kind will be to refer to facts. Then we shall be able to study the situation and to judge it calmly and objectively.

Mr. Byrnes said that, beginning with Potsdam, the Soviet Government has always sought to restrict in one way or another the participation of other countries in the examination of international problems. I shall reply by citing the facts.

I would remind you that the proposal to form the Council of Foreign Ministers, which is an important organ of international activity, was made at Potsdam by the American delegation. The composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers was accepted exactly as was proposed by Mr. Byrnes, and during all this time no one has proposed any enlargement of this body, which to my mind is quite understandable.

It is said, however, that the Soviet Union advocated a too stringent limitation of the number of participants in the Peace Conference. Indeed, a proposal was made on this subject which defined more precisely the composition of the

Conference. We quite easily reached agreement that 21 states should be represented at the present Conference. World public opinion also approved of this decision. What, then, is Mr. Byrnes after when he reproaches the Soviet delegation on the ground that the composition of the Peace Conference is too restricted?

True, a broader composition of the Peace Conference was proposed: it was to comprise representatives of practically all the states which declared war. Then it would have been necessary to supplement the list of 21 states by states which had at some time proclaimed a state of war with Italy, such as Haiti, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Salvador, the Philippines. I have enumerated ten countries. There are some more countries in this group.

Of course there would have been more participants at the Conference if the representatives of even these ten states had been added. Then, perhaps, in adopting the voting procedure, two-thirds, and even three-quarters, would have been agreed to. I must admit, however, that the Soviet delegation has never considered proposals of this kind for the expansion of the present Conference as ideal. Incidentally, no one at this Conference has expressed regret in connection with the number of its participants.

There is another question—that of convening meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers during the Conference. What are the facts? The Soviet delegation proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should meet, among other things, for an exchange of views on the election of the chairman of our Committee. Is there anything in this that would have hindered the work of the Conference or that of our Committee?

It is said that in the four Ministers' Council the Soviet delegation insisted on a preliminary discussion of the main

questions of procedure. This was indeed so, and the other three Ministers agreed to it. Some rules of procedure were elaborated, and they have been submitted for your consideration. Yet even on the rules of procedure which were elaborated we have been talking and talking for more than a week and we still cannot get down to the main questions of the Conference. And if these rules had not been elaborated? Far more time would then have gone on the discussion of the rules of procedure.

Is it right to say that the rules of procedure proposed by the Council of four Ministers are a kind of dictate, as was asserted here? Certainly not. This is a normal method of work and of international cooperation. When we proposed that the four Ministers' Council should be convened during the Conference, we regarded, and still regard, this proposal as justified and useful both for the Conference and for the Ministers who prepared it. If our proposal to discuss certain questions concerning the Conference was unacceptable to the American or any other delegation, they could have proposed that the four Ministers' Council should be convened to discuss other questions concerning the Conference—but this was not done.

It required Mr. King's speech at the Conference to remind us that a Council of Foreign Ministers does exist, that it is not deprived of the right of meeting or of the right to exchange views on matters concerning the Conference. I repeat that in my opinion it is useful for the Council of Ministers to meet during the Conference.

## 2. THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURE AND THE FACTS

Mr. Byrnes further said that the rules of procedure were adopted in the four Ministers' Council with certain reservations on the part of individual Ministers. Nevertheless, Messrs.

Delegates, you received the draft rules of procedure before the Conference began. What you had therefore were definite proposals of the Council of four Ministers.

I wish to point out that the unanimity of the four Ministers on questions of procedure continued until the opening of the Conference. But as soon as the discussion started in the Conference Committee, various reservations which were made during the preliminary stage of discussion were recalled.

But the fact remains: the proposal on procedure was submitted by the four Ministers as a unanimous proposal, yet at the Conference we have one pulling one way and the other pulling another. Only the Soviet and French delegations continued to defend the agreed proposal on procedure. As to the American and British delegates, they recalled reservations they had made before the procedure was adopted. A somewhat ambiguous situation arises: they agreed with the proposal on procedure, and nevertheless they believe themselves entitled to speak against this procedure. I decline to say whether this is consistent or not. Judge for yourselves on the basis of the facts.

It is said that the Soviet delegation itself proposed an amendment to the rules of procedure on the subject of voting. Indeed, after the British and American delegations had proposed their amendments to the voting rules, and only after that, we did make a proposal—but it is of a kind that is self-understood and does not upset agreed decisions. But if there are objections to it, we do not want to force it upon anyone and are prepared to consider it and to agree how matters can best be arranged.

At any rate, it is by no means the purpose of our proposal to upset decisions taken jointly. The purpose of the Soviet delegation is not to allow the annulment of decisions jointly taken. Therefore we propose no amendments on the subject

of the recommendations, that is, on the question on which there exists an agreed opinion of the four Ministers. But when we are told that at the Conference new problems arise, or amendments which have not been discussed previously and in regard to which the four Ministers are therefore not bound by a preliminary decision, we agree that it is necessary to discuss them in the ordinary way.

Mr. Byrnes stated at the four Ministers' Council that he intended to propose that representatives of the press should have wide access to the Conference and to its Committees. The Council of four Ministers did not record its opinion on this problem, mainly because the question was clear. When Mr. Byrnes made this proposal here, we all supported him, and the question was settled very simply. In this, as well as in other questions on which no proposals previously agreed upon by the four Ministers have been submitted to the Conference, the Ministers are not bound by any restrictions.

The Soviet delegation listens most attentively to the opinions of all delegates at the Conference. Everything that may prove useful in improving the work of the Conference, and that does not contradict agreed decisions, the Soviet delegation is prepared to consider attentively, providing it conforms to the aims of the Conference and to the interests of peace.

When Dr. Evatt says, as he did, that it must be candidly stated that if the two-thirds majority rule were adopted, the Conference would not be able to pass any decision with which the Soviet Union disagreed, we can only thank Dr. Evatt for his frankness. True, his statement seems to me unfounded. But if anybody wants to push through decisions against the Soviet Union and is looking for ways of facilitating this, certainly we cannot be his abettors in it. We believe no good will come of it. It would be more correct to put one's questions openly, to try to prove the correctness of one's proposals and as far as possible to convince all delegates, and

not some kindred group or other. This is the method we have adhered to heretofore and will adhere to in future.

I shall not dwell on all the details of Mr. Byrnes' speech, but I must say that this is not the first time the Soviet delegation finds itself in this sort of a position: a decision is adopted one day in agreement with other governments, and the next we have to defend it practically alone. We have had quite a few instances of this kind.

We do not conceal from anybody that we are seeking to secure that governments should work in concord on agreed decisions they have adopted. This is by no means in our interest alone, in the interest only of the U.S.S.R. We believe that it is in the interest also of other governments which shared in the agreed decisions. More, we believe that the representatives of all the 21 states present here, as well as other states which desire stable and lasting peace, are interested in concord among the great Powers. Only then shall we be able to draw the appropriate lessons from the war which we have just passed through, as well as useful lessons from the policies of governments of the period which preceded the war and which led to the second world war. These lessons should not be lost on us.

One should not strive to gain some advantage from a combination of votes at some or other meeting at the given moment, but should regard it as one's duty to support agreed decisions not only in words but in deeds, and to learn to work together, in order to contribute to the success of the Peace Conference and to the consolidation of peace. We hope that no one will object to this; and we, for our part, if it is necessary, do not decline the honour of defending this policy more firmly, consistently and constantly.

If sometimes we observe vacillation and attempts to depart from agreed decisions—and this is now a not infrequent occurrence—we still believe that in the process of work we

shall learn to collaborate in the manner expected by those whom we represent, in the manner expected by public opinion in the democratic countries.

### 3. WHAT THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH PRESS LACKS

One final remark. Mr. Byrnes suggested, in a tone amounting almost to a challenge, that his speech be published in the Soviet press. In doing so he stated that Molotov's speech of yesterday had already been published in the American press. But here before me is today's issue of the American newspaper *New York Herald Tribune*. It does not contain my speech. The facts do not bear out the statement that the American press has published this speech. Yet this newspaper has already extensively criticized that speech and, as we see, has done so before publishing the speech itself.

Does Mr. Byrnes suggest that the Soviet newspapers act on the basis of reciprocity in publishing his speech? If we are to act on the basis of reciprocity, we must advise the Soviet press to publish criticism of Mr. Byrnes' speech without publishing the speech itself.

Of course this would be wrong. The Soviet delegation holds a different view. We accept Mr. Byrnes' suggestion. We shall publish his speech, and let the Soviet people read this speech just as we have heard it here. But when it is proclaimed here by some that their press is free, if you please, and that everything about it is splendid, some perfectly legitimate questions are likely to arise.

Not a little material is available for a correct characterization of the leading American press. We might refer, for instance, to the book of the American, George Seldes, "The Facts Are," and to a number of other books in which one can find quite a lot that is useful on this subject.

However, there also arise questions like the following: Are there not very rich newspaper trusts in America which have important American press organs in their grip? Have not many of us heard that in the United States, alongside of objective organs of the press, there are powerful monopolies which control the most widely circulated press organs, which set the tone and so heavily standardize the political information published in American newspapers? Have we not heard of these powerful trusts, of these powerful monopolists, of the two or three virtual bosses of the American press we know so well?

Turning to the British press, which in some respects not infrequently resembles the American press, I shall refer to the recently published statement of one very prominent British public figure and to what he has to say of the situation in this field. I have in mind the report made by Reuters a few days ago of a statement by the British Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, who recently returned from Nuremberg and stated on July 30 that every newspaper in Britain ought to publish on its front page the statement: "This paper is owned by Lord So-and-So. Its object is to make commercial profit and to express the personal opinions which his lordship is pleased to hold from time to time. No guarantee is given that the facts reported in it are the truth or the whole truth. They may be anything but the truth."

Shawcross added: "I fear that suggestion will not commend itself." He further said: "What I condemn . . . is what is in fact now occurring in a notorious section of the Tory press—the selection or misrepresentation of facts to suit opinions, the expression of opinions disguised as facts. I think these things do seriously impede our democratic machinery of government. The important thing in modern democracy is that it should be based on informed opinion. And the ex-

istence of informed opinion depends largely not only on a free press but on an objective, honest press."

As you see, Sir Hartley Shawcross is longing for an objective and honest press in England, and one cannot help sympathizing with him. Evidently the British Attorney-General had serious grounds, if he was forced to make a public statement of this kind.

Indeed, there exists a Labour newspaper, the *Daily Herald*. It has been in existence for about 40 years, that is, it was founded long before a Labour Government in England came into being. But this newspaper stands alone. It is the only Labour daily newspaper in Great Britain. The bulk of the British press belongs to the Conservative Party. The Labour Government has only one Labour daily behind it, although a year ago the Labour Party received two-thirds of the votes of the British electorate. This is one of the important factors explaining why Sir Hartley Shawcross longs for an objective and honest press. The significance of such facts is clear to every one of us.

Therefore the Soviet delegation is in full sympathy with the idea that we should treat the press and its personnel with the utmost attention and consideration, and that we should endeavour to help it be objective and honest, since this is necessary in the interest of general peace. And everything in this respect that lies within the power of the Soviet side, it is prepared to do.

## SPEECH ON PROCEDURE AT THE PLENARY MEETING

*August 8, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. The Soviet delegation agrees with the draft rules of procedure submitted by the Committee, with the exception of one point: the Soviet delegation does not agree with the Committee's decision that the Conference should adopt its recommendations by a simple majority and not by a two-thirds majority, as was proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Soviet delegation cannot consent to recommendations being adopted at the Conference by a majority of one vote—to eleven delegations imposing their proposals upon the ten other delegations. The Soviet delegation believes this decision to be erroneous and insists on a revision of this erroneous decision of the Committee.

### 1. VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL RULES

Voting procedure at an international conference is a highly important matter. The Conference will be called upon to state its view on many serious questions. It is impermissible that these questions be decided by a majority of one vote. One must be either very naive or very inexperienced in

international affairs to advocate such a voting procedure at the Peace Conference.

The Soviet delegation feels compelled to recall certain elementary things. Everyone knows that at international conferences and consultations it is regarded as a guiding principle to strive to achieve unanimity among all participants. Nor could it be otherwise when it is a matter of having several or many sovereign states arrive at a common opinion. Of course, it is not such a simple matter to achieve mutual understanding and to coordinate the opinions of the 21 states represented at this Peace Conference. But seeing that we have gathered together at the Peace Conference, we should aim at unanimity, at the achievement of mutual understanding and at reasonable concessions to each other's point of view; and we must realize that no good results in the solution of international problems can be reached otherwise.

Both big and small states are represented here. In order to prepare recommendations agreed among them, due regard must be shown to the opinion of every one of them, big or small. The small states are especially interested in this, since not infrequently great Powers impose their will upon them to the point of maintaining troops in their territory in order to exert pressure on negotiations and to dictate their will to the small countries.

But, of course, this method is not applicable at the Paris Conference. Consequently we should seek normal ways of achieving unanimity at our Conference and not indulge in a policy of pressure or in the method of overriding one part of the delegations with the help of the majority vote of another.

The normal rules of international conferences are well known. It is customary at such conferences to strive to achieve unanimity, even if this should require no small effort to convince each other and to reach an agreed opinion acceptable to the members of the conference.

It is well known that not infrequently the principle of unanimity in adopting all decisions has been and is applied in international organizations. We also know that the United Nations Charter says that a two-thirds majority is needed for the adoption of important decisions in the Assembly, while in the Security Council, in addition, the unanimity of the five great Powers is needed.

At all the conferences of the great Powers which were held during the war and the world-wide significance of which is known, quite a number of decisions were adopted, and all these decisions were adopted only by mutual agreement. In the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was set up at the Berlin conference and whose mission it is to work for the establishment of enduring peace, the entire work is likewise carried out on the basis of complete unanimity. Only very shortsighted people can think that it is possible to achieve useful results in international affairs without heeding the aim of achieving unanimity among the countries concerned.

The Soviet delegation is compelled to recall these elementary things. Nor will it in future renounce the honour of upholding the necessity of achieving unanimity in the settlement of international problems, and it considers it impermissible to deviate from this principle. This is how we understand the interests of democratic countries, the interests of big and small states, the interests of those millions of common people, as they are called, who by their heroism and at the price of their blood brought us victory, and who are now patiently waiting to see whether we are capable of fighting for the establishment of enduring peace.

## 2. ERRORS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE

The Council of Foreign Ministers submitted to the Peace Conference its proposal regarding voting procedure at the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the Committees. With regard to the voting at the plenary meetings of the Conference, the proposal was as follows:

"Decisions of the Conference on questions of procedure shall be adopted by a majority of votes. Decisions on all other questions and recommendations shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the votes."

It took quite some time at the Council of Foreign Ministers to reach this agreed opinion, upon which, I will not conceal, the Soviet delegation especially insisted. From the text just quoted you will see that the Council of Foreign Ministers proposed that the Conference should observe the two-thirds majority principle in the voting on all essential questions and recommendations at the plenary meetings of the Conference.

In spite of this, the British delegation moved a new proposal in the Procedure Committee on the question of voting at the plenary meetings of the Conference. This proposal, to which objections were raised by a number of the delegations, has been adopted by the Committee. Here is the text of the decision adopted by the Committee:—

"Recommendations of the Plenary Conference will be of two kinds:

- (1) recommendations adopted by a two-thirds majority
- (2) those which received more than one-half but less than two-thirds of the votes of the members of the Conference. Both types of recommendation are to be referred to the consideration of the Council of Foreign Ministers."

Thus the Committee's proposal is that decisions which were adopted, not by two-thirds of the votes but only by a

simple majority, should also be regarded as recommendations of the Conference. This would annul the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers that the Conference should adopt its recommendations by a two-thirds majority. It would be enough for 11 delegations out of the 21 to vote for this or that proposal and it would become a recommendation of the Conference, although 10 other delegations objected to it. Thus one delegation out of the 21 present here can invest proposals with the character of recommendations of the entire Conference. As if recommendations of such a kind could carry serious weight at the Conference itself or with public opinion in the democratic countries! The Soviet delegation believes that those who view matters in such a light will be greatly disillusioned.

We all know that the recommendations of the Conference are not obligatory for the Council of Foreign Ministers. On the other hand, we all recognize the usefulness of having the Conference make such recommendations and thus help the final preparation of the peace treaties. Everyone realizes that recommendations unanimously adopted by the Conference will carry great weight with each one of us and with international public opinion.

In insisting on having recommendations adopted by at least two-thirds of the votes, the Soviet delegation was concerned, not so much with the number of votes cast, as with the desire to see that the method of voting itself should contribute to the working out of unanimous Conference recommendations. In this lies the political meaning of the proposal of the Council of four Ministers, which recommended the adoption of the rule that essential questions and recommendations shall require a two-thirds majority.

The decision adopted by the Procedure Committee upsets this proposal. It ignores the necessity of striving for

unanimous decisions. It helps those who are not anxious to achieve unanimous and, consequently, authoritative decisions. The Procedure Committee made a crude error in pronouncing in favour of the proposal that the Conference should adopt a recommendation even by a majority of one vote. Such recommendations cannot have any authority and can only muddle the entire work of the Conference. If the Conference approves this erroneous proposal of the Procedure Committee it will undermine the authority of the recommendations it adopts. Those who value the authority of the Conference and its recommendations cannot vote for this proposal of the Procedure Committee.

Why did the Procedure Committee make this error? How was it that such an obviously erroneous proposal was adopted by the Procedure Committee, in spite of all the warnings of a number of delegations?

The responsibility for this situation rests with the British delegation, which moved this proposal, and with the American delegation, which so actively supported this decision in the Procedure Committee. The British and American delegations united to get this decision carried through in the Procedure Committee. They evidently hoped to ensure that the Conference would adopt the recommendations they desired, but they permitted themselves to be carried too far by such considerations. They even ignored the fact that in the Council of Foreign Ministers they had given their consent to the adoption of recommendations by a two-thirds majority. They refer to all sorts of reservations they had made when this decision was adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers. But what significance can any reservations have, when the voting procedure submitted to the Conference was agreed to by the four Foreign Ministers? Reservations could refer only to those questions which had not been agreed or had not been discussed in the Council of the four Ministers. Other-

wise, it amounts to the right hand not knowing what the left hand does.

The British and American delegations could have refrained in the Council of the four Ministers from giving their consent to such or such proposals on the voting procedure of the Conference. Nor did they, in fact, give their consent right away. But after a prolonged discussion an agreed decision was adopted in the Council of the four Ministers; nevertheless at the Peace Conference both these delegations have repudiated this agreed decision and reverted to their original proposal that recommendations of the Conference should be adopted by a simple majority.

### 3. THE ERROR MUST BE RECTIFIED

But what matters in the final analysis is not that the British or American delegation is in an ambiguous position. Things are even worse now; the mistake of the British and American delegations has resulted in an erroneous decision being taken by the Procedure Committee, and the latter is recommending the Conference to approve its erroneous decision. The point is now to protect the Conference from making the same mistake as was made in the Procedure Committee.

How could this mistake have occurred? Does the British or the American delegation really prefer to vote as part of a simple majority rather than as part of two-thirds of the delegations at the Conference? I do not think so.

The Soviet delegation believes that all would like to adopt decisions not only by a two-thirds majority but unanimously—would like our decisions to be adopted as the thoroughly considered opinion agreed upon by all of us, and that this opinion should carry due weight. But Dr. Evatt, the Aus-

tralian representative, takes a different view of the matter. He explained why he had supported the British and American delegations in upsetting the decision of the Council of the four Ministers that recommendations should be adopted by a two-thirds majority. Speaking in the Procedure Committee, he said:

"Let us assume there is a draft amendment proposed by one country. The Soviet Union disagrees with this amendment. It will be quite impossible to get a two-thirds majority for that draft amendment. That is quite clear."

Dr. Evatt did not disclose the basis of his calculations. He only hinted at it, refusing to show his cards. For him the most important thing is to ensure the most convenient way of carrying through at the Conference recommendations to which the Soviet Union does not agree. He does not hope that two-thirds of the votes can be obtained in favour of recommendations directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. This is why he is so active at the Conference in his efforts to have it adopt recommendations by a simple majority.

Certain public circles understood Dr. Evatt perfectly well. On the day following the decision of the Procedure Committee certain Paris newspapers supported Dr. Evatt with great gusto. Yesterday the newspaper *Cité Soir* said: "The Western Powers gained the upper hand over the U.S.S.R." The newspaper *Etoile du Soir* and some others write in a similar vein.

That is the way the decision of the Procedure Committee on the voting question is understood, and the Conference delegates cannot ignore this.

Yet, the Soviet delegation does not believe that the purpose of the Peace Conference is that a particular Power or a particular bloc of Powers might gain the upper hand over the U.S.S.R. or any other state. More, at the Peace Conference

all the great Powers taken together must not gain the upper hand over any one, not only big but even small, state. If anyone should nevertheless try to adopt such a course, he will certainly fail in the attempt and cause political harm to his own state in the first place, as well as to the authority of the Peace Conference.

You know that when it was necessary to fight our common enemies, the U.S.S.R. was not in the last ranks among the Allies. The Soviet Union is proud of the fact that it saved European civilization from the fascist barbarians. The Soviet Union is proud of the fact that it liberated no small number of European states from the fascists' clutches and helped states in whose capitals only yesterday Hitler's lackeys were still installed to adopt the path of democratic development, helped to raise the banner of liberty and national resurgence throughout Europe. The Soviet Union made untold sacrifices in this struggle. Seven million lives—such are the losses of my country. The Red Army's services, and the incalculable losses suffered by the Soviet Union entitle us to recall here that the voice of the Soviet Union, as well as the voices of other democratic countries urging the greatest possible unanimity in international problems, deserves to be hearkened to.

Now, when we have won the victory, and when it is our bounden duty to work for the establishment of enduring peace, attempts to set a majority of the Conference against a minority can lead to no good. They will not find a favourable response on the part of democratic public opinion, but will only undermine the authority of the Conference, which all of us should treasure.

The Soviet delegation takes this opportunity to insist that the error made by the Procedure Committee should be rectified. A mistake can be corrected if there is still time. But a mistake can also be aggravated, by persisting in the wrong

course. The Procedure Committee made a gross mistake which may injure the prestige of the Conference. The Soviet delegation proposes that this mistake be corrected and that the international authority of the Paris Conference be thus upheld.

The Soviet delegation moves that the recommendation of the Procedure Committee on the voting question be rejected and that the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers on this question be approved.

## ITALY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

*Speech at the Plenary Meeting*

*August 13, 1946*

We have heard Signor De Gasperi's speech concerning the draft peace treaty with Italy. If this speech correctly reflects the policy of the new Italy, then it deserves attention, both for what it said and for what it avoided saying. In any case, this speech, which was directed against the draft peace treaty and which may occasion considerable perplexity, cannot be left unanswered.

### I

#### OUR ATTITUDE TO ITALY

The Soviet Union's view on Italy can be set forth very briefly. I hope that this view will coincide with the views of many of the delegates here.

Everyone is aware of Italy's historic services. Italy has held an outstanding place both in the history of the remote past and in modern history. Her culture and national liberation movement, and the high creative abilities of the Italian people have always been universally recognized. We Soviet people are confident of Italy's future as a great country. We do not doubt that the great Italian people will extricate itself

from the present difficulties, and will really take the broad road of national rebirth and progress worthy of a great and free Italy.

Here at this Peace Conference we are above all interested in Italy's status among the nations of Europe. Of especial importance is the extent to which she will be able to play the role of a substantial factor in the establishment of friendship with other nations and in safeguarding peace in Europe. We know that after the first world war Italy took a different path. The Italy of Mussolini proclaimed a program of imperialist expansion and gave herself over to the seizure of foreign territories, feeding her appetites at the expense of small nations—Albania, Ethiopia. Fascist Italy became a bulwark of the Hitlerite Axis in Europe and then, together with Germany and Japan and under the false flag of the anti-Comintern Pact, joined in the adventurist plans of the German and Japanese imperialists, who were striving for world supremacy. On fascist Italy lies the grave guilt for the war of conquest in alliance with Hitler Germany, for the predatory aggression against Albania and Ethiopia, as well as for the bloody assault on Yugoslavia and Greece and for the inglorious invasion of France and the Soviet Union.

It was only after the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad and the successful offensive of the Anglo-American troops in North Africa and Southern Italy that the fascist regime collapsed and Italy began to readjust herself on democratic lines. From that moment it became possible for Italy to transform herself from a hotbed of aggression into an important factor for stable peace in Europe.

As a result of the defeat of Germany and her fascist allies, great changes have come about in Europe. The Allied states now have the opportunity of directing the development of Germany along democratic lines, and of preventing her re-

vival as a new aggressive force. Still more does this apply to Italy.

This does not mean that the Italian Republic must become a weak, second-rate European state. Nor does it mean that Italy must lose her significance as an important political factor in the Mediterranean. There is at present a tendency on the part of some great Powers to gain a monopoly position in the Mediterranean and to push not only Italy, but also France—both major Mediterranean Powers—into the background. Such a situation cannot conduce to the development of friendly relations among the European states, nor can it further enduring peace in Europe. Not only France but Italy, too, must have assurance of her status as a Mediterranean state.

Fascist Italy, which based her well-being on expansion and the annexation of small states, discredited herself in the eyes of the peoples, and collapsed. The new Italy, if she strives to achieve national progress by means of the all-round development of her internal forces, and to establish friendly relations with her neighbours and all peace-loving countries, ought to have the active support of all democratic states. And can one doubt that the Italian Republic will then grow to be a strong and powerful factor for peace and progress in Europe?

It is not easy for the new Italy to rise firmly to her feet immediately after the overthrow of fascism. For this she must radically transform her whole political life, in order to become a progressive democratic republic; she must overcome the existing economic sabotage of the forces hostile to a democratic Italy; she must reorganize educational work among the broad mass of the people, among whom reactionary forces, in alliance with the remnants of fascism, are stubbornly clinging to their positions, changing their colours and adapting themselves to the new situation. Italy cannot be-

come a democratic republic unless she extirpates every last vestige of fascism and fascist ideology. This task has not yet been accomplished by far; one must remember that for over two decades fascism poisoned the minds of the Italian people, employing every means of material and spiritual influence for the purpose.

## II

### DE GASPERI'S DECLARATION AND OLD ANNEXATIONIST CLAIMS

Signor De Gasperi's speech does not in any way supply an adequate answer to questions which arise in connection with the peace treaty for Italy. This speech constitutes an attempt to evade the fundamental problem of the revival of Italy as a democratic state, and does not reflect any desire whatever to repudiate and condemn the aggressive policy of fascist imperialism.

The head of the Italian delegation had no words of condemnation for fascism, which brought Italy into her present grave plight. One might think that Italy had already eliminated every vestige of fascism and may forget the anti-democratic legacy left behind by fascism. Nor did his speech contain a single word of condemnation of the adventurist foreign policy of Mussolini's government, which caused tremendous calamities to Italy's neighbours and other nations and laid a heavy burden of guilt upon Italy.

There is no need to dwell here in detail on the speech of the head of the Italian delegation. Yet we cannot pass over the fact that his speech was to a large extent aimed at defending the annexationist claims of the old Italy, rather than at upholding the true national interests and vital needs of his people.

You have heard Signor De Gasperi concentrate on defending Italy's claim to the western part of the Julian March, together with Trieste city. Inflaming passions around this question, he has demonstrated how remote the foreign policy aspirations of the present leaders of Italy still are from a truly democratic foreign policy. Fascist Italy clung by her teeth to the Slav territory of the Julian March which she had seized, and sought to push her expansion farther east; yet the head of the Italian delegation at this Conference could not but understand that these annexationist tendencies consort ill with the actual possibilities of the present moment. This may explain why he did not claim the whole of the Julian March but only its western part, including the entire western coast of Istria, where the main cities and ports of the Istrian Peninsula are located.

Speaking in the name of the new Italy, the head of the delegation once again championed the claims of the old, imperialist Italy, and so proved that it is not easy for the Italian Government in practice to adopt a really new, a really democratic foreign policy.

Down to the end of the first world war the Istrian Peninsula and the city of Trieste never belonged to Italy. In the division of booty after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy received the Peninsula of Istria, despite the fact that Slovenes and Croats had always formed the bulk of the population. Thus a grave mistake was committed in regard to Yugoslavia, from whom territories with an ancient Slav population were separated and, without any justification whatever, transferred to Italy. Whereas before the first world war Istria, with her Slovene and Croatian population, was under the yoke of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, after the first world war Slav Istria fell under the yoke of fascist Italy.

Furthermore, the Italian authorities did everything they

could to enlarge the Italian part of the population of Trieste, in order to make use of the capital city of Istria, as well as of other towns, as a means of establishing their dominion over the entire Istrian Peninsula, with its Slav population. This policy did not differ essentially from the German Drang nach Osten policy, from the German policy of seizing Slav territories. We know from history that Germany strove to expand eastwards, seizing Slav lands and Germanizing Slav populations. The same policy of seizing Slav lands was pursued by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Nor was fascist Italy willing to lag behind them in this respect.

We are also aware of the consequences of this. Having seized Istria, fascist Italy, in conjunction with Germany, made use of this territory for the attack on Yugoslavia during the last war. Such are the facts of the case.

The head of the Italian delegation found nothing better than to come forward at this Conference with a claim, if not to the whole, at least to the most important part of Istria—the entire western coast. His references to the ethnical factor, and to the circumstance that Italians form the majority of the population of some of the coastal towns of Istria, certainly provide no warrant whatever for cutting off part of Slav Istria from Yugoslavia and giving it to Italy.

The head of the Italian delegation made his claims to western Istria and Trieste the focal point of his speech. But we cannot recognize these claims as the voice of a new, democratic Italy. No, quite the contrary. This is a mere repetition of Italy's old annexationist claims to foreign lands, to lands that have been Slav from time immemorial.

To repeat old claims, to champion imperialist traditions, is not to march in step with the new times. The days are

gone when Slav lands were spoils to be divided among European Powers, when Slav peoples groaned under the yoke of western and eastern conquerors. Today, we know, the Slav nations have found their place in the ranks of the Allied states, and state life in all the Slav countries is being built on progressive democratic principles.

Among the Slav and non-Slav states, Yugoslavia holds a glorious place as a heroic fighter in the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition. That Yugoslavia suffered the extremely heavy weight of German and Italian occupation and bore enormous sacrifices in the struggle against our common enemies everyone is aware. In these circumstances, it cannot be doubted that Yugoslavia's claim to Istria, with its Slovene and Croatian population, is as well-founded as Italy's claim to Istria, or to part of it, is ill-founded. If certain Italian politicians have not realized this until now, it only proves how tenacious the old annexationist traditions are in quarters where we would like to see a really new, really democratic foreign policy of the Italian Republic.

It is likewise clear that were the new Italy also to take this path, the path of forcible annexation of Slav or other foreign lands, we would not be able to expect the establishment of enduring friendly relations between Italy and all other democratic countries. Yet, it is in the interest of Italy herself, as of all other peace-loving countries of Europe, that the Italian Republic at last put an end to its old policy of expansion, and that Italy establish normal friendly relations with other countries, and primarily with her neighbours. Only then will Italy really become an important factor in the consolidation of peace in Europe, which all of us so much desire.

We greet the striving of the new Italy for national resurgence. But we positively cannot admit that any attempt on

Italy's part to seize foreign territories is in accord with her true national interests. It is known that attempts of this kind against other nations testify to the annexationist tendencies of certain narrow circles, but by no means reflect the true national interests of the people, which above all else demand economic recovery based on the development of the internal forces of the country, and the establishment of good and friendly relations with other peoples.

### III

#### THE TREATY AND ITALY'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

Signor De Gasperi hardly touched on the economic clauses of the peace treaty, although it is precisely these clauses that may affect the position of every worker, every peasant, every citizen of the Italian Republic and influence the entire future existence of the Italian State. As one understood him, he classes the economic clauses of the treaty as a secondary matter, to be considered in committee, and not at the Conference itself.

Yet war-weakened Italy is perhaps more behindhand in her economic rehabilitation than any other country of Europe. Suffice it to mention that, because of the difficulties involved in restoring industry, two million Italian workers are still without jobs. The occupation expenditures of Italy have reached enormous dimensions, and will have very grave consequences if they are prolonged. Even a small reduction of these expenditures would suffice fully to meet the reparations which Italy must assume in compensation of at least part of the damage caused to the Soviet Union and other Allied countries.

The head of the Italian delegation evidently attaches no significance to those parts of the peace treaty which may affect the entire economic life of the Italian people and the entire course of Italy's further development as a state. In the end, of course, the people will realize their position, even if some Italian leaders excessively abandon themselves to foreign policy schemes and claims to foreign territories, and forget that it is their duty to secure every Italian his daily bread and to take care of his other vital needs. But one should not close one's eyes to the consequences of this.

The Soviet Union treats with extreme caution such demands as, for instance, that citizens of any foreign state belonging to the United Nations should be granted equal rights with Italians in all matters relating to trade, industry, shipping and other commercial activities in Italy.

As you know, the Soviet Union has moved a proposal to restrict these excessive claims of foreign Powers and foreigners generally in Italy. We call attention to the danger that strong foreign states possessing large capital and wielding powerful means of pressure may use these practically unrestricted rights to the detriment of the national interests of the Italian Republic, citing in justification the "equal rights" of the United Nations and the impermissibility of "discrimination," so-called.

We cannot endorse such excessive claims on the part of foreign capital with regard to democratic Italy, which may lead to the economic enslavement of Italy by foreign trusts and cartels—as frequently happens to temporarily weakened countries and to small states, but which is disregarded by certain politicians who pose as chartered defenders of small nations.

We believe that Italy can live very well without western Istria, as this does not affect the genuine interests of the

Italian people. But if Italy's industry or trade or shipping are strangled by the competition of strong foreign states, which have grown still richer during the war, then the entire Italian nation will feel it heavily. We should foresee this danger now, in order to obviate it in time.

The protection of Italian industry and agriculture, as well as of Italian trade and shipping, against the pressure of strong foreign Powers exerted under the guise of equal rights and impermissibility of discrimination—pressure which may result in Italy's economic enslavement—is unquestionably a most important national interest of Italy, as it is of any other state weakened by the war, not to speak of small countries on which it is desired to impose similar enslaving economic terms.

The Soviet Union develops its economic relations with other countries on terms favouring their economic regeneration, on terms which promote the progress of their industries, their agriculture and their entire national economy. The Soviet Union would like to hope that other countries, too, will express their readiness to assist the Italian Republic to revive its economic life on similar terms, which preclude a policy of economic enslavement or outside pressure on independent, free Italy.

Some even go so far as to demand that Italy grant so-called "equal opportunity" to all foreign states in the development of civil aviation on Italian territory. This means that if Italy grants any favourable conditions for developing civil aviation on Italian territory to some state which has established friendly relations with her, she shall be obliged to grant similar favourable conditions for developing civil aviation on her territory to every other foreign state that desires to lay such a claim, even if this state has not established real friendly relations with the Italian Republic.

The so-called principle of "equal opportunity" in such questions would mean that even in matters closely bound up with her national defence, Italy would be confronted with claims which are incompatible with her national interest and state sovereignty and are, consequently, entirely contrary to international justice. One may conclude from this what may result from the abuse of so-called "equal opportunity," in other words from abuse of the principle of "equality," when it is forced upon the weak in order actually to place him at the mercy of the strong.

The head of the Italian delegation passed by these problems of the peace treaty, evidently because he did not consider them important, or he evaded them for other reasons. To us, however, it is clear that these problems very seriously concern the fundamental interests of Italy's national life.

#### IV

### ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND NOT PROLONGATION OF THE ARMISTICE

Lastly, the head of the Italian delegation advanced the unexpected thesis that at present we should confine ourselves only to the conclusion of a provisional peace, that is, actually to prolong the armistice, and that the final peace settlement should be postponed for some time. It is to be understood from what he says that he plans to take advantage of this, among other things, in order to hold on until a more favourable opportunity comes along to realize his claim to western Istria and Trieste. He even argued that a final settlement in Europe cannot be achieved before the conclusion of peace with Germany, although the question of Germany quite obviously has nothing to do with the problem of Istria and Trieste.

Evidently there is the hope in some quarters that, if not now then some time later, it will become possible to disrupt the compromise achieved in the Council of Foreign Ministers on the subject of Trieste. From this one can conclude that some people, observing that there are differences of opinion at the Paris Conference, are planning to bid for time and to exploit these differences for their own selfish aims.

It is interesting how far the head of the Italian delegation has gone in this direction. His proposal that we should confine ourselves at this juncture to the conclusion of a provisional peace means that he is even willing considerably to prolong the foreign occupation of his country, only that he may get a new opportunity to exploit certain differences among the Allies and gamble on setting some Allied Powers against others.

It is not difficult to discern that this policy has nothing in common with Italy's national interests. On the contrary, in the present circumstances the protraction of the occupation for a long time would place Italy in ever-growing dependence on foreign states. If, nevertheless, some Italian leaders are prepared to take this course, this is but another manifestation of the tenacious habits of the old ruling circles which should be alien to democratic Italy and which in our time cannot have even external favourable prospects.

The proposal for a provisional peace cannot meet with support at this Peace Conference. We have not gathered at this Conference in order to postpone the establishment of peace in Europe. Our task is to assist the establishment of enduring peace and to secure the successful accomplishment of this noble task by our common effort. We need not doubt that this understanding of the tasks of the present Conference also corresponds to the properly interpreted interests of the new Italy.

The speech of the leader of the Italian delegation has demonstrated that the old tendencies alien to the policy of democratic states which are striving for the establishment of lasting peace, have not yet been outlived in the new Italy. Let us, nevertheless, hope that the consolidation of the democratic foundations of the new Italy will help her to take the path other democratic countries are following. The peace treaty for Italy which our Conference is proceeding to prepare should also further this lofty aim. (*Applause.*)

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## SPEECH AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

*August 15, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. We are now concluding our discussion of the questions raised by the representatives of former enemy states. Some delegates said they did not wish to speak here, as they preferred to do so in committee. But why not speak if there is something to say, seeing that the proposals worked out by our common efforts in the Council of the four Ministers are meeting with unfounded objections, and hence require explanation? Why evade it? The Soviet delegation is of a different opinion. It believes it necessary to defend the proposals which were adopted with its participation and were submitted for the consideration of the Conference.

There have been other utterances too. For instance, statements have been ascribed to the Soviet delegation which it did not make. This was evidently done in order to object to them the more conveniently. But the delegates know what the Soviet delegation said, since everything has been published.

### 1. THE PEACE TREATY WITH FINLAND

Now I come to the peace treaty with Finland.

The Finnish delegation has made observations and proposals aimed at altering the armistice terms. Certainly, it

had a formal right to do so. I shall merely remark that during the many months that we discussed the peace treaty in the Council of Foreign Ministers, no observations or amendments were submitted by Finland. We have learned that there are such wishes only today. The Soviet delegation believes that the armistice terms, signed not only by the Soviet Union and Great Britain, but by Finland herself, form a good basis for the peace treaty with Finland. And these terms were in fact taken as the basis for the draft treaty submitted to the Conference.

Now a few words as to the substance of the peace treaty with Finland. The Finnish delegation has suggested the possibility of territorial changes as compared with the armistice terms. The Soviet delegation sees no reason for this. The Soviet Union has done no little to give Finland the opportunity of living in the way she wishes—which she sought in vain to secure from the tsarist government of Russia. It was from the Soviet State that Finland received her independence, sovereignty and freedom.

However, in the period 1918-22, when the Soviet State was still weak and unstrengthened, its border with Finland not infrequently proved to be exposed, because invasions of our territory by White Finns never ceased. Of course, the aggressive elements of Finland in this instance were usually mere tools in the hands of outside forces, of big imperialist Powers hostile to the Soviet State, which were trying to weaken the Soviet Union by every available means, and stopped at nothing in their endeavours.

Then began the war forced upon Europe and the world by Hitler Germany. Peace on the frontiers of the Soviet Union, particularly in the Leningrad area, and the security of those frontiers against enemy incursion were of especial importance to the Soviet Government in that period. For this reason, as is known, prolonged negotiations were con-

ducted during 1939 by the Soviet Government with the Finnish Government with a view to somewhat changing the frontier in the Leningrad area, where the Finnish border was only 30 kilometres away from Leningrad—that is, within artillery range. The Soviet Union proposed that the Finnish border be moved back, if only a score and a half or so kilometres, and offered Finland in compensation a piece of territory in Eastern Karelia twice the size of the territory she would yield near Leningrad. We failed to achieve this by negotiation. The war forced upon us by Finland in the winter of 1939-40 was a trying one, both for the Soviet Union and for Finland, but matters did not end there.

In 1941 Finland, along with Germany and Germany's other satellites, attacked the Soviet Union.

As a result, Leningrad experienced the horrors of a blockade lasting many months, the like of which was not experienced by any other big city during the war. For two and a half years Leningrad, with its three million and more inhabitants, was besieged by the Germans, who were assisted by the Finnish troops. For nearly two and a half years glorious Leningrad, the heroic city, the pride of our country, was shelled by heavy guns day in and day out, and suffered exceptional hardships and enormous sacrifices. This blockade of Leningrad was possible because Finland had sided with the Germans.

That is why now, when the question of the frontier in the Leningrad area is raised, nobody in the Soviet Union will understand a situation which would leave Finland's border within 30 kilometres of Leningrad. No one in the Soviet Union would agree to risk Leningrad again.

That is how matters stand as regards the main territorial question in the armistice terms and in the draft peace treaty with Finland. I shall not dwell on other territorial questions.

The Finnish delegation also raises the question of reducing reparations. I must say that in the matter of reparations the Soviet Union has met Finland's wishes to the utmost. Everything has been done to implement the decision on reparations in such a way as to promote the restoration and further progress of Finnish industry, and so that the time limits and nature of the economic terms should be as acceptable as possible to Finland. And we achieved corresponding agreement.

Moreover, one should not forget that of all the five former allies of Germany, Finland was the only country which was not subjected to occupation by foreign troops. Of course, the Soviet Union had enough forces to occupy Finland after the defeat of her fascist regime. It could have brought its troops into Finland and acted in the manner natural to a victor. But though we had all the material prerequisites for this, military and otherwise, as well as every political and moral justification, Finland was spared occupation by foreign troops. Thereby she was also spared the big costs inevitable under a regime of occupation.

It is clear from this that the Soviet Government took full consideration of the position of this small country, in spite of the grave crimes she had committed during the war. Since Finland has expelled Hitler's flunkeys from her government and taken a democratic path, the Soviet Union has tried in every way to lighten her obligations. The Soviet Union refrained from occupying Finland and spared this small country heavy occupation expenses, which considerably lightened the burden of reparations which were established for Finland and which she has been honestly fulfilling.

Guided by the desire to pursue a policy of goodwill towards a democratic Finland, and realizing that old tsarist Russia had committed many a sin against little Finland, the

Soviet Government restricted itself to laying the minimum reparations upon her, which compensate for only a small part of the enormous damage she caused.

The Soviet Union has conducted, and will continue to conduct, this good-neighbour policy towards Finland in so far as Finland herself pursues a similar policy towards the Soviet Union, and does not again become a weapon in the hands of whomsoever it may be against the Soviet Union.

There may be people who would like to speculate on differences among the great Powers on various points. We would not advise our neighbour Finland to be tempted by such schemes, or to yield to pressure of this kind. Finland's experience as a tool of strong Powers has been very deplorable for her. This should not be forgotten.

In view of all this the Soviet delegation has come to the conclusion that the armistice terms signed by the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and which bear the signature of Finland herself, terms which have proved fully justified—that these terms should be reflected in the peace treaty.

## 2. REGARDING CERTAIN QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE DEBATE

I now want to touch upon speeches made here on other subjects.

The principle of so-called "equal opportunity" has again been raised here. This time the American delegate objected to remarks I made on this subject on August 13. I must, nevertheless, say that the Soviet delegation still considers the remarks I made on that occasion absolutely correct, while the objections on this score have proved utterly baseless—they gave the impression one usually gets when people try too hard to prove their point.

For, indeed, they tried to prove to us that when it is a question of economic equality between strong Powers on the one hand, and small or war-weakened states on the other, the principle of "equal opportunity" is the most suitable one. It is even claimed that no better principle can be found for such cases.

Permit us then to ask: why do you propose to apply this wonderful principle only for eighteen months after the conclusion of the peace treaty? If it is such a good principle, then perhaps it ought to be introduced for an indefinite period?

But no, this is not proposed, and we understand why not. It is because the states concerned, the small and war-weakened states whom they want to compel to apply this principle, do not agree.

If it is a good principle, surely it should be applied not by imposition on other states, but with their voluntary consent. Then we should ask the states in question what their opinion is of this principle. Why is it the United States of America, and not Iceland, that is insisting on the application of this principle of "equal opportunity"?

This, of course, is not fortuitous. We are invited to accept this principle for the vanquished countries, and very insistently at that, by the United States of America, as well as by Great Britain—although the latter will hardly approve the full application of the principle of "equal opportunity," let us say, in India.

But nobody can say that the unlimited application of the principle of "equal opportunity" is equally convenient for strong and weak states, for big and small Powers. No one can prove that this is so. That is why Italy and Rumania, and Bulgaria, and Hungary, and Finland all object to it. And if you don't think so, then ask them whether they

will agree to the unlimited application of the principle of "equal opportunity."

Clearly, the unlimited application of this principle is convenient for those who are strong and rich, for those who by means of their capital seek to subjugate those who are weaker. If, however, one desires to reckon with the interests of the peoples of these countries, one should behave more modestly in such matters, and not impose by force something which may strangle the economy of weaker states. It would be a more democratic approach to the question if we afforded the small states the opportunity to express their opinion on this subject, without imposing on them obligations which are excessively burdensome and unacceptable to them.

- It was incorrectly stated at this Conference that the Soviet delegation, whilst insisting on reparations, objects to compensation being paid for the property of Allied states damaged on the territory of a former enemy state. This is incorrect. We do consider that Allied property-owners should be compensated for damage caused to them on the territory of a former enemy country; but we are for partial compensation, as in the case of reparations, in regard to which the principle of partial compensation is applied still more stringently. In this way justice will be observed, and, moreover, the real capacities of the vanquished states will have consideration.

But the United States delegate who spoke here was on the one hand extremely zealous in upholding compensation for owners who suffered damage on the territory of former enemy states, while on the other he was opposed to reparations, insistently emphasizing that they were a burden on the vanquished states. Yet the signature of the United States of America appears under the reparations clauses in the draft peace treaties for Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and

Italy. This is a contradiction, and a quite obvious one. The Soviet delegation cannot agree with such a position.

The question of Greece has more than once been raised here. Much has been said about her great services in defence of our common cause. And that is perfectly right. The Greek people did fight heroically in our common cause against our common enemies. Why, at this hour, should we not recall the people, the heroes, who took part in the national liberation movement in Greece, the EAM men, who were the heroes of this glorious struggle in Greece? (*Applause.*) One cannot acknowledge the services of Greece in our common liberation struggle against Germany and her satellites, and at the same time forget these true heroes who made the greatest sacrifices, and earned glory for Greece in the struggle against fascism. These important and irrefutable facts must not be forgotten.

On the other hand, when the representative of Greece comes forward with his annexationist plans—cut him off some territory from Bulgaria, cut him off some territory from Albania—and practically suggests a partition of Albania, why should we not criticize these utterances of the Greek representative? What is wrong in delegates criticizing such plans of annexation?

But to praise Greece, and to pass over in silence these annexationist speeches of the present official representatives of Greece—is this not tantamount to encouraging such speeches? That is why we should remember the heroic services of the Greek people, but when official Greek representatives draw wrong, anti-democratic conclusions, we should criticize them, in order to give adventurers a timely warning against their dangerous adventurist policy. (*Applause.*)

And, lastly, about the Peace Conference. The Soviet delegation cannot but react to the fact that there have been reports in the press lately about plans to adjourn the Peace

Conference, to suspend its work, and so on. The Soviet delegation cannot pass this over in silence, all the more since these false reports are represented in some quarters as the opinion of the Soviet delegation.

The Soviet delegation is of the opinion that at this Peace Conference we should strive to work concertredly and at the same time perseveringly for the earliest possible consummation of the work we have undertaken. We are of the opinion that it is better to adjourn something else, rather than the Peace Conference. We are also in favour of our not confining ourselves to a provisional peace, as has been proposed by one of the speakers at our Conference. We want our work to make a real contribution to the establishment of stable and lasting peace—the peace which all peoples, big and small, are expecting, for which all the peace-loving nations are striving. (*Applause.*)

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## ON REPARATIONS

*Speech in the Economic Commission for  
the Balkans and Finland*

*August 26, 1946*

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. The Soviet delegation is grateful to the Australian delegation for expounding in such detail the motives which guided it in moving its amendment to the article of the peace treaty on Rumanian reparations. The Soviet delegation believed it highly important to hear these motives, in order to know what reasons prompted the delegation to submit its proposals, which completely go back on the terms of the armistice with Rumania concluded two years ago by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States on behalf of the United Nations. We now know what they are, and also know that these proposals are supported by the Greek delegation.

### I

#### CONSEQUENCES OF AGGRESSION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Australia is at least 17,000 kilometres distant from Rumania. To get from Australia to Rumania one must cross two oceans. It would seem that there must be serious reasons why Australia deems it necessary to interfere so active-

ly in the question of reparations from Rumania to the Soviet Union and to insist here on the virtual cancellation of these reparations. It is interesting that it was precisely Australia that took this task upon herself, and displayed especial concern in this matter.

The position of the Soviet Union in this matter is different from that of Australia. Rumania did not attack Australia; she couldn't if she wanted to. Australia, although she formally declared war upon Rumania, did not expend a single round of ammunition against Antonescu's fascist troops. Not so was the case with the Soviet Union. When Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Rumania, which was then headed by one of Hitler's lackeys, Antonescu, joined with Hitler's band and also attacked the Soviet Union. Thus the Rumania of Antonescu was in collusion with the German aggressor, when she invaded the Soviet Union and took the field against the other United Nations.

Living 17,000 kilometres away from Rumania, one may possibly forget all this; but we Soviet people cannot forget it. We cannot forget that in the summer of 1941 Rumanian troops, under the command of the fascist Antonescu, invaded the Soviet Union, marched all through the entire Southern Ukraine, devastating everything on their way, just as the Hitlerites did, destroyed towns and villages, occupied the southwestern part of the Ukraine together with our beautiful southern city of Odessa, where they played riot for two and a half years, occupied and devastated our wonderful Crimea, and went as far as the Volga, where together with the Germans they besieged our glorious Stalingrad.

Possibly the Australian delegation has forgotten all this, or simply does not want to know about these things. Nevertheless, I would like to call the attention of the Australian delegation to these important facts, and to the opportunity

it had to see for itself what the invasion of Antonescu's fascist troops meant to the Soviet Union.

I shall not cite a great number of facts to show what the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany and her satellites meant. Suffice it to refer to the document published for general information on September 13, 1945, by the Extraordinary State Commission of the U.S.S.R. for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes of the German Invaders and their Allies in the Territory of the Soviet Union. This Extraordinary State Commission, composed of outstanding public men, was set up by the highest organ of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Soviet.

Here is what the document published by this Commission says about the results of the brigand attack by Germany and her satellites on the Soviet Union:

Germany and her former satellites "completely or partially destroyed or burned down 1,710 towns and over 70,000 villages; burned down or demolished over 6,000,000 buildings and deprived about 25,000,000 people of shelter. Among the demolished or most heavily damaged towns are some of the largest industrial and cultural centres, such as Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel, Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don and many others."

Germany and her former satellites "destroyed 31,850 industrial enterprises, which employed about 4,000,000 workers; they destroyed or carried away 239,000 electric motors and 175,000 metal-cutting lathes. They destroyed 65,000 kilometres of railway track, 4,100 railway stations, 36,000 post and telegraph offices, telephone exchanges and other communications establishments.

"They destroyed or wrecked 40,000 hospitals and other medical institutions, 84,000 schools, colleges, higher educational establishments and research institutes, and 43,000

public libraries. They destroyed and sacked 98,000 collective farms, 1,876 state farms and 2,890 machine and tractor stations; slaughtered, confiscated or drove off to Germany 7,000,000 horses, 17,000,000 head of cattle, 20,000,000 pigs, 27,000,000 sheep and goats, 110,000,000 head of poultry."

On the basis of numerous affidavits and documents, the Extraordinary State Commission established that the grand total of direct damage inflicted on the national economy of the U.S.S.R. and on individual rural and urban residents amounts to 679,000 million rubles.

Such were the calamities brought on the Soviet Union by the brigand attack of Germany and her former satellites.

Rumania bears no small share of the responsibility for these calamities, for this unparalleled devastation done to our country. Does the Australian delegation suggest that Soviet people should forget about all this, when even now, especially in the south of the U.S.S.R., you may everywhere meet with the grave aftermath of war, the destruction left behind by war, and with ruined Soviet families? But I do not doubt that honest people throughout the world know and remember these facts, which speak for themselves.

## II

### COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE

After all I have said about the ruin and calamity inflicted on the Soviet Union and its citizens by the aggressors in the years 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944, after all this, let us turn to the armistice conditions which were signed on the termination of the war with Rumania. One can, of course, assume a pose of impartiality and now assert that the

armistice terms were signed in haste and that it therefore cannot be held that they were well considered and that they may be left in force.

But, gentlemen, I would call your attention to the following. These armistice terms were signed, not only by the Soviet Union but by Great Britain and the United States of America, and before being signed were discussed in detail by the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. I would also recall that the terms of the armistice concluded by the Soviet Union and the two other Allied Powers with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, as well as with Finland—that the armistice terms were at the time discussed in detail jointly with the representatives of these defeated states and were then published in full and immediately.

What were the terms regarding reparations from Rumania?

They were precisely defined in the armistice. The amount of reparations was exactly fixed, and it was specified that Rumania should indemnify the Soviet Union only partially for the damage inflicted, since it was taken into account that Rumania had not simply dropped out of the war, but had joined the war against Germany and put in the field more than ten divisions to assist the Allied troops defeat Germany and her satellites.

The draft peace treaty presented to the Conference by the Council of Foreign Ministers fully reproduces what was said about reparations in the armistice terms. I shall read you Article 22, which deals with reparations, and to which the Australian delegation has submitted its amendments. Here is the text of this article:—

"Losses caused to the Soviet Union by military operations and by the occupation by Rumania of Soviet territory will be made good by Rumania to the Soviet Union, but taking

into consideration that Rumania has not only withdrawn from the war against the United Nations, but has declared and, in fact, waged war against Germany it is agreed that compensation for the above losses will be made by Rumania not in full but only in part, namely, to the amount of 300 million United States dollars payable over eight years from September 12, 1944, in commodities (oil products, grain, timber, seagoing and river craft, sundry machinery, etc.)"

When this question was discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers this article of the draft peace treaty with Rumania raised no doubts in the mind of the representative of Great Britain, or the representative of the United States, or the representative of France who attended all the meetings where this question was discussed. But it seems that this article now calls forth objections from the Australian delegation, which, however, has not presented any concrete proposals or any data in support of its view that radical amendment of this article is necessary.

It remains for me to note that, as compared with the armistice terms, one amendment has been made in this article: on the initiative of the Soviet Government the period of payment of reparations has been fixed in the draft peace treaty at eight years instead of six. This was done by the Soviet Government in order to make it easier for the democratic government of Rumania to pay the reparations. The Soviet Government has also granted other alleviations to Rumania in the payment of reparations, for which purpose appropriate Soviet-Rumanian agreements were concluded.

On the other hand, everybody knows that at the time of the signing of the armistice terms, the democratic government of Rumania fully agreed to them; in particular, it fully agreed to the reparations sum of 300 million dollars and with the procedure of payment fixed in the armistice terms.

Moreover, the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tătărescu, speaking at this Conference on August 13, made the following statement:—

“On the problem of reparations to be paid to the Allied and Associated Powers I cannot refrain from pointing out that the Soviet Union, which more than any other Power is entitled to claim full reparation from Rumania, has, nevertheless, agreed to limit her demands to only one-fifth of the losses sustained through Rumanian action.”

Hence Mr. Tătărescu, speaking on behalf of the Rumanian Government, admits that these reparations represent a well-founded demand of the Soviet Union, and that they constitute only one-fifth of the damage inflicted by Rumanian troops on the Soviet Union. He has no objections on this score.

The fairness of this demand of the Soviet Union cannot be denied by anyone. And it may be said that there are numerous statements by public leaders in the democratic countries confirming that this demand is just and well-founded.

### III

#### ERRONEOUS PROPOSALS OF THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION

But the Australian delegation, you see, is of a different opinion. It wants to make out that it is more concerned for Rumania's interests than the Rumanian Government itself. The Australian delegation would have us believe that in this matter it understands the situation better than the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States understood it, which twice discussed this decision in detail and approved it.

The Australian delegation tells us that in principle it agrees that Rumania should pay reparations to the Soviet Union. The Australian delegation has made repeated declarations today about its good intentions. But it is not the number of declarations of good intentions that matters. "The road to hell is paved with good intentions," they say. We are interested not in talk about good intentions, but in the actual significance of the proposals made by the Australian delegation.

And what does the Australian delegation propose?

The Australian delegation proposes that the amount of reparations be not fixed at this Conference and that the discussion of this question be postponed for six months; it proposes that a commission of representatives of seven countries be set up for this purpose, and that meanwhile payment of reparations to the Soviet Union be stopped. Such is the first proposal of this delegation.

But, pardon me, the amount of reparations has already been fixed. Rumania has already paid the Soviet Union 86 million out of the 300 million dollars of reparations. Is this not so? Moreover, Rumania has recognized and still recognizes the justness of the reparations imposed upon her. Yet the Australian delegation proposes that the Conference strike out one of the most important of the armistice terms, start a six-months' discussion on reparations in some commission which no one needs, and disrupt the payment of reparations, which the Rumanian Government has been conscientiously paying for already two years.

It comes down to this: the Australian delegation declares in favour of reparations, but its proposal would in reality mean the stoppage of reparations.

The second proposal of the Australian delegation is that reparations should be paid either in dollars or in pounds sterling, and not in Rumanian goods, as established by the armistice terms.

But what does this proposal of the Australian delegation mean? It means that Rumania is to be compelled to sell her goods abroad at cut prices in order to obtain American dollars and English pounds—which would be absolutely disadvantageous to Rumania, though it might meet with the approval of certain circles in the United States and Great Britain.

The Australian delegation for some reason believes this to be fair. And, indeed, seen from the viewpoint of certain circles in the United States and Great Britain it may seem correct. But for Rumania, it would cause great difficulties and might prove to be a noose around her neck.

The Australian delegation insistently offers its services to those who have plenty of dollars and sterling, although it is not being asked to do so by Rumania, for whom this would be extremely burdensome, and although the U.S.S.R., which is interested in reparations, does not ask it to do so either.

And all this is supposed to arise from concern on the part of the Australian delegation for Rumania's interests. No, this is not so. It may possibly arise from a concern for the dollar, or a concern for the pound sterling or for something else, but where do Rumania's interests come in?

If this is the way we are going to defend Rumania's interests, such "concern" will go pretty hard with her. It would place Rumania in thrall to the dollar and the pound sterling, which cannot be permitted. No, this is not the way to help Rumania. She must be helped to restore and develop her industry and agriculture and to strengthen her currency, so that she may be able to fulfil her obligations by developing her own industry and increasing her home production. If the Australian delegation intended by its proposal to help Rumania, then it has gone the wrong way about it. In any case, no one asked the Australian delegation to do so.

What, then, do we find? Professedly, the Australian delegation is solicitous for Rumania's interests and for the payment of reparations; actually, its proposal is detrimental to Rumania and would stop the payment of reparations to the Soviet Union.

#### IV

### THE AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS MUST BE REJECTED

Does the Australian delegation realize what it is doing? The Australian delegation proposes that the Conference should not fix the amount of reparations, although it was fixed long ago, and although the reparations are already being paid, and without any objection on the part of the Rumanian Government itself.

The Australian delegation's proposal to leave the question of the amount of reparations open for six months would in fact mean the stoppage of reparations to the Soviet Union. If this were done, it would be a heavy blow to the rehabilitation of those areas of the Ukraine, the Crimea and other Soviet regions which were devastated by the German, Rumanian and other invaders. It would greatly prejudice the rehabilitation of the industry and agriculture of these areas and the rebuilding of schools and hospitals, and would do grave wrong primarily to the population of these areas of the Soviet Union. Who wants such a blow to be dealt to the rehabilitation of the districts of the Soviet Union which suffered from aggression? Why stop the reparations payable by Rumania? Why prejudice the rehabilitation of the ruined areas of the Ukraine, the Crimea and the other Soviet territories which suffered piratical occupation by the enemy?

The Australian delegation insists on a modification of the system of reparations payments which has been in operation

for two years. It suggests that the reparations be henceforth paid in dollars and sterling, which it would be difficult for Rumania to obtain, and, moreover, when the U.S.S.R., too, does not think this expedient, and both countries, the Soviet Union and Rumania, are satisfied with the existing system of reparation payments in kind. Yet the Australian delegation would, by its uninvited interference, spoil the relations which have been established between Rumania and the Soviet Union. It suggests upsetting and throwing overboard the Soviet-Rumanian agreement which already exists. This can only be to the advantage of those who wish to spoil relations between the Soviet Union and Rumania.

But, gentlemen of the Australian delegation, you should know that both the Soviet people and the people of Rumania, as represented by her broad democratic circles, are desirous not only not to spoil their existing friendly relations, but to develop them further to the benefit of both countries. And is this not in the interest of all democratic countries? But your proposals would result only in undermining the friendship between Rumania and the Soviet Union, in spoiling the friendly relations which have been established between Rumania and the Soviet Union. I do not think that Australia or the Australian people are interested in that. I do not think that the Australian delegation, when it realizes where its proposals would lead, will uphold these proposals, which are wrong and harmful.

You are aware that the Australian delegation proposes that the Conference should not itself decide what amount of reparations is to be fixed for Rumania, but that it should refer this question to a commission of representatives of several states, which is to argue and discuss this question for six months. It is perfectly clear, however, that if such a proposal were accepted it would deal a severe blow to the cause of peace in Europe.

For, indeed, will the establishment of enduring peace in Europe be promoted by postponing for a further term the decision of important problems of the peace treaties? Is it in the interest of the democratic states that questions which have already been settled between the Allied countries and Germany's former satellites should now be left open, and that decisions previously adopted be annulled? Can anyone who wants lasting peace in Europe support such proposals?

No. Such proposals can have the support only of those who do not desire enduring peace in Europe. He who has the interests of peace at heart, he who really wants stable peace in Europe, cannot make such proposals, once he realizes what they will lead to.

It has already been proposed at the Conference to postpone the consideration of certain important matters for one year. This is exactly the course the Australian delegation is taking. What would it mean if the Peace Conference were to leave question after question open, and entrust it to commissions of one sort or another to settle them some time or other after the Conference? Would the decision of some chance commission be more authoritative than the opinion of the Conference, or the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers? No one can agree with that.

In practice, the acceptance of such a proposal would only result in undermining the authority of the Peace Conference and in prejudicing the cause of peace in Europe. If we follow the Australian delegation, which has proposed that the question of reparations in all the peace treaties be referred to some unhappy commission for six months, and, consequently, be left open, we shall be farthering a multitude of unsolved questions—and then this whole Peace Conference will have no serious meaning. Under no conditions can the Soviet delegation agree with such an attitude.

From all that has been said, the futility and harmfulness of the Australian amendments to the draft peace treaties with Rumania and the other former satellites of Germany should be perfectly evident. Such amendments cannot help us, and can only complicate the work of the Conference.

But may it be that the proposals of the Australian delegation are dictated in some degree or other by Australia's national interests? No, it will easily be seen that these proposals bear no relation whatever to Australia's national interests. The Australian people can, of course, have no desire to postpone the important question of peace to some indefinite future time, that the Conference break up without examining major questions, and, moreover, that the Conference violate and nullify decisions already accepted in the armistice terms.

Such errors may be committed by individual Australians, as well as by certain non-Australian reactionaries who have no interest in the establishment of lasting peace, and who like to fish in troubled waters. But what has the Australian people to do with this? The Australian people, like all other peace-loving peoples, desire the establishment of lasting peace in Europe and throughout the world, and this Conference will meet their desire.

Our Conference represents democratic states. It would not wish to help reactionary forces whose imperialist plans might be furthered by postponing the decision of important questions of the peace treaties. The Peace Conference must do everything in its power to ensure that the peoples who were the victims of aggression are not deprived of just indemnification of the damage inflicted by the aggressors, and to set the right course for the prompt solution of the questions raised in the peace treaties, since this is in the interest of stable and durable peace.

Who can be gratified by the Australian delegation's amendments? If the Australian delegation were to think over its amendments once more, it would probably realize that they can benefit only those who would like to delay and complicate to the utmost the settlement of the basic questions of the peace treaties. If the former aggressors had their advocate at our Conference he would insist on the adoption of such proposals and amendments. But who wants advocates of the aggressor at this Conference? The Australian delegation will of course agree that the Peace Conference is no place for pleading in behalf of the aggressors. But if that is so, the appropriate conclusions should be drawn, and the mistaken amendments moved by the Australian delegation should not be persisted in.

Lastly, we should also remember public opinion in the democratic countries; it should not be ignored. The work of the Peace Conference is constantly in the public eye. This being so, ask yourselves whether democratically-minded people can be persuaded that the proposals of the Australian delegation comply with the interests of justice and of enduring peace in Europe. The Australian delegation's proposals cannot win the approval of the democratic public. These proposals, which would nullify previous agreements, would gravely prejudice the interests of those countries which suffered severely from aggression, such as the Soviet Union. These proposals would be profitable to countries rich in dollars and sterling accumulated during the war years, but they would lead to the economic oppression of countries weakened by the war. These proposals, aiming at the postponement of such important questions of the peace treaties as the question of reparations, would be a severe blow to the attempts to establish enduring peace.

It is now clear how fallacious and harmful are the Australian delegation's proposals; it is equally clear that they

will encounter only the disapproval of public opinion in the democratic countries.

That is why we should like to hope that the Australian delegation will withdraw its harmful amendments, and that in any case they will not have the support of the Conference.

The Soviet delegation recommends that the proposals of the Australian delegation on the question of reparations be rejected as fallacious and harmful.

At the same time, the Soviet delegation proposes that the Conference approve the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers on reparations, a proposal which was thoroughly weighed and which complies with the just interests of countries that were the victims of aggression and with the interests of stable and lasting peace.

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## ONCE MORE ON REPARATIONS

*Speech in the Commission  
on Economic Questions of the Draft  
Treaty with Italy  
August 27, 1946*

When questions of procedure were under discussion, the Australian delegation displayed exceptional interest. It is now evident how this delegation is trying to take advantage of the rights provided by the Conference's rules of procedure. It is especially active in the matter of reparations. We observe that this is not the first commission in which the Australian delegation has advanced proposals on the reparations question which would upset previous decisions.

### I

#### TENDENTIOUS CHARACTER OF THE AUSTRALIAN AMENDMENTS

What is the striking thing about these proposals of the Australian delegation? In the first place, all of them follow one and the same pattern. With regard to all the countries for which we are now considering peace treaties the Australian delegation makes one and the same standard proposals.

Their stereotyped character is not altered by certain differences of detail.

It proposes that no total amount of reparations be fixed either for Rumania or Italy or Hungary or Finland or Bulgaria. Though these states completely differ, the Australian delegation has one standard approach to all of them in the matter of reparations.

Another question. In all cases it proposes that reparations be paid, not in kind, not in commodities produced by the reparations-paying countries, but in foreign currency, in dollars or sterling, or other foreign currency. Here, too, one and the same yardstick is proposed for all five countries.

It further proposes that the question of reparations should not be decided in substance at this Conference, but should be relegated to a commission consisting of seven members. It even proposes that reparations questions affecting Germany and Austria be also referred to this commission, although these questions do not concern this Conference at all. The very fact that we are invited to adopt standard decisions on reparations for five, or even seven, countries indicates that the proposals of the Australian delegation are not constructive proposals.

These proposals, however, bear a definite character: they are unacceptable to the states which suffered aggression, but in the countries responsible for aggression they will meet with sympathy from those who want to evade reparations.

But the fallaciousness of a simplified, standardized approach to different countries is perfectly obvious. It surely cannot be believed that the question of reparations due from Germany on the one hand and, say, from Bulgaria on the other, can be approached with one and the same yardstick, with one and the same standard. In such cases a standardized approach can do much harm.

But even in the standard pattern adopted by the Australian delegation it is not difficult to perceive a definite tendency where the U.S.S.R. is concerned.

Only one year has elapsed since the end of the war, but already there are people, even in Allied states, who have forgotten, or are beginning to forget, the role the Soviet Union played in defeating the common enemy and in winning the Allied victory; and they far too easily forget the sacrifices the Soviet Union made for its liberty and independence and for the sake of the common Allied cause.

Look what is going on before our eyes. The Soviet Union, together with other Allied states, fixed the reparations to be paid by Rumania, Hungary and Finland. These states are already paying reparations for over a year, and to this day there has been no misunderstanding between the Soviet Union and these states. In spite of this, the Australian delegation proposes that Rumania, Hungary and Finland cease paying reparations to the Soviet Union, and that the entire reparations question be referred to a commission of its own conceiving, thus disrupting operating agreements.

The Council of Foreign Ministers has fixed the sum total of reparations due from Italy to the Soviet Union at only 100 million dollars, payable in seven years. This decision was adopted after a great deal of discussion, after a very careful consideration of the question. Nevertheless, the Australian delegation now comes forward and proposes that this decision too be cancelled. At the same time we are told very politely: "We don't say you shouldn't receive reparations, but nor do we say you should receive them." Perhaps you expect us to be grateful for such an attitude to the Soviet Union? But on what grounds?

And no reasons are offered, no facts, nothing worthy of any attention. The Australian delegation simply decided that it must display special energy in matters which concern the

Soviet Union, and set to work to propose standardized amendments to all the draft peace treaties directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. The Australian delegation has written so many amendments at this Conference that people are beginning to wonder where it gets all the paper from. The tendentiousness of these amendments, in relation to the U.S.S.R., is self-evident.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the Australian delegation has adopted a definite line, a line opposed to the interests of the Soviet Union. All its proposals on reparations are incompatible with the interests of the Soviet Union. Among all the decisions on reparations now in operation, there is not a single one with which the Australian delegation agrees—not one!

But the draft peace treaty for Italy contains not only Article 64, on reparations, but also Article 69. Here is the text of this article:

“Each of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or take any other action with respect to all property, rights and interests within its territory which on the date of coming into force of the present Treaty belong to Italy or to Italian nationals, and to apply such property or the proceeds thereof to such purposes as it may desire, within the limits of its claims and those of its nationals against Italy or its nationals, including debts, other than claims fully satisfied under other Articles of the present Treaty. All Italian property, or the proceeds thereof, in excess of the amount of such claims, shall be returned.”

The Soviet Government considers this article a harsh one for Italy, but on the insistence of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, with whom we cooperate on many questions, it had to vote for it. But when it is proposed that we should extend this article to all the small countries which bear a

share of responsibility for aggression, we say that it is impermissible—there can be no standardized decisions. Italy, a big country, is one thing, and a small country, Hungary, say, is another. One cannot allow each of the Allied and Associated Powers to take from Hungary all her foreign assets and all Hungarian property which happens to be in its territory—even though Hungary caused no damage to the country in question. We consider this impermissible.

In this case, however, we do not hear the voice of the Australian delegation raised in defence of small nations. Here it does not object, does not make any amendments, in order to moderate appetites, if only a little. It does not even try to find out what foreign assets these are, how large they are, and to whom they belong—in this matter the Australian delegation does not propose that anyone should be restricted. Here is another tendency displayed by this delegation, a tendency which not everyone will receive sympathetically.

This is what we get. The Australian delegation objects to proposals which in even the smallest degree firmly protect the interests of the Soviet Union in the matter of reparations. But where the interests of other big countries are concerned, the Australian delegation does not propose that any restrictions be put even on such demands and such appetites as might unjustly infringe on the rights of the small states among Germany's former satellites. Is this an objective policy? Is this not tendentiousness? The Australian delegation has different measures: one for the Soviet Union and another for states which are more to its liking. After what has been said, I think this will be quite clear. A Russian proverb says "You can't hide an awl in a sack." One has to agree.

## II

### AMOUNT OF REPARATIONS

I shall now deal with individual issues.

In September last, at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet delegation proposed that the total sum of reparations to be paid by Italy be fixed at 300 million dollars. Of this sum, 100 million dollars were earmarked for the Soviet Union, and 200 million dollars for Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. As we know, the question of reparations for France is also now before us, and finally there is the question of reparations for Ethiopia, which we likewise think should be discussed.

One cannot, however, pass over the fact that although the afore-mentioned Soviet proposal on reparations from Italy was published and was never changed, certain newspapers which specialize in misinformation alleged that the U.S.S.R. was demanding reparations from Italy totalling 750 million pounds sterling, or 3,000 million dollars. It was necessary to issue a special denial of this printed lie about the U.S.S.R.—as we know, every reactionary is ready to stoop to any filthy slander and any lie in his desire to injure the Soviet State. But the truth will triumph nevertheless. The Soviet proposal on reparations from Italy is now widely known, and no one will succeed in distorting it.

What does it say? Is it not clear that when we say that Italy must pay the Soviet Union only 100 million dollars in reparations, we are demanding compensation for not more than one-twentieth or even one-twenty-fifth of the direct damage which Italy's fascist troops inflicted on the Soviet Union, and that as regards Germany, for instance, which bears the chief responsibility, we cannot confine ourselves to such insignificant compensation?

But we know that in the last years of the war Italy joined sides with the Allies and helped us to attain victory over Germany, and therefore we believe it necessary to show consideration for Italy and confine ourselves to the smallest, the most moderate reparations. But even with this the Australian delegation does not agree.

We believe that the sum of 200 million dollars of reparations for Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia is extremely inadequate. It does not at all satisfy either Yugoslavia or Albania, or possibly Greece, although in another commission the Greek delegate insistently urged that heavy reparations should not be imposed upon Germany's former satellites. At all events, no one can deny that the Soviet Union proposes to display the utmost magnanimity towards Italy.

Nevertheless, the Australian delegation insists not only that the Conference should not adopt these proposals, but that it should not adopt any decisions on reparations from Italy at all, and that this question should be put in cold storage and left to be debated for six months in some commission that is of no use to anyone. In practice this would mean burying reparations and leaving uncompensated the colossal damage inflicted by the aggressor on some of the Allied countries. Clearly, nothing will be furthered by this proposal.

### III

#### FULFILMENT OF REPARATIONS

The Australian delegation is again trying to have all the countries pay reparations, not in kind, not in goods of the given country, but in dollars or sterling. Today the Australian delegate has graciously explained that reparations may be paid not only in dollars or sterling, although he did not mention any other foreign currency. Evidently he respects

only the dollar and the pound sterling—and that, of course, is his right and his own business

But when he wants to make Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland pay reparations in dollars and sterling, and not in their own goods which each produces with its own currency, he is rendering these countries a bad service. The point precisely is whether these countries are to be made to pay reparations in foreign currency, of which they have very little, or whether they are to be allowed to pay reparations in their own goods, which they produce at home with their domestic currency. In order to pay foreign currency one has to sell goods in foreign markets.

Incidentally, the South African delegation has come to the assistance of the Australians with a scandalous amendment concerning so-called "fair prices." If we adopt this amendment, a vanquished state will not have the right to sell its goods abroad in the way all others do, but will have to sell them at prices which suit foreign export merchants, and these merchants will be entitled to demand by special arbitration procedure the fixing of such prices as they find convenient.

Thus they want to place Italy and the other vanquished countries in a position in which they will not only have to pay reparations, but will have to pay them in foreign currency; and since for this they must willy-nilly sell their goods in foreign markets, then they are to be tied hand and foot as regards the prices for these goods. And these forcibly imposed prices are to be called nothing more nor less than "fair." If this is called fairness, then the Soviet delegation must say that it has quite a different idea of fairness.

The Australian delegation submitted its proposal for the payment of reparations in dollars or pounds sterling without even taking the trouble to find out from the representa-

tives of Italy, Rumania, Finland, Bulgaria and Hungary whether this would be acceptable to them or not. Without asking any of them, the Australian delegation wants to compel them all to pay in dollars or sterling, in other words, to compel these countries to sell their goods cheap abroad for dollars or sterling—in the United States, Great Britain, and their dominions and dependencies. And this is offered as a fair solution of the reparations question!

In reality, it means that the merchants for whom it is desired to guarantee in the peace treaties such favourable terms of purchase of Italian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Finnish goods, would be in a position to buy these goods at rock-bottom prices and rake in enormous profit on the transactions. It is these merchants who under such a system of reparations payments would in fact be the chief recipients of reparations.

This is what the Australian proposal would lead to. And this is being offered to us as a fair solution of the reparations question. There is nothing fair here—either for the states which suffered aggression, or for the states which must bear the responsibility for aggression. In practice, such a decision would benefit the merchants, and precisely those merchants who have plenty of dollars or pounds sterling, and who, if we adopted the Australian proposal, would derive enormous profits and increase their fortunes on reparations. We are naturally opposed to such a decision.

And, lastly, one more question.

We are being insistently pressed to set up a commission which after the Conference, if you please, is to supervise reparations in each country for which they are established. Who needs such a commission? The Soviet Union, for instance, is highly interested in reparations, but it objects to such a commission, since it would interfere in the internal affairs of these countries, and by its interference

infringe on the national dignity and sovereignty of these states.

The Soviet Union has established friendly relations with all these states, and hopes they will further develop favourably. The Soviet Union does not force its friendship on anyone, but willingly establishes good relations with states which really desire friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Insistence on such commissions means seeking opportunity for continuous interference in the internal affairs of Italy, for continuous interference in the affairs of Rumania and other states. The Soviet Union resolutely objects to this, since it does not want to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, or to make such interference easier for others. The Soviet Union refuses to participate in such commissions. A decision to set up such commissions would only discredit the Conference.

In view of this, we say that the proposals of the Australian delegation are unacceptable to the Peace Conference. Out of respect for the Conference we express the conviction that it will reject these fallacious and unjust proposals.

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## REPARATIONS AND THE SOVIET UNION

*Speech at the Economic Commission*

*for the Balkans and Finland*

*August 28, 1946*

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation expresses its thanks to all delegations which, like the Yugoslav and others, fully supported the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers respecting reparations. Today we are summing up the debate on the question.

### I

#### IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION

The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the question of reparations. Our country suffered the invasion of several million soldiers of the fascist armies of Germany and her satellites. The invaders inflicted immense calamities on our country. To this day you may see at every step the destruction they wrought in all the western and southern regions of the U.S.S.R.

The whole Soviet people have rolled up their sleeves and are now engaged in eliminating the consequences of this enemy incursion. Just as in the years of the Patriotic War the peoples of the U.S.S.R. rallied around the great Stalin

and waged a victorious struggle against the invaders, so now for already over a year the Soviet people, under the guidance of their great leader, have been devotedly carrying out the plan for the country's rehabilitation. Enormous tasks confront us in the restoration of industry, agriculture and transport, in the rebuilding of demolished towns and villages, and all the Soviet people are now absorbed in this labour of restoration, in this heroic and titanic task of restoring their mills and factories, power stations and railways, and the wrecked and demolished homes of millions of families. Tens of millions of people are conscientiously working on the new Stalin Plan for their country's economic revival and reconstruction.

In these conditions reparations are of no little economic importance, as well as of enormous political significance, in that they offer a certain moral satisfaction to our people, who cannot acquiesce in a situation where countries whose armies for many long months tyrannized and wrought destruction on the territory of the U.S.S.R. should go unpunished and not assume at least some share of material responsibility for the miseries they inflicted on the Soviet Union.

The Soviet people have no misgivings regarding the feasibility of these new and enormous tasks that confront them in the economic rehabilitation and technical reconstruction of their country. The very Soviet State is so constructed, and enjoys such support among the working people, and is headed by so great a leader as Stalin, that we, Soviet people, are confident that the rebuilding of our country is in reliable hands and on the right road. We shall strive to carry out the five-year plan sooner than the time indicated. And we are certain that our country will soon be able to tackle new and still more majestic economic tasks than those it tackled before the war.

Naturally, we are anxious to remove all obstructions and complications from this path. If the reparations problem were to take such a turn at the Peace Conference that even the satisfaction of the modest Soviet claims to reparations already provided for in the draft peace treaties met with obstruction, this would cause inadmissible damage to the Soviet people. It would be absurd to think that the Soviet delegation will not try to uphold these legitimate and just interests of our country. We shall continue to do so in the future, even though it may sometimes not be to the liking of people who are incapable of understanding the most elementary things where the interests of other nations are concerned.

## II

### REPLY TO THE DEFENDERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION

The representative of the Greek delegation spoke twice in the Commission on the subject of the Australian amendment, and attempted to explain his view. He emphatically stressed that reparations must not be made burdensome for the states responsible for aggression.

Yet this same Greek delegate, as we know, is demanding reparations from little Bulgaria to the tune of no more nor less than, 1,000 million dollars—or to be more precise, 985 million dollars. Quite obviously, this figure is utterly unfounded, and is only indicative of an unrestrained craving for other people's property. This also shows that the Greek delegation has fallen into a grave contradiction, when it says, on the one hand, that we ought to be more careful about reparations, and, on the other, makes absolutely frivolous claims upon its neighbours. It should be added that the

Greek delegation, did not object to the proposals of the Australian delegation, which is very characteristic of its position.

The Canadian delegation stated that before the Conference it considered the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be correct, but that here, having learned of a certain minor remark of the Polish delegation, it arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to support the Australian amendment to set up a reparations commission. You also know that no sooner had the Canadian delegation rendered such prompt support to the Polish delegation than the latter itself withdrew its proposal. We do not know what the Canadian delegation will do now, but its attitude in certain respects is characteristic—characteristic of instability, unsteadiness, readiness to retreat and swing from one course to another. Two years ago when the armistice terms were signed, and even yesterday, before the Poles introduced a minor amendment on a disputable issue, Canada regarded the amount and procedure of payment of reparations established for Rumania as correct. It transpires, however, that one cannot rely upon this. The Canadian delegation, whose unsteady attitude on the reparations problem we have all observed, must now extricate itself as best it can from the situation in which it has landed.

A number of remarks have been made here in connection with my first statement, and I shall have to deal with them.

The representative of the U.S.A. defended the Australian delegation, and especially defended its right to move amendments, creating the impression that the Soviet delegation had disputed this right. But the Soviet delegation did not even dream of disputing the right of the Australian or any other delegation to move proposals and amendments. Every delegation may move correct and even incorrect proposals for that matter. That is its full right. But, on the other hand, who can dispute our right to criticize such proposals? If a

proposal is moved, it is evidently in order that it may be freely discussed, and the remarks which may be made concerning it considered. One may like or dislike these remarks, but certainly the right of criticism is no less a legitimate right of the Conference delegates.

The observations of our delegation concerning the Australian proposal, and the substance of the proposal itself, have been published in the Soviet press. Why should the Australian delegation in its turn not publish the statements it made here in support of its proposals, and the substance of the reply of the Soviet delegation? Let people judge what is right and what is wrong in the proposals of the Australian and Soviet delegations.

You know that before the opening of the Conference certain foreign newspapers started a rumour that the Soviet delegation was opposed to pressmen attending the meetings of the Conference and its committees. As soon as this question was raised at the Conference the Soviet delegation declared that this was a lying rumour, that somebody had started it although it absolutely did not correspond to fact. We welcome the presence of press representatives at our commission. We shall be gratified if the views of both the Australian delegation and the Soviet delegation on this subject are published in detail in the press.

If the representatives of the press help to present this or that viewpoint objectively to democratic opinion, it will be very useful. One should not be afraid of the press, not be afraid if the press discusses the important problems under consideration at the Conference and truthfully tells what proposals there are on important problems and what objections are raised to these proposals. This can only be useful in clarifying the situation, and in averting fabrications and false rumours which prevent people from learning the real situation.

Some have said here that we should not discuss the motives behind the various proposals. One might agree that, after all, it does not matter to us what motives guided this or that delegation in making its proposal. But on the other hand, it is certainly not the wording of proposals that interests us, but their actual substance.

The Australian delegation says that in principle it is for reparations. But recall the substance of its proposals, and it will be obvious that in practice they amount to abolishing reparations. This is as if somebody kindly offered a chair to his neighbour, and then, by way of a joke, say, pulled it away from under him as he was about to sit down. In such cases it is dangerous to rely on words, and it is better to look round so as not to become the victim of a bad joke, even though it be on the part of a friend. That is why we think that one cannot judge the substance of a proposal by its wording, but should analyze its real meaning and draw the appropriate conclusions, even if some people may not like it.

It was also said here that one should not express doubt as to whether a given delegation is expressing the opinion of its people. But it is impossible to agree to the utterances of delegates being restricted in this way. In democratic countries there are ways of verifying whether a representative is really expressing the will of the people. Why should not this question be sometimes raised, if there are weighty grounds for it? In democratic countries there are also fully elaborated and practically tested methods of remedying the situation when a given representative expresses the opinion not of the broad mass of the people, but of some particular group.

As you know, last year, at the Berlin (Potsdam) conference, which lasted only two weeks, at the beginning of the conference we saw one set of representatives of Great

Britain, and at the end of the conference a different set of representatives, because the people had made a very substantial correction both in the composition of parliament and in the composition of the government, and then in the composition of the delegation. By the way, this had a favourable effect on the work of the Berlin conference.

In democratic countries it is not so difficult sometimes to ascertain the real opinion of the people, and then ways may be found of correcting irregularities and mistakes committed. Representatives of democratic countries have no cause to object to this. And one thing that follows from this is that one should not deny the right of occasionally expressing doubt as to whether a given representative is really voicing the will of his people.

### III

#### REPARATIONS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY

There were also remarks to the effect that we are giving too much time and attention to the reparations problem. The Soviet delegation cannot agree with this.

I can understand the representatives of Great Britain and the United States being more interested, not in Article 22, say, of the draft peace treaty with Rumania, dealing with reparations, but in, let us say, Article 26, which speaks of the right of Allied and Associated Powers "to seize, retain, liquidate or take any other action with respect to all property, rights and interests" of Rumania and Rumanian citizens in the territories of those states. For them this may be a more important question. But in that case, who can prevent us from upholding that which concerns the legitimate and just rights of our state and our people.

Let us turn to the facts.

As you know from the documents I have cited, during

the war the foreign invaders destroyed 31,850 industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union, including a large number of big mills and factories. Before the war these enterprises employed about four million workers. This was a severe shock to our industry. The United States luckily was not invaded by the enemy. Quite a number of new plants were built in the United States in these years. The industry of the United States in these years considerably expanded and attained a capacity hitherto unknown even in America. New plants were built there not only for peace production, but also new powerful war industry plants—evidently with an eye to the future, for any contingency. This is universally known.

The Soviet delegation hopes that our desire as quickly as possible to repair the destruction inflicted on us by the war will be properly understood, as well as our desire to make use of all available possibilities for this purpose, including the relatively small reparations payments envisaged by the armistice terms. And of course we certainly cannot agree with any proposals which might hamper the economic recovery of the Soviet Union, which might hinder the restoration of economic life in the districts of the U.S.S.R. which were occupied by the enemy. We were gratified that our right to receive reparations was recognized in all the armistice terms both by the U.S.A. and by Great Britain. We understood each other and found a common language.

But the Australian delegation has adopted a different language. It put forward proposals here aimed at abolishing this agreement. The Australian delegation put forward proposals which not only contradict the view of the Soviet Union, but which are at variance with the view of the United States and Great Britain on these questions, and with the armistice terms and the draft peace treaties.

We had found a common language with the U.S.A. and Great Britain on this and many other questions. But the Australian delegation has begun to speak in another language, a language which has an entirely different meaning.

This other language, unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., can only be used by those who are beginning to forget how the war went and what part was played by this or that country in ensuring the common victory of the Allies, by those who are also beginning to forget the sacrifices which the war against fascism demanded of us. But that being the case, we shall state our opinion and give our estimate of such a situation. The language of the Australian delegation's amendments is not the language we spoke as Allies during the war. It is a language which cannot unite, but can only disunite the Allies, disunite the United Nations.

As to eliminating the consequences of the war, I must state that under all circumstances we are relying primarily on our own forces, and not on reparations. Of course, reparations will be of some help in the rehabilitation of our country. But the chief thing we rely upon is our own Soviet people, our Stalin five-year plans, and the fact that the entire work of restoration and further development of our national economy in the postwar period, as in the stormy period of the war, is directed by our great leader, our Stalin. He ensured previously and ensures now the unbreakable unity of our people in labour, in the postwar restoration of our national economy, and in promoting the economic, cultural and political prosperity of our state.

We hope that this at the same time corresponds with the interests of all other peoples who are ready to work together in defence of peace and security, and in establishing relations among peoples which answer to the best aspirations of all peace-loving nations.

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## THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S CLAIMS OF AGGRANDIZEMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF ALBANIA

*Speech at the Plenary  
Meeting of the Paris Peace Conference  
August 30, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. The Greek delegation is displaying very great activity at this Conference with regard to its foreign policy affairs. Again we are confronted with the claims of the Greek Government on its neighbour, Albania. The Greek Government is in this instance making claims not on a former enemy state, which would have been comprehensible; no, the Greek delegation is taking advantage of the Peace Conference to present claims of aggrandizement at the expense of its peace-loving neighbour, democratic, pro-Ally Albania.

The Greek delegation refuses to desist, which is very dangerous, as this again creates an uneasy situation in the Balkans, creates uneasiness in an area of Europe where peace and good-neighbourly relations between the peoples have only just been established, and where an opportunity is opening to solve various differences between the nations in a friendly manner. The Greek Government refuses to wait a little, until the time when Greece can put its demands before neighbouring or other countries by the usual proce-

dure—through diplomatic channels or by negotiations—and settle outstanding questions in the way every decent democratic government should.

The Peace Conference has not gathered in order to afford an opportunity to any aggressive, undemocratic government which does not want to observe the universally accepted rules of relations with other democratic states—it has not gathered in order to provide such a government with the opportunity to involve us in its affairs, which happen to be in an unsatisfactory state.

The Greek delegation wants the Conference to involve the Council of Foreign Ministers as well in this matter. It wants the Conference to commission the Council of Foreign Ministers to examine the claims of aggrandizement of the Greek Government against its neighbour. But we know that it is not the business of the Conference to give commissions to the Council of Foreign Ministers. We also know that the Conference has given no commissions to the Council of Foreign Ministers so far, because it has assembled not for this purpose, but to discuss the peace treaties for Germany's former satellites.

It follows from this that the Conference should not place its services at the disposal of any restless and aggressive government which does not understand what the Peace Conference is for, and which wants to use this rostrum to divert the attention of its own people and of other peoples from the unsatisfactory state of its domestic affairs.

It is not fortuitous that the Greek delegation has raised the question of its claims on Albania just on the eve of the plebiscite, on the eve of September 1, when by the most unlawful measures every preparation has been made to bring back the King to Greece, and when in Greece itself, gripped in a vice of terror and police violence against the democratic parties, against the democratic circles of society, there is

still no certainty that at the plebiscite all the artificial preparations for the restoration of the monarchy will not suffer fiasco. Evidently the Greek Government has no faith that even the aid and support of the foreign troops which have settled for long in Greece and which bear responsibility for the very abnormal situation in that country—that even the support of these foreign troops is a sufficient guarantee that the outcome of the plebiscite will be the one desired by the Greek Government, i.e., in favour of the King, whom the Greek people have to this day not allowed back into their country.

We know that the Government of the Soviet Ukraine has placed the question of the situation in Greece before the Security Council, in view of the fact that the policy of the Greek Government is a threat to peace. Possibly this question will be discussed this very day in the Security Council. It is legitimate that the attention of the leading international body charged with the maintenance of peace and security, the Security Council of the United Nations, should be drawn to this question. But the Greek delegation is unwilling to muster even a little patience and see how this question is dealt with in the Security Council. It hastens to use this rostrum to exert outside pressure upon the forthcoming plebiscite:

On the eve of the plebiscite, engineered with the assistance of certain outside forces for the restoration of an unpopular monarchy, it is proposed that this international Conference should help this "plebiscite." But it would be better to turn our attention to the fact that Greece remains the sole unquiet point in the Balkans, where democratic elements are denied the right to breathe, where editors of democratic newspapers are seized in the streets and murdered, where such extreme terrorist measures are practised as evoke indignation among democrats in all countries.

Evidently the present Greek authorities so badly need to pull through the design they have planned for September 1, in spite of the resistance of the people, that they must leave their internal affairs in the shadows and, for this purpose, divert attention to external affairs.

The present Greek Government, as is known, leans for support upon foreign troops. And these troops do not want to leave this foreign country. Of course, foreign bayonets can play their role, but, gentlemen, such assistance is unreliable, because it evokes the opposition of the people. It creates the impression that the present Greek rulers enjoy no authority with their people, that they need the support of foreign troops. It appears, too, that the Greek authorities need the International Conference to assist them in their foreign political manoeuvres. This is asking too much!

The Soviet delegation believes that the Peace Conference will refuse to facilitate these foreign political manoeuvres, which the Greek delegation needs before the plebiscite of September 1. The Soviet delegation moves the rejection of the proposal of the Greek delegation, which is striving to dismember Albania and to involve the Peace Conference in this affair. There are other ways of considering disputes between neighbours. After the signing of the peace treaty with Italy, the Greek Government can, if this should be necessary, avail itself of the usual rules of diplomatic procedure to adjust its relations with its neighbours. (*Applause.*)

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## ONCE MORE ON THE QUESTION OF ALBANIA

*Speech at the Plenary  
Meeting of the Paris Peace Conference  
August 30, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. We have gathered today to discuss two definite questions, but we are discussing something else—a third question. We approved an agenda consisting of questions relating to Iran and Iraq, but we are discussing the question of Greece. The matter raised by the Greek delegation was not placed in the normal way on the agenda of the Conference, but we have been unexpectedly compelled to consider this question.

Now it will be necessary to dwell on the explanation which was given today by the American delegate concerning the order of examination of questions in the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Conference. Naturally, none of us disputes the right of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the questions envisaged in the Potsdam (Berlin) agreement. The statements which have been made here on this score in connection with my speech were misdirected.

What order was established for the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers? Attention has been quite correctly drawn here to Point 3 (i) of the decision of the Potsdam

conference to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers. This decision says the following about the Council's tasks: it is authorized to draw up treaties of peace for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and "to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe." Consequently, the Council of Foreign Ministers is indeed authorized to consider any questions relating to this category.

But the point at issue now is not what the Council of Foreign Ministers should deal with. It is not the Council of Foreign Ministers that is sitting in this hall, but a conference of 21 states. The point is what the Peace Conference should deal with. This is defined not in the Potsdam resolution, but in another document, which has also been mentioned here. This document is called "Decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom." The section of this document dealing with the preparation of peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland (Point 2) says that "when the preparation of all these drafts has been completed, the Council of Foreign Ministers will convoke a conference for the purpose of considering treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland." Thus what the Peace Conference should deal with is here clearly defined. It should deal with the treaties of peace with these five states.

You see that the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers is one thing and the competence of the Peace Conference another. The two must not be mixed. One cannot fail to see that the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers and that of the Peace Conference are different. If we want to abide by what we signed, upon that which we agreed concerning the tasks and rights of the Peace Conference, we must abide by what has been recorded in

the afore-mentioned decision of the Moscow conference Perusal of its text shows that according to this decision, the Conference may deal only with the treaties of peace with five of Germany's former satellites. Nothing else was envisaged for consideration at the Peace Conference.

I understand the French representative, who spoke before me and correctly pointed out that the tasks of the Peace Conference did not include examination of questions relating to Albania and Greece. Albania is not a former satellite of Germany, it is not one of the former enemy states. No matter how much the Greek delegation may talk here about Greece still being in a state of war with Albania, this will remain an unfounded and irresponsible statement, invented in order to threaten little Albania and justify the plans of aggrandizement of Greece's rulers. In spite of this declaration we, by unanimous decision of the Conference, invited Albania to our Conference not as an enemy state, but as one of the states which helped the Allies during the war against Germany. And we greeted here the representative of the new democratic Albania, which fought together with us against Germany and fascist Italy and helped us to vanquish fascism. The Soviet delegation considers that such a friendly attitude towards present democratic Albania is the only correct attitude. If, however, we take the line of supporting the annexationist claims of the present Greek rulers, the Conference will slide into a wrong course, the course into which they are trying to push us.

It follows from all this that the Conference should not, and has no right to, consider any other questions than those outlined for it when it was convoked.

But perhaps one or another of the delegations present here has been authorized to consider any question it pleases at this Conference? Hardly so. In any case, the Soviet delegation has no such authority. Nor have we hitherto been

told that other delegations have been authorized to consider any questions which this or that delegation might take it into its head to raise at the Conference. As to the references to the desire to display liberality, they are out of place, as "liberality" of such kind does not promise the Conference anything good, and will only lead to confusion.

We should refuse to broaden the powers of the Conference and to lead it away from the path it has adhered to so far. We must consider the five draft peace treaties, and not get ourselves involved in a discussion of question which do not come within the competence of the Conference.

We know that certain foreign Powers support the present Greek rulers both officially and unofficially. Only yesterday it was said that official observers from Great Britain and the United States of America would watch the plebiscite in Greece. Today it is said that there will be no official observers, but that there will be unofficial observers. In other words, even now certain states continue to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, and consequently bear responsibility for this. Only the French Government has given up this affair. The Governments of Britain and the United States are again committed in the matter of Greece's internal affairs, and are trying to induce others to interfere. This is to a certain extent understandable. British troops are still in Greece, and this makes them answerable for the situation in that country. It has been widely reported that American warships are on their way to Greece. Evidently the Greek Government needs such support too. But these means of exerting pressure upon the internal affairs of Greece are not only alien to democracy, they are dangerous.

Is it not time to call a halt, is it not time to end this interference in the internal affairs of Greece, which is making it so hard for the Greek people? Is it not time to cease this outside interference, and give the Greek people the

opportunity themselves, freely and in a normal democratic way, to elect their own parliament, to decide the question of the monarchy without pressure from outside, to elect their own lawful democratic government, one really worthy of the heroic Greek people, who are friendly to us? Now, if the representatives of certain foreign states were to display a certain amount of liberality in this respect—liberality in the good sense of the word—I think that the public opinion of all democratic countries would only applaud such a step.

However, there are people who are bent on supporting the Greek delegation, whose voice is not regarded as sufficiently authoritative for a direct appeal to the Council of Foreign Ministers. As to that, it should be said that those who wish this might do it some other way. The Greek delegation might collect the signatures of such delegations in the lobbies of the Conference, without dragging the entire Conference into the business.

At any rate, it is the request of the Soviet delegation that the Peace Conference be not dragged into it. (*Applause.*)

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## THE STATUTE OF TRIESTE AND MAJOR QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

*Speech in the Political  
and Territorial Commission for Italy  
September 14, 1946*

Mr. Chairman and Delegates. The question of the state structure of the "Free Territory of Trieste" is of important significance in principle and in practice.

You know that we already have a basis on which to elaborate the statute of Trieste. It is provided in the decision of the four Ministers of July 3. This decision maps the frontiers of the "Free Territory of Trieste"; it recognizes that the integrity and independence of the territory should be guaranteed by the Security Council; it also lays down the general principles on which the organs of authority should be built.

Nevertheless, the committee elected by the Council of Foreign Ministers to work out the statute of Trieste did not arrive at a unanimous opinion. On the one hand we have before us three more or less similar drafts of the British, American and French delegations. On the other hand there are two other drafts, presented by the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations, in which there are also many kindred points. It is up to the Conference to analyze these drafts and pronounce its opinion in regard to the statute of Trieste.

There are various ways of approaching the question of the state structure of Trieste. One should remember, howev-

er, that we contemplate placing this entire territory under the protection of the United Nations. Consequently, the principles on which the state authority is organized in Trieste must conform to the basic aims of the United Nations.

The "Free Territory of Trieste" must not be regarded as a sort of mandated territory. Still less must it be regarded as a kind of colony of the Security Council. The aim we must strive for is clear: that aim must be the welfare of the population of Trieste, and the establishment of good relations with neighbours and other peoples.

If it be incorrect to regard the Free Territory as a sort of colony or semi-colony, neither must we regard it as a military base for one or another Power or Powers, or even for the Security Council itself. Trieste must not be converted into a new base in the Balkans for someone's armed forces. This would not accord with the interests either of the population of Trieste, or of the United Nations. It is recognized by all that Trieste is a major international commercial port, and it must fulfil its important part in the development of international trade.

The proposal of the Soviet delegation proceeds from the decisions adopted by the four Ministers. My task is to explain the Soviet delegation's point of view on this question, particularly with regard to the drafts presented by other delegations.

## I

### ORGANIZATION OF AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRACY

The principles on which authority in Trieste is to be organized is the first important question. In whose hands should authority in Trieste rest—in the hands of the people, or in the hands of the Governor? It is on this question that

the chief divergences between the drafts presented to the Conference are revealed. The decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers says that "legislative and executive authority shall be established on democratic lines including universal suffrage." This clearly specifies in whom legislative and executive authority in Trieste is to be vested. It follows from the decision that this authority must be in the hands of the people of Trieste, and that it must be organized on democratic lines.

This decision also lays down the position to be occupied by the Governor of Trieste. It states that "the Governor shall be appointed by the Security Council after consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy." And further that "annual reports shall be submitted by the Governor to the Security Council." Thus the position of the Governor is also defined with perfect precision.

Yet, in the draft of the British delegation, the entire authority is vested in the Governor. Such, too, is the tenor of the American draft, and to a considerable extent of the French draft. To justify this, all sorts of arguments are adduced concerning the tense political situation in Trieste. It is declared that democratic self-government should not be introduced there as yet, that the establishment of democratic principles in this territory should be postponed to the future. Contrary to the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the British, American and French drafts demand that the master in Trieste shall be the Governor. That is one political line.

The question arises, what exactly would be the Governor's powers in Trieste from this point of view?

The British draft dwells in detail on these powers. It states that the Government Council shall consist of the Governor, as Chairman, the Deputy Governor, the Director of the Free Port Administration, and three persons appoint-

ed by the Assembly of the Free Territory, but again with the consent of the Governor. It also lays down that the Governor, the Deputy Governor and the Director of the Port shall not be citizens of Trieste, or citizens of Yugoslavia or Italy, but citizens of other states. It is thus proposed that half the Government of Trieste should consist of foreigners.

The British draft further provides that the Governor shall be responsible for external relations and for the maintenance of public order and security, and that he shall have the right to dismiss members of the Government Council and to recommend the Assembly to appoint others. In addition, it provides that all administrative officers shall be appointed and dismissed by order of the Governor, that he may dismiss members of judicial bodies, that he shall have the right to suspend the operation of any law, to annul any administrative order and to issue ordinances which shall have force of law. He is also to be empowered to conclude agreements with other states, to enter into international multilateral arrangements, and so on. As you see, according to the British draft, authority is entirely delegated to the Governor. Approximately the same thing is said in the American and in the French drafts.

The question arises: what served as the model for drafts of this kind?

In this connection the situation one finds in the British colonies is of undoubted interest. Here the governors are vested with similar powers.

In India, for example, the governor-general, that is, the Viceroy, presides at the meetings of the Council of Ministers whenever he wishes, and the Ministers themselves are appointed by the same governor-general. It is within the governor-general's discretion to agree or not agree with this or that bill, and the governor-general can issue any ordinance

which in his opinion is necessitated by circumstances. The police and security organs are in the hands of the governor-general of India. It should be added that similar rights are vested in the governors of the individual provinces of India.

Take another example. In West Africa there is a British colony called the Gold Coast. The Governor of the Gold Coast has the right to approve or not approve the decisions of the local legislative council. He exercises supreme direction of the administration of the colony. He can discharge officials, provided they have not been appointed by the King. The Executive Council of the Gold Coast, which performs the role of the local government, is presided over by the Governor—and, by the way, also consists of six people, just as has been suggested for the Government Council in Trieste.

It will be apparent from all this that the position of the Governor of Trieste is to resemble that of the governor-general of India, or the Governor of the Gold Coast colony in Africa. Now the question arises, is this position suitable for the "Free Territory of Trieste"? What will happen if we accord such rights to the Governor of Trieste? Shall we not have, instead of a *free* territory, something like a *gubernatorial* territory—instead of a free Trieste, a gubernatorial Trieste? It seems to me that this danger exists. Naturally, the Soviet delegation objects to the experience of administration in British colonies being transplanted to Trieste.

It would be incorrect if we applied to Trieste the policy of Lord Curzon with regard to India. We cannot sympathize with such a policy. Also alien to us are the ideas of Cecil Rhodes, the organizer of the Union of South Africa, who said: "The native must be treated like a child, and should not be allowed either the suffrage or alcohol. We must maintain a system of despotism, similar to that which has

yielded such good results in India." Such a slave-owner ideology cannot be carried into Trieste. The Soviet delegation would like this to be clear to all.

All this indicates that the proposal of the British delegation does not accord with the elementary principles of democracy. The British delegate who spoke here said that he did not underestimate the ideological attractiveness of the Soviet draft, but that it was not applicable to Trieste realities. But he did not prove it, and I think he could not have proved it. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation cannot agree that the principles which are applied by the British Empire in India and the Gold Coast would be suitable for Trieste.

We by no means propose that the principles of Soviet democracy be applied in Trieste, although, as is known from the experience of our country, these principles have yielded no mean results, one may say, remarkable results. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation the realization of these principles is possible only at a certain level of political development, when it becomes a really vital need of the people. But we do believe that the generally known principles of democracy which have now attained such strong development in the countries of Europe could be usefully applied also in Trieste. Such is our view.

Naturally, we must distinguish between the positions that arise in various countries.

Take, for instance, two neighbouring countries—Greece and Bulgaria—where the destiny of the monarchy has been decided in these very past few days by means of a plebiscite. We know how it was done. In the one case, in Greece, when the question of restoring the monarchy was being decided, every means of pressure was brought to bear by the domestic authorities and outside forces, and a situation was created in the country in which nothing but falsification of the

plebiscite could result. A free expression of the will of the people under such conditions was impossible.

It was a different matter in Bulgaria. Everyone recognizes that a free plebiscite was held there under normal conditions, and it turned into a nation-wide celebration. The entire population participated in this plebiscite, and unanimously voted for the abolition of the monarchy and for the establishment of a republic in Bulgaria.

Comparing the two countries, we see that a republic was established in Bulgaria in a way which fully conforms to the generally recognized principles of democracy, and, on the other hand, that in Greece the monarchy is being restored by means that have nothing in common with an honest attitude towards the principles of democracy. Certainly, bad examples should not be copied. But is it not clear that we now have sufficient instances of the application of the principles of democracy which indicate the way to achieve democracy under the actual political conditions obtaining in Trieste?

Trieste is intimately connected with the modern political life of Europe. It has some 300,000 inhabitants, who are accustomed to active political life and are capable of appreciating the role of political, trade union, cultural and other organizations of a democratic type. One cannot propose for Trieste a statute which ignores democratic principles of state structure. An anti-democratic statute will not bring about the tranquility we desire, but will lead to opposite results. We are already well into the 20th century, and it should be recognized that democracy has become a vital requirement of the peoples.

True, certain people find the democracy of the 19th century more to their liking, and they do not want to recognize the progressive significance of the new, already established, and very important ways in which democracy is

developing in our time. We all know that 19th century democracy represented a great progress, and its positive role in the struggle against despotism, as well as against fascism in our day, is well known. In the 19th century, democracy of the parliamentary type developed in a number of countries, and that was a great step forward in the evolution of state life. But outside the election campaigns, and outside the walls of parliament, that democracy did not attain broad development. The participation of the people in the affairs of state still remained very restricted.

In our time, in the age of radio, newspapers and cinema, when there are, moreover, mass political parties and trade unions, and when not infrequently even the Church takes a very broad part in political campaigns, democracy has acquired a quite different aspect. The entire people, the millions, the masses, are now being drawn into political life. Not only during election campaigns, but from day to day the broad masses are now participating in the political life of their country and are actively reacting to international developments.

Together with the great advances of radio, the daily press and many other forms of mass enlightenment, democracy, too, and the forms of its embodiment, are making rapid headway in these times. Trieste is situated at one of the important political points of Europe, and all that has been said is fully applicable to it. We shall not be comprehended if we arrive at the opinion that we must refrain from applying the principles of democracy in Trieste. From this we must draw the conclusion that the state structure of Trieste must be built on democratic principles.

Trieste cannot remain outside the general stream of development of democracy in the countries of Europe. If we carefully study what there is acceptable to all of us in the modern democratic forms in Europe, we shall certainly find

ritory. And then we shall refrain from transplanting to the principles of colonial gubernatorial rule, and will what is useful and what is practically applicable to the given conditions for the democratic development of Trieste.

That is why we are against the British delegation's demand which to some extent resembles a colonial regime, consider it natural that the Free Territory should be organized on the principles of democracy without delay. The people of Trieste must have the opportunity really to live in freedom, and to enjoy all the rights enjoyed in democratic states—and only then will the decision adopted by us to create a Free Territory be comprehended by a

Also of importance in the statute on Trieste is the question of citizenship. The Soviet delegation regard correct the Yugoslav proposal, aimed in this respect at former active supporters of the fascist regime in Trieste. Not so long ago we all recognized that it was necessary to do away with the remnants of fascism. If this is so, active fascist supporters and their paid agents must not be granted the right of citizenship in Trieste.

## II

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE VETO POWER

The proposals which we have undertaken to propose must provide a new place for Trieste in international relations.

Back in September of last year the Council of Foreign Ministers recognized that Trieste should be a free international port. Trieste should play an important part in international

tional trade, and we must see to it that the proposals we elaborate facilitate this. It goes without saying that this must be done, not at the expense of the interests of the population of Trieste itself but, on the contrary, with due consideration for their interests.

In this connection it is necessary to dwell on the relations between Trieste and its neighbours—Yugoslavia and Italy. We believe it necessary that there should be special free zones in the port of Trieste for both neighbour states. And it is obvious that Trieste is particularly interested in developing relations with Yugoslavia, which is its main hinterland, its economic rear. In view of this the Soviet delegation regards as correct the proposal for a customs union between Trieste and Yugoslavia, and also for the establishment of a joint administration, together with Yugoslavia, of the Trieste railways. This will create more favourable conditions for Trieste's economic progress and for international trade in general.

One of the delegates who spoke here expressed the apprehension that this might prepare the ground for the inclusion of the Free Territory in Yugoslavia. No facts were however adduced to justify this apprehension. In any case, when setting up the Free Territory we cannot forget its geographical situation and its need for intimate economic ties, particularly with such a neighbour as Yugoslavia. Concern for the interests of the Free Territory demands such a solution, and this is the course we must take.

I now pass to the question of Trieste's political place in international affairs.

All the drafts submitted by the representatives of the four Ministers contain a proposal to demilitarize Trieste. But only the Soviet draft says that the Free Territory must also be neutral. Recognition of neutrality means that there will be no armed forces—either domestic or foreign—on

this territory. The Soviet delegation believes that the Conference should declare in favour of this proposal.

In this connection it is first of all necessary that a decision be adopted providing for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Trieste within a specified time. Nothing, however, is said about this in the drafts submitted. But the Soviet delegation does not deem it possible to evade so important a question.

It is noteworthy that the memorandum of the United States of America emphasizes that the Security Council must have the necessary means to ensure the integrity and independence of the Free Territory. But it is delicately silent as to what kind of "necessary means" is meant. Neither was any satisfactory answer given to the questions which I put to the representative of the United States here. Yet it is not difficult to guess that "necessary means" in this case might also be taken to signify armed forces. If this is so, then the Soviet delegation cannot consent to the proposal of the United States. It must be clear to us that the presence of armed forces would convert the Free Territory into a military base. This would be so even if these armed forces were formally subordinated to the Security Council. It was decided by the Council of Foreign Ministers that Trieste should become a free international port. But no one has yet believed it possible to say that Trieste should become a base for anyone's armed forces. The Soviet delegation holds that neither any individual Power, nor even the Security Council, should convert the Free Territory into a military base, since this would lend an entirely new and moreover undesirable aspect to the entire Trieste question.

As is known, the United Nations Charter provides that members of this Organization should in definite cases furnish the Security Council with the armed forces necessary to maintain peace. In the meaning of the Charter, what is

envisioned here are actions connected with preventing aggression or suppressing the action of an aggressive Power. And it is provided that in such cases special agreements should be signed between the Security Council and members of the Organization. All this, however, gives no warrant whatever for introducing into the Free Territory the armed forces of any Power or of the Security Council, and for actually turning this territory into a military base. Attempts of that sort should not have our support.

The question of the relations between the Free Territory and the Security Council merits special attention. According to the submitted draft, the Security Council is to safeguard the integrity and independence of the Free Territory, appoint the Governor, and receive annual reports from the Governor.

Yesterday the Australian delegation opposed these decisions. It argued that the Security Council could not cope with such tasks. The Australian delegation was unable to make any other proposals meriting attention, but it declared that the Security Council, with the veto power accorded to its permanent members, was not a workable body, and that therefore it should not be vested with the aforesaid powers.

The Australian delegation has thus found one more opportunity to impugn, disparage and spit at the veto power accorded to certain members of the Security Council. One might simply reply to this with the proverb: "Don't spit in the well—you may need its water for a drink." But we cannot confine ourselves to such a reply in the matter of the veto power. All the more since of late wild and extravagant attacks on the veto are being made quite frequently, and are not meeting with due rebuff even from the members of the Organization who were the authors of the Charter. If this continues, respect for the United Nations organization will be undermined at its very foundations.

What does the Australian delegation really want when it attacks the veto in the Security Council, and does it understand where this may lead?

At the San Francisco conference, for the first time, an international organization was founded with the serious duty of safeguarding the peace and security of nations. This organization rests on the unity of all peace-loving Powers in defence of universal peace. The chief and principal element of this organization is precisely the veto power, granted to the five great Powers in the Security Council.

According to the United Nations Charter, the veto means that in all major questions affecting the interests of peace, the United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China must act in accord, and that the Security Council cannot adopt any decision on such questions even if only one of these Powers is in disagreement with it. That means that the veto prevents two, or three, or even four Powers entering into compact and acting against one or other of the five principal states. The veto is a stimulus to the great Powers to work together, hindering intrigues of some against others, which is undoubtedly in the interest of all the United Nations and in the interest of universal peace. It goes without saying that this does not eliminate existing differences and disputes; but, free and open discussion of questions at issue, given the veto power, in the long run provides the best way towards mutual understanding and concessions, towards cooperation and agreements. Hence the purpose of the veto is to ensure that the actions of the great Powers shall benefit all the peace-loving states, large and small.

In the League of Nations the great Powers did not have the veto power. The League was formally built on the principle of equality of big and small states. Those who now advocate the abolition of the veto would drag us back from

the United Nations organization to something resembling the League of Nations. But that, then, reveals the underlying political purpose of these proposals.

Again one has to recall events of the prewar years.

The League of Nations was founded after the world war of 1914-18. It was the first experiment in creating an international organization, but an experiment that cannot be regarded as having been a success. In fact, the League of Nations played no material role in safeguarding peace. The League of Nations failed to become an effective organization for the protection of the security of nations. It even failed to safeguard the security of the countries of the Anglo-French group, which enjoyed the dominating influence in that first international organization. How it ended, we know.

The impotence of the League of Nations in defending the cause of peace was graphically demonstrated when a new war storm began to loom. Decision of the matter was then transferred from Geneva to Munich, as the aggressor demanded. The shame of Munich lies in the fact that there the Powers that played a leading role in the League of Nations signed a certificate of their own inability to defend the cause of peace, and compounded with the aggressor—doing so behind the backs of other peace-loving countries and at the expense of their interests, which only encouraged the aggressor in his reckless plans of war. Munich led us to a new world war, thus convincingly proving that without a united front of *all* peace-loving Powers, due opposition to aggression cannot be ensured, and the cause of peace cannot be upheld.

In the course of the last war there came into being a bloc of great Powers which took the lead of the democratic countries and demolished the aggressor in the West and the East. As a result of this the necessity was recognized to

set up a new international organization to defend the peace and security of nations. The United Nations organization appeared, and along with it the Security Council and the veto. This was an attempt to create at last an effective organization for the safeguarding of universal security. And it is precisely the veto that plays the leading role here. The veto principle demands that all the great Powers give attention to their common interests and the interests of universal peace, thus making it difficult to create narrow blocs and groups of some Powers against other Powers, and still more difficult for anyone to make a deal with an aggressor behind the backs and contrary to the interests of peace-loving countries.

What may renunciation of the veto power in the United Nations organization imply? It is not difficult to guess that it may untie the hands of some for definite actions. Renunciation of the veto would, of course, facilitate the creation of narrow groups and blocs among the great Powers, and at any rate would untie the hands of those who are opposed to a united front of the United Nations in defence of peace. But we have already tried that road. That road led us to the second world war. What it holds out for the United Nations organization is nothing but ignominious failure.

Such plans only meet the desires of reactionary circles, they only help the camp of unbridled imperialists. They do not conceal that cooperation with the Soviet State irks them. There are plenty of people in these circles, of course, who are inveterately inclined to hatch anti-Soviet projects. But we have the unforgettable experience of the League of Nations before us. It tried to uphold peace without the Soviet Union, and even directly at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union. No good came of it.

To ignore the Soviet Union, to forget the importance of its support in matters affecting peace is dangerous nowadays.

This course can only be taken by those who, instead of cooperation with the Soviet Union, prefer to build their calculations on bargains and agreements with a future aggressor, which, of course, has nothing in common with the interest of peace and international security. Such calculations have been defeated before. And they will be defeated again, for which purpose it is very important promptly to expose their ferocious imperialist nature and their incompatibility with the interests of the peace and security of nations.

After the second world war a new organization for the defence of peace arose. On the Security Council has now been laid the task of ensuring the cooperation of all the great Powers, and at the same time of displaying incessant care for the maintenance of universal peace. No such organization existed either in the 19th century, or before the first world war, or before the second world war. An international organization has been created which is built on a principle that does not permit either the Soviet Union or other peace-loving states to be ignored. This is exactly what the veto power is for.

Of course, the veto is no panacea. There are blocs and groups even now; nevertheless the veto principle furnishes a certain basis for the development of cooperation among the Powers in safeguarding the security of nations, no matter how big the difficulties. If we really stand for peace and security, we should treasure this weapon designed to serve such important aims.

Of course, there are no few differences among the Powers on one question or another—and disputes are inevitable. Yet we have already time and again found ways of settling differences. These ways are not barred to us in the future, especially if we all realize that attempts of one Power or a group of Powers to dictate its will to other Powers are out of place and futile. We must look ahead, and not permit

ourselves to be dragged back to that discredited ruin—the League of Nations. In the international organization created after the war, we must strive to form a united front of peace-loving states which will not permit the ignoring of any Power, and which will be aimed against any attempt to resurrect the aggressor.

The Australian delegation's sallies against the veto have nothing in common with the interests of universal peace, with the promotion of cooperation among nations. Impotent abuse of the Security Council and the veto may help only those whom we fought, and will win the gratitude only of a future aggressor. We would like to hope that these efforts will suffer fiasco, meeting with rebuff from all true champions of the peace and security of nations.

### III

#### CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

I now pass to the conclusions.

The Soviet delegation deems it necessary that authority in Trieste should be organized on democratic lines, as proposed in the submitted draft. Trieste must really be a Free Territory, and not a sort of gubernatorial territory. That is our first conclusion.

The Soviet delegation also maintains that the principle proposed in the draft, defining the relations between Trieste and the Security Council, should be preserved. We believe that in our proposals concerning Trieste, concerning its relations with neighbours and other countries, an adequate basis is provided for the decisions of the Conference. Such is our second conclusion.

Consideration of the statute of Trieste confronts us with a number of important political questions. With the new

status of Trieste, a proper settlement of questions concerning reciprocal relations between the chief nationalities in that territory, as well as of relations with neighbouring peoples. acquires particular importance.

In this respect the Soviet Union's experience in solving the national problem might be very useful. In the Soviet Union, which embraces sixteen constituent republics, and a large number of autonomous republics and national regions, important successes have been achieved on the basis of the Lenin-Stalin national policy in establishing friendship among peoples standing at various stages of political development and with big differences in customs and languages. We are fully convinced that the proper use of these achievements may bring no small benefit to Trieste as well.

Of course, the Australian delegation, too, should share its experience in such matters. But, as far as we know, that experience is not great. Australia has only such mandated territories as New Guinea and Nauru Island, with its two thousand native inhabitants. Yet the Soviet delegation believes that we must all assist with our experience when the United Nations organization is engaged in solving some important problem. However, inasmuch as the complex nature of the national-political problems in Trieste has been emphasized here, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to declare that the multiform experience of settling relations among nationalities in the Soviet Union will at any rate be of substantial benefit here as well.

In accordance with the considerations I have stated, the Soviet delegation presents for the Commission's examination and for further detailed study in the sub-committee the following proposals:—

In elaboration of the decisions adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers on July 3rd, 1946, the following provisions

should be included in the statute of the Free Territory of Trieste.

(1) The Free Territory of Trieste shall be neutral and shall be demilitarized.

(2) All foreign troops stationed in the Free Territory of Trieste shall be withdrawn within thirty days of the date of entry into force of the peace treaty with Italy.

(3) The international regime in the port of Trieste should provide that the port and transit facilities of Trieste be available to all international trade on conditions of parity, but that the neighbouring states, Yugoslavia and Italy, should have free zones allocated to them.

(4) In order to ensure favourable conditions for the economic development of the Free Territory of Trieste, there should be established between the Free Territory and Yugoslavia such economic cooperation as customs union, joint administration of railways of the Free Territory of Trieste, etc.

(5) The duty of the Governor shall be to ensure the observance of the statute of the Free Territory.

(6) Legislative authority shall be exercised by a Popular Assembly elected by means of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

(7) Executive authority shall be vested in the government of the Free Territory, which shall be formed by the Popular Assembly and shall be responsible to it. The government shall administer the Free Territory. All administrative authorities, including the police, the frontier and coast guards, shall be subordinated to it.

(8) Citizenship of the Free Territory of Trieste shall be granted to former Italian citizens who were resident there on June 10th, 1940, and who are still residing there on the date of entry into force of the peace treaty with Italy. However, the right to acquire Triestian citizenship shall not

be granted to active supporters of the fascist regime in Italy, active members of the fascist party, war criminals, persons who served in the Italian police and government officials who arrived from Italy after 1922.

(9) An inter-Allied Commission shall be set up of representatives of Great Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and France, which, after the date of entry into force of the peace treaty, shall form a Provisional Government of the Free Territory of Trieste, for which purpose the inter-Allied Commission shall consult with the local democratic parties and organizations.

(10) It shall be the special duty of the Provisional Government to set within a period of three months the date of elections to the Popular Assembly.

The Soviet delegation expresses the conviction that the right and proper solution of the question of the Trieste statute will be found by this Conference.

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# THE STRUGGLE FOR A DEMOCRATIC PEACE

*- Speech at the Plenary  
Meeting of the Paris Peace Conference  
October 9, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. The present Conference is the first Peace Conference since the termination of the second world war. In this war the democratic countries were ranged on one side, the fascist states on the other. The war ended in the defeat of our enemies and in the demolition of fascism in the former enemy countries. We secured victory at the cost of tremendous sacrifices. Naturally, the peoples of our countries want to know what will be the fruits of this victory. It is therefore understandable that on the Paris Peace Conference is focused the attention of many millions of people, who suffered the bitter hardships of the war, have come to hate war and aggressors, and desire the establishment of prolonged peace and security.

Our Conference has laboured no little on the draft peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. It has done considerable work in examining many of the clauses of these treaties, and is now approaching the end of its labours. We know that this is not the first time democratic countries are elaborating peace treaties. But one cannot say that the peace treaties which were concluded, for instance, after the first world war conformed to the as-

pirations of the peoples for lasting peace. We must bear this fact in mind and must seek to reach other, more propitious results. This applies both to the peace treaty with Italy which we are considering today, and to the other peace treaties.

## I

### THE MAIN TASKS OF THE CONFERENCE

What is our main task?

It is to ensure that the peace treaty we are considering really conforms to the interests of the peoples, who desire lasting and stable peace. It must be a democratic peace, which cannot allow the aggressor to go unpunished, nor fail to take account of the sacrifices sustained in the great liberation struggle, the struggle for our common victory. At the same time a democratic peace must create better auspices for the development of friendly relations among all nations which desire security and are prepared to give a concerted rebuff to all attempts at new aggression.

It is precisely for this reason that a democratic peace must be directed against fascism. It must facilitate the extirpation of the vestiges of fascism and of all its new varieties, and it must give every encouragement to the establishment of democratic principles in the former enemy states. The conditions of such a peace must contain nothing humiliating to the sovereignty of the given country, Italy, say, and nothing that might lead to its economic enthralment by other, stronger Powers. Such a peace must conform to the liberation aims for which the Allies fought, and at the same time must conform to the interests of the peoples of the former enemy states who have thrown off the yoke of fascism and taken the path of democratic development.

It is precisely from this standpoint that the Soviet delegation approaches the peace treaty with Italy, as well as the other peace treaties. We know very well that nowadays fascism and aggression are intimately connected. This particularly applies to Italy, which was the birthplace of fascism and which, for several years prior to the second world war, "glorified" itself by acts of aggression in Ethiopia and in Spain, and by its military and political alliance with Hitler Germany, which precipitated the last world war.

As we know, the peace treaties were prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers of four states. The Soviet Union took a most active part in the preparation of these treaties. The discussion at the Conference of the draft peace treaty with Italy has shown that all the clauses of the treaty which were agreed upon between the representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and France—that all these clauses met with the support of this Conference, where 21 states are represented. It cannot be said that these agreed clauses were not subjected to criticism here, and sometimes to even excessively captious criticism. Nevertheless it is now clear that cooperation among the four governments in the Council of Foreign Ministers has, in general, yielded propitious results and has met with approval at this Conference.

Both amendments and addenda to the draft have been submitted at the Conference, but—with certain exceptions, of which I shall speak later—they have not materially altered the agreed clauses of the draft submitted.

But there were also unagreed clauses in the draft peace treaty with Italy. And it must be admitted that in this respect the work of the Conference committees has not yielded substantial results, and has done practically nothing to facilitate the elaboration of agreed decisions. This only emphasizes the importance of the principle of cooperation

of the four great Powers. We therefore cannot agree with those who underestimate this and, worse still, regard this principle as a constraint on the development of international cooperation.

Unlike earlier peace conferences, the entire work of the Paris Conference has proceeded openly and publicly. This conforms to democratic principles. The Soviet delegation welcomed a situation which made it possible for all nations of the world to follow the work of the Conference, especially when the press has reported our proceedings with due objectivity and with a consciousness of its responsibility for truthfulness of information. And now, too, we should remember that our work is under constant international public scrutiny. This should promote a correct settlement of the questions of the peace treaties, including those which still remain unsettled.

I shall now pass to certain questions relating to the Italian peace treaty.

## II

### ECONOMIC QUESTIONS OF THE TREATY WITH ITALY

Of all economic questions of the Italian treaty, only the one of reparations directly concerns the interests of the U.S.S.R. I would recall in this connection that the Soviet delegation made its proposals concerning reparations from Italy in favour of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania and Ethiopia as far back as September, 1945, in London. Inasmuch as the Council of Foreign Ministers did not examine this proposal as a whole, but only considered the question of reparations for the Soviet Union, I would like to dwell on this question.

It will be recalled that the Soviet delegation proposed from the very beginning that the reparations from Italy in favour of the Soviet Union be fixed in the amount of 100 million dollars in kind, including deliveries out of current industrial production. This amount of reparations covers only a very small part of the direct damage caused by the Italian fascist troops, which invaded the Soviet Union jointly with Hitler's hordes. The U.S.S.R. thereby once more demonstrated its generosity towards the Italian people, who overthrew fascism and sided with the Allies. Even the Italian Government has never objected to this more than moderate demand of the U.S.S.R., which in fact bears only a symbolic character, a token that the Soviet people deems it impermissible for aggression to go unpunished.

The question of reparations for the U.S.S.R. was debated at six meetings of the Conference's Economic Commission. Sixteen hours had to be spent in discussion, because the Australian and certain other delegations stubbornly objected to this elementary demand of the Soviet Union.

But the question of reparations from Italy had been discussed still more lengthily before the Conference. It was debated at numerous sittings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and at meetings of the Deputy Ministers, as well as in a special committee on reparations. Before the Conference, 32 meetings were held on this subject, and 86 hours were spent on these meetings.

Thus the question of reparations to the Soviet Union from Italy was debated at 38 meetings, and 102 hours in all were spent on it.

This discussion ended in the unanimous decision of a committee composed of representatives of 20 states, which agreed with the correctness of the U.S.S.R.'s proposal to fix the reparations at 100 million dollars in kind, including

deliveries from current industrial production. After all these meetings, and the expenditure of over one hundred hours of time in all sorts of committees and conferences, the same proposal was arrived at which the Soviet Government had made as far back as September of last year. The changes in this draft have proved insignificant.

As you see, the Soviet delegation had to expend no small effort in order to drive home the most elementary things.

What do the facts I have cited testify? They testify primarily to that line which certain countries adopt whenever the issue concerns the direct interests of the Soviet Union. Even the most obvious things the Soviet delegation does not find it easy to prove, when the decision depends on the policy of other countries towards the U.S.S.R. But the Soviet delegation does not go into despair over this, believing that the truth will prevail anyhow, and that no effort must be spared in elaborating the conditions of a peace which will be worthy of the name of a democratic peace.

### III

#### ONCE MORE ON THE TRIESTE STATUTE

Now as regards Trieste.

Trieste, we know, is claimed by Yugoslavia, as the chief town and port of the Julian March, which according to the treaty is to be included in the Yugoslav State. It is also known that the Soviet Union has recognized the historical justice of these national claims of Yugoslavia. The time will come when this will win universal recognition, including the unqualified consent of Italian democrats. Nevertheless, after lengthy discussion, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided, by way of a compromise, that the territory of Trieste should belong neither to Italy nor to Yugoslavia, but

should constitute an international territory under the protection of the United Nations Security Council.

In virtue of this decision, the question of the statute of Trieste, the question of the structure of the administration of the Free Territory of Trieste, has acquired great importance.

We know that several proposals were submitted on this question to the Political Commission for Italy. The British and American, as well as the French, drafts of the Trieste statute give expression to a tendency which can certainly not be qualified as democratic. On the other hand, the drafts submitted by the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations express another tendency, based on the recognition of democratic principles for the statute of Trieste.

The point is whether the Free Territory of Trieste should really be organized on democratic principles, or whether in this case we, representatives of democratic countries, should depart from this. The Soviet delegation repeatedly pointed out in the Italian Commission that the Anglo-American proposals respecting the statute of Trieste would actually amount to the establishment of something resembling a colonial regime in Trieste, under which the population would be deprived of elementary rights and the full plenitude of power would be vested in a governor imposed from above.

After lengthy discussion in the Commission, the French proposal was accepted in amended form. Yet, essentially speaking, this proposal is nothing but a rehash of the Anglo-American draft and, although in milder guise, would present the population of Trieste with this same semi-colonial regime, under which they would be devoid of rights.

Furthermore, the decision on the principles of the statute of Trieste adopted by the Commission runs counter to

the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers on this question.

The Commission's decisions approve the Council of Foreign Ministers' proposal that the legislative and executive authorities in Trieste should be established on democratic principles. Actually, however, such restrictions are introduced in the Commission's decisions as regards both the legislative and executive authorities elected by the population, and such broad powers in establishing public order and security in Trieste are vested in the Governor appointed by the Security Council, that hardly anything would remain of democratic principles in the administration of Trieste.

The Governor is entrusted with the maintenance of public order and security, the conduct of external affairs, the appointment and dismissal of judiciary officials, as well as the right to take what are called "necessary measures," which in fact means that the Governor will be all-powerful and the population without any rights.

Add to this that foreign occupation troops are to remain in Trieste, which of course is appropriate only if Trieste is regarded, not as an international free territory, as envisaged in the draft treaty, but as a semi-enemy territory which is under surveillance and subordinated to Anglo-American troops.

All this certainly does not tally with the Council of Foreign Ministers' decision on the statute of Trieste, nor in general with the democratic peace for which we must strive. That is why the Soviet delegation will again insist that its proposals of September 14 be accepted, and that, above all, decisions be adopted to the effect that the executive authority in Trieste shall be vested in a government chosen by the Popular Assembly, while the duty of the Governor, as an agent of the Security Council, shall be to ensure the observance of the Trieste statute.

The Soviet delegation also deems it necessary that the Conference should fix a precise date for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Trieste, and that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Trieste should not be postponed to an indefinite future, as is suggested in the so-called French proposal.

Essentially speaking, it would be enough for us to agree on one simple decision: namely, that Trieste should be organized approximately on the same lines as Danzig. All the rest would not be difficult to settle. It is not correct to say that there is no analogy between Trieste and Danzig. An analogy undoubtedly exists, and the experience of the administration of Danzig must be utilized in Trieste. If it was possible in Danzig to manage with only a High Commissioner and leave it to the Danzig population itself to establish the legislative and executive authority, why should it be impossible in Trieste to establish similar relations between the Governor, on the one hand, and the legislative and executive bodies, on the other? Why should we go backward as compared with Danzig in the matter of the democratic organization of Trieste?

If it is not desired here to make a forward step in this matter—which should be perfectly natural in our days—then in any case we should not make a single step backward compared with the democratic principles and democratic order which the League of Nations established for Danzig twenty-five years ago. The Soviet delegation cannot consent to the proposal of the Commission on this question.

The Soviet delegation urges the Conference to approach the statute of Trieste and the wishes which have been expressed by the Yugoslav delegation in this matter with the utmost attention. The Soviet delegation regards the attempts to impose upon Trieste an anti-democratic gubernatorial regime resembling a colonial system as unwarranted. Nor can

the reference to the situation of unrest in Trieste be recognized as well-founded. The chief responsibility for this situation rests with the occupation authorities, who have failed to find a common language with the local population. All the more legitimate is the demand that a date be fixed for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Trieste, and that a democratic order be established in Trieste.

If Danzig was granted a democratic statute, although this created a menace to it on the part of such a country as Germany, there is no reason whatever to deny Trieste the statute of Danzig, which was recognized by the League of Nations. This minimum of democracy is essential in Trieste.

#### IV

### OUR TASK: THE EXTIRPATION OF FASCISM

I should like further to touch on a proposal which was rejected in the Political Commission for Italy. This was a proposal of the Polish and Ukrainian delegations to bind Italy not to permit the existence and activity of fascist or other organizations aiming at depriving the people of their democratic rights or conducting propaganda hostile to any of the United Nations. There are clauses to this effect in the treaties with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. One would think that a clause banning fascist organizations should be particularly appropriate in the treaty for Italy. Nevertheless, by a majority of nine votes to eight, with three abstentions, the proposal of the Polish and Ukrainian delegations was rejected by the Commission. With this one cannot possibly agree.

During the war the Allies declared again and again that their aim was to extirpate fascism. In the Italian surrender

terms it was specifically stated that it is the obligation of the Italian Government to eliminate fascist organizations, to abolish all fascist institutions, etc. Of course, no little has already been done in Italy in this respect. But the measures taken cannot be regarded as sufficient.

On the other hand, one cannot help noticing that attempts to resurrect fascism in Italy are continuing. Even such a Right-wing Italian political leader as Sforza warns, in his recently published book, against the danger in Italy of neo-fascism, which has come to succeed the old outspoken criminal fascism. Pacciardi, one of the leaders of the Italian Republican Party, recently sounded the warning in the press that "royalist and fascist groups are openly working to destroy the Republic," and that "key positions in the administration are held by enemies of the republican system, who are sabotaging the efforts of the Ministers." Italian courts time and again acquit prominent fascist leaders who belonged to Mussolini's intimate clique. Every now and again underground fascist organizations are discovered in various parts of Italy. There are recurrent open sorties of fascists, in the shape of dissemination of literature, sporadic seizures of radio stations for fascist propaganda, and so on.

That, under these circumstances, the proposal of the Polish and Ukrainian delegations, designed to prevent a revival of fascist organizations in Italy, is well-founded, should be perfectly obvious. If we really want a democratic peace, we must accept this proposal. To reject it would only mean encouraging the fascists who are lying low. But if we accept it, it will be a stimulus to the consolidation of the democratic front in Italy, to the benefit of the common cause of the democratic countries.

## COOPERATION FOR A DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Lastly, it has been said here that there are groupings at the Conference.

It has been said, for instance, that there is a Slav group and a Western group. It has also been said, of course, that there ought not to be any groups and that an effort should be made to remove the differences between the West and the East, and so on. The Soviet delegation is desirous no less than any other to help promote cooperation among all democratic countries. It appeals to the other delegations to do likewise, considering such cooperation to be an essential condition for a democratic peace.

But, first of all, to divide the Conference into a Slav group as contrasted to a Western group, and vice versa, must surely be regarded as artificial. There should be no room for such a contrast. It sounds like an anachronism—it smacks of the time when the East was politically backward, which certainly cannot be said today, when we compare the young Slav democracies with the typical old democracies of the West.

It goes without saying that the young Slav democracies need one another, especially when their legitimate national interests are ignored by other Powers, as has so often been experienced by the Slav states in the past, and as still not infrequently recurs even today. But the young Slav Republics are seeking to establish friendly relations, not only among themselves, but with all other democratic countries, provided these relations evolve on a basis of equality and reciprocity. And one should remember that besides the three Slav states, the Soviet Union also comprises thirteen non-Slav Soviet Republics.

On the other hand, attempts are being made by certain circles in the so-called "old democracies" to isolate the young Slav democracies, because the latter insist on upholding their national independence and their new ways of national development, and do not want submissively to obey orders from outside. This is something particularly familiar to the Soviet Union, which has already traversed a fairly long road of independent, free development. And the Soviet Union has been convinced by its own experience of the correctness of the wise words of Lenin, the genius of the great Russian Socialist Revolution, who said that a people that has taken the destinies of its country into its own hands is invincible.

These attempts are now not infrequently dressed in the garb of a "Western" group, although in the Western group it is sought to include China, India, and even Ethiopia, provided only that they increase the number of votes of a certain grouping. This being so, division into a Western and a Slav group, just as division into West and East, obviously leads to absurdity. The point of the matter is not that there is a Slav or Eastern group, on the one hand, and an anti-Slav or Western group, on the other. These labels only confuse things.

At this Conference a struggle is proceeding for the establishment of a democratic peace, which should be the goal of all democratic countries, but which is not yet equally appreciated by all the countries represented at the Conference. The Soviet delegation calls upon the delegations of other countries to collaborate in establishing a democratic peace. This requires reaching compromises on certain questions on which agreement has thus far not been achieved, such as we have already succeeded in securing with regard to the majority of the questions of the peace treaties. Such agreement can be achieved, provided we all recognize that we are striv-

ing for a democratic peace, and do not pursue a policy of imposing the will of certain Powers upon other states. Otherwise we shall get nowhere.

Enough has already been said here about the adopted procedure for the work of the Conference, which absolutely does not satisfy a considerable section of the delegations. However, if it is our common desire to achieve the democratic peace possible under present conditions, we will find a solution for disputed questions, and it need not be doubted that this solution will meet the aspirations of all peace-loving nations.

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## THE DANUBE AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

*Speech at the Plenary Meeting  
of the Paris Peace Conference*

*October 10, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. The question we are now discussing—the peace treaty with Rumania—is one of great importance to the entire problem of restoring peace in Europe, and especially in the southeastern part of Europe. The destiny of Rumania, if we take the past few years, is very typical of that changed situation in Europe of which we are all aware, since we remember the events—the collapse of the fascist regimes in the enemy countries and the establishment of democratic regimes, which signified a radical reconstruction and the adoption by these states of new, modern ways of life.

We know that Rumania was precisely a state which, by resolute action, freed itself from Antonescu's fascist regime, joined the Allies, and thus discarded the disgraceful role of servant of Hitler Germany and blazed a new trail for itself in the ranks of the Allies. After this, together with us, together with the Allied troops, the new democratic Rumania fought for the defeat of Hitler and made no little sacrifice in this struggle. The services rendered by the Rumanian people in this cause are recognized by us all. Suffice it to say that we all find it necessary and just, in

the peace treaty, to settle the question of Northern Transylvania in a way which accords with the basic national interests and aspirations of the Rumanian people.

## I

### THE DANUBE PROBLEM IN THE PAST

Discussion of the peace treaty with Rumania has also raised more general problems. It was Senator Vandenberg chiefly who contributed to this, by centring his speech on the Danube problem as a whole and on so-called "equal economic opportunity."

Naturally, I too shall have to deal with this question.

I must say that the speech of the Yugoslav representative, Mr. Kardelj, was a splendid answer to the speeches on the Danube problem, and it also helped to clarify the principle of "equal opportunity," which certain representatives of the United States and Great Britain elevate almost to one of the major principles of contemporary times. My task has thus been considerably facilitated.

To begin with, it should be pointed out that there is a desire on the part of some to have the Danube problem settled in the peace treaties with Germany's former satellites, to have the problem of navigation on the Danube settled by the method of prescribing to the vanquished states. In fact, what they desire is to take advantage of this opportunity to restore on the Danube the privileged position of certain great Powers, which evidently are not concerned about the sovereignty or the national interests of the Danube states, but wish to dictate and prescribe their will everywhere.

The intention is to do this in such a way that whatever is put into the peace treaty, prescribing definite terms to the

vanquished state, should also apply to other Danube states (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) who are our Allies, who fought together with us against the common enemy and to whom we have no right to prescribe, and with whom we should maintain friendly relations and develop friendly cooperation. Vanquished states and Allied states are lumped together, solely in order to clear the way for economic influence in the Danube area. Is this right? Can this lead to a democratic peace?

This is not the first time the Danube question has been raised since the end of the war. The American Government raised the question of the Danube regime at the Potsdam (Berlin) conference, and presented a project for a regime on "international inland waterways." This project dealt not only with navigation on the Danube, but also on the Rhine and the Oder and in the Kiel Canal and, in the bargain, so to speak, it also raised the question of navigation in the Black Sea Straits. Projects of this kind merely emphasize how unilaterally this question is again being raised. This unilateral approach is maintained also in the way the Danube problem is being treated now.

It is urged that an international regime for the Danube was instituted as far back as the Paris Conference of 1856—that this regime, which created a privileged position in the Danube Basin for Britain, France, Prussia and some other non-Danube states, has already existed for ninety years. We are told that this is an ideal regime for the Danube in our time. But I would remind Senator Vandenberg that ninety years ago, when the Paris Conference of 1856 took place, times were entirely different. Suffice it to say that at that time Negro slavery still existed in the United States of America—slavery in America was not yet abolished. As to the states of which we now speak as the Danubian democratic states, at that time nobody hardly paid a thought to their sov-

ereignty, independence and suchlike things. Most of them were simply in the position of subject nations.

Mr. Bevin has said more than once that Britain has now renounced 19th century imperialism. But, if we do not shut our eyes, if we are not afraid of the truth and do not call unpleasant truths dishonesty, we will certainly be perfectly justified in regarding the times of 1856 as the heyday of 19th century imperialism. It was precisely in that period, so typical of 19th century imperialist policy, that the so-called international regime on the Danube was established. And if we really do renounce 19th century imperialism—the imperialism of the last century at least!—why, then, should we cling to these remnants of the imperialism of a period now past? In the middle of the last century, when the so-called international regime on the Danube was set up, not only was the very existence of democratic states in the Danube Basin never mentioned, but, as we know, even the very concept “democratic state” did not exist. At that time an “international regime” was introduced on the Danube, set up by means of frank imperialist pressure. And now it is proposed to restore this order of things under the formula of “equal opportunity,” under the pretext of upholding the principle of the equality of states. Of course, this cannot be agreed to. No one will take such proposals seriously.

## II

### “EQUAL OPPORTUNITY” AND “DOLLAR DEMOCRACY”

The principle of so-called “equal opportunity” has become a favourite topic of late. What, it is argued, could be better than this principle, which would establish equal opportunity for all states without discrimination? The

advocates of this view come forward now as modern champions of the principle of equality in relations between states. But in that case, gentlemen, let us discuss the principle of equality seriously and honestly.

The Danube is not the only waterway of international importance. There are other waterways of still greater international importance. It is not only certain riverways that are of international importance; as we know, sea routes, and, still more, routes linking up oceans, are of far greater international importance than any river system. If we really wish to maintain the principle of "equal opportunity" in the matter of waterways, then let us adhere to this principle consistently, as befits real champions of the principle of equality in relations among states.

Why then do we not advocate the principle of "equal opportunity" in regard to waterways where the interests of many states are especially great—the Suez Canal, say, or the Panama Canal? Many states are interested in both these waterways. If we are to become ardent patriots of the principle of so-called "equal opportunity," let us then discuss its application in this case too. Are the advocates of the principle of "equal opportunity" willing to apply it to the Suez Canal? Are the advocates of the principle of "equal opportunity" willing to apply it to the Panama Canal as well? These questions should not be evaded. They will come up sooner or later anyway.

As to the Danube, apart from everything else, we are now faced with a specific situation with which we have to reckon. There are countries in the Danube Basin which suffered very grievously in this war. On the other hand, it is in this area that important political changes have taken place, and the young democracies which have been formed here have not yet had time to solve even the most pressing problems of their postwar recovery. The Danube Basin

includes Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and some other states. These countries went through hard times during the second world war. They suffered badly in the war, they have been greatly weakened, and in any case they certainly cannot be classed among those that grew rich on the war—leave aside the Soviet Union, whose human and material losses were exceptionally great. The Soviet Government has published the concrete figures and facts of these losses for everyone to read. The losses caused by the destruction of war and the rapine of the invaders alone are estimated at 679,000 million rubles. And if we take the Soviet Union's total expenditures on the war, they will exceed these losses, colossal as the figure is, severalfold. Such is the postwar situation of the states in the Danube area.

There are, however, other states which were with us in the Allied camp, but which fortunately suffered less than the states I have just mentioned. And lastly, there are countries which, although they bore the heavy burden of the struggle against our common enemy, have at the same time succeeded in these past years in increasing their wealth. Take, for example, the United States of America.

Here in Paris everyone of you can find a copy of the "World Almanac, 1946." In this book you may read the following figures: the national income of the U.S.A. in 1941 was estimated at 96,000 million dollars, in 1942 at 122,000 million dollars, in 1943 at 149,000 million dollars, and in 1944 at 160,000 million dollars. Thus, in four years of the war the national income of the U.S.A. rose by 64,000 million dollars. The same book says that in 1938 the total national income of the United States was 64,000 million dollars. Hence the mere increase in the national income of the U.S.A. during the war years was equal to its total national income

in 1938. These are facts which one cannot refrain from mentioning.

Yesterday the United States representative declared here that his government could substantiate a claim for 20,000 million dollars of reparations, were the United States to start calculating its losses during the war. But such statements hardly carry conviction with people who are aware of the facts.

We know that the United States made a very great effort in this war, in defence of its own interests and of our common aims, for which we are all very grateful to the United States. But for all that, it cannot be said that the United States is one of those states which suffered grave material damage in the second world war, which were ruined and weakened in this war. We are glad that this did not happen to our ally, although we ourselves have had to go through trying times, the consequences of which will take us long years to heal.

Now that you know the facts, place side by side Rumania, enfeebled by the war, or Yugoslavia, ruined by the German and Italian fascists, and the United States of America, whose wealth has grown immensely during the war, and you will clearly see what the implementation of the principle of "equal opportunity" would mean in practice. Imagine, under these circumstances, that in this same Rumania or Yugoslavia, or in some other war-weakened state, you have this so-called "equal opportunity" for, let us say, American capital—that is, the opportunity for it to penetrate unhindered into Rumanian industry, or Yugoslav industry and so forth: what, then, will remain of Rumania's national industry, or of Yugoslav's national industry?

It is surely not so difficult to understand that if American capital were given a free hand in the small states ruined and enfeebled by the war, as the advocates of the principle of

"equal opportunity" desire, American capital would buy up the local industries, appropriate the more attractive Rumanian, Yugoslav and all other enterprises, and would become the master in these small states. Given such a situation, we would probably live to see the day when in your own country, on switching on the radio, you would be hearing not so much your own language as one American gramophone record after another or some piece or other of British propaganda. The time might come when in your own country, on going to the cinema, you would be seeing American films sold for foreign consumption—and not those of the better quality, but those manufactured in greater quantity, and circulated and imposed abroad by the agents of powerful firms and cinema companies which have grown particularly rich during the war.

Can anyone really fail to see that if, as a result of the application of the principle of so-called "equal opportunity" in small states, unrestricted competition begins between the home products and the products poured out by the factories of the United States or Great Britain, nothing will remain of the sovereignty and independence of these states, especially considering the postwar conditions? Is it not clear that such unrestricted application of the principle of "equal opportunity" in the given conditions would in practice mean the veritable economic enslavement of the small states and their subjugation to the rule and arbitrary will of strong and enriched foreign firms, banks and industrial companies? Is it not clear that if such "principles of equality" are applied in international economic life, the smaller states will be governed by the orders, injunctions, instructions of strong foreign trusts and monopolies? Was this what we fought for when we battled the fascist invaders, the Hitlerite and Japanese imperialists?

If you still have any doubts on this score, read what Senator Thomas writes in the latest issue of the *American Magazine*. He writes in this widely circulated periodical that it is not accidental that American dollars are frequently the instrument of U.S. foreign policy. And further, that the American policy of dollar democracy renders assistance to U.S. foreign policy. Senator Thomas dwells at length on a number of specific questions to explain his idea. He further explains why the last American loan was granted to England, and why America could not have refused this loan. He also explains the reasons for granting the last loan to France, and the plans for granting a big loan to China, he speaks of the conditions on which a loan might be granted to Poland, and so on.

The candid Senator is highly pleased with this "dollar democracy," and believes that its success will be unbounded. He too, of course, is a proponent of the principle of "equal opportunity," especially at the moment when America is going through a period of prosperity, and many other countries through a period of postwar economic weakness. The advocates of "dollar democracy" have visions of seizing one economic position after another in all parts of the globe. There are now quite a number of American capitalists who dream of becoming masters of whole states, of instituting conditions in those states to suit themselves, by taking the utmost advantage of the temporary postwar conditions, which are particularly favourable for "dollar democracy." But no government of a democratic state can allow itself to be tempted into such schemes of aggrandizement if it cherishes its prestige, and if it realizes what the consequences may be.

During the war the Allies regarded it as one of their chief aims to see to it that there shall be no fascist states in Europe or any other part of the world, and that the road shall be cleared for the democratic states and for their

prosperity. This does not mean that after the war we should sympathize with those who would like to make use of their wealth and the fortunes amassed during the war to exploit the postwar difficulties experienced by small and war-weakened states, even though this be done under the cry of the "equal opportunity" principle, or the "policy of dollar democracy," or, generally, under the auspices of any avaricious schemes, by whatever fine words they are embellished.

### III

#### TWO METHODS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As to the Danube problem, it cannot be settled in a hurry. This question should be treated earnestly, and when considering it we should not confine ourselves to fine-sounding formulas like "equal opportunity," which would work to the grave detriment of many and many a nation, if such principles were permitted to be practiced without restriction, trusting solely to the moderation of the appetites of the groups and states concerned.

But, gentlemen, if we admit this view to be correct, then a different method is needed of solving such important problems as navigation on the Danube—and, the chief thing, a different method is needed of treating small states, including the small vanquished states. Decency must be observed towards the small vanquished states too, and still more so, surely, toward our small friends—Allied states.

But what do we find in reality, what manner of attitude to this question do we encounter at the present time?

The other day an official United States representative spoke in the United Nations Economic and Social Council on the subject of the river vessels seized by the American

occupation authorities in the upper reaches of the Danube. He stated that the Danube fleet—comprising 800 ships belonging to Allied and former enemy countries, and seized by the American authorities on the Danube—would continue to be retained by the American authorities. Among these vessels are 168 Yugoslav, 48 Czechoslovak and over 300 Hungarian ships. These ships could just now be of great use if they were restored to their lawful owners. But the United States refuses to restore these ships even to the Allied countries—Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—and frankly declares that this is done in order to force the Danube states to comply with certain American demands. Not only has the United States to this day failed to restore to Hungary the vessels seized by the American authorities on the Danube; it has not even restored the equipment of a number of important Hungarian factories, rolling-stock, cattle and other Hungarian property which were removed from Hungary by Szalasi's men and the Germans, and which found their way into the American occupation zone. One cannot agree with such methods of treating small states.

What do we get?

The Danube states do not want to have non-Danubian states lording it on the Danube, in their countries. That, one would think, is quite natural. In retaliation, strong Powers which have no connection with the Danube, resort to every means of pressure to compel the Danube states to surrender their lawful rights. Are such methods of pressure, coercion and intimidation worthy of democratic states? Are they in keeping with the aim of establishing a democratic peace?

We are told here that in the Economic Committee of the Conference a decision was taken by eight votes to five to convoke a Danube conference. But all the eight votes belonged to countries which are located far away from the

Danube, while the five other votes were the votes of Danube states. One would think that the convocation of a Danube conference should be the affair of the Danube states themselves, and there is absolutely no reason to fear that this would prejudice the interests of the Allies, or of any other state in general. But no regard is paid to this, just as no regard is paid to the fact that the ground for the convocation of such a conference is still absolutely unprepared. Nevertheless, it is desired to force through the convocation of a Danube conference of a definite composition, taking advantage of the bloc vote that has been cemented here against the votes of all the Danube states. Is this correct? Does this method accord with democratic principles, does it accord with the interest of establishing a democratic peace? Not in any way. We certainly cannot agree with such methods.

The facts I have cited are illustrative of the incorrect attitude and impermissible methods which are being employed at this Conference against small states. Yet we hear no voices of protest raised against this on the part of the chartered champions of small states, when the interests of the small democracies on the Danube are involved. For instance, the Australian and certain other delegations have time and again come forward at the Conference, claiming to defend the rights of small states. But when the United States and Great Britain went so far as to exert pressure on the small Danube states, neither the Australian nor certain other delegations seemed to notice what was happening. Perhaps they like such treatment of small states, but the Soviet Union cannot acquiesce in it.

The Soviet Union regards such methods of exerting influence on small states as impermissible. The Soviet Union will insist on small states being treated humanly. It cannot be allowed that strong Powers, which happen today to have plenty of dollars or pounds sterling in their pockets,

shall have the opportunity to dictate their will to other states without let or hindrance, to prescribe whatever they like right and left. Such a policy will be productive of no good, and will encounter legitimate resistance from other states, big and small. Such a policy is doomed to failure, not to mention the fact that it is already sustaining one grave moral and political defeat after another. In any case, the Soviet Union, as well as many other countries, will never agree with such proclivities, with such methods of building international relations. Let those who have plenty of dollars use them for good purposes—where necessary, say, for the elimination of unemployment or for other requirements of their own countries, or for developing normal trade relations with other countries. But one cannot concur when a strong Power tries to exploit its temporary advantages at a time when many countries have not yet healed their war wounds, and when they still face such serious difficulties of the postwar transitional period. And it is particularly impermissible for strong Powers to behave aggressively towards small countries, or to resort to methods of pressure and unscrupulous imposition of their will on other states.

There are two diametrically opposite methods in international life. One of them, well known to all from time of old, is the method of coercion and domination, for which all means of pressure are good. The other—one, it is true, which is not sufficiently widespread as yet—is the method of democratic cooperation, based on recognition of the principle of equality and the legitimate interests of all states, big and small. We do not doubt that, despite all obstacles, the method of democratic cooperation among countries will triumph in the end.

Now that we have achieved victory over Hitler Germany and imperialist Japan, and over their allies, all the countries

which were drawn into the maelstrom of war have many important affairs to attend to, and many problems still to solve. Yet the nations are not inactive. Some states have more or less recovered or are recovering from the war; others have not yet recovered and are only just beginning really to tackle the task. But, gentlemen, there should be no doubt in our minds that the democratic countries, even the youngest of them, have enough living examples before them to help them find the right way to repair their losses, increase their economic resources and ensure stable prosperity for their people. Only we must not allow any outside forces to hinder this, or the rights of the peoples, won in stern and sometimes truly self-sacrificing struggle, to be violated. Then all the democratic countries will unfold their energies to the full, will prove their worth in the great deeds of their peoples, and we shall all rejoice in their achievements. (*Applause.*)

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## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND SMALL COUNTRIES

*Speech at the Plenary Meeting  
of the Paris Peace Conference*

*October 14, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. With the examination of the draft peace treaty with Finland, the Conference is concluding its work. It is now possible to see the general results of the Paris Conference.

### I

#### RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

This Conference was the first experiment in broad co-operation of the nations in settling the peace after the second world war. Representatives of big states and small have come together here to examine the peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. These peace treaties should contribute to establishing durable peace in Europe. To do that, they should conform to the interests of the peoples that desire stable and lasting peace, and help to repel every attempt at new aggression. This means that they must accord with the aims of a democratic peace, which proceeds from a recognition of the aggressor's responsibility

for his crimes, but not from a feeling of revenge against the vanquished, and which should to the greatest possible extent help to establish the security of nations and to unite them against the forces of possible new aggression.

The Conference was preceded by the fairly prolonged work of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four great Powers. During this preparatory period, the main issues of the peace treaties were considered; alterations of the frontiers of states were determined where disputed issues were involved; reparations claims were examined, although this work was not completed; military restrictions were laid down for the vanquished states, and so forth. On all these questions agreed decisions were adopted by the four governments. However, there remained certain problems which were not settled in the preparatory stage and were referred to the Peace Conference for consideration.

The Conference was to express its opinion both on questions on which agreement had been reached and on all others. What, then, are the results of the Conference?

It transpires that questions on which agreement had been reached by the four great Powers received the approval of the Conference of 21 states as well. The changes made by the Conference in these cases did not contravene the preliminary understanding, if we leave out of account the statute of Trieste. The discussion at the Conference only confirmed that these sections of the treaties fully meet the purposes of a democratic peace, taking into consideration the necessary compromises which are inevitable in questions of this kind. We were thus able to convince ourselves that when the Powers which bore the brunt of the war against our common enemy act together and adopt agreed decisions, they, as a rule, express the will of the overwhelming majority of democratic countries and further the purposes of a demo-

craphic peace. This is the positive result of the Conference's work.

The situation is different in regard to those articles of the treaties on which preliminary accord had not been reached. This applies to a group of economic articles, the question of the statute of Trieste, the navigation regime on the Danube and certain other problems. The results of the work of the Conference in this latter respect do not resemble the results of the discussion of those problems on which the four Powers reached agreement.

One might have expected that it would be in regard to problems on which accord had not been preliminarily reached that the work of the Conference would be most useful. Actually, this was not so. These problems proved to have been inadequately prepared by the Council of the four Ministers. The Conference, on the other hand, failed to find ways to eliminate the divergences which had arisen earlier. Indeed, as experience has shown, the group which dominated the Conference, beginning with the United States and Great Britain, did not even desire to do so. They relied on the fact that they had an ensured majority of the delegations on their side and sought to make use of this situation to have their view prevail.

These calculations, however, were not justified. Nor could they have been justified, since at international conferences, when the equality of all participants is observed, nothing can be obtained by building up a mechanical majority and disregarding the legitimate interests of other countries which do not belong to the majority. The dominating group demonstrated once more that it does not want to seek agreement acceptable to all the participants of the Conference. The outcome is known.

The results of the Conference's work cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Treaty articles which had not been agreed

upon before the Conference in most cases remained unagreed. Yet it would be well to remember that international conferences do not gather in order to demonstrate divergencies, but in order to find ways and means of harmonizing the opinions of the various parties and to work out joint decisions. On the other hand, the minority exerted every effort to explain its views and to appeal for normal cooperation, and this, as we hope, should not remain fruitless of effect.

All this places a big responsibility on the Council of Foreign Ministers for the ultimate decisions on which the signing of the treaties will depend.

## II

### REASONS FOR UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS

From what has been said it will be clear what is the main reason for the unsatisfactory results of the Conference's work in regard to a considerable number of questions. From first to last, we observed a striving on the part of a definite group of delegations to secure a dominant position and to dictate their decisions, without any regard for the opinion of a large section of the delegations. This was done in various ways, and at times this method created a rather difficult situation for the delegations of small countries. One might have expected that agreement at this Conference would be facilitated by the initiative of the small states. But was this actually the case? Actually, the delegations of the small states were not infrequently compelled simply to follow the dominant trend, the majority.

Take the question of the Danube, or, in other words, whether or not a decision should be written into the peace treaties with the Balkan countries to convoke a conference

of a definite composition to consider the problem of Danube navigation—to which all the Danube states objected at this juncture. No recommendation was adopted on this point at the meeting of the Economic Committee, since no proposal obtained two-thirds of the votes, as is required by the Committee's rules of procedure.

The voting at the plenary meeting showed a majority of fourteen votes against seven in favour of convocation of a conference, such states as India and Ethiopia being among the fourteen. One would have thought that, in a matter like the Danube, these states could have adopted a more objective, more sober and reasonable attitude towards the Danube states. But this was not so. Why, one wonders, did India have to insist on this question being settled in the peace treaty, say, with Rumania? What interests of India, what interests of the Indians, are involved in the convocation of a Danube conference, on which Britain and the United States so strongly insist? The leader of the Indian delegation, Sir Samuel Runganadhan, could, of course, get up here and for some reason of his own declare that the Indian delegation had a deep interest in this matter—that it was, as it were, under moral compulsion to insist upon a decision in the matter of the Danube with which not a single Danubian state at this Conference agrees. But every one of us understands that if we had had the voice of an independent India, if we had had the voice of a representative of the real India—which all honest democrats throughout the world demand—we could have expected more objective voting on the part of India, whereas now we have been again confronted with the intolerable situation that the Indian delegation simply performed its colonial duty of voting at the will of another country—of Great Britain. But the time is not far off when other and happier days will come for India!

Or take another matter. By an overwhelming majority of votes, including those of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, the Political Committee for Bulgaria approved the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers to preserve the present Bulgaro-Greek frontier, which accords with the interests of stable peace in Europe. But at the plenary meeting of the Conference, the British delegate, notwithstanding the way he voted in the Committee, and still earlier in the Council of Foreign Ministers, headed a majority group of delegations, commanding twelve votes, which abstained when the proposal to leave the present Bulgaro-Greek frontier unchanged was put to the vote. As a result, the Conference did not take any decision on this subject. The effect is that Britain, with the help of the votes mainly of small states, achieved a decision at the plenary meeting which by no means accords with the interests of enduring peace, and which may only serve as an impetus to adventures and aggression. One asks, does such a vote conform with the national interests of Ethiopia, Belgium, Brazil, India, Holland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, China or, lastly, even Greece herself—the countries which, together with Britain, abstained from voting on this question? Is not this combination of delegations a kind of voting game, which no honest democrat and no unbiased person generally can regard as otherwise than a gross political blunder, prejudicial to the cause of enduring peace, and advantageous only to the dissemination of unrest and fresh aggression?

This voting combination has cast a shade on the whole practice of voting at this Conference. However, there can be no doubt that the Council of Foreign Ministers will reaffirm its previous decision on the stability of the Bulgaro-Greek frontier, which will be a condemnation of the artificial combination of the twelve abstaining votes at the plenary

meeting of the Conference. The political voting game in the matter of the Bulgaro-Greek frontier will certainly not be approved by public opinion in the democratic countries. The miscalculation made in this political game is obvious. That is why we confidently say to our friends, the Bulgarians: "Bulgarians, rest assured, your frontier will remain inviolate." (*Applause.*)

To elucidate the reason for the unsatisfactory course of the Conference, it is necessary to recall the way many of the subjects were discussed here. We who formed the minority felt it our duty to explain our views on all important questions. We made many an appeal, endeavouring to evoke a sense of objectivity, of the need for cooperation.

We believe that a study of these pronouncements will be of value, for, after all, one has to have in mind not only the delegates at the Conference, but also the millions of people who are attentively watching everything that goes on in the Palais de Luxembourg. Yet at the Conference even the most weighty arguments proved of little effect. The method of persuasion enjoyed neither success nor popularity whenever an opinion did not have the agreement of the American or British delegation. Regardless of whether a proposal was right or wrong, if it suited a definite group, it secured the support of the guaranteed majority of the Anglo-American bloc. For some reason, things at the Conference were so arranged that, contrary to alphabetical order, the delegate of the United States was the first to vote, and his "no" from the start set the keynote in regard to all proposals submitted by the minority. This, of course, facilitated the position of a definite group, but it did not create the requisites necessary to lend weight and authority to the Conference decisions.

If you verify it, you will see that throughout the Conference the Soviet delegation did not go back on a single

opinion which it had expressed before the Conference and which was reflected in the agreed decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. But I cannot refrain from pointing out that the other three members of the Council twice went back on their opinions, as reflected in the agreed decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

We know that on the question of procedure, the British, American and French delegations went back here on the position they had taken in the Council of Foreign Ministers. It seemed to them more convenient to rely on the backing not only of a majority of two-thirds of the votes, as is customary at international conferences, but also on a simple majority—evidently in order that in each and every vote the dominating group at the Conference might be sure of every convenience and, in fact, of a dead certainty. We also know that on the subject of the statute of Trieste these three delegations again went back on their opinion, as agreed upon by the four Foreign Ministers in the Council, and prevailed on the Conference to adopt decisions which contravene the democratic principles of the statute of Trieste recognized by the Council. These examples likewise show that no particular concern was displayed for the authority and prestige of the Conference.

This, gentlemen, is how matters stand in regard to the results of the Conference. As a consequence, the value of many of the recommendations passed by the Conference has been impaired. The entire manner of work of the Conference, and the incorrect voting procedure it adopted, have had the effect of diminishing the weight and authority of its recommendations.

### III

#### ATTITUDE TO SMALL COUNTRIES

All this behooves us to pay serious attention to the principles of cooperation between big and small states in these postwar times, in order to avert possible undesirable consequences due to the violation of universally recognized democratic principles in this field. Besides the good things accomplished by the Conference, which I mentioned at the beginning, it has furnished no few examples of how co-operation between big and small states should not be practised if we are really imbued with the spirit of democratic cooperation among nations.

In this connection I want to dwell on the problem of Finland, and on the policy of the great Powers towards small countries.

The policy of the Soviet Union towards Finland is clear. It is determined by the democratic principles on which the attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards small countries is based. The Soviet Union has always sought to establish friendly relations with its small neighbour, Finland. This proved impossible to achieve before the war, because Finland was ruled by a clique of reactionaries, including reactionary Socialists of the type of Tanner, who has now been convicted by a Finnish court together with other war criminals. This clique involved Finland in an alliance with Hitler Germany and in war against the U.S.S.R., in which Finland played a disgraceful part in the siege of glorious Soviet Leningrad.

Yet, despite this, when the Soviet Army routed the German and Finnish troops which besieged Leningrad, and victoriously advanced northward from Leningrad, the Soviet Union agreed to magnanimous armistice terms, and on its own initiative refrained from sending Soviet troops into

Finland's territory. This made the armistice terms considerably easier for Finland, which, unlike all the other satellites of Germany, was spared great expenditure for the maintenance of occupation troops.

After the end of the war, Finland freely chose her democratic path of development, and since then has been treading her own road, observing a policy of good-neighbourly relations with the U.S.S.R. In this, as in other cases, the Soviet Union, has never interfered in, nor exerted any pressure on, Finland's domestic affairs; and whenever Finland applied to the U.S.S.R., it rendered her the necessary practical assistance and all possible ameliorations in carrying out the armistice terms. On her part, Finland has honestly discharged her reparation and other obligations to the U.S.S.R.

The draft peace treaty with Finland envisages only those absolutely indispensable obligations which had already been laid down earlier in the armistice terms, and the magnanimity of which no impartial person can deny. Naturally, no departure from these minimum conditions can be allowed.

As to the policy of the other great Powers towards Finland, the situation is somewhat different. Senator Vandenberg's speech today confirms this and leaves a very unfavourable impression as to the consistency and sincerity of the views he expressed. The American delegate assumed the pose of Finland's well-wisher, and made a statement which implies nothing more nor less than the annulment of the armistice terms signed by Finland, on the one hand, and by the Soviet Union and Great Britain, on the other. These armistice terms were signed two years ago, and not once in all this time has the United States declared that it disagrees with those terms. Only today did Senator Vandenberg display a peculiar kind of courage and come forward in the name of the U.S.A. against the basic terms of the armis-

stice with Finland. The American delegate launched into a policy of openly coquetting with a small country, pretending that this coquetry was a solicitude for Finland's interests. But such methods in regard to small countries are well known of old and cannot be a novelty to any one of us.

It is interesting that, somewhat earlier, the British delegation similarly displayed a specific kind of interest in Finland. It was only in regard to Finland that Great Britain agreed to the Soviet Union's proposal not to confiscate or liquidate the country's foreign assets, although both Great Britain and the United States demand the confiscation and liquidation of the foreign assets of Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, despite all the objections and requests on the part of the Soviet delegation that such excessive demands in respect to small countries be abandoned.

The United States and Great Britain have thus adopted one line in regard to some of the small states, and a different line in regard to Finland. And these efforts to display a peculiar kind of goodwill towards Finland are made in such a way as to tend to set Finland against her neighbour, the Soviet Union. We have had occasion to observe such methods in the foreign policy of certain states in the past. Before the war we witnessed many facts of this kind, especially with respect to small countries which are neighbours of the Soviet Union.

We know what was the outcome of the coquetting by great Powers with Finland's reactionary circles. The Finnish reactionaries imagined that everything would be permitted them. The end of it was that Finland concluded an alliance with Hitler and plunged into a war gamble against the Soviet Union. Having become a plaything in the hands of German fascism, Finland bore tremendous sacrifices in the last two wars against the U.S.S.R.

Certain reactionaries like this political playing with small countries, particularly if it satisfies their desire to damage the Soviet Union in one way or another. We believe, however, that the Finns have drunk the bitter cup to its dregs, and have now learned to distinguish true friends from bad advisers who are pursuing their own selfish aims.

One thing is clear: true cooperation between big and small countries can rest only on an honest democratic foundation. Playing at friendship should now cut no ice with the nations which have been through such heavy trials. But, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that true friendship between nations is one of the great factors of our times.

#### IV

### FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION

The underlying principles of cooperation among states, big and small, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations have become the target of a regular offensive. It is being waged under the guise of an attack on the so-called power of veto of the great Powers in the Security Council. But, in reality, this is an expression of the pressure of the reactionary circles of certain great Powers who imagine themselves masters of the world and seek to impose their will on all nations, and who, desirous of removing all obstacles to this, want to abolish the principles of cooperation of nations established by UNO.

How they wish to achieve this is now becoming increasingly clear.

A little while ago Australia and Cuba placed on the agenda of the UNO General Assembly proposals which are calculated to destroy the foundation on which the United Nations organization rests. They are very much concerned,

if you please, that the principle of unanimity of the five great Powers in deciding basic questions of the peace and security of nations, as required by the UNO Charter, should be abolished. But, obviously, it is not Australia and Cuba that are involved here, for in such matters they are unable to accomplish anything independently.

An attack on the principle of unity of action of the great Powers has now also been launched by M. Spaak, who has forgotten that this is a peculiarly inappropriate role for the President of the General Assembly, who ought to uphold the United Nations Charter instead of destroying it. We know that some politicians do not find it so very difficult to adapt themselves to reactionary circles. But if one bears in mind that the future does not belong to these forces, there need be no doubt that the principles of democratic cooperation of nations, uniting big and small countries in furtherance of general peace and security—that these principles will triumph over each and every machination of the reactionaries.

The Soviet Union remains true to its program of striving for durable peace and security, and upholds the principles of honest cooperation among nations. You heard, lately, the calm and firm voice of the great Stalin, resounding through the world. The head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, said that he unreservedly believes in the possibility of friendly and enduring cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, despite the existence of ideological differences, and that he also believes in "friendly competition" between the two systems.

Such is the general line of foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

This policy is not new. As early as November 6, 1944, when the Allies were engaged in the strenuous struggle against Hitler Germany and imperialist Japan, the great

leader of the Land of Soviets, J. V. Stalin, said in reference to the creation of the United Nations organization:

"Can we count on the activities of this international organization being sufficiently effective? They will be effective if the great Powers who have borne the main burden of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and harmony. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated."

At that time these statements seemed to all of us absolutely indisputable. In not a single democratic country was any objection raised to this statement of the head of the Soviet Government. But the war ended. The Soviet Army had performed its epoch-making feat. New sentiments appeared. And now attempts are being made to turn things in a different direction. It is sometimes sought to use even the Peace Conference in the interests of a definite dominant group, and evidently even to adapt UNO to these ends. But we shall lend no hand to these efforts. The Soviet Union will resist every attempt to deflect UNO from its main task, the task of promoting cooperation among the peace-loving countries in furtherance of the general security of nations.

The Soviet Union stands for cooperation among all nations, cooperation among Powers big and small, based on the principle of equality and recognition of the legitimate interests of big and small states. Such are the principles of democratic cooperation among nations, principles which we shall faithfully uphold to the end. And we know that this is the only correct policy. (*Applause.*)

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## SPEECH AT THE CLOSING MEETING OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

*October 15, 1946*


Mr. Chairman and Delegates. The Soviet delegation supports with great pleasure the resolutions which have just been read expressing gratitude to M. Bidault and the Government of France for their exceptional hospitality, and thanking the Secretary-General and all members of the staff of this Conference for the immense assistance they rendered us during the intensive work here. (*Applause.*) The Soviet delegation would only like this deep and sincere gratitude to be expressed as eloquently and convincingly as possible.

We have heard a speech devoted to the importance of the work of this Conference. Each one of us cannot help thinking of this at the present moment. And not only are those present here pondering today over the results of the labours of this Conference, but also those who are outside these walls and who are far, far more numerous than we sitting in this hall. They do so because they recall the dire years of war, the crimes of fascism, the trials and tribulations of the struggle in these last years, when the yearning of the peoples for the establishment of genuinely lasting and enduring peace and international security after the second world war became so strong.

The Soviet delegation represents here a country which has made its contribution to the cause of our common victory. We know that this contribution of the U.S.S.R. has met with the widest recognition among all the Allied and associated nations as a great factor in bringing about the defeat of the enemy and the liberation of the nations from fascism, which sprang up after the first world war.

Now, when the Allies are engaged in the work of establishing the peace and security of nations, the Soviet Union, which we here represent, deems it its duty to continue the struggle for those aims for which we fought in the war. We are convinced that the struggle we are waging for a democratic peace accords with the most important interests of the peoples of big and small countries, accords with the vital interests of all peace-loving nations. (*Applause.*)

We are waging this struggle—although at times it is not to the liking of some—for the sake of a democratic peace, for the sake of guaranteeing the security of the nations in fact and not only in word. We, Soviet people, are dedicated to this great cause, and we shall wage this struggle with all the persistence and vigour of which we are capable, guided by a sense of duty towards our people. (*Applause.*)



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## STATEMENT MADE TO A CORRESPONDENT OF THE POLISH PRESS AGENCY CONCERNING POLAND'S WESTERN FRONTIERS\*

V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., was asked by Mr. Bibrowski, representative of the Polish Press Agency in Paris, to state the view of the Soviet Government on the speech made by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, in Stuttgart, in which he declared that the question of Poland's western frontiers had not been finally settled.

In response to the request of the representative of the Polish Press Agency, V. M. Molotov made the following statement:

In his Stuttgart speech on September 6, Mr. Byrnes said that the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union had agreed at the Berlin (Potsdam) conference to place Silesia and other former eastern areas of Germany under the administration of the Polish State, but that they had not decided to support at the peace settlement the transfer to Poland of any specific territory, and the extent of the territory to be transferred to Poland was to be determined when the final settlement was made. It must be admitted that a statement of this kind is liable to create doubt regarding the stability of the present western frontiers of Poland, and hence cannot be left unanswered.

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\* Published in the Moscow newspapers, September 17, 1946.

It is necessary in this connection to mention certain facts

In the first place, it would be well to recall what precisely was decided at the Berlin conference. As we know, at this conference the heads of the three governments agreed that the former German territories east of Swinemünde, the Oder and the Western Neisse should be under the administration of the Polish State, and that the final delimitation of Poland's western frontiers should be postponed until the Peace Conference. This decision was merely a fulfilment of the decision of the Crimea conference of the three Powers, which some six months earlier had recognized that Poland should receive substantial accretions to her territory in the north and the west. Thus, the Berlin conference merely carried out what, with the participation of Roosevelt, had been envisaged at the Crimea conference, and its decision can on no account be considered something accidental or adopted under the influence of temporary circumstances. On the contrary, the decision to move Poland's western frontier to the Oder and the Western Neisse was adopted after prolonged discussion, in which representatives of the Polish Government also took part. It should be added that the French Government likewise concurred with this decision.

How great was the significance the Berlin conference attached to its decision respecting Poland's new western frontier is evident from the following. At this conference another decision was taken, namely, regarding the transfer to Germany of the German population of the territory handed over to Poland. Inasmuch as all this was published, there is no need to dwell on the details.

The decisions of the Berlin conference did not remain a dead letter. Immediately after the Berlin conference they began to be put into effect. For more than a year now Poland's western frontier has run along the Swinemünde-Oder-Western Neisse line. The administration of the entire ter-

territory east of this line has for over a year been in the hands of the Polish Government. On November 20, 1945, the Control Council in Germany drew up a plan for the transfer of the German population from Poland. In pursuance of this plan, the resettlement of three and a half million Germans from Poland to the Soviet and British zones of occupation in Germany was begun. This resettlement has since continued without interruption down to the present day. More than two million Germans have already been transferred from Poland to German territory, more than half of whom have been settled in the British zone. Poles from other districts of Poland are settling in the areas vacated by the Germans. Millions of Poles have already settled in the western Polish territories. All this is well known to the representatives of the United States of America, as well as to the representatives of other countries. From the facts cited it will be seen how serious was the significance attached by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the decision to shift Poland's western frontiers, and that they certainly did not contemplate any revision of this decision in the future.

The statement that the Berlin conference considered it necessary to postpone the final delimitation of Poland's western frontier until the Peace Conference is, of course, correct. From the formal aspect, this is so. Actually, however, the three governments pronounced their opinion concerning the future western frontier by placing Silesia and the afore-mentioned territories under the administration of the Polish Government and, in addition, by accepting the plan to remove the Germans from these territories. Who would ever conceive the idea that the removal of the Germans was undertaken only as a temporary experiment? Those who adopted the decision to remove the Germans from these territories in order that Poles from other areas

of Poland might at once settle there cannot propose some time after to reverse these measures. The very thought of such experiments with millions of people is incredible, not to speak of its cruelty both to the Poles and to the Germans themselves.

All this shows that the decision of the Berlin conference signed by Truman, Attlee and Stalin has already determined Poland's western frontiers and is only awaiting formal enactment at the future international conference on the peace treaty with Germany. The signatures of the heads of the governments are so deeply respected by the nations precisely because everyone knows the unswerving force and moral prestige of the decisions to which these signatures are appended.

True, there were passages in Mr. Byrnes' speech regarding Poland's western frontiers which might give rise to doubt as to the stability of the position of certain American circles on this question. But, on the other hand, it is perfectly clear that questions of this kind cannot be the subject of transient political calculations.

The historic decision of the Berlin Conference regarding Poland's western frontiers cannot be shaken by anyone. And the facts moreover show that to do so now is simply impossible.

Such is the view of the Soviet Government.

It only remains for me to wish our Polish friends success in their vast work of rehabilitating the western territories, and to express confidence in the growing friendship and fraternal cooperation between democratic Poland and the Soviet Union.

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**SPEECHES AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

*October-December 1946*



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## THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

*Speech at the Plenary Meeting  
of the General Assembly*

*October 29, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. The general report of the Secretary-General affords us an opportunity to express our views not only on the individual questions that interest one or another country, but also on the general questions of international cooperation. Such an exchange of opinion should be conducive to the establishment of mutual understanding among the United Nations. It is essential, also, in order that we may improve the work of the Organization and of such of its important bodies as the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and so on. The United Nations organization is only at the very starting point of its activities. There are bound to have been important shortcomings in its work, if only for the reason that it is just beginning to apply its new principles, and in conditions very different from those of the preceding period. Precisely for that reason, however, it is to the interest of the United Nations not to hush up existing shortcomings, but to lay open these shortcomings from the very outset, and see to it that they are not permitted in future.

This, naturally, applies first and foremost to the Security Council, inasmuch as that body is daily occupied with the

important problems involved in safeguarding the interests of universal peace, problems in which the interests and views of individual states not infrequently come into conflict.

## I

### SHORTCOMINGS OF THE INITIAL PERIOD

Take the question of Spain, and the Iranian question. The Security Council and, still earlier, the General Assembly have been unable to resolve on anything more than general declarations against Franco. As the Secretary-General has rightly pointed out here, that, of course, is altogether insufficient. On the other hand, the proposal that relations with Franco be broken off was not accepted. In this way, certain of the great Powers, who created this attitude, have assumed the moral responsibility for inactivity with regard to a dangerous seat of fascism in Europe. As to the Iranian question, it came up in connection with the date of withdrawal from Iran of a certain number of Soviet troops stationed there under treaty. And even after these troops had left Iranian territory to a man, and both governments—Soviet and Iranian—had requested that this question be removed from the agenda, the Security Council refused to do so, taking an altogether unjustified stand, openly unfriendly towards the U.S.S.R.

By acting in this way the Security Council committed a gross error, which cannot but undermine its prestige.

Again, take the World Federation of Trade Unions. It seems to me that it would be quite natural for the United Nations to establish friendly contact with the international organization of trade unions that has come into being in the last few years, which embraces tens of millions of workers in many countries. This is particularly essential

for the Economic and Social Council, which cannot pursue its work successfully without the support of such mass democratic organizations as the World Federation of Trade Unions. Actually, however, the situation is quite different. To this day, the World Federation of Trade Unions has not been invited to participate in the daily labours of the Economic and Social Council. But that is not all. Can we consider it proper for this organization to be limited to the same conditions of representation on the Economic and Social Council as the International Automobile Association, or the National Organization of Dried Fruits Retailers, and the like? Is it not time we corrected this situation, which is out of all keeping with the elementary principles of democracy? Or look at the situation with regard to the establishment of the international trusteeship system. One might think somebody was deliberately obstructing the establishment of the Trusteeship Council. But is not the prestige of our Organization undermined by its continued inability, in this the second year of its existence, to set up a Trusteeship Council that would concern itself with improving conditions of life for the peoples dwelling on territories held under mandate by Great Britain, France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, and that would promote their development towards self-government and independence? What is the actual situation? Not a single step has yet been made in this direction by the countries which maintain a tenacious grip on the mandates to Palestine and Tanganyika, Togo and New Guinea, etc. As yet, they have confined themselves to drawing up unsatisfactory drafts and making declarations that do not touch upon essentials. In fact, the Government of the Union of South Africa has gone even further. Instead of undertaking measures to prepare Southwest Africa for self-government or independence, it simply demands sanction

for the annexation of that territory, which, as anyone can see, entirely contradicts the United Nations Charter.

In this connection, I might mention India as well. Though India is a Member of the United Nations, and consequently, under the Charter, should be in relations of sovereign equality with Britain, have you not heard here, at the General Assembly, India's plea for support and assistance? We cannot turn deaf ears to all this. It is time we recognized India's just demands.

Take another example. In the same manner, Holland should recognize the just demands of the peoples of Indonesia. I shall not speak of Greece just now. But it is impossible to look on indifferently at the excesses committed by the Greek fascists under the protection of the British occupation forces.

Two months ago the Soviet representative made the following proposal in the Security Council: "States Members of the United Nations shall be required to submit the following information to the Security Council within two weeks:

"1) At what points in the territory of Members of the United Nations or other States, with the exception of former enemy territories, and in what number are armed forces of other Members of the United Nations?

"2) At what points in the above-mentioned territories are air and naval bases, and what is the size of their garrisons belonging to the armed forces of States Members of the United Nations?

"3) The information to be provided under paragraphs 1 and 2 should refer to the situation as it existed on August 1, 1946."

The necessity of such information to the Security Council would seem clear enough, not to speak of the fact that the presence of armed forces of United Nations outside the bor-

ders of their own countries, and not on enemy territories for which an occupation regime has been specifically established, is now causing grave uneasiness among the peoples and among public opinion throughout the world.

Turn your attention to the situation that has arisen in this respect.

In accordance with the corresponding chapter of the Charter, the Military Staff Committee has already begun to study the question of the armed forces which the Members of the United Nations organization are to make available to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, as provided in Article 43. In this connection, naturally, the Security Council should be acquainted with the facts of the situation, namely, what armed forces of United Nations are at present stationed outside the borders of their own states, and where. The submission of this information should, of course, be obligatory upon all the United Nations. The Soviet Union, for its part, is prepared to submit this information to the Security Council, and sees no grounds for any other Member of the United Nations organization refusing to do so.

After all, what reasons can there be for refusing to submit this information to the Security Council? Why should any one of us conceal from the United Nations the actual state of affairs in this regard? What have the governments of the United Nations to fear when the Security Council calls upon them to supply information that is essential for implementing the decisions recorded in our Charter? The Government of the Soviet Union, for its part, sees no grounds whatever for concealing the actual situation in this regard from the other United Nations, and thus hindering the Security Council in the fulfilment of its duties.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's proposal was not accepted in the Security Council, as objections were raised

against it by the representatives of Great Britain and the United States, who were joined also by the representatives of certain other states. This important question has been held up in the Security Council. Still, the Soviet Government is confident that we shall succeed in reaching agreement on this question, and put an end to the deadlock. It is essential that the General Assembly express its weighty opinion on this question.

The facts I have cited in connection with the Spanish question, relationships with the World Federation of Trade Unions, trusteeship, and other questions that have been discussed up to this time, indicate the existence of grave shortcomings in the work of the United Nations organization and of its different bodies. The list of examples might be considerably extended. This is particularly true of the Security Council. There is a mistaken tendency to attribute the shortcomings in the work of the Security Council to the application of what is called the "veto." The hubbub that has been raised over this question is evidently designed to turn our attention from the most important shortcomings in the activities of the United Nations organization, and in this manner to shift the blame from the guilty to the innocent. But we shall hope that this design will not succeed.

## II

### THE STRUGGLE OF TWO LINES IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY

In any case, the General Assembly has not come together with the purpose of ignoring the main trend of development of international relations in our day.

We should be interested, first and foremost, in the question: in what direction is international cooperation

developing at the present time? Does the new Organization promote that international cooperation, in the name of peace and security for the peoples, for which it was created? Are we on the right path? That is the main question.

The creation of the United Nations organization began while the second world war was still raging. It was carried out by that same anti-Hitler coalition which was headed by the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—countries which had borne the chief burden in the struggle against our common enemy, and which desired to set up an effective international organization to safeguard postwar peace and security. They recognized the necessity of taking into account the grave lessons of the past, and, first and foremost, the commonly known fact of the impotence and collapse of the League of Nations, in order not to repeat that organization's weaknesses and errors, but to set up an organization which would be free of its chief defects.

The fundamental principle of the League of Nations was the unanimity of all members in the adoption of decisions. This made the League of Nations ineffective, as it allowed interested members to delay, or actually block, any decisions the League might have in view. The League showed itself impotent to take measures against aggressive Powers, which could always find abettors among its membership.

The Charter of the United Nations has introduced a new system for the adoption of decisions. It has now been determined that the General Assembly adopt important decisions by a two-thirds majority. As to the Security Council, which bears primary responsibility for safeguarding peace and undertaking measures against aggression, the decision of such questions in this body requires not only a majority of at least seven of the eleven members of the

Security Council, but also, indispensably, the unanimous agreement of the five great Powers: the United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and China, whose unanimity serves, so to speak, as a guarantee for the interests of the United Nations as a whole.

The principle of unanimity of the great Powers was not a chance development, but the result of protracted and thorough discussion. The recognition of this principle expressed the desire of the United Nations to secure harmony and unity of action among the great Powers in counteracting any new aggression.

Such a desire for unity of action in defence of peace and security was lacking among the great Powers before the second world war, and that was a very great misfortune for all mankind. The United States of America stood aside from the main road, if I may so express it.

In regard to the Soviet Union, the principal Powers in the League conducted a nearsighted and altogether reactionary policy. The grievous trials of the war brought the governments of the great Western Powers to the conviction that there must be concerted action against the common enemy during the war, and to the recognition that such an international organization must be set up to solve the problems of the postwar period as would maintain the profoundly progressive principle, forged in the war, of unity among the great countries, with all the democratic states rallied around them. From this it follows that the principle of unanimity of the great Powers on questions of safeguarding peace and security has deep roots; that its recognition by the United Nations resulted from the desire for more reliable protection of the interests of all peace-loving states, both great and small.

Of late, an extensive campaign has been launched against the recognition of this principle. Everything conceivable is

being done to distort and discredit this principle. The problem of the unity essential among the great Powers is assiduously consigned to the background, and persistently replaced by a question of detail: how the so-called "veto" is to be applied in the decision of questions in the Security Council. What is the real meaning of the campaign against the "veto," that is, against the right of any of the five great Powers to prevent the adoption by the Security Council of a decision which that Power considers undesirable from the point of view of safeguarding peace and international security? What may result from rejection of the principle of unanimity of the great Powers?

The results of such a rejection are easy enough to forecast. Nobody, today, will suggest a return to the bankrupt League of Nations, with its unanimity of all members in the adoption of decisions. Consequently, by the rejection of this principle, it is desired to impose a system under which decisions would be adopted by a simple majority. Such proposals have already been made here, at the General Assembly. There are even people who describe this manner of adopting decisions in an international organization as the most democratic. They pretend that the best type of democracy, worthy of universal recognition, consists in equalizing the vote of Honduras in the international organization and the vote of the United States, or the vote of Haiti and the vote of the Soviet Union, which represents a union of sixteen Republics.

I think it is clear enough that there is no need of wasting words on a discussion of such "democracy."

But that does not mean we can disregard the campaign that is in progress in the form of a fight against the "veto." It would be very nearsighted to consider this campaign a minor or fortuitous affair. And it would be naive to ignore the fact that this campaign has assumed a character definite-

ly hostile to the Soviet Union. None of us are so purblind as not to see that out-and-out reactionaries are already using it to their own advantage.

The debate on the "veto," and the whole of the present discussion, make it necessary to speak openly of the contradictions and the chief political tendencies existing in international life in our day. Two main tendencies are struggling within the United Nations organization to influence the fundamental trend of its work. One of these finds its backing in the basic conceptions of the United Nations organization, in respect for the principles upon which the Organization stands. The other, on the contrary, desires to undermine the foundation of the United Nations organization and to clear the way for representatives of a different line. These latter are already attacking in many ways, not only by direct assault, but also by means of flanking operations.

We still remember vividly the rise of the United Nations organization. It was imbued from the very outset with the spirit of democratic cooperation. We all know the important part that was played in this by the United States of America.

The United Nations organization was set up in order to secure such international cooperation among big and small countries as would in the greatest possible measure correspond to the interests of all peace-loving states. It was clear from the very outset that this required, first and foremost, the assurance of agreed action on the part of the great Powers. And it was understood then, no less than now, that this must be a type of international cooperation which would unite in the interests of peace and security the efforts of states having dissimilar social and political systems.

The war showed with particular clarity that states with very dissimilar social structures may have very important

common interests, which they can uphold only by common effort and on condition of noninterference in one another's domestic affairs. This was recognized by the United States, by Great Britain, by the Soviet Union. And, as we know, the coordination of the military effort of these countries and their Allies, and the extensive mutual aid practised among them, led to great results, securing to the Allies the victorious conclusion of the war.

The Soviet Union remains true, as before, to the principles of such international cooperation; it is prepared to spare no effort for success in this direction. Therefore, the U.S.S.R. firmly maintains the stand of respect for the United Nations organization, and considers it essential that the Charter be honestly and consistently observed. Such international cooperation can be really successful, of course, only if the other Powers also evince in action their readiness to follow the same course.

Recognition of the principles of such international cooperation is profoundly significant. It expresses the firm determination to secure universal peace, expresses preparedness for peaceful competition among states and social systems in social and economic affairs.

As to the Soviet Union, our people have no hesitations and no doubts: they know that peace among the peoples and peaceful competition among them, which implies also the possibility of developing ever broader and more amicable cooperation and mutual aid among big and small states, is fully in harmony with our country's interests.

We have no doubt that such a standpoint, calling for the development of international cooperation, is likewise to the interests of all peace-loving countries. It may conflict with the plans only of such a government as has no faith in its country's internal forces, such a government as is infected with disbelief in peaceful international cooperation.

and competition, preferring ambitious plans of conquest, domination, and exploitation of other peoples.

The lessons of history, as we know, are not always received as the real interests of a state demand. We cannot be sure that the crash of imperialist Germany and the collapse of imperialist Japan will be sufficiently convincing proof, to excessively greedy imperialists, of the fatal, adventurous nature of their plans to fight for world supremacy—which, as we know, is the true essence of imperialism. Even in the new, postwar conditions, to judge by a number of open statements that have been made, we must reckon with the possibility that such aggressive imperialist circles, liable to resolve on reckless aggression and the most hazardous military adventures for the sake of world supremacy, may gain increasing influence in certain countries. These imperialists have their prophet in Churchill, who claims followers not only in Britain, but in the United States.

Clearly, the normal principles of international cooperation have no place in the plans of such imperialist circles, which, in the final account, believe only in the extreme methods of pressure and violence. They have a different standpoint, in its essence irreclaimably reactionary. We must recognize that the standpoint of these circles, aimed at world supremacy, is diametrically opposed to the standpoint of international cooperation and peaceful competition among social systems. We must also take into account the fact that the adherents of this imperialist, altogether reactionary standpoint regard the Soviet Union as the chief obstacle to the execution of their expansionist plans, and would be glad, in their impotent malice, to unleash the whole pack of hounds against it.

Thus, we have to reckon with two opposite tendencies in the development of international relations. And it is not hard to see that whereas the principle of unanimity of the

great Powers established in the United Nations organization is entirely in harmony with the standpoint of consolidating normal international cooperation, of developing in every way the forms of such cooperation and competition, the retention of this principle in its integrity cannot accord with the standpoint of seeking world supremacy, a standpoint accompanied by aspirations to expansion and aggression. The collision and conflict of these two standpoints are now, we may say, in their initial stage; yet they are already bringing dissidence into the United Nations organization.

Imagine for a moment that the campaign for the abolition of the so-called "veto" is successful. What would be the political consequences?

It is perfectly obvious that the rejection of the principle of unanimity of the great Powers—and that, essentially, is what lies behind the proposal to abolish the "veto"—would actually mean the liquidation of the United Nations organization; for this principle is the foundation of the Organization. It may be that not all the participants in this noisy campaign entirely realize what it may lead to. However, inasmuch as the principle of unanimity of the great Powers forms the cornerstone of the United Nations organization, the abolition of this principle must lead to the collapse of the entire edifice of the Organization.

But that is not all. The success of this campaign would signify a victory of the political line directed at the domination of one group of states, headed by the strongest Power, over the remaining Powers, which would then remain in the minority. Instead of the line of international cooperation in the spirit of the democratic principles of the United Nations organization, we would have the triumph of the line pursued by the new claimants to world supremacy, in the form of a corresponding bloc, or, if you will, concern of Powers which already feel cramped by the retention of

the principle of unanimity of the great Powers. The debate and struggle centring around the so-called "veto" clearly indicate that we now face an accentuation of the contradictions between two basic political lines, of which one consists in defence of the principles we have all recognized, of international cooperation among big and small Powers, and the other—in the aspiration of certain influential groupings to free their hands for an unrestrained struggle for world supremacy. Neutrality in such a question is ambiguous and unbecoming. The Allies fought imperialist Germany and imperialist Japan in order to free the peoples from the fascist claimants to world supremacy. We did not wage this fight with the idea that any other country or countries should take their place. Our peoples did not sacrifice their priceless blood in flowing streams in order to clear the way for new claimants to world supremacy. That is what we should recall to mind just now. If the great Powers which headed the fight against the fascist aggressors keep together and, with the support of the remaining peoples, banish all dissidence from their ranks, they can do much to counteract the inflammation of insatiable appetites. If they do not, the new claimants to world supremacy will have their hands free for adventures of every type, until they break their necks.

As we know, there are no few methods by which the stronger Powers can exert pressure on other states. We know that squadrons of naval vessels and of friendly planes sometimes appear in seas and regions where they have not been seen before, when this is considered necessary to promote the success of diplomatic negotiations. We know, too, that dollars and pounds do not always stay at home, especially if there is any need for launching "dollar diplomacy," be it only, say, to secure the proper respect for "dollar democracy." Nowadays, too, as we know, there is

already talk of "atomic diplomacy." It is no secret to anyone that these and other methods, in various combinations, are not infrequently applied in order to influence other countries, particularly small ones. But there are people, there are influential groupings, to whom all this seems insufficient. And the moment all the barriers are removed, the moment, among other barriers, the principle of unanimity of the great Powers in the United Nations organization is abolished, the road will be entirely clear for such persons and such groupings, who will not rest content with less than the obedience of all nations to their dictates, to their money bag.

It is a most important task of the United Nations organization to oppose such insatiable appetites and aspirations for world supremacy. Only when they have demonstrated their ability to act in this direction can the United Nations reply as they should to the question: are we on the right road?

### III

#### THE ATOMIC BOMB AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In this connection we must dwell on the question of the atomic bomb, which today plays such an important part in the political calculations of some circles.

Only recently J. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, cogently expounded the views of the Soviet Union on this question. He laid particular stress on the fact that atomic bombs "cannot decide the issue of a war, inasmuch as atomic bombs are altogether insufficient for that." Further, he said that, if we are to speak of menaces to peace, "of course, the monopoly possession of the secret of the atomic bomb creates a menace," against which "there exist

at least two cures: a) the monopoly possession of the atomic bomb cannot last long; b) the use of the atomic bomb will be forbidden." These authoritative statements, which echoed around the world, meeting sympathetic response in the hearts of many millions, should be properly appreciated.

As we know, there are two distinct plans with regard to the use of atomic energy. I refer to the plan of the United States of America, on the one hand, and the plan of the Soviet Union, on the other.

The American plan, known as the "Baruch plan," unfortunately suffers from a certain degree of egoism. It is based on the desire to guarantee the United States monopoly possession of the atomic bomb. At the same time, it demands the immediate establishment of control over the production of atomic energy in all countries—a control so shaped as, on the surface, to appear international, while in reality it is designed to secure a veiled monopoly for the United States in this field. Projects of this type are obviously unacceptable, for they are dictated entirely by the narrowly conceived interests of one country, by an impermissible negation of the equality of states and of their legitimate interests.

Moreover, this plan suffers from a number of illusions. Even in the sphere of atomic energy, no single country can count on retaining a complete monopoly. Science and its exponents cannot be shut up in a box and kept under lock and key. It is about time illusions on that score were discarded. Another illusion is the hope that the atomic bomb will have a decisive effect in war. We all know that the atomic bomb was used against such cities as Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The population of these Japanese cities experienced the brutality of the atomic bomb. Against troops, the atomic bomb has nowhere yet been applied. And that is no accident.

If, however, it is planned to use atomic bombs against the civilian population in the towns, and to use it extensively, as the chatter goes in certain newspapers, no illusions should be entertained as to the international effect that would be produced by the realization of such savage plans. Just indignation might grip the hearts of honest men and women in all countries; and excessive enthusiasm over the atomic bomb as a decisive factor in future war may lead to political consequences that will bring tremendous disappointment, first and foremost, to the authors of such plans. And finally, it must not be forgotten that atomic bombs on one side may draw a reply in atomic bombs, and perhaps something else to boot, from the other side; and then the utter failure of all the present calculations of certain self-satisfied, but limited people will be more than obvious. Illusions are always dangerous in serious matters, as both Baruch and his partners will probably have to admit.

All this goes to show that right is not on the side of the American plan, even if we leave out of account the fact that the realization of this plan would conflict with unanimously adopted decisions of the United Nations. Suffice it to say that the adoption of this plan would require the destruction of the Charter of the United Nations organization, by rejection of the principle of unanimity of the great Powers in the Security Council, where the question of the atomic bomb is to be decided. Is it not in order to free the hands of the admirers of the atomic bomb, that certain people are raising such a to-do about the "veto"?

All this goes to show that the Baruch plan is not in keeping with the interests of the United Nations, either in substance or in form.

There is also another plan regarding the atomic bomb, a plan proposed by the Soviet Union. This plan is based on an entirely different standpoint.

We Soviet people do not connect our plans for the future with the use of the atomic bomb. You should remember, too, that the General Assembly has already expressed itself for the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments. Hence, there are no grounds for postponing the adoption of the international convention the Soviet Union has proposed, prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons. Only by adopting such a decision can we create conditions that will conduce to the free and effective discussion of the questions involved in the establishment of control over atomic energy in all countries.

Back in the years that followed the first world war, the peoples reached agreement to prohibit the military use of asphyxiating gases, bacteriological means, and other inhuman means of warfare. All the more necessary is it today to prohibit the military use of atomic bombs, and of all other means of mass destruction of human beings, which in the present instance implies the mass destruction of city residents and of peaceful citizens generally, the ruthless blow falling chiefly on children and women, on the sick and the aged. Those who fought the aggressors yesterday, and those who are genuinely opposed to new aggression, must feel it their sacred duty to outlaw the use of atomic bombs and to direct the newly-discovered atomic energy exclusively to peaceful uses. Only such application of atomic energy can be recognized by humanity as just. The honour and the conscience of the freedom-loving peoples demand that the atomic bomb be outlawed; for the United Nations can never undertake responsibility for any plans to use atomic energy for mass destruction of human beings, or, in general, for any application of atomic energy to the detriment of mankind.

I suppose that the debate among us on this question was inevitable, in view of the novelty of the problem; but in

this, too, we must avoid splitting into two camps: bellicose atomists, on the one hand, and those who advocate exclusively peaceful application of atomic energy, on the other. It should therefore be hoped that in the end the exchange of opinions that has begun on this question will lead to a unanimous opinion among the United Nations, including the United States.

What would people think, otherwise, and what could we reply to their perplexed questions?

You may have read in the New York papers, the other day, a speech of Mr. Baruch's in which he rather candidly expressed his views on the questions of war and peace. On October 12, at City College, he declared: "Peace seems beautiful during the savagery of war, but it becomes almost hateful when war is over." In his further discourse, Baruch spared no words to express his love of "liberty." But his ideas of liberty are very far removed, as we can easily see, from the actual desires of the ordinary people for liberty, well-being and enduring peace. He would like to see everybody satisfied with a liberty under which only a few fortunates can enjoy the good things of life, not only in times of prosperity and peace, but also during the storms of war. His ideas are very far from those of the people who must bend their backs in heavy daily labour, or who with their own hands and their own blood defend their country's liberty and future. Otherwise, even men of his class would have to agree that the chief concern of the "ordinary people," so called, in our day is to have governments and political leaders recognize it as their prime task to safeguard peace and security for the peoples; for, after all the trials of the second world war, the prospect of security and lasting peace is the most cherished hope of the ordinary people, men and women, throughout the world.

It may well be that the far-reaching plans built up around the atomic bomb arise from that very philosophy which is expressed in the words: "Peace . . . becomes almost hateful when war is over." If we are to adopt this dismal philosophy, then, of course, we must draw the corresponding political conclusions: swell our military budgets, increase the size of our armies, and do our best to outstrip others in the race for armaments, including atomic bombs. There can be only one continuation of this belligerent philosophy: in preparations for new aggression, which has been so unanimously condemned among the United Nations. But it is not difficult to perceive the error of talk about "almost hateful peace." In this philosophy we detect, first and foremost, a profound lack of faith in the road of peaceful progress for one's country, and a pessimistic uncertainty as to one's strength when faced by the prospect of peaceful competition among states and social systems. On the other hand, this philosophy is rank with the unrestrained desire for expansion and for undivided world supremacy.

We cannot believe that the Americans, in their majority, adhere to this sort of philosophy. We assume that the Americans, like all other peace-loving nations, after their successes in the second world war, desire above all else that the peace be as stable as possible, that the security of the peoples become the chief concern of the governments of the United Nations. These sentiments of the ordinary people of the Soviet Union and of the United States unite these peoples with one another and with all the other United Nations.

The Soviet Union emerged from the recent war as a country which had experienced hateful enemy occupation on a considerable part of its territory. For long years to come, our people will be unable to forget their tremendous

sacrifices, to forget their ruined towns and villages, for the restoration of which they are now straining every effort. This is one of the great tasks included in our new Stalin Five-Year Plan, which we have begun to carry out this year. And we are confident that the time is not distant when our industry and agriculture, our transport system and cultural institutions, our towns and villages will completely recover from the consequences of war and once more begin to thrive, thus demonstrating to other peoples, too, the power and the tremendous possibilities of a liberated people and of the working people's state they have created. Among our people there is no disbelief in the peaceful road of progress, no such uncertainty as arises in countries where the economic and political situation is unstable; for we firmly maintain the positions won by the Soviet Union, and we have the most profound faith in the growing strength of the Soviet people. There is a great desire among our people to participate in a peaceful competition among states and social systems, in which individual peoples may not only display their inherent possibilities, but establish closer and more all-embracing mutual co-operation.

Our people aspire to stable peace; they believe that only peace can guarantee economic welfare and real prosperity for long years to come, and, together with this, a free life for the ordinary people and for all mankind. The Soviet Union is a stranger to the aspirations of those strong Powers and of those influential groupings in other countries which are infected with imperialist dreams of world supremacy. The Soviet Union sees its best friends in those states which truly desire peace. We regard it as our most important task to consolidate international co-operation in the name of peace and progress. The newspapers here today publish J. V. Stalin's replies on cardinal

questions of international relations. In these replies you will sense a far-seeing wisdom, will sense the unbending will of the Soviet Union to consolidate friendship among the peoples on a democratic basis of cooperation.

## IV

### PROPOSAL ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

It remains for me to draw certain conclusions and offer concrete proposals. The creation of the United Nations organization was a great and historic accomplishment. It is a task of even greater importance to secure the proper direction of its work. And that requires that the peoples be inspired with respect for the principles of this Organization. It requires also that attacks and assaults against these principles encounter the proper resistance. When that is so, the present shortcomings in its work will be overcome. When that is so, the United Nations organization will successfully carry out its fundamental tasks, safeguarding peace and security for the peoples and developing international cooperation on a just and democratic basis.

Our fight against the common enemy ended in brilliant victory. Those who yesterday claimed world supremacy have been downthrown, and the fate of these countries should serve as a grave warning to all who may again be carried away by unbridled aspirations for expansion and world supremacy. The Allies have disarmed Germany and Japan, and are able to keep them disarmed for a sufficiently long period.

We know how deep are the wounds that have been dealt our peoples, and how heavy the burden many of them carry as a result of the second world war. The gov-

ernments would not be fulfilling their prime duties if they did not undertake all possible measures to ease this burden and to take account of the legitimate wishes of the peoples. Particularly important in this connection is the fact that we now have every possibility for limiting armaments and cutting down military expenditures; yet these, in some cases, still continue to grow, without any sufficient reason.

The Charter of the United Nations organization empowers the General Assembly to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (Article 11 of the Charter). In defining the functions and powers of the Security Council, the Charter makes it responsible for formulating plans for the regulation of armaments, in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources (Article 26 of the Charter). Further, Article 47 of the Charter, which provides for the establishment of the Military Staff Committee and defines its functions and tasks, points out that the Security Council is to have in mind the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

It must be recognized that the time is ripe for definite decisions in the way of accomplishing these tasks. Now that the chief aggressive countries have been disarmed, and measures have been taken for the stringent limitation of armaments in the remaining ex-enemy states, the time has come to adopt measures for the general reduction of armaments. The execution of such measures, moreover, will increase confidence in the genuine desire of the United Nations to achieve stable peace. Finally, the reduction of armaments will strike a well-deserved blow at the expan-

sionist aspirations of groupings which have not yet sufficiently mastered the lessons taught by the ignominious rout of the aggressors in the last war. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the peoples will have every right to doubt the sincerity of declarations of peaceful policy, if one state or another, while making such declarations, not only fails to reduce its armaments, but, on the contrary, increases them, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

In accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations organization, the Soviet delegation submits to the consideration of the General Assembly the following proposal:

"1. In the interests of consolidating international peace and security and in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Organization the General Assembly considers a general reduction of armaments necessary.

"2. The implementation of the decision on the reduction of armaments should include as a primary objective the banning of the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes.

"3. The General Assembly recommends to the Security Council to provide for the practical achievement of the objectives set forth in the above-mentioned paragraphs 1 and 2.

"4. The General Assembly calls upon governments of all states to render every possible assistance to the Security Council in this responsible undertaking the accomplishment of which conforms to the establishment of stable peace and international security and also serves the interests of the peoples by lightening their heavy economic burden caused by excessive expenditures for armaments which do not correspond to peaceful postwar conditions."

The adoption of a decision providing for a general reduction of armaments and prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes will indeed accord with the peaceful aspirations of our peoples, and will promote the development of international cooperation.

In conclusion, allow me to express my confidence that the present proposal of the Soviet delegation will receive the support of all the United Nations. (*Applause.*)

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## STATEMENT AT A BANQUET HELD IN NEW YORK IN HONOUR OF THE UNITED NATIONS

*November 11, 1946*

Mr. Chairman, allow me, first of all, to thank you and the Foreign Press Association for your invitation to this banquet in honour of the United Nations organization. The Soviet delegation accepted this invitation with pleasure. It regards the present assemblage as one of many manifestations of respect for the international organization which pursues the lofty aims of the United Nations.

The war has ended in our victory. The hopes of the peoples are centred on freely enjoying the blessings of universal peace. The "ordinary people," who constitute the vast majority of the population in every country, have only one desire: that their enjoyment of the blessings of universal peace may be as prolonged, as lasting as possible. That is their legitimate right, especially after the sublime heroism and the sacrifices rendered during the war. We must not forget or underestimate the rights of those who by their daily labour create all the values, bring into being all the achievements of civilization, that all of us enjoy. We will hardly be mistaken in saying: they will appraise their leaders, their statesmen and public men, by the degree to which these leaders prove themselves capable of securing to the peoples a life of peace, the advancement of material



questions in the United Nations organization, and it would not be in place to anticipate that discussion here. However, the American delegation has already taken steps to meet the proposal of the Soviet Union, and I declare that the Soviet delegation, in its turn, is also prepared to take steps to meet the United States delegation. We may already affirm that agreement is possible between the proposals of the Soviet and the American delegations. It is up to us all to exert ourselves earnestly for the solution of this important problem.

Not a single delegation at the General Assembly has objected to discussing the general reduction of armaments. On the contrary, as you know, several delegations have expressed their complete approval of this proposal, and others, their readiness to discuss the problem. I hope that we shall now be able to get down to this question seriously, and begin the solution of the problem of general reduction of armaments here in New York, at the present session of the General Assembly.

With such premises, the press can contribute greatly to this work. The press will not err in taking this important and urgent problem close to heart. The general reduction of armaments, including the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes, is undeniably to the interests of all peace loving peoples. Inasmuch as the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic bombs will be universal, no country will be able to evade the demand for such measures, and no country will be in a privileged position.

Now that our common enemies have been routed, and disarmed for long years to come, we are in a position to set about the reduction of armaments in our own countries. That will put an end to the armament race which has begun. We must carry out the general reduction of



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## THE PRESENCE OF ARMED FORCES OF UNITED NATIONS ON THE TERRITORIES OF NON-ENEMY STATES

*Speech at the Meeting of the First  
Committee of the General Assembly*

*November 20, 1946*

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen. The question of the presence of armed forces of United Nations on the territories of non-enemy states is one of great political importance. It has already been the subject of no little discussion in the United Nations organization. Still more has been said about it in the press.

While the war was in progress, Allied troops were of necessity compelled to enter the territory of other friendly states. This was particularly true of the troops of such countries as the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. As we know, the Allied troops accomplished a great liberating mission in regard to those peoples which in the course of the war had come under the heel of Hitlerism and its allies. Who has forgotten the enthusiasm with which the American and British troops were greeted in, say, France and Belgium at that time, or the Soviet troops in, say, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia? In some cases, Allied troops were compelled

to enter the territories of United Nations even before enemy invasion, in order to forestall it. There can be no denying the services of the great democratic Powers and the other Allied countries in this struggle, and, in particular, in the restoration of freedom and independence to those friendly countries whose own forces were insufficient to crush the invading fascist troops.

But the war ended long ago. The aims pursued by the armed forces of the United Nations have been completely realized. It might have been expected that, in view of this, the Allied troops would be called home. In any case, the grounds that justified their entry into the territory of other countries have ceased to exist. Yet in a number of cases the troops of Allied states remain to this day in other countries, serving as an instrument of foreign interference in the domestic affairs of these countries and exerting pressure on relations among states. Moreover, certain Powers have established an extensive network of air and naval bases far beyond their borders.

I need hardly say that the presence of Allied troops on foreign territories many months after the close of the war is bound to arouse a very natural uneasiness among the friendly peoples of the countries where foreign troops still remain. Nor can we disregard the fact that world public opinion, which desires the establishment of stable peace and universal security, is displaying perceptible anxiety over the situation that has arisen. This, of course, does not apply to the territories of former enemy states, inasmuch as there are weighty reasons for the presence of Allied troops on such territories. We all know that there are Allied armed forces on the territories of the former enemy states, in some cases in quite considerable numbers. Nevertheless, it does not occur to anyone to question the presence of the armed forces of the Allied Powers in

Germany, for example, or in Japan. The presence of Allied troops on these territories, which were strongly infected with fascism and militarism, is essential to the accomplishment of the important tasks the Allies have set themselves, the tasks of demilitarization and democratization in these countries, in the interests of universal peace and security. It is also natural that Allied troops remain on the territories of the other former enemy states, inasmuch as armistice conditions are still in force; but only until the peace treaties are concluded.

All this cannot apply to states that belong to the Allied camp. In relation to these states, the presence of foreign troops cannot now be justified, except for such special cases as the necessity of maintaining lines of communication with former enemy states, and that only for the term of occupation of the enemy states.

Such are the views of the Soviet Government. Accordingly, the Soviet Government has already taken the practical steps which these views infer.

In the course of the war, Soviet troops entered the territory of, say, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Norway. But immediately after the conclusion of the war measures were taken for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from these territories. As early as last autumn these troops were recalled, and communiqués to that effect were published.

Again, towards the end of the war against Germany, Soviet troops were obliged to land on the island of Bornholm, which belongs to Denmark. In April of this year the evacuation of Soviet troops from this island, too, was completed.

Last autumn, as we all remember, the Soviet troops fought against Japan, and routed the Japanese troops in Manchuria. You know from published communiqués that

the withdrawal of Soviet troops from China was begun at the end of last year, and was completed by May 3.

After Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R., Soviet troops, on the one hand, and British troops, on the other, were compelled to enter the territory of Iran, in order to safeguard Allied communications of wartime importance. Quite a to-do was raised, early this year, in connection with the Soviet troops that still remained on Iranian territory. As you know, the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran, too, was entirely completed by the beginning of May.

A certain number of Soviet troops are maintained on Polish territory at present, guarding our lines of communication with Germany. This situation has not caused any misunderstanding in the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland, and has naturally been completely understood by our other Allies.

Finally, there are Soviet troops in Northern Korea. Their presence there is provided for by precise agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the Allied Powers. Consequently, this case also affords no ground for misunderstandings.

A different situation has arisen with regard to American and British troops on the territories of certain of the United Nations. We know that there are armed forces belonging to the United States of America and to Great Britain on the territory of a number of states of the United Nations. They came during the war, but in some cases remain even today, long after the conclusion of the war. We may point not only to European countries, but to the countries of South America, not only to Africa, but to Asia. Suffice it to say that armed forces, including air and naval bases, belonging to the United States of America and to Great Britain are disposed even today in every part of the globe, including various territories of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans. Moreover, there has been no

little talk of late about the interest which the leaders of the armed forces of certain states are evincing in such distant regions as the Arctic.

Only the representatives of the United States of America and Great Britain themselves, of course, can give us a complete picture, by which we could judge of the state of affairs.

There is no need for me to dwell in detail just now on the political aspect of the question under discussion. I think I may hope that this question, in the main, is already sufficiently clear to the representatives of the states here present.

After all that has been said, let me remind you that as early as last August the Soviet Government submitted a proposal to the effect that the States Members of the United Nations organization submit to the Security Council definite information regarding their armed forces stationed on the territories of other United Nations. It proposed that the governments submit the following information:

Firstly, information as to where on the territories of United Nations and other friendly states, and in what number, there are armed forces of other United Nations.

Secondly, information as to where on the aforesaid territories there are air and naval bases, and what is the size of their garrisons belonging to the armed forces of other States Members of the United Nations organization.

Aside from political considerations, such information is essential to the Security Council and to the Military Staff Committee, which is now studying the question of the armed forces which the United Nations are to make available to the Security Council in order to safeguard universal peace, in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. The Soviet Government, for its part, has expressed

its readiness to submit such information to the Security Council.

You know also that Mr. Austin, at the General Assembly, has expressed the point of view of the United States of America on this question. Mr. Austin did not object to the proposal of the Soviet Union, but he extended the question. He proposed that information be submitted regarding all mobilized armed forces, whether stationed abroad or at home. In this way, he indicated the necessity of submitting information regarding Allied troops on the territories of former enemy states as well.

The Soviet Government is prepared to meet these proposals. It hopes to reach agreement on this question both with the Government of the United States and with the other governments.

First of all, the Soviet Government expresses its agreement that all states submit complete information regarding their armed forces abroad, as proposed by the American Government. Thus, both the Soviet and the American Government agree to the submission of information not only regarding armed forces stationed on the territories of friendly states, but also regarding armed forces stationed on the territories of former enemy states. By including this last addition, we could obtain a joint Soviet-American proposal covering the whole problem of armed forces abroad.

On receiving such information, the Security Council would have a complete picture of the armed forces of the different states which are stationed outside their borders. This will be of great importance to the Security Council and to the Military Staff Committee, which is now studying the question of the armed forces required by the United Nations organization to safeguard international peace and security.

As to the armed forces of United Nations stationed within each country, that question, too, must be settled. True, it has no direct bearing on the proposal now under discussion. But we have all recognized the necessity of discussing the question of a general reduction of armaments. In other words, having taken such a decision, we shall have to busy ourselves with the question of armed forces as a whole.

An examination of the problem of general reduction of armaments, of course, implies the necessity of full information, not only regarding armed forces stationed abroad, but also regarding armed forces stationed at home. General disarmament must embrace all countries, and must apply to all types of armed forces, wherever they may be located. Thus, when we take up the problem of the general reduction of armaments, we may reach agreed decision on this question too—i.e., the question of troops stationed at home.

But we must not underestimate the importance of the question set before us today. The question of armed forces of United Nations which remain abroad long months after the conclusion of the war should not be submerged in other, more general problems, which are to be examined separately.

In conformity with these remarks, the Soviet draft has been revised to include the afore-mentioned addition from the proposals made by Mr. Austin. I now present to you for your consideration and for subsequent submission to the General Assembly this revised draft, which reads as follows:

“The General Assembly recommends to the Security Council to take a decision to the effect that States Members of the United Nations should submit the following information to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council within a month:

"1. At what points in the territory of Members of the United Nations or other States, with the exception of former enemy territories, and in what number are armed forces of other Members of the United Nations?

"2. At what points in the former enemy States, and in what number are armed forces of the Allied Powers and other Members of the United Nations?

"3. At what points in the above-mentioned territories are air and naval bases, and what is the size of their garrisons belonging to the armed forces of States Members of the United Nations?

"4. The information to be provided under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 should refer to the situation as it existed on 1 November, 1946."

All of us will have to submit this information to the Security Council. We have no grounds for refusing to do so, or for concealing from the United Nations organization the actual facts concerning our armed forces abroad. No country should evade this duty; for its fulfilment is essential in order that the Security Council may be able to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Charter.

The Soviet Union is prepared to do what is called for by the present draft. We hope that the other governments will also agree to this.

There can be no doubt that an affirmative decision in this question will be to the interests of peace and international security.

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## THE QUESTION OF ARMED FORCES OF UNITED NATIONS ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES

*Speech at the Meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly*

*November 21, 1946*

Mr. Chairman. There is no need for me to touch upon the substance of the question just now, as the majority of the delegates who have spoken here expressed no objection in principle to the proposal of the Soviet delegation. In the event that objections should be raised against this proposal, however, I naturally reserve the right to speak on the substance of the question as well.

A question has been put here by the British delegate, Sir Alexander Cadogan. He requested that I explain the purpose pursued in setting before the General Assembly the question now under discussion. I am prepared to explain once more. But I should like to call your attention to the fact that I have already twice explained the purposes of the Soviet proposal. I spoke on this question at the General Assembly. Yesterday, I made a statement in the present Committee. In both cases I tried to explain the reasons which had prompted the Soviet delegation to bring up this question.

Perhaps Sir Alexander Cadogan's question yesterday may be explained by the fact that I spoke in Russian. The process of translation evidently inconvenienced matters. But the text of my speech was distributed to the delegates in

English and in French on the same day. Therefore, I do not think there is any necessity of dwelling in detail on what was said in yesterday's statement.

To be brief, the purposes of the Soviet proposal are the following. I am repeating in order to remove all misunderstanding, any thought that there is something unclear about the question. We all know very well that our Charter contains a chapter, the seventh, entitled: "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." In this chapter there is an article, Article 43, which reads:

"1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

"2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

"3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

The Military Staff Committee of the Security Council is at present studying the question of how to ensure the fulfilment of Article 43 of the Charter. It seems to me that if information is received from all states concerning the armed forces they maintain outside their borders, this should

facilitate the preparation of the agreements mentioned in Article 43. Without such information, the Military Staff Committee would find it difficult to accomplish its task; and it might even be impossible to draw up a plan for the organization of the armed forces to be made available to the United Nations organization which would fit in with the actual state of affairs and constitute a real guarantee for the accomplishment of the tasks set by the Charter of our Organization.

It is not, of course, merely a question of submitting one or another type of information, nor even merely of the task that has to be done by the Military Staff Committee.

It seems to me perfectly obvious that the submission of this information to the Security Council will also be of great political importance. In any case, we will then have a complete idea as to which countries have armed forces outside their borders; where, and in what number. And when we have all, without exception, submitted this information to the Security Council and the Secretary-General of our Organization, when the situation is entirely clear to all us, many other things will also be much clearer to us than at present. In any case, such information will enable us to judge whether or not this question, the question of the presence of armed forces of United Nations on foreign territories, is one of major political significance. A precise idea of the actual state of affairs in this respect is very important to all of us, and, it seems to me, will work in the interests of universal peace, of securing the freedom and independence of all countries, and particularly of the small nations, and will assist in the accomplishment of those peaceful aims which are the chief task of the United Nations organization.

That is what I wished to say in addition to my earlier statements on this question.

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## THE QUESTION OF ALLIED TROOPS ABROAD

*Speech at the Meeting of the First  
Committee of the General Assembly*

*November 22, 1946*

Mr. Chairman and Delegates. We are discussing an important question. That has been recognized by most of the representatives who have spoken here.

It is clearly our duty to discuss questions that concern any country, in so far as they affect vital interests of security or national independence. All the more, then, are we obliged to discuss questions which, like the present one, affect the problem of universal peace and the development of friendly relations among all states. The present case involves both the interests of the great states and those of the small countries.

The Soviet Government's proposal that the United Nations submit information regarding their troops, in so far as these troops are stationed outside the borders of their home countries, and particularly in so far as they are stationed on the territory of one or another of the United Nations, will affect the great Powers first and foremost. The great Powers should regard the submission of this information as the fulfilment of their duty towards the other states, and particularly the small countries. Nor are the small countries unaffected. If we accept the propos-

al of the Soviet Government, they will also be obliged to submit information on this question.

When the countries, big and small, submit this information, we will obtain a complete picture of the state of affairs as regards the troops of United Nations on foreign territories. At the same time, this will ensure the accuracy of the information, and its reciprocal verification. This information should be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations organization and to the Security Council.

I have already spoken of the tremendous services and sacrifices rendered by the great Powers in the liberation of the territories of certain friendly states which had been invaded by the fascist aggressors. These services are great and indisputable. They will go down through the ages, to the glory of the liberators.

While the war was raging, and the enemy threatened the very existence of certain states, the Allied troops exerted their efforts to end enemy invasion and restore freedom and democratic rights to the peoples. But now the times have changed. The war is over, yet in some cases Allied troops still remain on the territories of other United Nations. It is perfectly obvious that the previous reasons and grounds for this no longer exist, in view of the transition from war to peace. If today, after the conclusion of the war, when more than a year has passed since the defeat of the enemy, the troops of some United Nations still remain on the territories of friendly states, this can no longer be explained as previously. There are evidently other reasons behind it. Of these, however, we have no precise knowledge. But why should we not have this knowledge? Why should the United Nations organization not be informed on such a question, which affects most important aspects of the relations among states?

# I

## PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

In the first chapter of the Charter, which sets forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations organization, we read: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

We all adhere to these principles, and it must be our concern to see that they do not remain on paper, but are carried out in practice. Following these principles, we must not permit any action in relation to other countries which will affect the "political independence of any state." Only in that way can we fulfil the obligations which we assumed on entering the United Nations organization.

It is only natural that talk and rumours should arise over such a question as the presence of one country's troops on another country's territory at the present time, when the war is over and there is no military necessity for it. Such a situation cannot but arouse dissatisfaction among the peoples. World public opinion regards it with anxiety. Nor can it be denied that such a state of affairs affects the prestige of the international Organization to which we belong.

In some cases even too much significance has been attached to the presence of Allied troops on the territory of other United Nations.

For example, when part of the Soviet troops were delayed on Iranian territory for a few weeks, this became an object of discussion at many meetings of the Security Council. A tremendous hubbub was raised about it. How

many speeches were made at that time concerning the undesirability, the impermissibility of delay in withdrawing the troops of one United Nation from the territory of another United Nation!

In this case, too, there was no procrastination on the part of the Soviet Union. The evacuation of the Soviet units from Iranian territory was completed promptly in the time specified by the Soviet Government. Yet half a year has passed since that time, and still the Security Council has not even gotten around to removing from its agenda the question of Soviet troops being delayed on Iranian territory. At the same time, can we be entirely sure that other states have also withdrawn all their soldiers from Iranian territory? In any case, we do not have sufficiently definite information on that score. It remains only to add that things cannot be done in this manner, applying one criterion in one case, and another criterion in other cases. The same criterion should be applied in all cases, and to all states. Only if it follows such procedure can an international organization really consolidate its prestige.

It must be recognized that in speaking of the presence of troops of one United Nation on the territory of another United Nation, we are touching on an important question, one that cannot be shrugged away. There must be full clarity on such questions among the United Nations.

We all know that there are British troops on Greek territory. The British troops came to Greece at a time when this was necessary in the fight against fascist Germany. But that fight has long since ended. Nevertheless, the British troops have not left. That is now attracting universal attention. Why is it necessary for troops of the mighty British Empire to remain on the territory of little Greece so many months after the conclusion of the war?

Nobody can deny that the presence of these foreign troops exerts heavy pressure on the domestic situation in Greece. As a result, Greece has become perhaps the most unquiet country in Europe. Surely, we have no right to disregard this fact.

Here is another example. United States troops still remain on Chinese territory. We are told that they are on this territory by agreement between the American and Chinese Governments, to cooperate in the accomplishment of certain definite obligations with respect to the disarming and evacuation of Japanese soldiers and civilians. Such an explanation, however, can hardly be found convincing. The question arises: cannot the Chinese Government manage without foreign troops, now that the enemy is defeated, and the war long since concluded?

We are told that there is only a small number of American troops in China. But that only goes to show that American troops are not really needed there. At the same time, the fact that American troops remain obviously complicates China's internal development, intensifying the division within the country and creating a peculiar situation for the Chinese Republic in international affairs. So long as American troops are kept in China, this question cannot but remain on the order of the day, acquiring ever increasing international significance.

Another important circumstance is the fact that certain Powers have their military bases—air and naval—in almost every part of the globe. The establishment of such bases had its purpose during the war. But how can the United Nations ignore a situation in which the number of air and naval bases maintained by certain states remains very considerable even after the war? The network of such bases maintained by the United States of America and by Great Britain embraces all the continents and all the

oceans. And that despite the fact that the war is long since over!

The Panama representative has spoken here. He spoke of the military bases maintained by the United States of America in Panama. He said that a part of the American bases in Panama had been returned to Panama, and that as regarded the remaining bases, his Government hoped to reach agreement with the Government of the United States. It is evident from what he said that there are still American bases in Panama.

The Brazilian representative has also spoken here. He reminded us of the existence of military bases on Brazilian territory. We learned from his statement that the specialists who serviced these bases still remain in Brazil. It appears that American specialists on military bases are still needed in Brazil. That is a fact which attracts attention, inasmuch as we are living in peacetime conditions.

Only recently, we all read the newspaper reports about the dispute between the United States of America and Iceland, on this same question of military bases. The United States has a population of approximately 140,000,000; Iceland, approximately 130,000, in other words, about one to a thousand. And in the course of several months we read in the newspapers about the litigation between the United States of America and Iceland over the retention of American bases on Iceland's territory. That mighty state, America, wrangled with Iceland, the smallest of all the states now Members of the United Nations, because it wanted to retain its bases on Iceland's territory even today, when universal peace has been restored. And this dispute, as you know, acquired international significance.

I have cited only a few examples to illustrate the importance of the question that has been raised by the Soviet Government. I could multiply the number of these

examples many times over. The presence of the troops of one United Nation on the territory of another United Nation, at a time when the war is over and peace has been restored, is attracting universal attention. This situation gives rise to many exaggerated rumours, to all sorts of perplexed questions and dissatisfaction among the peoples. It cannot, however, be denied that the presence of foreign troops on a country's territory is an impermissible means of pressure on the domestic affairs of the state. In some cases, too, the presence of foreign troops is designed not only to exert foreign pressure on a country's domestic affairs, but also to create a menace from without for the country's neighbours. We must put an end to such a situation.

## II

### THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND THE AMERICAN ADDITIONS

In order to remove any grounds for rumour in this connection, it is essential that all the 'United Nations submit complete information regarding their troops stationed on the territories of other United Nations. That will clear the atmosphere. It will bring into the relations among big and small states the clarity essential to the establishment of proper mutual confidence. There are no grounds for refusing to inform the United Nations organization on all these facts. On the contrary, if the 'United Nations organization receives such information, that will help to establish more wholesome international relations and to strengthen mutual confidence among the peoples.

The Soviet delegation proposed at the General Assembly that all the United Nations submit to the Secretary-

General and to the Security Council information as to what troops they have on the territories of other United Nations. In reply to this, as you know, came a statement on the part of the Government of the United States. Mr. Austin, speaking at the General Assembly, declared that the United States of America would not object to discussing this question at the General Assembly.

At the same time, he proposed that the question be extended, and presented two new proposals.

Mr. Austin proposed, firstly, that information regarding the troops of United Nations be submitted not only in relation to the territories of other United Nations, but also in relation to former enemy states. He proposed, secondly, that information be submitted regarding the troops of United Nations which are stationed at home. The Soviet delegation replied affirmatively on both these questions, although its reply did not entirely coincide with the proposals of the United States Government.

Take the question of Allied troops on the territories of former enemy states. That question is clear enough without any new information. The presence of Allied troops on the former enemy territories is provided for in the armistice terms. Hence, the Soviet Government saw no reason for raising this question on a par with the question of the presence of Allied troops on the territories of other United Nations. Inasmuch as the terms of armistice with each of the defeated states were signed not by one, but by several Allied states, and, furthermore, were made public for general information, everybody knows on what grounds Allied troops are maintained on the territories of the former enemy states.

More, the Allies are now engaged in drawing up peace treaties. And these peace treaties, in their turn, contain the clear provision that after their conclusion the Allied

troops are to be withdrawn from the territories of the former enemy states, within a definite and precisely designated period.

Only in relation to Germany and Japan has the drafting of peace treaties not yet been commenced. As you know, there is sufficient reason for that. But even here, things are not at a standstill. As to the peace treaties for Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland, each of these treaties provides that the Allied troops are to be withdrawn from these countries within 90 days after the treaty comes into force. Thus, the question of Allied troops on former enemy territories is perfectly clear. Still, the Soviet Government raised no objection to Mr. Austin's proposal, considering that the submission of precise data on this question may be of interest to the United Nations.

At this point, I must remark upon a certain misunderstanding which has arisen in connection with Mr. Connally's statement about Austria. He declared, for some reason, that the American troops in Austria were there with the consent of the Austrian Government. Actually, the Allies did not ask the consent of the Austrian Government. In fact, there was no Austrian government at the time when the four states—the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union—concluded their agreement to bring troops into Austrian territory. When this agreement was concluded, definite zones were assigned for the troops of each of the Allied states, and provision was made for inter-Allied control over all Austrian territory, on which point there is a special detailed agreement. Such are the facts of the situation.

Senator Connally made another statement concerning the state of affairs in former enemy territories.

He said: if we are to consider that the presence of Allied troops in friendly states leads to interference in the

domestic affairs of those states, then armies present in ex-enemy states are also capable of influencing the internal affairs and policies of those states. Mr. Connally is perfectly right in that. But the Allied troops on the territories of the former enemy states are there precisely for the purpose of controlling the domestic situation in these countries for a definite period of time. We all know, for example, that the Allies have adopted a special decision concerning the democratization and demilitarization of Germany, and have agreed on the necessity of a lengthy occupation of Germany by Allied troops in order to carry out these decisions. In relation to Japan, too, as one of the chief aggressive Powers, grave measures are naturally required to control the domestic development of this state over a definite period of time, in order to ensure the accomplishment of demilitarization and democratization in this state as well.

Mr. Connally knows, of course, that the Allies agreed to keep their troops on the territory of Germany and Japan, and likewise in the other former enemy states, in order to safeguard important interests of the Allies and of all the United Nations. But surely it is not right to apply to states of the United Nations the criterions we consider necessary in regard to former enemy states!

Finally, I must dwell on one more remark of Mr. Connally's. The Soviet delegation proposed that the United Nations submit information regarding their troops on the territories of other United Nations, but did not propose that information be required regarding Allied troops on the territories of former enemy states. However, when the American Government proposed that information be required regarding Allied troops on the territories of former enemy states as well, the Soviet delegation agreed to this. Such information may be useful, if only for the sake of greater precision. Inasmuch as other governments consider

this desirable, the Soviet Government raised no objections to this proposal.

But even after the Soviet delegation had agreed to this proposal and had introduced a corresponding paragraph into the text of its draft, which has been distributed to all the delegates here present, Mr. Connally, for some reason, continued to insist upon this proposal and to reproach someone with unwillingness to submit this information. We do not know why this should have been done, when all grounds for such statements had been eliminated. But perhaps Mr. Connally did not read the Soviet delegation's proposal until after he had spoken, and perhaps he was not listening when I stated my agreement to the submission of such information.

### III

#### THE PURPOSES OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL

Now I should like to return once more to a question that has been touched upon here by quite a number of delegates. They inquire of the Soviet delegation, what purpose it pursues in making this proposal. Inasmuch as this inquiry has been repeated, I shall dwell upon it once more. I shall have to remind you again that, under the Charter, the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee are obliged to draft a proposal concerning the armed forces that are to be made available to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace. That is provided by Article 43 of the Charter. Never before has an international organization occupied itself with such questions. Today, this task has been put on the agenda. The Military Staff Committee has already begun to examine the question, although, of course, we must not underestimate the diffi-

culties involved in problems of this nature. And we must all help the Military Staff Committee to work out a plan for the organization of the armed forces that are to be made available to the Security Council to safeguard universal peace. But is it not clear that for this purpose the Military Staff Committee must have information concerning such things as, for example, the armed forces of United Nations which are stationed outside the borders of their countries, and, consequently, designed entirely for use abroad? If the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee are ignorant of the facts in regard to such troops, how can they draw up the necessary plan for the armed forces of the United Nations organization? Only complete information on these armed forces will make it possible to draw up a proper plan for the organization of the armed forces subordinated to the Security Council, which are to be used for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr. Bevin said yesterday that the question under discussion did not come within the scope of Article 43. But he did not take the trouble to offer proof of his statement.

The Soviet delegation does not share that opinion. Its representatives participating in the work of the Military Staff Committee consider the information in question extremely important for working out the plan for the organization of the armed forces of the United Nations. So far as I have been able to understand the discussion here, a considerable section of the delegates who have spoken are also in agreement with this.

As to the discussion that has been going on here, I should like to dwell on that particularly.

We have seen that different representatives took different attitudes towards the Soviet proposal. That should

not surprise us, if only in view of the novelty of the problem.

In my statement at the beginning of the discussion on this question, I presented, for the Soviet Government, a detailed account of the armed forces of the Soviet Union on the territories of other United Nations, and also on the territories of former enemy states, as provided in the respective armistice terms. Thus, the Soviet Government has laid its cards on the table, as Mr. Connally here proposed, and has shown how things stand in regard to Soviet troops abroad. We have also heard the French representative, who likewise dwelt on this question. He explained how things stand as to French armed forces on the territories of other states. We have heard a statement by the Chinese representative. He reminded us that during the war there were Chinese troops on the territories of Burma and Indo-China, and stated that after the conclusion of the war all Chinese troops had left foreign territories and returned home.

Thus, of the five great Powers, the Soviet Union, France, and China have here presented an official account of the state of affairs in regard to their armed forces outside their borders. Unfortunately, we have heard nothing of this sort either from the representative of the United States of America or from the British representative. They have not given us this information, evidently considering that there is no need to speak of such matters before the representatives of the 'United Nations organization.

We cannot, of course, demand that information regarding the troops of every state on the territories of other United Nations be presented right here, at this Committee. At the same time, we have no grounds for asserting that the United States of America and Great Britain will refuse to submit information regarding their armed forces on

the territories of foreign states, should the necessity for submitting such information be recognized by the United Nations organization.

#### IV

### REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IS A SEPARATE QUESTION

I shall go on to a question on which various points of view have been expressed here, and on which we have not yet reached unanimity.

As you know, the Government of the United States has proposed that, besides information regarding the armed forces of United Nations on former enemy territories, information be submitted regarding troops stationed at home. You know also that the Soviet Government does not object to this proposal. We consider, however, that this question should be examined at the time when we turn to the problem of the general reduction of armaments.

It remains for me to remind you that not only the question of the presence of armed forces of United Nations on foreign territories, but also the question of the general reduction of armaments, was taken up at the General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union. Again, when we begin to examine the problem of the general reduction of armaments, we will naturally be faced with the general question of armed forces as a whole, including the question of the armed forces each state maintains at home. That is the view of the Soviet Government.

Yesterday, we heard one more proposal. The British delegate proposed that we combine the discussion of the question of United Nations troops on foreign territories and the question of the general reduction of armaments, which includes also the question of troops stationed at

home. It is easily demonstrated, however, that such a combination would not be to the purpose. It is clear to all of us that each of the two questions involved is very important.

We have no doubt that the delegate who proposed combining the discussion of these two questions also realizes the importance of each of the questions, and has no desire to impair the consideration of either one of them. At the same time, we already see clearly that the question of Allied troops on foreign territories is not a simple one, and calls for serious discussion; and the problem of the general reduction of armaments is still more complicated. We cannot combine the discussion of these questions without impairing our consideration of both the one and the other. By combining the discussion, we will fail to devote sufficient attention to either question. Therefore, such combination is inexpedient.

Nor is it hard to see that the questions are different in their very nature.

When we say, give us information about your troops on foreign territories, we are speaking of a question of the present day, of receiving factual material for the current moment. But when we discuss a question that has to do with the general reduction of armaments, we are bringing up a problem of great scope, applying to a lengthy period of time. While the first question is chiefly one of fact, the second is primarily a question of principles, involving the intricate elaboration of problems such as the participants in international meetings and conferences have never heretofore been able to solve.

Nobody will deny that it will require quite some time to work out the problem of the general reduction of armaments. Without serious application, which will take many months, there can be no serious discussion of the problem

of the general reduction of armaments. Are we to understand that we are being called upon to postpone the submission of information regarding troops on foreign territories until such time as we finish discussing the question of the general reduction of armaments? Are we to understand the proposal for the joint discussion of these two questions in the sense that information regarding troops on foreign territories is not to be demanded from England, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and other states until the problem of the general reduction of armaments has been worked out? If that is so, and if we adopt such a decision, we will place ourselves in a very embarrassing position. It will be understood that we do not wish, as yet, to inform the United Nations organization about our troops on foreign territories. We will thus give cause to think that we wish to keep our forces on the territories of other United Nations as long as possible. But judge for yourselves—what will that lead to? How will it be interpreted? Again, another consideration. If we decide on the joint discussion of these two questions, and postpone the submission of information regarding troops on foreign territories until such time as we finish our work on the problem of the general reduction of armaments, we must ask ourselves another question: will such a decision have a desirable effect from the point of view of the prestige of the United Nations organization?

## V

### A CLEAR REPLY IS NECESSARY

It is clear to all of us that nobody will now dare openly refuse to submit this information to the United Nations organization. Such a refusal would put any country into

a position which it would be hard to explain to the peoples. But we must also see to it that no one is allowed to evade the question, to shirk a clear reply. We must answer unequivocally: do we wish to submit information about our armed forces on foreign territories, or do we not? Any indeterminate reply, any attempt to evade the question, will impair the prestige of the United Nations, not to speak of the prestige of the state that takes this course.

The representative from El Salvador spoke here, and said that we should not occupy ourselves with the question of submission of information regarding the armed forces of United Nations on foreign territories, because the Security Council had not as yet requested such information. But the position of the representative from El Salvador made rather a strange impression. It is convenient for those who would like to avoid a reply to the question. But this position is not in keeping with the gravity of the question under discussion.

Indeed, we have been discussing this question for three days now, although the Security Council never set it before us; and so far nobody has objected to that. Consequently, we have all recognized the necessity of discussing this question. Why should not the representative from El Salvador also express his opinion on the substance of the question, and tell us frankly, without evasion, whether or not he thinks it proper to demand that such information be submitted to the United Nations organization? In any case, if there is anyone among us who would like to avoid a definite reply to this question, it seems to me that the majority among us will not agree to that.

After all the discussion that has taken place, we must say clearly: do we consider this proposal expedient, or do we consider it inexpedient? It would be best for us to learn

to speak frankly in such cases. And so, let those who are against submitting information about their troops on foreign territories tell us openly about it and explain their reasons. If there is anyone who maintains the necessity of keeping troops on foreign territory, the United Nations organization ought to know the reasons. In any case, evasion of a clear answer to the question will not satisfy many of us now.

The Soviet delegation hopes that we shall arrive at a unanimous opinion on the question under discussion. In so far as this concerns the great Powers, they should see this as their duty to the other nations. The prominence and responsibility of the great Powers in the United Nations organization should prompt them to an affirmative reply to this proposal.

As to the small countries, they are even more interested in such unanimity. The discussion of this question at the General Assembly should strengthen the confidence of the small nations that due attention is devoted here to the interests of their national independence and freedom.

The Soviet delegation hopes that we will attain unity in deciding this question. Our decision must consolidate the prestige of the United Nations organization; it must be in keeping with the interests of peace and universal security. (*Applause.*)

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## THE SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION ON THE ARMED FORCES OF UNITED NATIONS

*Speech at the Meeting of the First  
Committee of the General Assembly*

November 26, 1946

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen. Our discussion is drawing to its close. The question of Allied troops on foreign territories has attracted considerable attention. With the exception of the representative from El Salvador, nobody here has objected to the examination of this question. Yes, objections have also been stated by the representative from Argentina. On the other hand, I note with satisfaction that the representatives of France, Poland, India, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia have declared definitely in favour of adopting the Soviet proposal. Other delegates have introduced amendments to this proposal, but they too attributed great importance to the question under discussion.

There are several points on which we have, on the whole, reached agreement.

It may be stated as the general opinion that the information in question, if submitted, will contribute to the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter. This will considerably extend the possibilities of the Military Staff Committee.

The Soviet delegation's proposal that information be submitted regarding the armed forces of United Nations on the territories of other United Nations has encountered no objections. I am not for the moment speaking of the reservations conditioning this agreement.

The Soviet delegation, in its turn, has agreed to the proposal of the United States of America that information be likewise submitted regarding Allied troops stationed in former enemy states. It may be considered that this proposal, too, has unanimous support.

Nor have any objections been raised against the Soviet delegation's proposal calling for information on the location and garrisons of air and naval bases belonging to the armed forces of one or another of the United Nations on the aforesaid territories. The receipt of this information by the Security Council will be of great importance.

Sir Philip Noel-Baker has proposed that information relate, not to November 1 of the present year, but to January 1, 1947. The Soviet delegation does not object to this British amendment.

Some delegates, however, propose that, besides information regarding the troops of United Nations abroad, information be submitted regarding the troops stationed at home. Mr. Connally, representative of the United States of America, has been particularly insistent upon this proposal. He has been supported by Mr. Bevin and Sir Philip Noel-Baker, for Great Britain, and also by certain other delegates.

This being so, I shall have to present the views of the Soviet Government on this subject.

As I have already said, the Soviet Government considers it essential that the United Nations organization receive from the Member States a complete idea of all their armaments. But the Soviet Government considers that this

question should be examined when we turn to the question of the general reduction of armaments, which, as it happens, is the very next item on our agenda. In that case, the question of armed forces at home, far from being forgotten, would on the contrary be discussed from every aspect. Then the submission of the corresponding information would help us to solve that most important political and practical problem, the general reduction of armaments.

We have heard here that the United Nations organization and its Security Council must receive comprehensive information regarding the armed forces of United Nations. Senator Connally has spoken of this very eloquently, with the interesting gesticulation that we all admire so much. The same idea has been warmly advocated by Sir Philip Noel-Baker. A number of other delegates have also expressed themselves in favour of this proposal, which they find extremely tempting.

Well, then, just what is it that is being proposed to us?

We are told that the question of submitting information regarding the armed forces of United Nations on foreign territories is closely linked with the problem of reducing armaments. In this connection it is declared, as Sir Philip Noel-Baker declared yesterday, that the Soviet delegation's proposal is too narrow, that it should be extended—extended in the sense that information should be submitted not only regarding troops abroad, but also regarding the troops stationed within each country.

Let us see what follows when the question is put in that way.

If we are called upon to link the question under discussion today with the problem of reducing armaments, we shall have to speak not only of troops, wherever stationed, but also of every type of armament. If we desire

to link the question of troops on foreign territories with the general problem of reducing armaments, we must admit that information should be required not only regarding the total number of uniformed personnel on active duty, including military-type organizations, but also regarding every type of armament existing in each country. Consequently, we shall then have to speak of jet-propelled weapons, and atomic weapons, and all other types of armaments, in order to obtain a really comprehensive picture of the situation, such as some of the delegates here insist upon. Is that what Mr. Connally and Sir Philip Noel-Baker want?

They call upon us to extend the question of the submission of information regarding armed forces, and, imperatively, to require information regarding armed forces stationed at home. But after all, war is not fought bare-handed. As we know, the means of warfare, and their quantity, in our day, are increasing rapidly. The question of armaments, in any country, is decided not only by the number of troops in service and the number of naval and air forces, but also by the accumulation of definite technical means of warfare; and no enumeration of these can exclude the production of different types of armaments, including the production of atomic weapons, flying bombs, and the like. The question arises: do those who insist on extending the question under discussion want us to adopt a decision requiring every country to submit complete information regarding all its armed forces and its armaments as a whole?

The Soviet delegation does not object to such information being required from all states, with no exception. But we can demand such information, obviously, at the time when we take up the question of the general reduction of armaments. At that time it will be essential, if the problem

of the general reduction of armaments is to be settled satisfactorily.

But the Soviet delegation does not think that the question now under discussion should be so far extended as to be submerged in another, broader problem. We consider the question of the armed forces of United Nations on foreign territories an independent one. It is linked up with the fulfilment of the tasks set by Article 43 of the Charter.

As to the problem of the general reduction of armaments, it has no connection whatever with Article 43 of the Charter. It is touched upon, as we know, in other parts of the Charter. The problem of the regulation and reduction of armaments is mentioned in Articles 11, 26, and 47 of the Charter. Clearly, it will also be correct for us to commence the implementation of the directives contained in these articles of the Charter. But that is a task of a special nature.

We must recognize that the submission of information regarding armed forces on foreign territories is an urgent matter; and we cannot hold up the decision of this question pending our examination of other, more intricate problems, such as that of the general reduction of armaments. Again, every one of us must understand that the problem of the general reduction of armaments will occupy a lengthy period of time and will necessitate a tremendous amount of work. It would be wrong to put off the submission of information regarding armed forces on foreign territories until such time as we settle the problem of the general reduction of armaments. That might be interpreted as evading decision in an urgent problem, as reluctance to submit information which the delegates have here expressed such unanimous readiness to supply. And so the Soviet delegation proposes that the

present discussion be concluded by the adoption of a decision calling for the submission by January 1, 1947, of information regarding the armed forces of United Nations stationed on the territories of other United Nations. The Soviet delegation agrees to the amendment of the American delegation, which has also been supported by the British delegation, calling for information regarding the armed forces stationed in former enemy states. As to the question of armed forces at home, that question should be considered in connection with the question of the general reduction of armaments, which we shall begin to discuss tomorrow. In connection with the examination of that question, we shall have to submit not only complete information regarding the entire personnel of our troops and the entire composition of our armed forces, but also information regarding all the armaments at the disposal of each of our states.

If we agree to this proposal, we shall avoid dragging out decision on the question which cannot brook delay; and in our further work we shall have to take up the general problem of armed forces and armaments, with a view to realizing the aim of a general reduction of armaments.

When we take up the problem of the reduction of armaments, we shall also discuss the question of control over the reduction of armaments. The Soviet delegation will then present its point of view on control, as will also, of course, the other delegations.

Gentlemen, you are familiar with the proposal of the Soviet delegation, which you received on November 20. I shall not repeat it.

In view of the discussion which has taken place here in the last few days, the Soviet delegation offers the following supplementary proposal:

"The General Assembly deems it necessary that all States Members of the United Nations should submit information regarding armed forces and armaments in their own territory, this information to be submitted when the Security Council will consider the proposals for the general reduction of armaments."

If we accept both the first proposal of the Soviet delegation and this second proposal, it seems to me that we shall be answering clearly to the questions that have been touched upon in the course of the discussion.

It remains for me once more to express the hope that these decisions will be adopted unanimously.

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## CONCERNING THE GENERAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

*Speech at the Meeting of the First  
Committee of the General Assembly*

*November 28, 1946*

### I

#### THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Mr. Chairman and Delegates. We begin today to examine the question of the general reduction of armaments. I need not enlarge upon the importance of this question in our day. The timeliness of its discussion is quite obvious.

The tremendous events of the second world war, when tens of millions of people were mobilized into the armies in the field, when the fronts stretched over thousands of kilometres, when the enemy doomed whole countries to waste and plunder, when the sacrifices of war attained enormous, unparalleled dimensions, are still fresh in every memory. The second world war far exceeded the first world war in scale. It truly gripped the entire world.

The lessons of the first world war proved insufficient to prevent the bloodshed of the years just past; but the second world war should at last have brought conviction that serious measures must be taken, and at once, to prevent the recurrence of such wars. This is felt with particular force by the peoples of those countries which expe-

rienced the incursion and brutalities of the fascist hordes, the calamities of enemy occupation, the disruption of their entire economic life—those countries which, for a long time to come, must strain every effort to heal the wounds of war and restore their wasted towns and villages, as the peoples of the Soviet Union are doing today.

The war ended in glorious victory for the Allies. Our common enemies are vanquished and disarmed. It is entirely within our power to keep the former aggressors under control of the peace-loving states, to prevent them from re-arming and threatening new aggression.

An international organization has been set up, designed to safeguard peace and security for the peoples and to prevent the rise of new aggression. We must all make it our effort to strengthen confidence and friendly relations among the peoples, to develop international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace, for the national liberation of the dependent countries, and for the effective advancement of the well-being of the peoples, of the toiling masses.

In these circumstances, the general reduction of armaments will serve the cause of peace and international security, strengthening confidence among the peoples, big and small. The examination of this question in the United Nations organization should put an end to the armament race that has begun, a race which promises no good, but already points to those who will bear the chief responsibility for its consequences. Again, general disarmament is necessary in order to reduce military budgets and cut state expenditures on the manufacture of armaments. Otherwise, there can be no easing the tax burden on the population, which cannot bear this weight uncomplainingly very long. Thus, reduction of armaments is essential and urgent; it is to the vital interest of big and small states.

The general reduction of armaments must embrace all countries, and must apply to every type of armament. Only in that case will it attain its purpose.

The opinion was expressed at the General Assembly that the initiative of the Soviet Union in the question of reducing armaments was appropriate, because of its mighty armies. Well, the Soviet Union did create a mighty army, when this was necessary to defend its national honour and liberty, and when it was required by the interests of all the freedom-loving peoples which had fallen victim to fascist aggression. But when the forces of aggression were routed, and peace restored, the situation changed. That is why the Soviet Government, devoted to the interests of peace and friendship among the peoples, has taken the initiative in raising the question of a general reduction of armaments.

This involves, first of all, the reduction of armies, whose size must be cut now that peace has set in. It involves also the reduction of naval and air arms, whose dimensions today are in some cases entirely out of keeping with peacetime conditions. It will be a good thing if the Powers owning the greatest naval and air forces follow the same course as the Soviet Union, and evince an active concern for the reduction of armaments.

The problem of armament reduction, of course, embraces also the question of technical means of warfare. That is why the question is put as that of a general reduction of armaments, and not merely as that of a reduction in the personnel of the armed forces. It should be clear to all that the problem of reducing armaments is not confined to the personnel of armies and navies, but includes also the question of war materials, the question of technical means of warfare, some of which must be subjected to limitation, and others to direct prohibition.

The Charter formulates the functions and powers of the General Assembly with regard to problems of armament reduction. Article 11 of the Charter states that the General Assembly may consider "the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments." In accordance with this, the Soviet Government has proposed that the General Assembly adopt a decision recognizing the necessity of a general reduction of armaments.

We do not think that the General Assembly can at once adopt a detailed decision on this question. In our opinion, it should recommend that the Security Council work out the necessary concrete measures. But the recommendations adopted by the General Assembly should make a beginning in this work, which is of the greatest political importance.

## II

### THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

In the consideration of the problem of armament reduction, great importance attaches to the question of atomic weapons.

The draft submitted by the Soviet Government contains the following proposition:

"The implementation of the decision on the reduction of armaments should include as a primary objective the banning of the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes."

At its London session, early this year, the General Assembly adopted a decision establishing a commission for control of atomic energy. In the terms of reference of this commission we read that it is to draw up proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic

weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction."

Thus, the General Assembly has already recognized that the question of prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes has to be taken up. We must draw the conclusions that follow from this decision. It would be wrong to postpone decision on this question; for that might give rise to misgivings as to the sincerity of the afore-mentioned decision of the General Assembly.

In accordance with this decision of the General Assembly, A. Gromyko, the Soviet representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, has submitted the following two proposals:

First. A draft for an international convention prohibiting atomic weapons. Second. A plan for the work of the Atomic Energy Commission in the initial period.

The draft for an international convention prohibiting the manufacture and use of atomic weapons presents the views of the Soviet Government on this question. It recognizes the tremendous importance of the discovery of atomic energy, in so far as this discovery will be used to improve the life of the peoples the world over, to increase their well-being and promote the progress of human culture. At the same time, it notes that the use of atomic weapons endangers not so much armies as cities and civilian populations. As we know, no few articles have appeared of late holding out the threat of atomic bombs, though nobody has proved, or can prove, that atomic bombs are capable of deciding the course of war. But it is not to be disputed that the use of atomic bombs may cause the most grievous consequences for large cities, and, consequently, for the civilian population.

Taking into account all this, and also the afore-mentioned decision of the General Assembly, the Soviet Govern-

ment has submitted a draft for an international convention prohibiting the manufacture and use of atomic weapons, and has proposed that by this convention atomic weapons be declared outlawed. The Soviet draft provides that the governments undertake to refrain from the use of atomic weapons under any circumstances, to prohibit their production, and to destroy all stocks of atomic bombs.

Further, the Soviet Government has submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission a plan for the work of the Commission in the initial period, which provides for the elaboration of this convention and, likewise, for the consideration of measures towards the prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic weapons and of all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The plan also proposes that measures be worked out to secure control over the use of atomic energy and over the observance of the conditions of the international convention outlawing atomic weapons, and that a system of sanctions be worked out against the unlawful use of atomic energy.

These proposals of the Soviet Government have not as yet found support in the Atomic Energy Commission. Yet it is perfectly obvious that they accord with the interests of all peace-loving peoples, that they will serve to strengthen confidence among the peoples, not to speak of the fact that they follow directly from decisions already adopted by the General Assembly.

After all, it is two decades now since an international agreement was signed prohibiting the military use of asphyxiating and poisonous gases and liquids, and also bacteriological warfare. To this day, it has never occurred to anyone to doubt the correctness of that step. We can easily imagine how greatly the calamities and sacrifices of the last war would have been increased, had it not been for this prohibition of the use of poison gases and liquids,

and of dangerous bacteriological means, for military purposes. But if such prohibition is correct in regard to gases and bacteriological means, it is even more correct in regard to the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

Refusal to draw up an international convention prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes runs directly counter to the finest aspirations, to the conscience of the peoples of all the world. Therefore, we are all entitled to hope that agreement will finally be reached among the governments on the question of an international convention prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

### III

#### THE NECESSITY OF CONTROL AND INSPECTION

The problem of the general reduction of armaments confronts us with the need for instituting control over the fulfilment of whatever decisions may be adopted in this sphere. If we adopt a decision prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes, this decision too will require serious control.

When we speak of control over the reduction of armaments and over the prohibition of atomic weapons, we must keep always in mind the importance of this task. Of course, the question must be carefully worked out, and debates may arise concerning one or another of its elements. Nevertheless, it would be well for us to recognize—inasmuch as we are considering the institution of control in so grave a matter as atomic energy, we should all agree with J. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, who recently declared that "strict international

control is needed" here. Having recognized in principle the necessity of strict international control, we should also be able to reach agreement on the concrete points involved in control over the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and over the fulfilment of whatever decision may be adopted concerning the general reduction of armaments.

Accordingly, the Soviet delegation submits an addition to the proposal on the general reduction of armaments which I read in the General Assembly on October 29. Here is our additional proposal:

"To ensure the adoption of measures for the reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, there shall be established within the framework of the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, international control operating on the basis of a special provision which should provide for the establishment of special organs of inspection, for which purpose there shall be formed:

"a) A Commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments;

"b) A Commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes."

The Soviet delegation feels that this proposal supplies a basis for decision in the question of control and inspection. The adoption of such a decision will facilitate our further work in this field.

In conclusion, I feel that we should recall the history of the problem of disarmament.

You know that the League of Nations also occupied itself with the question of reducing armaments. More than one special conference was called to consider this problem.

The failure of these conferences is remembered by all, and should serve us all as a lesson.

The problem of the general reduction of armaments is now being taken up again. The peoples of the entire world will be watching with tremendous interest to see what the United Nations organization does in this sphere. The prospects of this problem depend upon us all.

We must set to work now to achieve a general reduction of armaments, overcoming every obstacle in our way. The Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for safeguarding universal peace, must take up this question as soon as possible. The Soviet Government, for its part, will work actively for the speedy practical solution of the problem of the general reduction of armaments.

## THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE DRAFT DECISION

*Speech at the Meeting of the First  
Committee of the General Assembly*

*December 4, 1946*

### I

#### THE AIMS OF THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. Chairman and Delegates. Quite a number of delegates have spoken here on the question of the reduction of armaments. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that the majority of the speakers took a favourable stand on this proposal. Hence, it may be considered the dominating opinion among the United Nations that the reduction of armaments must be begun.

As to the different individual statements, I must dwell, first of all, on those of Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British delegate. His position is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, Sir Hartley may be understood as speaking, like other delegates, in favour of our adopting a decision on the general reduction of armaments; on the other hand, however, his speeches betray profound displeasure at the fact that this question has been brought up before the General Assembly. That is the only possible explanation of the torrent of doubts and suspicions that comes pouring forth when he talks and warns us about the possibilities

of deceit, of snare and propaganda, to which he has devoted so much eloquence. We shall hope, however, that he, too, will present a clear reply when the question has to be decided: who is for and who is against the general reduction of armaments; who is for and who is against the prohibition of atomic weapons?

Various questions come to mind when one hears such speeches. Perhaps the Soviet Government did wrong in bringing up the question of the general reduction of armaments? But nobody here has said that openly. Still, perhaps the wrong time was chosen for bringing this question before the General Assembly? Nobody has made any definite statement to that effect either.

It is sometimes hinted that we ought first to guarantee collective security, and only then commence disarmament. The error of such logic is easily perceived. Anyone can understand that the general reduction of armaments under the direction of the United Nations organization will unquestionably strengthen international security. Consequently, those who are concerned for international peace and security should certainly desire the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments. Otherwise, talk about the need to consolidate universal security would be no more than camouflage for those who in reality do not recognize the necessity of a general reduction of armaments.

What did the Soviet Government have in mind when it submitted the question of the general reduction of armaments for consideration at the General Assembly?

Our aim was very simple. It was, that the General Assembly take the first step towards the solution of this important problem. We considered, and still consider, that it will be quite sufficient if the General Assembly expresses itself without delay on the following three questions.

In the first place, the General Assembly would be doing

a great good by declaring firmly that the time has come to commence the general reduction of armaments.

In the second place, the General Assembly must express itself on the question of prohibition of atomic weapons, inasmuch as we all know that the menace of atomic weapons is causing grave alarm among the peoples.

In the third place, the General Assembly should recognize the necessity of establishing reliable international control over the fulfilment of the decision on the general reduction of armaments and on the prohibition of atomic weapons, an international control which would have at its disposal an inspection system to keep check on the situation in every country.

The adoption of these three decisions by the General Assembly would be an important forward stride towards the general reduction of armaments. After such a decision the Security Council would be obliged to set to work on the preparation of concrete measures. That is the substance of the Soviet Government's proposal.

If we all are agreed on the necessity of this, the General Assembly will be able to adopt a decision on the reduction of armaments that will go down in history.

## II

### THE AMERICAN DRAFT AND OUR AMENDMENTS

Since the submission of the Soviet draft, we have also studied a number of other drafts on the question of the reduction of armaments. Of these we should mention, first and foremost, the proposals of the Australian and Canadian delegations. Finally, within the last few days, we have been offered the draft of the United States of America, concerning which Senator Connally made his statement on December 2.

All these drafts, in greater or lesser degree, support the initiative of the Soviet Union.

The American draft seems to us deserving of particular attention in this respect.

I shall not conceal the fact that we cannot be satisfied with the American draft in the form presented here. We consider it insufficiently clear, and somewhat one-sided. We shall propose amendments to this draft, embodying our suggestion.

In the interests of unanimous decision by the General Assembly on the general reduction of armaments, we are prepared not to insist on the draft we have submitted, and express our readiness to adopt the American draft as the basis for further discussion. We hope that this step of the Soviet delegation will make it possible to attain unanimity, so that the General Assembly, at its New York session, may take the first step in this important matter.

Further, I should like to dwell on the amendments which the Soviet delegation would like to introduce into the American draft. There are only three such amendments.

I shall begin with an amendment relating to the first paragraph.

On the one hand, this paragraph speaks of the Security Council, obligating it to formulate practical measures for the reduction of armaments. On the other hand, this same paragraph mentions international treaties and agreements on the reduction of armaments. The question arises, in what manner is the decision on the reduction of armaments to be adopted: is it to be done by way of concluding international conventions, or as a Security Council decision?

If we adopt the point of view that the reduction of armaments is to be effected by way of international agreements, that will supply no little opportunity for every kind of procrastination and delay. The Soviet delegation is

therefore of the opinion that the decision to reduce armaments should be adopted as a decision of the Security Council. It is very important that the General Assembly express itself in favour of that point of view. In that case, the reduction of armaments will be considerably accelerated. The wording of the first paragraph should be revised in this spirit.

As to the second paragraph of the American draft, the Soviet delegation would suggest that it be adopted in the following form: "As an essential step towards the urgent objective of eliminating from national armaments atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, the General Assembly urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in Section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946. Accordingly, in order to ensure that the general regulation and reduction of armaments are directed towards the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely towards the minor weapons, the General Assembly recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the report which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council before December 31, 1946, and facilitate the progress of the work of that Commission, and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons."

Permit me now to make a few remarks in connection with this proposal.

On acquaintance with the text I have presented, you will see that the first sentence of this draft, replacing the corresponding sentence in the second paragraph of the American draft, is taken bodily from the second paragraph of the Australian draft. The value of this sentence lies in the fact that it mentions the General Assembly resolution

of January 24 this year establishing the Atomic Energy Commission, and recalls that, in accordance with that resolution, the Commission should regard as its urgent objective the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. It seems to us that such a proposal should meet no objection here.

In the second sentence of this paragraph of the American draft, besides a minor change in wording, we have added at the end the following words: "and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons." This addition eliminates the one-sidedness to be observed in the text of the second paragraph of the American draft, by recalling the necessity of considering a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

I should state here that the Soviet delegation feels we should make a more precise declaration on the prohibition of atomic weapons. This is done in the second paragraph of the Soviet draft. However, the Soviet delegation is prepared not to insist upon its original proposal, if the second paragraph of the American proposal is adopted with the changes of which I have just spoken.

The text of the third paragraph of the American proposal is acceptable to us. We think, however, that the end of this paragraph should be supplemented by the provisions made in the third paragraph of the Soviet draft, which, as we know, deals with the establishment of two control commissions: one for control over the fulfilment of the decision on the reduction of armaments, and the other for control over the fulfilment of the decision prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes. So far as we have been able to judge from the discussion, such a proposal should meet no objection here.

The fourth paragraph of the American draft is acceptable, and does not require amendment. There is no need to dwell now on other, less essential amendments.

### III

#### CONTROL AND THE "VETO POWER"

I shall go on to the question of the "veto," or, to be more precise, the question of the application of the principle of unanimity of the great Powers. This is necessary, in the present circumstances, in order to clear up an obvious misunderstanding which has arisen in the course of the discussion.

As you already know, the Soviet Government takes the stand that decision on the general reduction of armaments and on the prohibition of atomic weapons should be adopted in the Security Council. The adoption of such a decision involves no slight difficulties. It is possible that differing points of view will be expressed in the Security Council on one or another aspect of this problem. Only the attainment of unanimity in the Security Council, and above all of unanimity among the five permanent members, can secure the adoption of a decision on the reduction of armaments. Beyond all shadow of doubt, the attainment of such unanimity is to the interests, not of any one individual Power, but of the Security Council as a whole, including all five of its permanent members. Consequently, the "veto power" may be applied by any of the great Powers during the formulation of the decision on the reduction of armaments in the Security Council, until unanimity is attained among all the great Powers and the Security Council can adopt its decision in the manner laid down by the Charter.

The principle of unanimity of the five great Powers

will also have to be observed in adopting those decisions of the Security Council which will have to do with the establishment of commissions for control over the reduction of armaments and over the prohibition of atomic weapons. But once the decisions establishing the control commissions have been adopted, and these commissions have begun their work, they will naturally follow whatever rules are laid down for them by the Security Council.

It should be perfectly clear that the principle of unanimity which we know in the Security Council has no connection whatever with the work of the control commissions. Consequently, it is altogether wrong to represent matters as though any state possessing the "veto power" will be able to hinder the realization of control and inspection. The control commissions are not the Security Council, and there are consequently no grounds for declaring that any Power will be able, by the "veto power," to hinder the accomplishment of control. Any attempt to hinder control or inspection instituted by decision of the Security Council will be nothing short of violation of a Security Council decision.

Talk of the "veto" in connection with control and inspection is thus entirely groundless. Such talk can be interpreted only as expressing the desire to substitute one question for another, as an attempt to evade direct reply to the question of the general reduction of armaments.

And so, we are facing an important decision. The General Assembly must take the first step towards accomplishing the general reduction of armaments. It is our task to prepare this decision, permitting no further postponement.

The Soviet delegation hopes that the American draft and the amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation will provide a good foundation for decision by the General Assembly.

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## TROOPS ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES

*Speech at the Plenary Meeting  
of the General Assembly  
December 8, 1946*

### I

#### THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND THE AMERICAN ADDITION

Mr. President and Delegates. We are now examining a question which was raised on the initiative of the Soviet Government. It was put as the question of the presence of troops of United Nations on the territories of other United Nations and non-enemy states. We proposed that all states having representatives in the General Assembly submit information regarding their troops stationed on the territories of other United Nations. We proposed also that information be submitted regarding military bases, including naval and air bases, set up by any of the United Nations outside their own borders. Thus, we proposed that all our states render account to the United Nations organization regarding the armed forces which for one reason or another, despite the fact that the war has long since ended, are stationed outside the borders of their countries.

The submission of this information will be very im-

portant to the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee, at a time when they are working on a plan for the organization of the armed forces that are to be made available to the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining universal peace.

The submission of this information will affect, above all, such of the great Powers as the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, which during the war were compelled to send troops beyond their borders to fight our common enemy. Under the Soviet Government's proposal, all states, and first and foremost the great Powers, would be obliged to render account of the armed forces and military bases they still maintain on the territories of other United Nations. If this information were submitted it would, of course, be easier to bring this abnormal situation to a speedy end. After all, the war being over long since, what justification can there be for the presence of troops on foreign territory, aside from those individual exceptions which we all know and understand.

The presence of foreign troops on the territory of one or another United Nation may, as we know, be used by another state to exert impermissible pressure on that country's domestic affairs. It may be used to exert pressure not only on the domestic affairs of the country concerned, but also on the relations between that country and its neighbours. This is obviously an impermissible situation.

As might have been expected, the Soviet Government's proposal met with great sympathy, particularly on the part of the small countries; for they, indeed, are not infrequently very aware of outside pressure, especially when it is backed by the presence of armed forces on their territories.

Some of the small countries, as we know, are still unable to rid themselves of foreign troops which invaded their territory long ago, during the nineteenth-century period of imperialist conquests, and which to this day refuse to return home. In other cases, foreign troops appeared on the territories of other states after the first world war, and are still doing their best, by fair means or by foul, to remain on these territories. Finally, there are similar cases which arose after the second world war. The troops of certain Powers found themselves in states which are Members of the United Nations, and still remain there. It is the more impossible to ignore these last cases in that all this is done right before our eyes, in contravention of the normal relations that should exist among the United Nations and in violation of the elementary rules which all governments are obliged to observe.

In making its proposal, the Soviet Government declared that it was prepared to submit full information regarding its troops still on the territories of other United Nations. The Soviet Union has no need to conceal from anyone how things stand in this respect. It would seem that none of us should have anything to fear in submitting information about our troops on the territories of other United Nations. That would help considerably in the work of the Military Staff Committee. It should also be helpful in prompting the troops of certain states not to linger in foreign territories, inasmuch as the war is over and the circumstances that necessitated the presence of Allied troops on these territories no longer exist.

Not all the states, however, took a calm and objective view of the Soviet Government's proposal. The discussion of the question revealed that such a demand annoys the representatives of certain states. It seems that they

would like to get out of submitting such information. That is the only possible explanation of the fact that the discussion of the simple question raised by the Soviet Government involved so many complications.

As you know, the United States Government submitted two additions to the Soviet proposal.

The first of these was, that information be required regarding troops not only on the territories of United Nations, but also on the territories of former enemy states. The Soviet delegation saw no reason for such a demand. After all, the Allied troops occupying the territories of the former enemy states are there in precise accordance with terms that have been made public and are known to all. Moreover, their stay is limited, depending upon the conclusion of the peace treaties; and the conclusion of these treaties with the majority of the countries concerned is assured in the near future.

Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation raised no objections to this American demand. We did our best to remove obstacles to the settlement of the question of information regarding troops on foreign territories.

## II

### AN UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSAL

Further, the United States Government, supported by Great Britain, proposed that information be submitted regarding troops stationed at home. Paragraph 4 (1) of the draft resolution is devoted to this.

The Soviet delegation tried to show the American and British representatives how out of place this proposal would be in the present resolution. It pointed out that this

question would be settled in connection with the proposal for a general reduction of armaments, now under discussion, whereas in the present resolution such an addition could only serve to complicate the question—that of troops on foreign territories. The Soviet delegation proposed that we should not confuse two distinct questions: one, that of troops abroad; the other, that of troops at home. However, our view was not accepted.

The General Assembly is offered a resolution, paragraph 4 of which provides that all Members of the United Nations submit information regarding "the total number of their uniformed personnel on the active list, wherever stationed, at home as well as abroad, including military-type organizations."

The Soviet delegation considers this paragraph unacceptable, for the following reasons.

The proposal that information be submitted regarding troops at home as well as troops abroad serves only to *divert attention* from the question which has been placed before the General Assembly. Is it to our interest to divert attention from the question of troops stationed on foreign territories? Why should attention be diverted from this important question? Why should the question be complicated by supplementary proposals that will hinder us from obtaining a clear idea as to how things stand with regard to troops on foreign territories? If we want to know the truth as to how things stand with regard to troops of United Nations on foreign territories, we should not impede the submission of such information, should not raise obstacles to the clarification of this question, by diverting attention to other questions, no less complicated.

For this reason, the Soviet delegation proposes that paragraph 4 (1) be deleted from the resolution. That will

leave in the resolution only the demand for information regarding troops stationed on foreign territories. It will be a great achievement for the United Nations organization to have this information submitted without further delay.

Paragraph 4 (1) of the resolution is unacceptable for other reasons as well.

This paragraph calls for information only on "uniformed personnel." It makes no mention of information regarding armaments. Yet we know that wars are not fought barehanded. Consequently, if we are to form a correct idea of any armed forces, we must require information not only regarding uniformed personnel, but also regarding armaments, including, of course, every type of weapon.

The Soviet delegation objected to paragraph 4. But when this paragraph was nevertheless accepted, we proposed that it be applied not only to uniformed personnel, but also to armaments. Our proposal, however, was rejected, on the insistence of Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British delegate, and Senator Connally, the American delegate.

Paragraph 4 (1) was retained in a form calling only for information on uniformed personnel, with no mention of information on armaments. Thus, if we accept this paragraph, the information submitted under the present decision will give us a *distorted idea* of the countries' forces, inasmuch as it will contain no data on armaments, on atomic bombs, jet-propelled projectiles, and the like. All that will be left unsaid. If such a decision is adopted, many will understand this to mean that for some reason or other we have decided not to submit information on the real state of the armed forces. We may be asked why we conceal the information concerning armaments, why

we evade submitting that information, once the question of the armed forces within each of our countries has come up.

No lucid explanation has been offered in reply to these legitimate questions. Our proposal that information be submitted not only regarding uniformed personnel, but also regarding the armaments at the disposal of this personnel, was not put to the vote in the First Committee. The demand of the American and British delegates that no vote be taken on this Soviet proposal received twenty-four votes; eighteen voted against, and ten abstained. Thus, the demand was carried by a number of votes which does not even constitute half the membership of the United Nations organization. But the rejection of the Soviet proposal left paragraph 4 in this one-sided form. Under such a paragraph we cannot receive an objective idea of the armed forces. That is why the Soviet delegation objects to its adoption.

We are discussing an important political question. The correct solution of this question will be to the interests of all peoples imbued with the desire for lasting peace and for the development of friendly relations among all peace-loving countries.

We are offered a resolution which in its greater part is acceptable to all of us. On the first three paragraphs of this resolution, we have reached complete agreement. Paragraph 4 (1) of this resolution diverts us to other matters. Moreover, the submission of information as provided by this paragraph would result in a distorted picture of the armed forces in our countries. Therefore, paragraph 4 (1) should be deleted from the resolution. Only by deleting this paragraph, and thus adopting a *real* resolution, can the General Assembly avoid embarrassment in the eyes of public opinion and promote so important a work as the

elucidation of the state of affairs with regard to troops of United Nations on foreign territories.

In view of all these considerations, the Soviet delegation proposes that paragraph 4 (1) be deleted from the recommended resolution.

The attitude of the Soviet delegation to the British delegation's amendment on control follows from what I have said concerning paragraph 4 of the resolution.  
*(Applause.)*

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## THE DECISION ON REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

*Speech at the Plenary Meeting*

*of the General Assembly*

*December 13, 1946*

Mr. President and Delegates. I have already had occasion from this platform to set forth the point of view of the Soviet Government on the question of general disarmament. We have listened with great interest to the points of view of other governments on this question, as set forth in the Committee that discussed this question and in the General Assembly.

The international situation confronting us at the present time differs in many respects from the international situation that took shape after the first world war. We know that Germany, say, after the second world war is not the same thing as Germany after the first world war. Japan, too, after the second world war, is altogether a different thing than Japan after the first world war. If we remember that Germany and Japan—the two chief aggressive Powers, one in the West, the other in the East—set the tune for the aggressive forces before the second world war, that it was these two countries which unleashed the last war and dragged into it all countries, great and small, we will understand that this radical change in the condition of Germany and Japan has a very important bearing on the international situation.

It must also be assumed that in regard to the former aggressive states we will consistently maintain such a policy, such a stand as answer to the interests of universal peace. We must carry to completion the demilitarization of the former enemy states, their genuine disarmament, and must establish strict control to prevent them from again becoming aggressive forces. We must carry to completion the fight against fascism, the fight to democratize these states, as the Allies recognized while the war was still in progress. Thus, so far as the forces of aggression are concerned, we now have favourable conditions for setting to work to prevent new aggression.

Another important circumstance is the fact that there are no countries today, after the second world war, which hold themselves aloof from the international organization newly established to build up peace and security.

In this, too, the situation differs tremendously from what we had after the first world war. Now all countries, great and small, deserving of the name of democratic states are Members of the United Nations organization. The exceptions to this rule are very inconsiderable. And this provides a most important requisite for the solution of the problem we are discussing today, the problem of general disarmament.

It must be recognized that much now depends on ourselves, on our joint efforts, on our desire to cooperate with one another in the interests of universal peace, without setting up one country against another, without organizing some states into blocs against other peace-loving states, or giving rein to a policy dictated by the desire to subject other states to the dominating influence of some powerful country. Working in the spirit of the purposes and aspirations which form the cornerstone of the United

Nations organization, we can and must seek to ensure universal peace and security for the peoples.

Permit me now to pass directly to the resolution that has been submitted for our consideration.

The Soviet draft on the general reduction of armaments, as submitted to the General Assembly, was based on two underlying ideas.

In the first place, we considered it important that the United Nations organization declare itself firmly on the necessity of general disarmament; in the second place, we considered it essential that the United Nations organization declare the necessity of prohibiting the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes. The draft resolution presented contains both these ideas. I will not deny that the Soviet delegation would have liked to see the basic proposals it submitted to the General Assembly expressed in more definite form. However, the resolution now presented contains fundamental concepts which, though differently put, reflect both the idea of the general reduction of armaments and the idea of prohibiting the production of atomic energy for military purposes. The Soviet delegation is therefore satisfied with the results of the Committee's work and with the resolution that has been presented for adoption by the General Assembly.

The speakers today have dwelt at particular length on the use of atomic energy for military purposes. And that is perfectly understandable, inasmuch as this type of armament merits particular attention at the present time. It was precisely for that reason that the Soviet draft pointed to the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes as a primary objective. The draft resolution justly points out the necessity of expediting the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the con-

sideration of a convention to include prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. This last is especially important. Anyone can understand that the atomic bomb is not a defensive weapon. Therefore, when people speak of the necessity of defence, of protecting their own countries, it should be clear to us that such tasks are not to be carried out by means of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb, as we know, is designed for foreign territories, and not for the defence of home territory.

The resolution submitted for our approval will, we are confident, become a decision of the General Assembly and the first step towards the realization of general disarmament. After this decision has been taken by the General Assembly, other steps will be required, further measures, which will have to be worked out by the Security Council. That is a highly important task of the Security Council. And it remains for us to wish it success in working out and implementing these further measures. Today, the Soviet delegation expresses its satisfaction with the first results of our work on the question of the general reduction of armaments, and with the cooperation we have achieved here in our work on this question.

As we heard today, the question of the general reduction of armaments still arouses a certain anxiety among the representatives of some states. Some of the speakers favour the reduction of armaments, but in somewhat uncertain tones. The question, of course, is so important and so intricate that nobody can counsel haste in such a matter. But in any case, we must express ourselves confidently to the effect that this problem is now a grave and urgent task, which we must all set about without delay. We must not think that security and peace will be best ensured, the more troops we have on the

territories of other states, the more military, naval, and air bases we establish on territories, some near, some far removed from our state borders.

Some information has already been offered here on a question over which there has been no little talk of late —that of troops on foreign territories. But at such a meeting, of course, this information could not be presented in full; it could not be exhaustive. The Soviet delegation would like to express the desire that the proposal we have discussed here separately, namely, the question of troops on foreign territories, also be settled without further postponement, that this question also receive decision. Then we will all know exactly what troops our states maintain outside their borders, and where; what military bases the different states maintain, and where. Such information would be particularly useful right now, when we are reaching decision on the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

The adoption of a decision on the general reduction of armaments should have its effect on economic life as well, including the budgets of the different states. Indeed, it is no secret that the military budgets of certain states today are greatly inflated. The populations will warmly approve the decision on the general reduction of armaments and the reduction of military budgets, among other reasons, because this will make it possible really to ease their tax burden, and will counteract the forcing up of commodity prices. All this seriously affects the most vital material interests of every one of the ordinary people, every one of the working people. We must therefore hope that one of the earliest practical conclusions to be drawn from the decision we adopt today will be a reduction of inflated military budgets to more normal size, and

an easing of the burden imposed on the populations by military budgets. This will meet with great approval in all countries.

I should like to remind you also that, in adopting our decision on the general reduction of armaments, we should not forget about the frantic propaganda in favour of a new war which in some cases is to be observed even today, only a year after the end of the second world war. It should be clear to us that connivance with such propaganda cannot promote the realization of a general reduction of armaments. When we are referred, in this connection, to freedom of the press and other fine things of that sort, we want to say in return: why should freedom of the press be used primarily by the fomenters of a new war, and why cannot we, the opponents of such pernicious propaganda, use freedom of the press for a concerted rebuff to such makers of the press, such fabricators of public opinion?

The present session of the General Assembly has already adopted, and is yet to adopt a number of decisions. These decisions will have varying significance. Some will be of greater importance, others of lesser. None of us, it seems to me, can doubt that the decision on the general reduction of armaments will rank among the most important decisions of the General Assembly.

It has been adopted unanimously in a Committee representing all of our countries. That is one more proof of the timeliness of such a decision. So important and intricate a question as the general reduction of armaments could be decided unanimously only because we have all recognized that it is timely and urgent. More, this decision is in keeping with the fundamental interests of all peoples, great and small. We shall adopt it unanimously, because we understand that this is to the interests of our

peoples, whom we serve, and to the interests of universal peace.

That is why the Soviet delegation expresses its confidence that the unity we attained in the preparatory period, that this unity will also be evinced in the Assembly's decision on the general reduction of armaments.  
*(Applause.)*





**SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS MADE  
AT THE MOSCOW SESSION OF THE COUNCIL  
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS**

*March-April 1947*



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## THE DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY

*Statement Made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
March 11, 1947*

1. The Berlin conference decisions provide for the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination of her war-industrial potential. The productive capacities not required for the development of the peace industries which she will be permitted to have must be either removed in accordance with the reparations plan, or else destroyed.

It is indisputable that the implementation of these general decisions of the Allied Powers on Germany's demilitarization constitutes one of the foundations of Allied policy aimed at safeguarding the world from possible aggression on Germany's part, and at converting her into a peaceable democratic state. This goal conforms to the interests of all the peace-loving countries of the world.

2. Nearly two years have passed since Germany's surrender. The German army downed arms and ceased to exist as such. In view of this, the liquidation of Germany's war-industrial potential now becomes of decisive importance for her demilitarization, in order that Germany, whilst remaining a democratic and peaceable state having, along with agriculture, its industry and for-

eign trade, shall be deprived of the economic and military possibility of emerging again as an aggressive force.

It is generally known that the main base of Germany's war-industrial potential is located in the regions of Western Germany, pre-eminently in the Ruhr industrial area, in view of which the question of the war-industrial disarmament of Western Germany is of decisive importance for Germany's demilitarization. However, gigantic plants, built specially for purposes of aggression, such as the plants of Hermann Goering, Krupp, Robert Bosch, I. G. Farbenindustrie, etc., which constituted the foundation of the trusts, cartels and other industrial monopolies, remain intact in Western Germany or are designated only for partial removal, which creates the prerequisites for a rapid restoration of their former military power and significance. The merging of these plants into monopolistic organizations facilitated the Nazi aggression, and the preservation of these monopolies constitutes a threat also for the future. It must be admitted that the elimination of the war-industrial potential in Germany's Western zones has practically not yet been begun, with the exception of individual isolated measures, which do not actually affect the war-industrial potential of the Western zones. According to the official data contained in the report of the British Command, by January 1, 1947, there were eliminated only 7 per cent of the total number of tank, aircraft, ordnance and other war plants situated within the British zone which had been built specially for armaments production. References in the reports of the British, American and French occupation authorities to what is called "neutralization of war plants," cannot justify the utterly insignificant extent of liquidation of war plants, which actually even now are being preserved as war plants. It is quite obvious that this so-called "neutraliza-

tion" can have no significance whatsoever in eliminating of war-industrial potential, not to speak of the fact that the Berlin conference decisions do not provide for any "neutralization" as a means of elimination of the war potential.

By January 1, 1947, the agencies of the Control Council received for consideration lists of 1,554 plants in the three Western zones, the capital and industrial equipment of which is to be allocated for reparations, as having relation to war-industrial potential. But only at three plants was complete removal of equipment finished by that time, while at thirty-seven plants the removal of equipment has not been completed to this day.

In this connection it should be observed that in the Soviet occupation zone 676 plants out of 733 belonging to war industry and other forbidden industries have been allocated for reparations and dismantled.

In January, 1947, inter-Allied quadripartite commissions, set up by the Control Council to check to what extent war plants had been liquidated, visited all the occupation zones in Germany. Thirty war plants were subjected to selective inspection, nine of which were in the Soviet zone and seven each in the American, British and French zones. The commissions recorded very grave shortcomings in the organization and carrying out of work for the elimination of war plants in the Western zones, and confirmed instances of theft and dispersion of equipment at various plants there.

3. At the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in July, 1946, the Soviet delegation insisted that a plan should be drawn up as speedily as possible and procedure established for the elimination of those German industries which had served as a military-economic base of German aggression, producing an enormous quantity of armaments for the German army. On the

initiative of the Soviet representatives, the Control Council, on October 2, 1946, passed a decision providing for the elaboration of such a plan for the whole of Germany within the next one or two months. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the occupation authorities of the American, British and French zones failed to submit the required lists of plants, no plan has been drawn up to this day.

4. Laws and directives adopted by the Control Council regarding the disarmament and disbandment of the personnel of Germany's former armed forces have not been fully implemented. Article 1 of Law No. 34, adopted by the Control Council on August 20, 1946, laid down that: "All German land, naval and air forces, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, officer corps, reserve corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations, and other military and para-military organizations, together with their headquarters and associations, destined to maintain Germany's military traditions, are considered dissolved and completely liquidated."

Nevertheless, there still remain at the disposal of the commanders of the British and American occupation forces undisbanded German military units and services which formerly belonged to Germany's land forces; air fleet and navy. These so-called "auxiliary units," retain their military organization and are commanded by German officers who enjoy rights of disciplinary action, which facilitates the preservation of German army cadres. According to official reports of the British and American Commands, by January 1, 1947, the strength of German units preserved as auxiliary units and services constituted: 81,358 men at the disposal of the British Command, and about 9,000 men at the disposal of the American Command.

This situation contradicts the Control Council's decisions.

5. Along with German military formations, there still remain in the British and American occupation zones in Germany undisbanded military units organized from non-Germans, which under the law should be disbanded and repatriated. Among them are Chetniks, Ustashis, Szalasyites, men of the so-called "Yugoslav Royal Army," also units of General Anders, Bandera terroristic organizations, etc.

This situation contradicts the Control Council's decisions.

6. In view of all this, it is proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers instruct the Control Council to carry out the following measures:

(1) To work out by July 1, 1947, a plan for the elimination of Germany's war-industrial potential, fixing the time limit for the completion of the work of eliminating the war-industrial potential at not later than the end of 1948, and paying special attention to the liquidation of cartels and trusts controlling plants related to Germany's war potential.

(2) To expedite the work of destroying German war materials and demolishing on Germany's territory all military installations which had been intended for war on land, sea or in the air, so that this work may be fully completed by the end of 1949.

(3) Fully to disband and liquidate by June 1, 1947, all still existing German military formations, including auxiliary units.

(4) To dissolve and completely abolish all still existing or newly formed units, staffs, guard services and other organizations, as well as training depots organized from among non-Germans who by decision of the Control Council are subject to be disbanded and repatriated.

# DENAZIFICATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF GERMANY

*Statement Made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers*

*March 13, 1947*

The Allied Powers have repeatedly emphasized in their decisions that the eradication of the remnants of German fascism (denazification) and the establishment of a democratic system in Germany form one of the most important conditions for ensuring peace and security in Europe. The materials contained in the Control Council's report, as well as the information at the disposal of our governments, enable us to judge how far these decisions have been carried out, what successes have been achieved in this field, and what grave shortcomings still exist.

## I. DENAZIFICATION

The Control Council's report on denazification shows that from the very outset of their activities the Allied control organs have carried out measures for the destruction of the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and subsidiary organizations, have dissolved fascist institutions created under the Hitler regime, abolished certain laws and taken steps to prevent fascist and militarist activities in Germany.

Nevertheless, the present situation with regard to the execution of the general program of denazification in Germany, agreed upon at the Berlin conference and aimed at eradicating the remnants of fascism and at preparing the conditions for the reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis, cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Many things still remain undone in this respect. This applies in the first place to the execution of the important provision of the Berlin conference regarding the removal of members of the Nazi party who had been more than nominal participants in its activities, and other persons hostile to the Allied purposes, from public and semi-public offices and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings.

To this day many important economic and administrative positions in big German industrial centres are held by persons who actively assisted Hitler in coming to power and who organized the preparation and carrying out of German aggression. The facts show that in a number of cases organizers of German fascism and aggression, who under Hitler's regime were leaders of German trusts, concerns and other monopolies, remain in leading positions. Thus the iron and steel industry control in the British zone is headed by Dinkelbach, who under Hitler was director of the huge Vereinigte Stahlwerke. Dinkelbach not only directs the iron and steel industry in the British zone, including the Ruhr, but has even been entrusted with the preparation of projects for the "socialization" of industry in the British zone. The prominent fascist leader Ernst Poensgen, who under Hitler's regime was one of the thirteen members of the Reich Armaments Council, is now President of the German Metal Industry Association in the British zone. Prominent leaders of German industrial monopolies, such as Hugenberg, of the steel industry, Wilhelm Zangen, one

of the leaders of the war industry of fascist Germany, as well as Hermann Bücher, Rechberg and others, are still at large and playing a prominent role in the British and American zones.

Not infrequently, former fascists who carried out the punitive policy under Hitler's regime hold office as judges and as procurators in the judiciary and procurator offices. According to the materials contained in the report of the Control Council, such persons constitute about 35 per cent of all those employed in the procurator offices and judiciary in the American zone, and up to 43 per cent in the British zone, while in the French zone one-half of all judges are former active figures of the Hitler regime. The president of the court in the city of Hannover is Eilts, former Counsellor of the Nazi Military Tribunal. The prison governor in Cologne is the fascist butcher Dockweiler, who during the war was governor of the Brokke prison in Poland, notorious for its numerous executions and brutal regime.

The German democratic press has repeatedly published long lists of prominent Nazis who occupy leading positions in the British and American zones. But the public demand for the removal of these persons has in many instances been ignored.

Denazification has been not infrequently replaced by a formal census of practically the entire German adult population. Suffice it to say that by January 1, 1947, 11,600,000 persons in the American zone were required to fill in denazification questionnaires. Over six million have already received rehabilitation certificates, and the remaining 5,600,000 have still to come before the denazification commissions. But the decisions of the Berlin conference demand the removal of former active Nazis from leading positions and the punishment of fascist criminals, not the

wholesale trial of all former members of the Nazi party and of its affiliated organizations. On the other hand, this system of wholesale "denazification" does not preclude the possibility of some of the active Nazis being included in the mass of rehabilitated persons.

According to the American press, it was stated in the report presented to a special committee of the United States Senate on the state of denazification in the American occupation zone in November 1946, that many high officials who were formerly active fascists had in practice entirely escaped punishment. The Senate Committee received information relative to a large number of persons who, according to Control Council directives, should have been classed among the most active Nazis, but were actually classed only as Nazi "fellow travellers" and fined not more than 2,000 marks each. After paying this fine, these prominent fascists can be considered cleared and can be appointed to responsible positions in the administration and in industry. The report to the Senate Committee noted that in Bavaria, out of 575 prominent Nazis tried, some 400 were classed by the denazification courts (Spruchkammer) as "fellow travellers." No wonder that the American Deputy Commander-in-Chief, General Clay, stated in the Council of the Lands at Stuttgart in November, 1946: "It appears more and more that the denazification process is being used to return as many people as possible to their former vocations rather than to find and punish the guilty."

The Commission of the World Federation of Trade Unions which visited Germany also found the state of denazification in the British, American and French occupation zones unsatisfactory.

As to the Soviet zone, here the military administration in carrying out denazification concentrated its main attention on removing active fascists and persons who held

leading positions under Hitler's regime from public and semi-public offices and replacing them by persons recommended by democratic organizations. In the course of this work enterprises sequestered by organs of the Soviet military administration, as well as the landed estates of Nazi leaders and war criminals, were turned over to German democratic administrative organs.

Mr. Marshall said here that he regarded the information on denazification presented by the Soviet side as inadequate. I must, however, call Mr. Marshall's attention to the report of the Control Council on denazification, which contains detailed information in regard to all zones, including the Soviet zone. In particular, I would call attention to the data published in the report regarding the number of former Nazi officials dismissed and barred from responsible positions. It can be seen from these data that the figure for the Soviet zone is 390,478 persons, which is more than in any other zone. Perusal of the report of the Control Council will show that the Soviet military administration has furnished full information concerning the progress of denazification in the Soviet zone.

As to Mr. Marshall's statement that Nazis sometimes try to join the Socialist Party in order to get rehabilitated, the Soviet delegation is not aware of any facts corroborating this statement. Nor did Mr. Marshall cite any facts to bear this out.

The unsatisfactory state of denazification is fraught with danger to the democratic transformation of Germany. In particular, the Control Council's report shows that a widely-ramified fascist underground organization, the "Nursery," created on the eve of Germany's surrender, has been discovered and liquidated in the British and American zones. This organization planned its criminal activities far ahead, acting under the guise of business concerns. Refrain-

ing from direct resistance to measures of the occupation authorities, this organization worked to place in economic and administrative posts active fascists who would take advantage of their official positions in order to develop activities hostile to the purposes of the occupation of Germany. A big underground fascist organization, which worked under the direction of former generals and high S.S. officers and had its branches all over Germany, has also been recently uncovered in the British and American zones. This organization had as its object the re-establishment of the fascist regime in Germany. Big secret stores of arms were discovered in the process of its liquidation. Several underground fascist groups and organizations have also been liquidated in the Soviet zone, including groups of the "Edelweiss-Piraten" organization, which consisted mainly of former agents of the Gestapo, S.S., S.D. and other Nazi organizations. Underground organizations of the so-called "Rhine Resistance Movement" were discovered in all the occupation zones, which had set themselves the aim of sabotage and wrecking in industry, in order to hinder the restoration of Germany's peace economy, as well as to obstruct the discharge by Germany of her obligations towards the Allied Powers.

In view of all this the execution of the general program of denazification adopted at the Berlin conference cannot be regarded as satisfactory.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to propose that the Council of Foreign Ministers instruct the Control Council to concentrate its attention in future on the following tasks:

1. To take measures without delay for the removal of former active fascists from public and semi-public office.
2. To expedite the trial of Nazi criminals by courts and tribunals, and to replace former officials of the Hitler

regime in the judiciary and procurator offices by persons whose political and moral qualities are conducive to the furtherance of democratic principles in Germany.

3. To ensure, in pursuance of the decisions of the Berlin conference, the unconditional prosecution of leading supporters of the Hitler regime and war criminals, without, however, permitting the wholesale prosecution of former rank-and-file and non-active Nazis.

Today we have heard Mr. Marshall's proposals. The Soviet delegation will closely study these proposals, but we can say already that the Soviet delegation considers them acceptable in principle.

## II. DEMOCRATIZATION

The Berlin conference decided that local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles; that all democratic parties and free trade unions shall be permitted and encouraged; that representative and elective principles shall be introduced into the regional, provincial and Land administration; that certain essentially important central German departments shall be established; and that freedom of speech, the press and religion shall be permitted. The implementation of this program adopted at the Berlin conference should prepare the way for the final reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis, and the eventual peaceful cooperation of Germany in international life.

Certain success has been achieved in this respect. Considerable democratic forces have appeared and are developing their activities in Germany. The utter bankruptcy of Hitler's regime, of the German war economy and of the fascist ideology have strongly undermined the former

influence of fascism and militarism amongst the working sections of the population. This creates a favourable basis for the further democratization of political life in Germany.

However, the extent of democratization is far from equal in all the occupation zones, a fact which is in large measure due to the zonal disunity of political life and the absence of a politically united Germany.

In the American and Soviet occupation zones elections have already been held to the representative institutions of the Lands (Landtags), which have formed governments on the elective principle. Elections to local self-government bodies have also been held in the British and French zones. However, the elections were not held on the basis of a democratic electoral system uniform for the whole of Germany, which led to substantial shortcomings in the elections in various zones.

For instance, the electoral system adopted in the British zone led to the following results at the elections to the local self-government bodies in September 1946: the German Social-Democratic Party received 11,178,000 votes and 2,549 seats; the Christian Democratic Union, with 11,000,000 votes, won 8,583 seats; the Communist Party, with 2,000,000 votes, received only 139 seats.

As to the electoral system in the American zone, in some cases—in Bavaria, for instance—a party which failed to gather 10 per cent of the votes does not receive a single seat in the Landtag. By means of this undemocratic electoral mechanism undesired opposition in the Landtag is eliminated.

In connection with the present situation, German democratic organizations in all zones express the wish for the establishment of a single democratic system of proportional representation for the whole of Germany.

Another important problem is that of the position of democratic parties and free trade unions in Germany. Notwithstanding the positive results achieved in this respect, one serious obstacle to the development of German democratic organizations is their zonal disunity. Up to now the German democratic organizations have not been given the opportunity to unite on an all-German scale. Ever since October 1945, the Soviet representatives in the Control Council have been vainly urging the adoption of a law which would at last recognize the right of German democratic parties and trade unions to unite on an all-German scale, to freely hold congresses and conferences and elect their central bodies.

Yet it is perfectly clear that restriction of the activities of democratic German organizations within the limits of the separate zones contradicts the principles laid down by the Berlin conference and hinders the democratic development of Germany. Unless the democratic parties and trade unions are unified on a national scale, and unless they are given the opportunity freely to decide their internal affairs, there can be no serious talk of any all-round development of democratic life in Germany.

Of great importance for the democratic reformation of Germany and for her future development as a state is the problem of the Constitutions of the Lands, which are now being adopted by the Landtags in certain zones. But in this respect, too, there are substantial shortcomings.

The basic provisions of these Land Constitutions proceed from diametrically opposite principles, and this cannot but hinder the democratization of Germany. For example, the Constitution of Bavaria, in the American zone, adopted in December 1946, is permeated with federalist proclivities. On the other hand the new Constitution of Thuringia, in

the Soviet zone, is based on recognition of the unity of a democratic German State, and proclaims Thuringia a component part of a German democratic republic.

Of great importance for the democratization of Germany is the land reform effected in the Soviet zone in the autumn of 1945. This reform undermined the political and economic influence of the Junkers—the age-old mainstay of German militarism and subsequently of Nazism.

In the other occupation zones, so far, only preparations for land reform are in progress, and the Control Council has acknowledged that "land reform has been practically completed only in the Soviet zone—although distribution of landed property according to size-groups testifies to the possibility of land reform in every zone."

It would be most advisable for the Council of Foreign Ministers to confirm the following agreement reached in the Control Council: "Land reform must be carried out in all occupation zones in the course of 1947."

The Soviet Government believes that in order to carry out a general program of reconstruction of German political life on a democratic and peaceful basis, the policy in all the zones must be coordinated. In particular it is necessary:

1. To grant German democratic parties and free trade unions the right to unite on a national scale, to hold congresses and conferences attended by representatives from all over Germany, to elect central bodies and to publish central newspapers and magazines.

2. To instruct the Control Council to work out and introduce throughout the territory of Germany uniform principles of democratic legislation governing elections, based on universal, direct and equal suffrage with secret ballot and proportional representation.

3. To approve the decision agreed upon in the Control Council regarding the carrying out of a land reform in the American, British and French occupation zones in 1947; as the basis for the democratic reconstruction of German rural life.

The elimination of the serious shortcomings noted above, and the precise observance of the Berlin conference decisions by all the occupation authorities in Germany, will ensure the reform of German political life on a democratic and peaceful basis.

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## GERMANY AND REPARATIONS

*Statement Made During the Discussion of the Section  
of the Control Council's Report Concerning Economic  
Principles and Reparations at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers*

*March 17, 1947*

We have just heard Mr. Bevin's important statement. This statement will be studied by the Soviet delegation. In my own statement today I shall expound the Soviet Government's views on the major questions which were also dealt with by Mr. Bevin.

The Berlin conference laid down the basic principles of economic policy with regard to Germany, proceeding from the view that Germany should be treated as a single economic unit and that the policy of the four Allied Powers on all basic questions of Germany's economic life should be shaped accordingly.

The common Allied economic policy in Germany was to ensure both the satisfaction of the peace requirements and needs of the German people itself, and the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations to the Allies, including reparations; and at the same time to ensure the elimination of Germany's war-industrial potential.

To achieve these ends it was necessary, by measures agreed upon among the Allies, to solve such problems as

the development of German peace industry and agriculture, the organization of a monetary and banking system, the development of internal trade, the organization of transport, and other measures. In order that the development of Germany's peace industry—which has long been an important factor in world economy and world trade—might also benefit other nations who stand in need of German coal, metal and manufactured goods, it was necessary to create for Germany real possibilities for export and import trade.

At the Berlin conference, the head of the Soviet Government, Generalissimo Stalin, proposed the establishment of a central German administration, which could ensure Germany's political and economic unity. This proposal was not accepted by the other participants in the conference.

## I

### THE BERLIN CONFERENCE AND THE ECONOMIC UNITY OF GERMANY

The Berlin conference decisions provided for the establishment of a number of central all-German economic departments—industry, finance, transport, communications, foreign trade—headed by German state secretaries and working under the guidance of the Control Council. This decision, however, to which the Soviet Government attached and still attaches very great importance, has remained unrealized.

More than that, highly important measures have often been introduced in some zones in direct contradiction to the principle of Germany's economic unity. These measures were effected by unilateral actions, disregarding the exist-

ence of the Control Council, which was charged by the Allied Powers with responsibility for carrying out the Berlin conference decisions.

It is generally known that the industry of the Ruhr, where three-quarters of Germany's coal and steel industry are concentrated, was the main base of German militarism and the decisive mainstay of Nazi aggression. In view of this, it is necessary that important measures with regard to this industry should be carried out with the concurrence of the Control Council. But actually this was not the case.

Already in December, 1945, the British administration took over the possession and direction of all the Ruhr coal mines, and faced the Control Council with an accomplished fact. Even now the Control Council lacks sufficient data to judge the measures taken by the British administration with regard to the Ruhr coal mining industry.

In August, 1946, the British administration confronted the Control Council with another accomplished fact. This time the British administration, by unilateral action, assumed control over the iron and steel industry of the Ruhr.

Thus the British administration carried out measures with regard to the basic Ruhr industries ignoring the other Allied Powers represented on the Control Council.

Yet already at the Berlin conference the Soviet Government had proposed that the industry of the Ruhr, which constitutes a paramount part of Germany's war potential, should be placed under the joint control of the four Allied Powers. The participants in the conference agreed to postpone consideration of this question. It was decided that the Council of Foreign Ministers should take up the matter. At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris in July 1946, upon the instructions of the Soviet

Government, I again emphasized the necessity of establishing quadripartite control over the Ruhr industrial area. But then, too, the discussion of the question was not finished.

This, however, did not prevent the British administration from taking further unilateral actions in the Ruhr. This must be stopped.

The Soviet Government insists that the Council of Foreign Ministers take a decision to place the Ruhr industrial area under the joint control of Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. For the reasons already stated, the Soviet Government considers it wrong and impermissible for the Ruhr industrial area to be left under the control of any one of the Allied Powers. Nor can one agree to plans which would exclude the Soviet Union or any other of the four Allied Powers from real control over the Ruhr industrial area. Only joint control by the four Allied Powers can create the assurance that the heavy industry of the Ruhr will not become a base for the revival of German war potential and for new German aggression.

We know, too, that at the end of last year the French administration, by unilateral action, separated the Saar region from the rest of Germany. This question was not submitted for consideration to the Allied Control Council either. In this case, too, the Control Council was confronted with an accomplished fact. Such a procedure of solving important problems in Germany cannot be accepted.

In December of last year the Control Council was confronted with further separate actions on the part of two governments—of the United States and of Great Britain. These governments reached an agreement for the economic and administrative fusion of the British and American zones of occupation in Germany.

This agreement provides for a common three-year economic program for the two zones. It envisages the development of trade between the two merged zones and other countries, and stipulates that settlements with other zones of Germany shall be effected, not in German marks, but in American dollars or British pounds. By this agreement, two occupation zones in Germany—the American and British—were, in fact, severed from the rest of Germany. Germany has thus been split, and this may lead to most pernicious economic as well as political consequences. This agreement fundamentally contravenes the Berlin conference decisions regarding the economic unity of Germany.

In this case, too, the Control Council in Germany has been confronted with an accomplished fact, contrary to the obligations assumed by the United States and Great Britain. This situation cannot be recognized as normal, the less so as this Anglo-American agreement absolutely disregards the necessity of eliminating Germany's war-industrial potential, and Germany's obligation to fulfil reparations deliveries, to say nothing of the fact that it directly obstructs the implementation of the program of economic rehabilitation of Germany as a whole.

This Anglo-American agreement facilitates the penetration of American and British monopolists into German industry and opens to them wide opportunities for bringing Germany's economy under their influence. But this Anglo-American agreement is incompatible with the economic unification of Germany, since it leads to the dismemberment and destruction of an independent German State and stands in contradiction to the Berlin conference decisions and other inter-Allied agreements on this subject.

The very basis of the agreement is wrong. If one is to proceed from the necessity of fulfilling inter-Allied obliga-

tions with regard to Germany, the other zones cannot join in such an agreement.

It follows from all this that the Anglo-American agreement ought not to remain in force. It should be annulled.

## II

### THE REPARATIONS QUESTION AND THE SOVIET UNION

The question of reparations merits especial attention. An intolerable situation has arisen in this respect.

As is known, the Berlin conference laid down that the amount of equipment subject to removal from the Western zones on account of reparations was to be determined by February 2, 1946. However, that date was passed more than a year ago, yet there is still no plan for the removal of equipment from the Western zones.

The same decision of the Berlin conference laid down that advance deliveries of equipment on account of reparations would be made from the Western zones. In spite of this, the American and British occupation authorities in Germany are under various pretexts holding up the implementation of this decision to this day.

Even decisions on reparations from the Western zones agreed upon in the Control Council a year ago remain unfulfilled.

Naturally, the Soviet military administration, in its own occupation zone, has taken and continues to take measures to fulfil the reparations plan established by it in conformity with the decisions of the Berlin and Crimea conferences. Corresponding deliveries of equipment and of current industrial production are being effected in the Soviet zone. Certain plants in Germany have also been turned over to

the Soviet Union on account of reparations. The details of these measures should be thoroughly considered when agreement is reached upon the basic problems of reparations.

However, all these measures are wholly inadequate for the implementation of the Berlin conference decisions on reparations, since actually in the Western zones these decisions are not being carried out. What makes the situation still more intolerable is that the Western zones, controlled by the British, American and French authorities, are not supplying reparations to other Allied countries either. We know that the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency, which represents the reparations interests of the other Allied countries, has twice already complained to the Council of Foreign Ministers against the non-fulfilment of the decision on reparations. The statement of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency should receive the attention it merits.

The countries which experienced brutal and devastating Nazi occupation cannot reconcile themselves to such a situation. In the Soviet Union—as in the other countries which experienced German occupation, with incalculable destruction of mills and factories, of whole towns and numerous villages—the Government and people cannot view the thwarting of the decisions on reparations with indifference.

You are all aware of the contribution which the Soviet Union made to the common Allied cause in the last world war.

For four years the armies of the Soviet Union opposed more than 200 divisions of the Germans and their satellites; at times the number of these divisions rose to 240. For three years the Soviet troops fought the armies of Hitler and his satellites singlehanded. The Soviet Army defended its Homeland and covered it with glory. The

services rendered by the Soviet Army in the salvation of European civilization are universally known.

The Soviet Union suffered severe ravages in the war against Hitler Germany. Our country lost millions of its people and suffered enormous material damage. The Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people cannot permit that this be forgotten.

It is necessary to recall here what the war cost the Soviet Union.

The expenditure of the Soviet State on the war with Germany, as well as with Japan, and the loss of income sustained by state enterprises, cooperatives, collective farms and the population of the Soviet Union as a result of the occupation run into an enormous sum. In the period of the war alone this expenditure and loss of income amounted to not less than 357,000 million dollars.

To this sum must be added the damage caused to our state and our population as a result of the enormous destruction and depredation suffered by state, cooperative and personal property in the territory occupied by the enemy. The Extraordinary State Commission, composed of some of the country's most eminent public figures, has estimated this direct damage in the territory which suffered occupation at 128,000 million dollars.

To make clear the enormity of this total of direct losses sustained by our country, I shall remind you that the German fascist invaders and their satellites completely or partially destroyed or burned down 1,710 towns and over 70,000 villages and hamlets; burned down or demolished over 6,000,000 buildings and deprived about 25,000,000 people of shelter; destroyed 31,850 industrial enterprises, which employed about 4,000,000 workers; they destroyed 65,000 kilometres of railway track, 4,100 railway stations; they destroyed and sacked 98,000 collective farms, 1,876

state farms and 2,890 machine and tractor stations; slaughtered, confiscated or drove off to Germany 7,000,000 horses, 17,000,000 head of cattle, 20,000,000 pigs, and 27,000,000 sheep and goats. Besides this, they destroyed or raked 40,000 hospitals and other medical institutions, 84,000 schools, colleges, higher educational establishments and research institutes, and 43,000 public libraries.

To all this should be added the losses in human life, which run into several million.

After these figures, I hope you will understand why the Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people insist that the Council of Foreign Ministers shall take measures to ensure the implementation of the Berlin and Crimea conferences decisions on reparations. It is essential that the amount of reparations and the procedure for collecting them be at last determined.

Although the direct losses alone sustained by our country in the occupied territory total 128,000 million dollars, the Soviet Union is demanding reparations from Germany only to the amount of 10,000 million dollars. This means that Germany will pay less than one-tenth of the direct losses sustained by the Soviet Union in the territory occupied by the German invaders. The fairness of this demand of the Soviet State cannot be disputed.

### III

#### THE BASIC DOCUMENTS ON REPARATIONS

In order that the question of reparations from Germany may be properly clarified, I shall have to dwell on the basic documents relating to this problem.

In the first place I shall cite the full text of the decision of the Berlin conference on this subject. Here it is:

## "REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

"In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached:

"1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R., and from appropriate German external assets.

"2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

"3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

"4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

"(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon;

"(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

"Removals of equipment as provided in points (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

"5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

"6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparations shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

"7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6:

"8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

"9. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America renounce their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

"10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany."

This decision of the Berlin conference does not call for detailed comment.

It should be noted, however, that the decision of the Berlin conference begins with the words that it was taken "in accordance with the Crimea decision." In view of this, it is necessary to recall precisely what the Crimea conference decided on reparations from Germany.

To make this utterly clear I shall have to read the decision of the Crimea conference which hitherto has not been published. Here is that decision:

"PROTOCOL

ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF  
THE THREE GOVERNMENTS AT THE CRIMEA  
CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF  
GERMAN REPARATIONS IN KIND

"The Heads of the three Governments agreed as follows:—

"1. Germany must pay for the losses caused by her to the Allied Nations in the course of the war.

"Reparations are to be received, in the first instance, by those countries who have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

"2. Reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the three following forms:

"(a) Bulk removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport, navigation and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to



Secondly, through annual deliveries of goods from current production;

Thirdly, by the use of German labour.

The Crimea conference also discussed the question of the amount of reparations. At the Crimea conference the Soviet and American delegations arrived at agreement to the effect that the Allied Reparations Commission would accept as a basis for discussion the Soviet Government's suggestion to fix the amount of reparations from Germany at 20 billion dollars, one-half of this sum to go to the Soviet Union. The protocol also shows that at that time the British delegation did not feel it possible to mention any reparations figures.

It is necessary to recall these decisions of the Crimea conference. It is particularly necessary to do so because an attempt is now being made to interpret the agreement on reparations achieved in Berlin in the sense that it supersedes all previous agreements and negotiations or reparations. It is impossible to agree with this. It is impossible to agree with this if only for the reason that the Berlin conference decision on reparations from Germany itself stated that it was accepted "in accordance with the Crimea decision," while the decision of the Berlin conference on Germany says: "the purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany."

## IV

### REPARATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC UNITY OF GERMANY

Disputes have been arising lately on the subject of deliveries out of current production on account of reparations. It should be noted that these disputes arise despit

the fact that, according to many reports, current deliveries are taking place in the Western zones too. From the text of the Protocol of the Crimea conference it is evident that already at that time this question raised no doubts in the minds of any of the participants in the Crimea conference. The decisions of the Berlin conference concentrated on the removal of equipment as the main question. But this decision does not contain a single word against reparations from current production as provided in the Crimea conference decision. At that period, however, there was no need to go into the details of this question, since it was impossible to determine the size of the possible current deliveries.

More recently it has been pointed out that the fulfilment of part of the reparations from current production would involve enlarging the plan for the level of German industry adopted by the Control Council a year ago. The justness of this observation should be admitted. In view of this the Soviet Government proposes that the plan for the level of German industry established a year ago be revised and the level raised to the extent required.

We should not place obstacles in the way of the development of German peace industry. The Allies should exercise control over German industry to prevent its development being directed towards the re-establishment of war potential and the revival of German militarism and aggression. But on the other hand, there are at the present time in various countries many unsatisfied requirements for industrial commodities. The restoration of Germany's peace industry may facilitate the satisfaction of these requirements for manufactured goods. We should assist the speediest development of the German coal-mining industry, and an increase of output of metal and other industrial commodities in Germany. This will make it possible to satisfy those requirements of the German people which have not been

satisfied in recent years, while at the same time the export of German manufactured goods may in no little degree help to satisfy the similar needs of other nations.

Of course, there will be foreign monopolists who will desire to prevent the appearance of German goods in foreign markets. Afraid of competition, these gentry would like to strangle German industry, to reduce it to naught, at least in foreign markets. But we should not yield to such pressure on the part of narrow, selfish groups. The interests of the peoples lie in an entirely different direction. The peoples need a considerable increase in cheap manufactured commodities of good quality, and they also need German industrial output to help check the brazenness of foreign monopolists, who strive to eliminate their competitors by every possible means and are prepared to impose any goods of their own at grossly inflated prices.

At the same time, we should not forget those decisions of the Berlin conference which speak of the necessity to do away with the excessive concentration of economic power in the cartels, syndicates, trusts and other German monopolies of every kind. This task has not been carried out in the Western zones to this day. Yet unless de-cartelization is carried out and the rule of the monopolies is destroyed, it will be impossible to ensure the conditions for the revival of Germany as a peaceful and democratic state. In order to carry out this important task it is necessary to take away plants and other enterprises from the combines, cartels and trusts, and to make them the property of the German State. It is necessary to enlist the aid of the democratic parties and the free trade unions of Germany in carrying out these measures, for they can be of substantial assistance in this matter. Otherwise the German monopolies may be replaced by monopolies of a different kind.

monopolies of foreign origin, which are in no way better than the German monopolies.

From all that has been said, it should be quite clear what is needed to achieve the economic unity of Germany.

The establishment of German economic unity means the achievement of an agreement among the four Allied Powers responsible for control over Germany, under which the level of development of German industry and agriculture will be properly coordinated, as well as Germany's appropriate participation in world trade, while at the same time fulfilment by Germany of her obligations to the Allies, including unconditional fulfilment of reparations, will be ensured. Naturally, German economic unity means at the same time that Germany will bear the cost of appropriate occupation expenditures and that the Allies will consistently carry out measures for the elimination of Germany's war-industrial potential.

For its part the Soviet Government is fully prepared to assist the realization of Germany's economic unity and the elimination of inter-zonal economic barriers of every kind. The realization of this plan is in the interest of the Allies, not to mention the fact that it fully corresponds with the interests of the German people, since it seeks to convert Germany into a peaceful, democratic state which in the course of time will take a fitting place among the free and peaceful nations of the world.

A most important prerequisite for Germany's economic unity is the establishment of central German administrative departments for industry, agriculture, finance, transport, communications and foreign trade. This is essential for ensuring unified direction of all basic economic measures throughout Germany. It is also essential for preparing the administrative machinery of a German government, the creation of which must be commenced without further

delay. The Allied countries can effectively accomplish this task by enlisting the support of the democratic parties and free trade unions.

· V

## OUR PROPOSALS

In accordance with the foregoing, the Soviet Government submits for the consideration of the Council of Foreign Ministers its proposals on the economic unity of Germany and on the question of reparations from Germany.

### ECONOMIC UNITY OF GERMANY

With a view to implementing the Berlin decision on the economic unity of Germany and eliminating the existing shortcomings in this respect, the Council of Foreign Ministers deems it necessary.

1. To establish forthwith the central German administrative departments envisaged by the Berlin conference in the fields of industry, finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, as well as agriculture, which should ensure unified direction of major economic measures throughout Germany and prepare the administrative machinery of the German Government.

2. In amendment of the decision of the Control Council of March 26, 1946, to provide for a higher level of German industrial output, so as to raise the annual production of steel in the near future to ten-twelve million tons.

3. Taking into consideration that the industry of the Ruhr constituted the main base of German militarism, to place the Ruhr industrial area under the joint control of Great Britain, France, the United States and the U.S.S.R.

4. To carry out measures on a national scale for putting the financial system and currency of Germany on a sound basis.
5. With a view to ensuring imports of raw and other materials essential for German peace industry and to ensuring the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations to the Allies, to assist in increasing German exports.
6. To instruct the Control Council to adopt the necessary measures for taking away factories and other enterprises from German combines, cartels and trusts and making them the property of the German State. To enlist the assistance of the democratic parties and free trade unions of Germany in the carrying out of these measures.
7. To regard the agreement on the economic fusion of the British and American zones as null and void, since it violates Germany's economic unity.

#### REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

In conformity with the Berlin conference decision to exact reparations from Germany by zones, and in order to determine the amount and procedure of exacting reparations, the Council of Foreign Ministers deems it necessary:

1. To fix the total sum of reparations from Germany in the amount of... (at 1938 world prices).

To fix the sum of reparations for the U.S.S.R. at 10,000 million dollars, the Soviet Union undertaking to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share.

2. To utilize for covering reparation payments:

(a) Bulk removals which were or will be made after the Berlin conference of such usable and complete industrial equipment as is unnecessary for German peace economy.

In the event of the equipment of a given enterprise being left for use in Germany, any other property of the enterprise connected with its activity may be taken on account of reparations.

- (b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production.
- (c) German assets abroad.
- (d) Various services.

3. Removals of equipment from the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany for the Soviet Union, as provided for in the Berlin decisions, to be completed by July 1, 1947, and the corresponding removals from the Western zones of occupation of Germany by July 1, 1948.

4. To establish that Germany's reparations obligations must be fulfilled within twenty years, counting from the date of publication of the decisions of the Berlin tripartite conference.

5. To resume the activity of the Allied Reparations Commission, composed of representatives of Great Britain, the U.S.A., France and the U.S.S.R.

6. Provided that the established plan of reparation deliveries is punctually observed, to deem it possible not to place obstacles in the way of an increase of production of German civilian industry, both for Germany's internal consumption and for the development of trade with other countries.

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The Soviet Government asks that its proposals be considered.

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# STATEMENT MADE IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF THE SECTION OF THE REPORT OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL IN GERMANY DEALING WITH ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND REPARATIONS

*At the Sitting of the Council  
of Foreign Ministers*

*March 19, 1947*

Mr. Bevin's statement today clarifies several important questions and is of substantial significance for us. It will be carefully studied by the Soviet delegation.

We believe that when examining the German problem we should be guided by the decisions of the Berlin conference. These decisions were adopted nearly two years ago, and it may now be said with confidence that they represented and still represent a good basis for the joint work of the Allied Powers in Germany. Naturally, the decisions then adopted do not contain everything we need at the present time, because our governments have meanwhile accumulated much experience and can now give fuller answers to questions which have confronted the Allies in Germany. Nevertheless, the Berlin decisions still remain a reliable basis for the joint work of the Allies in Germany.

However, one may have a good program and yet not ensure its fulfilment. We must admit that as regards the

realization of the program outlined by the Berlin conference there have been some essential shortcomings. And this applies in the present case too.

## 1. DECISIONS AND THEIR FULFILMENT

At the Berlin conference it was already clear to the Allies that some machinery must be set up to execute, for example, decisions on economic questions. With this end in view, the following decision was adopted:

"For the time being no central German government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by state secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council."

The Berlin conference thus adopted a definite decision as to the manner of ensuring the fulfilment of its decisions. That is why the necessity was recognized of setting up five central German administrative departments. These departments were to act under the direction of the Control Council. However, we have not succeeded in carrying this decision into effect.

The Soviet Government is now of the opinion that the question of establishing a German government should not be postponed any longer. But even now the first step towards this must be the establishment of several central German economic departments. Fulfilment of the adopted decisions could not be assured without this.

We have already learned here that the American delegation recognizes the necessity of establishing several economic departments in Germany. Today the British del-

egation has also supported this view. We know, however, that the French Government, now as heretofore, holds a position of its own with regard to this question.

M. Bidault yesterday presented France's point of view. We should give the most attentive consideration to his arguments.

I do not intend to dwell on the details of this issue now. But the gist of the question, which is both an organizational and a political one, is sufficiently clear to all of us. And it must be admitted that until this question is decided we cannot be sure of the fulfilment of the decisions adopted by our Council with regard to the major economic problems of Germany. That is why we are faced with the task of settling this question among ourselves. The Soviet Government believes that if we abide by the decisions of the Berlin conference, and at the same time listen attentively to the arguments presented by each of us, we shall find a correct decision for this important problem. One of our urgent tasks is to reach agreement on this problem on the basis of the Berlin conference decisions.

## 2. THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY'S ECONOMIC UNITY

The various views regarding the substance of the economic problem in Germany have now been sufficiently clarified. We all recognize the necessity of the economic unity of Germany. Each of us still adheres to his own viewpoint, but it is my impression that no considerations have been advanced here which in their essentials cannot be reconciled, given the desire. In any case, we must endeavour to find ways of reconciling them.

Mr. Marshall has mentioned six points relative to Ger-

man economic unity. These points are: common utilization of natural resources, a plan for exports and imports, reparations, financial reform, freedom of movement, central German administrative agencies.

Mr. Bevin, with reference to this matter, expressed opinions which closely approach this position.

M. Bidault presented France's view. It seems to me that here, too, there is a great deal in common with the opinion of our other colleagues.

The Soviet delegation has stated its point of view. It moreover expresses its readiness to work to find a basis for the reconciliation of the opinions that were put forward here.

Is it necessary to reach agreement on the level of Germany's economy? We believe that this is desirable and essential. Is it necessary to reach agreement on an export and import plan for Germany? This, too, is of course desirable. And so with the other problems—financial reform, freedom of movement, and so on. However, the chief thing, as we see it, is whether the problem of the economic unity of Germany includes a settlement of the question of reparations. The Soviet Government holds that the economic unity of Germany is a problem which certainly does include the question of reparation payments from Germany.

It was said here that Great Britain cannot increase the burden of her commitments involved in control over Germany. The same has been said by other Ministers. But that being the case, the Soviet Government is entitled no less than any other to say the same thing.

That means that Germany must bear definite expenditures arising from the occupation of her territory and from the necessity of maintaining Allied control bodies. This is indubitable. Germany must fulfil all her obligations to the

Allies, and these, of course, include payment of reparations.

The Berlin conference adopted decisions simultaneously on Germany's economic unity and on the payment of reparations. If a solution of the economic problem were suggested which assured the economic unity of Germany but failed to assure the payment of reparations, we could not agree to it. Moreover, it would run counter to the decisions of the Berlin conference. If, however, we all agree that the establishment of the economic unity of Germany does not run counter to the payment of reparations but, on the contrary, must necessarily include a solution of the reparations problem, it should not be very difficult to reach agreement about the rest. The main point is that in settling the question of the economic unity of Germany, we must also settle the question of reparations.

### 3. THE QUESTION OF REPARATIONS

As regards reparations, here, too, the agreement reached at the Berlin conference should serve as the basis. But we cannot agree to the decisions of the Berlin conference being counterposed to those of the Crimea conference. Surely, we cannot forget what was said in the agreement on the German question adopted at the Berlin conference, namely, that "the purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany." Nor can we overlook the fact that the decision of the Berlin conference on reparations explicitly says that it is adopted "in accordance with the Crimea conference decision."

The fundamentals of the reparations question were already contained in the decisions of the Crimea conference, which took place before the Berlin conference. The Berlin

conference only elaborated the decision adopted earlier at the Crimea conference, establishing in particular the procedure of payment of reparations by zones. Hence we consider it wrong when it is said that in view of the Berlin conference decisions the decisions of the Crimea conference are to be regarded as annulled. We cannot agree with this opinion, and hold that it contradicts the Berlin agreement of the Allies.

The Soviet Government is grateful for the sympathy expressed for our country in connection with the damage it sustained at the hands of the invader—a matter which has invariably to be recalled whenever the question of reparations comes under consideration. But the fact is that the Soviet people evidently feel the urgency of the need to settle the reparations problem more than anyone else.

Almost two years have passed since Germany's surrender. And how do matters stand with regard to the reparations which the Soviet Union was due to receive from the British, American and French zones?

Let us look at the actual state of affairs.

It transpires that during the entire period, up to January 1, 1947, the Soviet Union received reparations deliveries from the Western zones to a sum of only 5,000,000 dollars, that is, if we speak of reparations received without payment. In addition, the Soviet Union received from the Western zones 7,500,000 dollars worth of reparations deliveries which, according to the Berlin agreement were to be paid for with other commodities. Thus the total unrequited reparations received by the Soviet Union from the Western zones amount to 5,000,000 dollars, which is an utterly insignificant sum. If the total reparations for the Soviet Union within that period had been limited to this sum, the Soviet Union would have committed a very

grave error. The Soviet Government, however, did not commit this error. The Soviet people could not sit with folded arms, waiting for reparations from the Western zones and doing nothing to obtain reparations from the Eastern zone of Germany, for which the Soviet military administration is directly responsible.

The Soviet Government took the necessary measures to ensure that the Soviet zone in Germany, in accordance with the Berlin conference decisions, fulfil its part of the reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union, and a corresponding share of them was assigned to Poland. In this period, equipment of plants which served Germany's war needs was removed and transferred to the U.S.S.R. Reparations deliveries from current production in the Soviet zone were also effected in this period. Certain enterprises in Germany were transferred to Soviet ownership on account of reparations. I may mention in passing that it was incorrectly stated here that these enterprises enjoy some sort of extra-territorial rights. Although they now belong to the Soviet Union, they operate on the basis of German law.

The Soviet Government is prepared at the appropriate moment to inform the Allies of everything that has been done in the Soviet zone in fulfilment of the reparations decisions. When the time comes the Soviet Union will present a full account on this matter, down to the last kopek, or down to the last dollar, if you prefer. This, it goes without saying, must be done on a basis of complete reciprocity.

It must be admitted, however, that had the Soviet Union not taken these measures with regard to reparations in the Soviet zone in Germany, it would even now be sitting empty-handed, without any reparations at all. That would mean that the Berlin conference decision would have remained unfulfilled in this respect as well. The Soviet

Government acted perfectly correctly when it took care that the decision on reparations agreed upon at the Berlin conference be fulfilled at least in the Soviet zone.

At the same time the Soviet Government expresses its natural dissatisfaction at the fact that the Western zones are not fulfilling the reparations decision. Together with this we consider that agreement should be reached on the total sum of reparations. It would be impermissible, indeed, to exact reparations without any limitation. Agreement must also be reached on reparations deliveries from current production. Without this the fulfilment of the reparations agreement cannot be assured.

Further, a reminder should be made of the Crimea conference decision relative to the establishment of an Allied Reparations Commission.

The Berlin conference confirmed the necessity for such a Commission. The Commission began its work in Moscow. On the proposal of the American Government, the Commission was transferred from Moscow to Berlin. Soviet representatives were duly sent to Berlin to participate in the work of the Commission. Unfortunately, the representatives of the other governments did not get down to work in the Reparations Commission in Berlin. We now propose that the Commission resume its work.

Mr. Bevin has here objected to the work of the Reparations Commission being resumed in Moscow. But the Soviet Government does not propose that this Commission should work in Moscow. We insist that the resumption of the Commission's work in Berlin be not postponed any longer.

We note with satisfaction the statement made by the French delegation that it also is in favour of the resumption of the work of the Reparations Commission.

#### 4. LEVEL OF GERMAN INDUSTRY

Further, it is important to reach agreement on the level of German industry.

The Soviet Government has already expressed the opinion that the level of German civilian industry should not be restricted, the more so since all German industry is, and should remain for a definite period, under the control of the four Allies. Allied control must ensure that German industry does not restore its war potential, and that it develops solely for the satisfaction of Germany's peaceful requirements. Our four governments are in a position, by means of coordinated decisions, to accomplish this task in the interest of all peace-loving states, and this would make it possible the better to ensure both the satisfaction of the German people's requirements in goods, and the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations to the Allies, including the payment of reparations.

Experience has shown that the decision on the level of German industry adopted in March of last year is not quite satisfactory. It should be revised. But when we are told that the agreed level of German industry should assure before all else an export and import plan for Germany, and that only after this is it possible to think of the payment of reparations, we cannot agree with such an opinion. We cannot agree to a plan for German industry which took account of all requirements, including home needs and export needs, but failed to take account of Germany's obligations in respect to the payment of reparations. If we could agree on a plan for the level of German industry satisfactory both from the point of view of Germany's home requirements—including provision for appropriate imports, by increasing Germany's export trade—and from the point of view of Germany's fulfilment of

her reparations obligations, then this important problem would be entirely solved. A practical examination of this matter might help in elaborating a coordinated decision on the level of German industry.

The French Government, as we know, is strongly urging us to fix a definite quota of coal deliveries from Germany to France. The Soviet Government considers this view acceptable. We are certain that in this matter the Council of Foreign Ministers can satisfy the legitimate interests of France and of other interested countries, and will be able to overcome the difficulties involved.

The coal problem should be given special attention. Why is it that coal production in the British zone in Germany has reached 41 per cent of the prewar level, when in the Soviet zone it has reached 74 per cent, although conditions in the Soviet zone are more difficult? Why is it that output of lignites in the British zone has reached 74 per cent of the prewar level, when in the Soviet zone it has reached 84 per cent? Why cannot coal output in Germany be raised to 80 per cent, or 90 per cent, or even 100 per cent of prewar level? There is nothing unfeasible in such a program. On the other hand, if our common efforts were aimed at developing in Germany such branches of peace industry—and the Germans know how to work!—we should thereby be facilitating the fulfilment by the occupying Powers of their duties in Germany. Only allow German peace industry a certain chance of developing, and the burden of expenditures sustained by the Allies in Germany would not only not increase, but decrease.

## 5. THE RUHR

And lastly, as regards the Ruhr industrial area.

That the Soviet Union, like the other Allies, is particularly concerned about the Ruhr is understandable. The Ruhr is the base of German militarism, because it is there that the foundation of Germany's war potential is located. It would be a very risky thing if any one single Power were to assume responsibility for controlling the Ruhr area. It would be much more correct if this responsibility were divided among the four Allied Powers.

The four Allied Powers must control the whole of Germany's economy, and consequently the whole of Germany's industry. This ought to be our aim at this conference. At the same time we should agree that the Ruhr industrial area, which is of particular importance from the standpoint of Germany's war potential, should be placed under special quadripartite control.

I shall have to quote a little history in order to recall how this question was discussed at the Berlin conference.

The Soviet Government proposed then that the Ruhr industrial area be regarded as a part of Germany, and that quadripartite control be established over the Ruhr area, for which purpose it was proposed that an appropriate Control Council be established, comprised of representatives of Great Britain, France, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.

On July 31, 1945, when this question was considered at the Berlin conference, Mr. Bevin said (I quote from the record compiled by our Secretariat at the Berlin conference):

"I am unable to discuss this question owing to the absence of the French. This is a major question of principle and the French are very closely concerned in it."

I will read one other excerpt from this record concerning the subsequent discussion of this question:

*"Stalin.* Perhaps it would be better for the present to postpone the question of control over the Ruhr region, but we have before us the idea that the Ruhr region remains a part of Germany. Let us reflect this idea in this document.

*"Truman.* Unquestionably it is a part of Germany."

The last part of the record reads as follows:

*"Bevin.* I cannot at present agree, because I have not got before me the previous discussion of this question with our representatives. I know there was an idea of internationalizing the Ruhr to reduce Germany's war potential. This idea has been discussed. I agree that the Ruhr should remain under the administration of the Control Council pending further discussion. But I should like to have the opportunity of consulting my Government to get this question quite clear. I would be ready to transfer this question to the Council of Foreign Ministers, since this would give me time to study the question thoroughly.

*"Stalin and Truman agreed with the proposal."*

It will be seen from this that agreement was reached at the Berlin conference that the question of control over the Ruhr industrial area should be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers. This, however, has not been done, although the Soviet Government has proposed that it should be. On the other hand, we know that one of the Allied Powers is carrying out very important measures in the Ruhr area unilaterally.

The Soviet Government believes that we should now at any rate consider what was designated for consideration as far back as July 1945. It therefore again calls attention to its proposal that quadripartite Allied control over the Ruhr industrial area be established.

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## PROVISIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF GERMANY

*Statement made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
March 22, 1947*

We have begun to examine the question of the provisional political organization of Germany. In this connection we shall have to deal with the state structure of Germany as well. Thus, in addition to other questions, we are faced with a cardinal political problem—our attitude towards Germany, towards the German people.

The Soviet people were attacked by Hitler Germany. They lived through four extremely difficult years of war. A large part of the territory of the U.S.S.R. came under enemy occupation, accompanied by the measureless brutality of the Hitler army, its violence against the civilian population, the enormous destruction and the ruin of many millions of Soviet people. Using all modern means of warfare, Hitler stopped at nothing in his criminal war for the annihilation of our people. It is known, too, that the Soviet people replied to this assault by administering a crushing rebuff to the German invaders and mercilessly demolishing them.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Government and the Soviet people generally are not governed by feelings of revenge in

their attitude towards Germany and the German people. We do not identify the German people with Hitler Germany, although no one can exonerate the German people of responsibility for Germany's aggression.

In the Soviet Union we have always regarded the ideology of the German race theorists with contempt, considering it worthy of cannibals but not of civilized human beings. On the other hand, wholesale reprobation of the German people, or of any other people, is regarded in the Soviet Union merely as one of the varieties of racism.

Now that Hitlerism has been defeated and control of Germany rests in the hands of the Allied Powers, responsibility for Germany's further destiny lies first and foremost with these Powers. They are confronted with the task of helping the Germans who are seeking a new path to make Germany a peaceable democratic country, and not to permit Germany's resurgence as an aggressive force.

The Soviet Government does not consider that everything necessary is being done in this respect.

It cannot be said that either the democratic reconstruction or the demilitarization of Germany is being carried out in full conformity with the decisions of the Allies. We think, however, that only by the genuine democratization of Germany and her demilitarization can the aim set of converting Germany into a peaceful and democratic state, which in time will take a worthy place among the peace-loving nations, be achieved. Any other way can only result in temporary and unstable success, but it cannot serve the attainment of our chief aim—that of averting the resurgence in the centre of Europe of a hotbed of extremely dangerous aggression in the form of a revived militaristic Germany.

There are plans to put an end to Germany as an independent state. Some of these plans would make for

this objective directly, others in roundabout ways. The Soviet Union does not approve of plans to destroy Germany as an independent state, and regards such schemes as historically groundless and not in accord with the interests of the peoples, who are anxious for durable peace.

On the day of the victory over Germany, May 9, 1945, Generalissimo Stalin addressed the people. In this address he said: "The Soviet Union is triumphant, although it has no intention of either dismembering or destroying Germany." That is the position of the U.S.S.R.

To destroy Germany as a state is impermissible, nor is it permissible to convert highly industrialized Germany into a de-industrialized, backward country. Such a policy not only runs counter to the economic recovery of Europe and of the world; it would dislocate Germany's political life, and thus create a menace to general peace and tranquility.

There are all sorts of plans for the dismemberment of Germany, for the federalization of Germany, for the severance of Western Germany from the rest of the German territory, and so on. All these schemes in the final analysis are expressions of this same aim of destroying Germany as an independent state. Such plans are incompatible with the task of democratizing Germany and with the interests of general peace and tranquility.

The argument usually advanced today in support of the idea of federalizing Germany is the need to weaken the German State. This is regarded as practically the only means of preventing Germany's revival as an aggressive power. It is not difficult to discern, however, how unsound this argument is.

It must be admitted that federalization would, of course, weaken Germany. This cannot be denied. Federalization would give the victorious Allies a temporary advantage. From the short view, this advantage is obvious.

But if we take the long view, federalization presents a serious danger. If we consider not only the tactical advantages for the immediate future, but look ahead, the policy of federalizing Germany is not warranted by the interests of the democratic countries.

By adopting the course of federalizing Germany the Allies may undermine the faith of the German people in their policy. In that case the cause of a united Germany, which evidently is dear to the German people, would be placed in the hands of the German militarists, who seek to re-establish Germany as a militaristic country dominating over other nations. The proclamation by the Allies of a policy of federalization would result in the militarists assuming leadership of the movement for a unified Germany, in their efforts to win over the German people for their own purposes. As a result, the idea of revenge would raise its head, chauvinism, which has such a fertile soil in Germany, would flourish, and the conditions would be created for the appearance of new Bismarcks, or even of new Hitlers.

The history of Germany teaches us how dangerous it is to leave the cause of a united Germany in the hands of the German militarists. If the aspirations of the German people for a unified Germany should once more become a tool in the hands of the German militarists, who are still very much alive, the Allied policy of reconstructing Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis would be doomed to failure.

Federalization can create other difficulties for the Allied Powers in Germany.

In a federalized Germany there will be no central German government capable of bearing responsibility for Germany's fulfilment of her obligations to the Allies. Moreover, the Allies must not assume direct moral respon-

sibility for everything that takes place in Germany. Appropriate responsibility should lie upon a German government, invested with the necessary powers. The situation in this respect may be illustrated by the example of Japan. As we know, there is a Japanese government, although supreme power rests with the Allied occupation authorities. Other examples could be cited as well.

All this speaks against the Allies imposing federalization on the German people. It will be a different matter if the German people themselves declare in favour of federalization, if they decide this question by a free vote, without outside compulsion. In that event this should not be opposed by the Allied Powers, which should seek to strengthen their support among the German people, while at the same time ensuring the fulfilment by Germany of all her obligations to the Allies.

It is sometimes said that the line of federalizing Germany follows from the decision of the Potsdam conference regarding the decentralization of the state administration of Germany. This reference, however, cannot be considered well-founded.

When, in the summer of 1945, the Potsdam conference decided that it was necessary to decentralize the political structure of Germany, it was dealing with a Germany that had only just been liberated from Hitlerism and had not yet liquidated the Hitler centralized state administration, which had destroyed the Landtags and the autonomous administration of the Lands. Under these conditions, the task was to restore the administrative decentralization which had existed before the advent of the Hitler regime, when there had been Landtags and two all-German Chambers of representatives. The task then was to restore the democratic organs of local self-government, to revive the activities of the democratic parties and, following that, to

restore the district and provincial administrations, as well as the Land administrations. The Potsdam conference decisions contain no mention whatever of federalization of Germany. At that time this question was not even discussed.

Today the situation is altogether different. Elections to local self-government bodies have already been held throughout the whole of Germany. Democratic parties, free trade unions and other democratic organizations have appeared and begun to function. In many of the Lands elections have been held to the Landtags. It is presumed that elections to the Landtags will soon be completed in all the Lands. In this respect the decisions of the Potsdam conference have on the whole been fulfilled successfully.

However, the Potsdam conference decisions also provided for the formation of several central German administrative departments. In this respect the Potsdam conference decision has not been fulfilled, although the need for such central German departments has long been felt.

Further postponement of the establishment of these central departments will prejudice first of all the implementation of the measures designed to achieve Germany's economic unity. The Soviet Government therefore considers that the establishment of the central German departments, as well as the introduction of measures preparatory to the establishment of a Provisional German Government, brook no delay. This is dictated by the need properly to carry out the economic and political measures of the Allies throughout Germany. It is also required to ensure the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations to the Allies.

In accordance with the observations I have made, I submit for the consideration of the Council of Foreign Ministers the following proposals:

# I

## ON THE FORM AND SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF GERMANY

The task of establishing a provisional political organization of Germany must be worked out on the basis of the following principles:

- a) Germany's political system must have a democratic character and the organs of power must be established on the basis of democratic elections.
- b) The centralized Hitler state administration, which destroyed the Landtags and the autonomous administration of the Lands, must be abolished, so that the decentralized administration that existed prior to the advent of the Hitler regime shall be re-established, with the revival of the Landtags and of two all-German Chambers.
- c) Such a Provisional German Government must be established that, while guaranteeing Germany's political and economic unity, it can at the same time assume responsibility for fulfilling Germany's obligations to the Allied states.

Proceeding from the above it is proposed:

1. As a first step towards forming a Provisional German Government, Central German Administrative Departments dealing with finance, industry, transport, communications and foreign trade shall be instituted in accordance with the Potsdam conference decision.
2. The Control Council shall be instructed to draw up a provisional democratic Constitution, enlisting for this work the democratic parties, free trade unions and other anti-Nazi organizations and representatives of the Lands.

3. Elections shall be held in accordance with the provisional German Constitution, after which a Provisional German Government shall be formed.

4. In accordance with the Potsdam conference decisions, the German Government is to be charged, as its basic tasks, with the eradication of the remnants of German militarism and fascism, the implementation of comprehensive democratization of Germany and the carrying out of measures designed to rehabilitate German economy, and also with the unconditional fulfilment of Germany's obligations to the Allied states.

5. The permanent Constitution of Germany shall be approved by the German people.

## II

### ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN STATE

1. Germany shall be re-established as a single peaceable State—a democratic Republic with an all-German Parliament consisting of two Chambers and an all-German Government, the constitutional rights of the Lands forming the German State to be guaranteed.

2. The President of the German Republic shall be elected by the Parliament.

3. An all-German Constitution adopted by the Parliament shall be in force throughout the whole territory of Germany. In the several Lands, Land Constitutions adopted by the Landtags shall be in force.

4. The German Constitution, as well as the Land Constitutions, shall be based on democratic principles. They shall consolidate Germany's development as a democratic and peaceful State.

5. The all-German Constitution and Land Constitutions shall guarantee the free formation and activity of all democratic parties, as well as of trade unions and other public democratic organizations and institutions.

6. The all-German Constitution and the Land Constitutions shall guarantee to all citizens of Germany, regardless of race, sex, language or creed, the democratic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religious worship, assembly and association.

7. The Parliament and the Landtags shall be elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot and under the system of proportional representation.

8. Local self-government bodies (district and communal councils) shall be elected on the same democratic principles as the Landtags.

## GERMANY AS AN ECONOMIC UNIT

*Statement made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
March 31, 1947*

Most of the delegations have already stated their views on the questions dealt with today by Mr. Marshall. With the exception of certain attacks on the Soviet delegation, as well as on the French delegation, these remarks have been made in a general form, a fact which has to be taken into consideration. Since, however, an attempt was made in today's statement to sum up certain results, the Soviet delegation will study this statement. It will also study attentively M. Bidault's statement and the document presented by Mr. Bevin.

My remarks at this moment can only be of a preliminary nature.

We were pleased most of all by that statement of Mr. Marshall in which he declared that in respect to Europe, the United States "is more concerned in building solidly than in building fast." The Soviet delegation entirely shares this view.

We cannot, however, consider that what has been done heretofore by the Allied Powers was based upon a different point of view. It was stated here, for instance, that the agreement reached in Potsdam was only a paper agreement.

A statement of this kind may be interpreted as a repudiation of the Potsdam agreement. The Soviet delegation is of the opinion, however, that the Potsdam agreement should not be repudiated. This agreement cannot, therefore, be regarded as a paper agreement. We for our part, deem it necessary to insist upon the precise fulfilment of this agreement, as well as of all the other agreements adopted at Allied conferences.

## I. THE QUESTION OF REPARATIONS

All the Ministers present here have recognized the necessity of discussing German economic unity, reparations and the level of German industry conjointly. We consider this a good beginning for achieving an approximation of viewpoints. We believe that on most of the questions dealt with here by Messrs. Marshall, Bevin and Bidault—to be on the safe side I say most, and not all the questions—an approximation of our viewpoints can be reached which would facilitate the fulfilment of our fundamental tasks regarding Germany, as laid down in our earlier joint decisions. But the Soviet delegation, of course, cannot forget the interests of the Soviet Union and its legitimate rights.\*

That the Soviet delegation reminds the Council about reparations from Germany is not to be wondered. For the Soviet Union there can be no settlement of the German problem without a settlement of the reparations question. This is not only the opinion of the Soviet delegation—there are not many of us in this hall—it is the opinion of all Soviet people. The Soviet people know what German occupation meant; they experienced it in a considerable part of the territory of the U.S.S.R. Even now they feel every day what destruction and what hardships the German occupa-

tion left in its train. They demand reparations from Germany with every right, and consider that this question cannot be reduced to general phrases, but must find a concrete solution in this Council.

We understand France's viewpoint when she raises the question of coal. That is a most important question for France's economic development; she, too, suffered German occupation, which lasted five years. We understand the feelings of the French when they demand compensation for the damage caused them by the German occupation and insist upon German coal deliveries for the rehabilitation of France's economy. We consider this to be a lawful demand on France's part, which could be met from reparations.

The question of reparations, naturally, has one meaning for the United States and another for the Soviet Union. The United States, which, fortunately, did not experience German occupation, is in a different position. Perhaps there they do not feel what Soviet citizens feel after having lived through the excruciating atrocities, destruction and plunder perpetrated by the Nazis in the occupied territories. But at least it is necessary, when the Soviet Union's attitude on such an acute and important question as reparations is presented, that it should be presented in conformity with the actual facts.

Disputing the Soviet Union's right to reparations from current production, Mr. Marshall said that it looked very much as though the Soviet Union were trying to sell the same horse twice. But that is not the case. We, Soviet representatives, do not approach the question of reparations as traders, trying to do a trade. But, on the other hand, we do not want traders to come along and sell our horse to someone else cheap, and without our consent at that.

## II. OUR RIGHT TO REPARATIONS

Our formal right to reparations from Germany is based upon decisions twice adopted by the Allies: everybody remembers the decisions taken at Potsdam and, still earlier, in the Crimea.

The Crimea protocol, as is known, was signed by the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. At the Crimea conference the United States agreed to accept as a basis for discussion a proposal for the payment of reparations to the Soviet Union in the amount of 10 billion dollars. Only Great Britain refrained from expressing her view on this question. At the Crimea conference both the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain accepted it as indisputable that there should be reparations in the form of annual goods deliveries from Germany. This point did not raise any doubt on the part of any participant of the Crimea conference.

It is sometimes said nowadays that the Potsdam (Berlin) decisions cancelled the decisions adopted at the Crimea conference. This is merely an arbitrary interpretation of the Potsdam decisions, which cannot be substantiated. The Crimea conference decision on reparations has not been cancelled. Show us where it says in the Potsdam conference decisions that the Crimea conference decision on reparations is cancelled. It isn't there. Consequently, the Crimea conference decision remains in force.

More, the Potsdam decision directly states that it is adopted "in accordance with the Crimea conference decision." And in another place it says that "the purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany."

This reference in the Potsdam conference decisions

made it unnecessary to mention the various specific aspects of the Crimea agreement on reparations. The Potsdam decisions concentrated on the main question—on removals of equipment. At that time, two months after Germany's surrender, it was difficult to define more precisely the question of deliveries from current industrial production, or to add anything to the Crimea decision on this point. Besides, there was no need for this, since the question did not give rise to any doubt.

All this goes to show that the Soviet Union's claim to reparations from current production is based upon a solid foundation of joint Allied decisions. And we cannot agree when a contrast is drawn between the Potsdam decisions and the Crimea decisions, since the Potsdam decisions were nothing but a further development of the decisions taken in the Crimea.

### III. GERMANY MUST MAKE COMPENSATION

We are now being asked a question like this: can Germany pay reparations, is she capable of meeting the reparations claimed from her by the Soviet Union and other Allied countries?

To this question the Soviet delegation answers without hesitation: there is nothing in these claims beyond Germany's capacity. Germany, which in the time of the war alone spent 620 billion marks for her war needs, besides having spent many billions of marks preparing for war, is now free of these colossal expenditures. If Germany directs even a fraction of these former war expenditures to making partial compensation for the damage she caused to the Allied countries, she will not only be able to ensure the rehabilitation of her economy but also fulfil her obligations to the Allies.

It has been repeatedly said here that Germany cannot do without importing a number of commodities, in particular, certain foodstuffs. In this connection the necessity was stressed of a corresponding export of German products to ensure the imports Germany needs. We consider this view correct. This requires the working out of an all-German export and import plan, and this should be attended to as early as possible.

Mr. Marshall stated here that the Soviet Union's reparations claim would lead to a reduction of imports into Germany. The Soviet delegation, however, never proposed a reduction of imports, as is being wrongly ascribed to it now. We hold it necessary to take measures to increase the export of German goods to other countries which need them, so as to ensure an increase of imports of the foreign goods needed by Germany. We believe that an increase in imports is also necessary to ensure fulfilment by Germany of the reparations deliveries.

We were told here that if the Soviet delegation's view were accepted, it would be necessary to cut food rations in Germany from the present 1,550 calories to 1,100 calories. I must say that this contention does not correspond to the view of the Soviet delegation. We consider that even the present rations in Germany are inadequate. The Soviet Government is ready, in conjunction with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, to help not only to prevent a reduction of the existing food rations in Germany, but to raise them.

The spring has now set in, and it is highly necessary to expedite measures for the recovery of agriculture. We believe that these measures must be taken right now, without delay.

Agrarian reform would likewise contribute to the advancement of agriculture in Germany. But agrarian reform

has been carried out only in the Soviet zone. In the other zones—the American, British and French—agrarian reform has not been carried out to this day. The land is still held by the Junkers, who do not wish to assist Allied policy in Germany, and are obstructing the promotion of agriculture. The land should be taken away from the militarist Junkers and turned over to the German peasants right away. The German peasants know how to work. Upon receiving the Junkers' land, they would considerably increase agricultural output and Germany's food resources. Why, then, is agrarian reform being postponed for the second year in the Western zones?

In connection with the necessity of raising agricultural output in Germany, mention was made here of the territory which the Allies placed under Poland's administration. As you all remember, in the Crimea and at Potsdam our governments assumed definite obligations with regard to Poland's western frontier. We are all bound by those obligations and cannot renounce them. This is why the districts of Germany which have come under Poland's administration cannot be made an object of discussion when examining the question of Germany's economic unity.

#### IV. LEVEL OF GERMAN INDUSTRY AND REPARATIONS

A prompt decision to raise the level of German industry would likewise be of great significance in increasing Germany's agricultural output and food resources. Great Britain, as we know, has stated her attitude on this point. The Soviet Union has also expressed its view regarding the level of German industry which, evidently, closely approaches the British attitude. We know that the French

view is more reserved. So far, the United States has not made its attitude clear. There seem to be certain apprehensions regarding the development of German peace industry. The Soviet Government believes that we need not fear the development of peace industry in Germany. It cannot harm anyone; on the contrary, it would meet the requirements of other European countries, which are in need of an influx of manufactured goods. In such a case there would be no grounds for speaking of the danger of Germany's becoming an overpopulated slum or a country which economically resembled a poorhouse in the centre of Europe.

We should take effective measures to eliminate Germany's war potential, to prevent the resurgence of Germany as an aggressive force. The Soviet Government insisted, and keeps insisting, that the adoption of a co-ordinated plan for the liquidation of Germany's war potential be expedited. At the same time, it should be made possible for Germany to develop her peace industry and agriculture. It is towards this that the Allies' efforts in Germany should be directed.

If we fulfilled the decision on the level of German industry adopted last year, we ought to be having now in the British zone, for instance, a steel industry with an annual production level of approximately five million tons. But, actually, the level is 2,500,000 tons. The development of the coal-mining industry in the Ruhr is likewise lagging. Measures to ensure a proper rise of coal output in the Ruhr have so far not been taken. Something of a similar situation obtains in other German industries. As to the Soviet zone, there all measures are being taken to promote industry.

We are told that the British taxpayers bear a certain share of the expenditure on the rehabilitation of Germany.

We have no grounds to confirm or to contend this. However, if steps were taken to ensure a proper development of Germany's peace industries in the Ruhr and other parts of Germany, taxpayers outside of Germany would not have to bear any burden of expenditure on Germany's needs. Consequently, it is necessary to provide these opportunities for the development of German peace industry, by raising its level, and by fixing definite targets for the advancement of the steel industry and coal industry, as well as of other German industries.

## V. GERMAN ECONOMIC UNITY AND THE ALLIED POWERS

We are now discussing the question of Germany's economic unity. It is a ripe question. We should strive to ensure the economic unity of Germany and a suitable development of her peace industry under the joint control of the Allied Powers.

Already at Potsdam, the Soviet Government proposed the establishment of a central German administration, through which better conditions could be provided for Germany's economic unity. This proposal was, however, rejected. Now we are again being told of the importance of ensuring Germany's economic unity and of the undesirability of partitioning Germany into two halves. The Soviet Government fully agrees that it is impermissible to split Germany into two halves, and it will strive for a decision guaranteeing Germany's economic unity. There are no responsible persons in the Soviet Union who favour the splitting of Germany or, let us say, the separation of the western part of Germany from the rest of her territory. Such views are alien to the Soviet Union.

But when the American and British Governments are fusing their two zones, disregarding the existence of the Control Council and disregarding the fact that this runs counter to German economic unity, then we declare: this separate decision must be annulled, for it actually leads to the severance of Western Germany from the rest of Germany's territory, and practically means splitting Germany. If we are all really in favour of Germany's economic unity, then none of us should take separate measures leading to the splitting of Germany into two parts and undermining faith in the possibility of achieving the economic unity of Germany.

The substantial difference between our views has not yet been eliminated. However, the Soviet delegation is prepared to work with other delegations to bring about an approximation of our views on Germany, to unite our actions in Germany and to ensure the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations to the Allies. Our purpose is to make Germany a united, peaceable and democratic country. Such a Germany will in due time find a worthy place among the peace-loving nations. Only then will the Allied Powers have fulfilled the responsible tasks confronting them in Germany.

## THE STATE STRUCTURE OF GERMANY\*

*Statement Made During the Discussion  
of the Provisional Political Organization  
of Germany at the Sitting of the Council  
of Foreign Ministers*

*April 2, 1947*

The Soviet delegation agrees to adopt as a general scheme those proposals relating to the first main stages of the establishment of political democracy in Germany which were suggested by the British delegation. It goes without saying that the general character of the political structure of Germany, and above all the relations between the central German administration and the administrations of the Lands, is a question of especial importance. I will not conceal that the Soviet delegation fears that certain proposals, including those of the American delegation, are liable to be interpreted in such a way as would deny existence to Germany as a united state. These proposals would lead to the federalization of Germany, with which we cannot agree, unless it is approved by the German people themselves.

The general position of the Soviet Government with regard to the federalization of Germany has already been stated by me, V. M. Molotov continued. We are still of the same opinion. Our proposals will be based on this general stand of the Soviet Government.

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\* This statement is given in the form in which it was published in the Moscow newspapers on April 4.

In this connection V. M. Molotov suggested for consideration the following proposal of the Soviet delegation:

"1. Germany's political structure must have a democratic character, and the organs of power must be established on the basis of democratic elections, similar to what was provided for by the Constitution of Weimar, the rights and duties of the President being limited however to those exercised by the head of a constitutional state without independent executive authority.

"2. As a first step toward forming a Provisional German Government, Central German Administrative Departments dealing with finance, industry, transport, communications and foreign trade shall be established in accordance with the Potsdam decisions."

The Weimar Constitution was adopted in Germany in a democratic way. It was approved by the German people. If, in working out the new constitution for Germany, we take that which was democratic in the Weimar Constitution, we shall make our work considerably easier and shall avoid serious mistakes. Then nobody will be in the position to say that we are trying to impose on the German people something of our own which does not conform with the views of democratic circles in Germany. Moreover, it would be clear to the Germans that we do not desire to liquidate Germany as a state, and that we are reckoning with the opinion of democratic circles in Germany.

But we know that there are big defects in the Weimar Constitution, which should not be left and which must be discarded as contradictory to democratic principles. Mr. Bevin correctly pointed out that the rights of the President under the Weimar Constitution were exceedingly wide and could be used to the detriment of a democratic Germany.

In view of this, the Soviet delegation's proposal points to the necessity of limiting the rights and duties of the

President to those of the head of a constitutional government, who has no independent executive authority. In this instance the Soviet delegation adopts the wording contained in the British draft. It seems to us to be satisfactory.

There is no need to touch just now on the other amendments to the Weimar Constitution, because it is important to agree on the fundamentals of the political structure of Germany. Amendments may be made when we go further into this problem.

V. M. Molotov said that the most advisable thing would be to discuss first the basic principles upon which Germany's political structure should be founded. Discussion of the stages of development, although it would give an opportunity to settle a number of questions of an organizational nature, could not by itself properly clarify the main issue of the political structure of Germany. In this connection the proposal made by the American delegation relative to the procedure for the formation of a Provisional Government of Germany, which had not yet been discussed, deserved attention; it recommends that the Provisional German Government should consist of the heads of the present governments of the Lands. This proposal evoked serious doubt.

For, indeed, how will the Germans react to this proposal?—V. M. Molotov said. They might take it to mean that Germany no longer exists as a single state, but that there are only separate German Lands, the representatives of which constitute the Provisional Government. It seems to me that it would be highly undesirable if the Germans were to understand our proposal as being directed *against Germany's existence as a state*. The formation of a Provisional Government consisting solely of the heads of the governments of the Lands would indubitably undermine the political unity of Germany. In such an event it would be im-

possible to ensure the fulfilment of Germany's obligations to the Allies.

Furthermore, if the Provisional German Government were to be composed of persons representing the Lands, the German people might form the conviction that the government was composed of persons *dependent on the occupation authorities*. Such a government would hardly enjoy the necessary prestige among German democratic circles. From this standpoint, the American delegation's proposal evokes serious doubt.

Lastly, the proposal of the American delegation states that directives to the Provisional German Government shall be given either by the Control Council as such, or by decision of a majority of the members of the Control Council. If we accepted this proposal, we should be going back on the principle of agreed decisions among all the Allies. The majority would then cease to reckon with the objections of one or other of the Allies. The Soviet delegation considers this proposal unacceptable. It would violate the Potsdam and other, still earlier, decisions of the Allies regarding the Control Council. It would destroy the Control Council and unity of action of the Allies in Germany. If we adopted such a decision we would tangle up affairs in Germany and cause great confusion in German political life.

When we spoke of the British delegation's proposals regarding the main stages in the establishment of political democracy in Germany, V. M. Molotov continued, we had in view the following:

First, the creation, as the initial step, of central administrative bodies for a number of economic branches, as was decided at Potsdam. We might supplement this decision by, say, creating an all-German authority for agriculture and food, which we all considered desirable.

Secondly, the creation of some advisory body to assist

the Control Council in drafting Germany's provisional constitution. On this question I shall have more to say.

Thirdly, approval of Germany's provisional constitution by the Control Council.

Fourthly, elections and the formation of a Provisional Government on the basis of the provisional constitution.

These initial stages in the establishment of a democratic system in Germany seem to us acceptable and appropriate.

Of course, we must define the nature of the Advisory Council that is to be composed of Germans and is to assist the Control Council. The British proposal gives no explanation on this point, but explanation is necessary.

As to the composition of the Advisory Council, the Soviet delegation's opinion is that it should consist not only of representatives of the Lands. That would be totally inadequate. It is imperative that all the democratic parties be represented on the Advisory Council; that the trade unions, as well as other anti-Nazi organizations, participate in it. The Advisory Council will then reflect the real sentiments of the German people and will be a good medium for expressing the opinion of German democratic circles.

The same applies to the Provisional Government of Germany, which should be set up after general elections are held in Germany. In so far as the formation of the Provisional Government will depend on the Control Council, it is necessary that proper consultation be held with representatives of the democratic parties, trade unions, other anti-Nazi organizations and the Lands. Only then will it be of a democratic character and will reflect the aspirations of the democratic circles of Germany. If, however, the Government is composed only of representatives of the Lands, it will be understood by the Germans as an attempt on the part of the Allies not to regard Germany as a single state. In this they might discern a desire to eliminate Germany as

a state. Such a decision would be wrong, and would not be in conformity with our common desire to ensure the democratic development of Germany.

Hence, V. M. Molotov concluded, the Soviet delegation's proposals are as follows. We suggest that the main principles of the political organization of Germany be approved. We then propose that the main stages in the practical implementation of these principles be defined. We support the proposal that an advisory body should be set up, but with the stipulation that it shall include representatives of the democratic parties, trade unions, other anti-Nazi organizations, and of the Lands. The Control Council should prepare a provisional constitution in consultation with such a German advisory body. After this, elections to an all-German parliament might be held and a Provisional German Government formed on the basis of the provisional constitution.

This procedure, as recommended by the Soviet delegation, seems to us to conform most closely to the spirit of the principles adopted by the Allies at the Potsdam conference.

V. M. Molotov then passed to the relations between the central German Government and the governments of the Lands, and said:

The proposals made here on this subject, suggesting that the entire authority should be vested in the Lands, would have the effect of restricting the powers of the German Government, in particular in the economic sphere. They would so enhance the powers of the Lands at the expense of those of the all-German Government as to represent a tendency to split Germany into parts, which would signify the liquidation of the German State. We consider such a tendency wrong. If things take this course, we should be making the position of the democratic elements in Germany difficult and the position of the militarist and revanchist elements in Germany easier. In that case the milita-

rists and the revanchists would take the cause of German unity into their hands, and we should be letting slip an exceedingly important implement for the creation of a democratic and peaceable Germany and turning it over to our enemies of yesterday. This, of course, would yield very bad results from the standpoint of Germany's democratic future.

That is why we consider, V. M. Molotov continued, that in regard to the relations between the central German Government and the Lands the right thing would be to take the Weimar Constitution as a basis. It provided for the existence of Landtags and two Chambers, the second Chamber composed of representatives of the Lands; at the same time it was based on the principle of the political unity of Germany. It seems to us that we could base ourselves on these fundamental principles in solving the problem of the relations between the Lands and the central administration of Germany, which should be superior to the administrations of the Lands.

As to the remark made here that the re-establishment of the democratic provisions of the Weimar Constitution might call forth the objection of certain Allied states, it seems to me that we could obviate this. For this, amendments should be introduced in the Weimar Constitution which would eliminate its objectionable, undemocratic features. It should furthermore be borne in mind that Germany will remain under the control of the Allied Powers for a long time to come.

Explaining the character of anti-Nazi organizations, V. M. Molotov pointed out that there were some anti-Nazi organizations in Germany which enjoyed high prestige among the German people, such as the Society of Anti-Fascist German Women, the Peasant Mutual Aid and the Kulturbund, embracing intellectual workers. Such organizations were widely known among German democratic circles. The participation of such organizations in one or other

advisory body was very desirable and useful. It would enhance the prestige of the advisory body as reflecting the opinion of the German people.

V. M. Molotov further pointed out that only the American delegation had expressed itself in favour of changing the existing working procedure of the Control Council. The existing procedure, he said, calls for unanimity on the part of all four members of the Control Council. The American delegation proposes that decisions in the Control Council should be taken by a majority vote. The U.S.A. delegation motivates this proposal on the ground that if decisions in the Control Council are not taken by a majority vote, settlement of questions would be delayed, or, in the absence of unanimity in the Control Council, would be left to the discretion of the German Government. The Soviet delegation believes that the Control Council has enough experience to ensure the elaboration of agreed directives to the German administrative bodies. The German bodies to be set up must work on the basis of these directives. The Soviet delegation sees no danger that the German administrative bodies may be left without instructions.

If unanimity in the Control Council is discarded in favour of the adoption of decisions by a majority vote, the danger will arise of the Control Council collapsing. This danger is far more serious than the danger of delay in the working out of one or another directive. The Soviet delegation therefore considers it impossible to adopt a decision on the working procedure of the Control Council which would undermine the existing procedure and violate the principle of complete agreement in the decisions of the Control Council. The Soviet delegation considers that the procedure which was established by the Allies during the war against Germany and which has been in operation ever since the war must be preserved.

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## BASIC DIRECTIVES FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE GERMAN PEACE TREATY\*

*Statement Made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers*

*April 9, 1947*

I consider, V. M. Molotov said, that the first thing necessary is to recall what has already been decided by our governments, the commitments we have undertaken in respect of Poland's western frontier. These commitments were undertaken when we were still at war, in February 1945, at the Crimea conference. In July 1945, after Germany was defeated, we defined these commitments more precisely at the Potsdam (Berlin) conference.

Here is the decision which was adopted at the Crimea conference by the heads of our governments—the late President Roosevelt, the then Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill, and the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin.

"The three heads of Government recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in

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\* This statement is given in the form in which it was published in the Moscow newspapers on April 10.

due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

After that a decision was adopted at the Potsdam conference, under which stand the signatures of President Truman of the United States, Prime Minister Attlee of Great Britain and the head of the Soviet Government Stalin. Here is the text of this decision:

"The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of Poland:

"In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea conference the three heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the conference and have fully presented their views. The three heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the Peace Conference.

"The three heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the Western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany."

Thus, V. M. Molotov stated, our governments twice discussed the question of the western frontiers of Poland already in 1945, and undertook definite commitments.

The head of the French Government did not participate in the Potsdam conference where the final decisions on Poland's western frontier were adopted. But we are well informed of France's views on this question. Suffice it to quote the document which M. Bidault read at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on July 10, 1946. This document contains a chapter entitled "The Frontiers of the New Germany," which reads as follows:—

"Nothing effective can be done until the frontiers of post-war Germany are established, and, indeed, we cannot expect the occupation authorities to conduct a long-term policy until they know what territories will finally remain German in the future.

"The Potsdam conference reached an agreement in respect of the eastern frontier of Germany which is in principle provisional but is essentially of a fundamental nature, and which has not been contested by the French Government."

France's view thus coincides with the view of the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, whose heads participated in the Potsdam conference.

The question under consideration at Potsdam was not simply one of compensating Poland in the west for the territory which she transferred to the Soviet Union in the east. That would be an over-simplification of the matter. To the Soviet Union were transferred only lands populated by Ukrainians and Byelorussians, who had naturally to be re-united with their brethren in the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia. And in the west, Poland returned to her ancient lands, which had once been the cradle of the Polish State. Poland's present territory coincides with the historical territory of the Poland of the Piasts.

The decision on the western frontiers of Poland was adopted after the question had been twice discussed at a conference of the three Allied Governments. Before adopting this decision at Potsdam a detailed statement of the views of the Polish Government was heard. The problem of the new western frontiers of Poland was thoroughly weighed by the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union before it was settled at the Potsdam conference.

The Potsdam conference did not limit itself to a decision on the new frontier between Poland and Germany. It also adopted a decision on the deportation of Germans from Poland, which followed as a logical conclusion from the decision on Poland's new western frontier.

In accordance with the decision adopted at Potsdam, the Control Council, on November 20, 1945, drew up a plan for the transfer of Germans from the territories which had passed to Poland. After that, the transfer of Germans from the territories which had passed to Poland proceeded rapidly. It proceeded both in accordance with the Control Council's plan, and apart from that plan. Consult the Control Council's report to the Council of Foreign Ministers, namely, Section 7, on "transfer of population," and you will see that up to January 1, 1947, 5,678,936 Germans had migrated from Poland, not counting those who removed to Germany illegally.

On the other hand there has been a process of settlement of Poles in the territories which have passed to Poland. The Polish Government recently announced that there are now some five million Poles and only 400,000 Germans in the western lands. Consequently, this territory is already settled by Poles, and the Germans there comprise less than one-tenth of the entire population.

All this testifies that the decision of the Potsdam conference in respect to Poland's new western frontier was con-

sidered by our governments as final. And it was in accordance with this that measures have been taken in this period to settle these territories with Poles. Surely no one can conceive the idea that the deportation of Germans from these territories and the settlement of Poles there was undertaken only as a temporary experiment. The governments which accepted these decisions and carried them into effect could not, of course, have considered that the decision of the Potsdam conference would in any way be liable to revision in the future. Such matters are not to be trifled with, to say nothing of the fact that it would be an intolerable cruelty, not only towards the Poles but towards the Germans themselves.

We must respect our decisions. I hope we all respect them in equal degree. We must respect the commitments we assume. I have no doubt whatever that we all respect the commitments assumed by our governments. Only then will they be respected by others.

The Potsdam conference decided to postpone giving formal shape to this decision until the Peace Conference. And it could not have done otherwise from the formal standpoint, but, in essence, the decision of the Potsdam conference in respect of the western frontier of Poland was final and not subject to revision.

Consequently, the Soviet Government sees no necessity to appoint any committee to study this question. It was sufficiently studied at the time, and after that the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted a decision, to which France adhered. When the time comes for demarcating the frontiers, then, as is usual in such cases, it will be done by appropriate representatives of the states concerned. But that is a matter for the future.

We need not doubt that the industrious Polish people will make good use of the lands that have passed to Poland

in the west. Both industrial and agricultural output in these territories will grow and supplement the common resources of Europe, since in the present conditions of peace there are favourable premises for the development of trade between Poland and other states. The Soviet Government expresses the conviction that the results of the Potsdam conference will be beneficial not only to Poland, but to the other European nations as well.

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Mr. Marshall has said that the English text of the Potsdam decision contradicts the statement I made, which was in precise conformity with the Potsdam decision. But this assertion is at variance with the fact that no divergency whatever exists between the English and Russian texts of the Potsdam decision. Everyone can convince himself of this.

- How this decision is to be understood is not difficult to determine. We might take if only the following facts.

Here is the first fact. On his return from Germany after the Potsdam conference, President Truman, on August 9, 1945, made a speech over the radio. Apropos of the Berlin conference decisions he said the following:

"The territory the Poles are to administer will enable Poland better to support its population. It will provide a short and more easily defensible frontier between Poland and Germany. Settled by Poles, it will provide a more homogeneous nation."

This statement of President Truman's was published in the American press. It correctly interpreted the decision of the Potsdam conference in the sense that the frontier between Poland and Germany had been established at Potsdam. It, moreover, pointed out the advantages of this new Polish frontier.

I have quoted a statement by the President of the U.S.A. He took part in the decisions of the Potsdam conference. I shall now refer to the statement of the French Government which I have just quoted. It shows how the Potsdam conference decision was understood by those who were not present at the conference. I have quoted M. Bidault's statement of July 10 last, in which he said that "the Potsdam conference reached an agreement in respect of the eastern frontier of Germany which is in principle provisional but is essentially of a fundamental nature."

Hence the French Government, like everyone acquainted with the Potsdam decision, did not doubt, and could not have doubted, that this decision on the western frontier of Poland was of a final character. Of course, no one disputes that the Peace Conference must give formal shape to this decision. But we, the representatives of the governments which took part in the Potsdam decision, must not forget that we are bound by that decision.

Mr. Marshall referred to one of the statements made by Generalissimo Stalin at the Potsdam conference. Such reference is useful if only as a reminder that these statements strictly conformed with the decision which was arrived at at Potsdam. The statements of J. V. Stalin to which references have been made here only make it clear that, immediately after the rout of the Hitlerites, a Polish administration began to be set up in the territories which subsequently passed to Poland in accordance with the Potsdam decision. In the existing situation it could not have been otherwise. The Potsdam decision set its seal on this situation. The historic significance of the Potsdam decision is that it established new and just frontiers for the Polish State.

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## STATEMENT MADE DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE BASIC DIRECTIVES FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE GERMAN PEACE TREATY

*At the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
April 11, 1947*

Our discussion has now turned to the Saar, the Rhineland and the Ruhr. The importance of these problems is clear to every one of us.

I shall deal first with the Saar. Yesterday M. Bidault again formulated the French position on this issue. The Soviet Government recognizes that this problem merits attention, and that it will have to be settled. The proposals made by M. Bidault yesterday require proper study.

The French delegation also urged the separation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr from Germany. It is suggested that Germany be deprived of possession of the Ruhr coal mines and blast furnaces and that the management of these industries be placed in the hands of representatives of several Allied states.

The Soviet Government cannot agree to a policy of separating the Ruhr and the Rhineland from Germany. This is a policy of dismembering Germany and liquidating her as an independent state, which cannot be justified by the interests of durable peace. The German nation must

not be deprived of its state. Such a policy would turn the German people into our irreconcilable enemies, and push them into the arms of the German revanchists and militarists. With such a policy, the democratization of Germany would be out of the question, because to adopt the line of dismembering and liquidating the German State would be to render service to the worst elements in Germany, who dream of revanche and of restoring Germany as an imperialist power with plans of new aggression. Such is the view of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Bevin dwelt in his speech on the evolution of the views of the Allied Governments on the German problem. He described this evolution as follows:

At Teheran, a proposal was advanced that in the interest of the security of Europe, Germany should be divided into five parts. The representative of Great Britain reserved his opinion on this question. He was even twitted for not having pronounced in favour of the division of Germany. At that time a commission composed of representatives of the three governments was set up to study the problem. This commission, I think, met only once, and nothing came of this meeting. At the end of the Potsdam session we were unexpectedly confronted with a proposal the very opposite of that advanced at Teheran. It was proposed that Germany should be treated as a single unit, that central departments be established there and a declaration made to the effect that the Ruhr was to be a component part of Germany.

After this, Mr. Bevin added that the British Government decided to support the proposal regarding the economic unity of Germany, and to treat Germany as a single economic unit in order to meet the wishes of their colleagues.

This historical reference does not altogether correspond

with the facts. I therefore consider it necessary to re-establish the real facts.

A proposal to divide Germany into five parts really was discussed at Teheran. It was made by the U.S.A. But no decision was arrived at. Such is the real position as far as Teheran is concerned.

Since Mr. Bevin said that at the end of the Potsdam session a proposal was unexpectedly advanced opposite to that which had been made at Teheran, I feel it necessary to re-establish the facts in this connection as well. Matters were not as Mr. Bevin said they were.

I have to remind you that about a year after Teheran, namely, in October 1944, Mr. Churchill, then British Prime Minister, and Mr. Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, came to Moscow. In negotiations with the Soviet Government Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, on behalf of the British Government, presented a plan of their own for the partition of Germany. This time the proposal was to divide Germany into three parts. And this time, too, the negotiations did not result in any decision. Indeed, no decision could have been taken, because neither the President nor the Secretary of State of the United States took part in these negotiations.

After that, in February 1945, came the Crimea conference. This conference decided to set up a commission in London, under Mr. Eden's chairmanship, to examine the German problem. But, as Mr. Bevin said, nothing came of the work of this commission.

It remains for me to remind you of the statement made by the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, on May 9, 1945, directly after Germany's surrender. In this statement J. V. Stalin said:

"Three years ago Hitler publicly stated that his task included the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the

severance from it of the Caucasus, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic and other regions. He definitely said: 'We shall destroy Russia so that she shall never be able to rise again.' This was three years ago. But Hitler's insane ideas were fated to remain unrealized—the course of the war scattered them to the winds like dust. Actually, the very opposite of what the Hitlerites dreamed of in their delirium occurred. Germany is utterly defeated. The German troops are surrendering. The Soviet Union is triumphant, although it has no intention of either dismembering or destroying Germany."

Thus, already several months before Potsdam, GeneraliSSimo Stalin declared that the Soviet Union had "no intention of either dismembering or destroying Germany." How then can Mr. Bevin now assert that at the end of the Potsdam session a proposal was *unexpectedly* advanced opposite to that which had been made in Teheran, and that it was proposed to treat Germany as a single unit?

From the facts I have cited it will be seen how the matter really stood.

I shall now pass to Mr. Marshall's statement. Mr. Marshall began his statement yesterday with the words:

"The United States delegation believes the concentration of basic economic resources in the Ruhr area raises two distinct problems: one is the question of security against the militant use of Ruhr resources by a revived Germany. The other is the question of how to assure that the concentration of coal, steel and other resources in the Ruhr area will be equitably employed in the interests of the countries of Europe including Germany."

The Soviet delegation agrees that the Ruhr problem should be examined, first, from the standpoint of international security and, secondly, from the standpoint of the employment of the economic resources of the Ruhr.

However, Mr. Marshall himself did not dwell on the question of security, postponing its examination until the discussion of the treaty on the demilitarization of Germany. He spoke yesterday only on the second question—the economic resources of the Ruhr—although it must be admitted that these two questions are very closely interconnected.

More, Mr. Marshall said that during the period of military occupation no special control should be established over the Ruhr, but he foresees that on the termination of the occupation special measures for controlling the Ruhr resources may be necessary. This proposal is directed against establishment of quadripartite control in the Ruhr during the occupation period. It is impossible to agree to this, if we really recognize the great importance of the Ruhr industrial area for the international security of which Mr. Marshall spoke, and which all of us regard as indisputable. On the other hand, the question of special measures of control over the resources of the Ruhr after the occupation calls for special discussion.

Already at Potsdam the Soviet Government presented its proposals concerning the Ruhr industrial area. The Soviet Government proposed that it be recognized that the Ruhr industrial area, regarded as part of Germany, should administratively come under the joint control of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. At the same time we proposed that a special Allied Council, composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, be set up for the Ruhr industrial area. And we already then proposed that a provisional Allied Council consisting of representatives of these states be appointed immediately.

As I have already said, at that time Mr. Bevin proposed that discussion of this project be postponed because

no representative of France was present at Potsdam. In accordance with Mr. Bevin's proposal, the question of creating a special Allied Council for the Ruhr industrial area was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers, but it has not been examined to this day.

Now we are again discussing the Ruhr problem. The governments we represent recognize that the Ruhr industrial area is of decisive importance for Germany's future. The main problem we have to go into now is whether the Ruhr is again to become an industrial base for the revival of Germany's war potential and for the restoration of an aggressive Germany; or whether the Ruhr is to become an industrial base of a peaceable, democratic Germany and give of its industrial resources to other peoples of Europe also, as may be found necessary by the Allied Powers.

The Soviet Government still insists on its proposal for quadripartite control over the Ruhr industrial area. The purpose of this proposal is to ensure Germany's development along peaceful democratic lines, and the utilization of the Ruhr economic resources primarily in the interest of the German nation, but at the same time in the interest of other nations of Europe.

The present situation in the Ruhr cannot be regarded as normal.

The Soviet Government considers it wrong that the Ruhr, which is so exceptionally important militarily and industrially, should remain under the sole control of the British occupation authorities, without the participation of the other Allied occupying Powers. Since the economic fusion of the British and American zones at the end of last year a situation has arisen in which the Ruhr is falling under the control of two occupying Powers—Great Britain and the United States—while France and the Soviet Union continue to be denied a share in control of the

Ruhr. We regard this situation, too, as absolutely abnormal.

In point of fact, Great Britain and the United States, having by separate action economically united their two zones, have severed Western Germany from the rest of the country. In this western part of Germany, which includes the Ruhr, a special regime is being established, and the Ruhr's resources are falling into the hands of two occupying Powers acting without the consent of the Control Council. In fact, Great Britain and the United States have already effected the dismemberment of Germany, although they have not yet completed the process. They have done this on their own responsibility, without the consent of the Soviet Union or France. And at the same time both the economic and the political unity of Germany have been disrupted.

In spite of this, yesterday's statement of the American delegation advances the idea that the Ruhr problem is a general European problem, and for this reason some sort of European economic commission may be useful. But is it not clear that these statements will remain mere words as long as the United States and Great Britain do not act in concert with France and the Soviet Union, who are members of the Control Council and are jointly with the United States and Great Britain carrying out the Allied occupation of Germany? Only when we in fact ensure concerted action of at least four Allied Powers—the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union—shall we be able to say that we are all acting, in regard to the Ruhr industrial area, in conformity with the general European interest and, consequently, in conformity with the interest of all the Allied European states. But such concerted action of the four Powers cannot be achieved if the present policy of separating Western Germany from the

rest of the country is pursued, and if two Allied Powers act in the Ruhr without regard for the Control Council of which they are members.

The policy now being pursued by Great Britain and the United States in respect to the Ruhr in no way conforms with the economic principles enunciated by the American delegation yesterday. The American delegation declared that it was necessary, first, equitably to distribute the main resources, such as coal and steel, produced in the Ruhr, and, secondly, to assure other countries access to Ruhr resources. Actually, neither the one nor the other is being done at present.

Equitable distribution of the coal and steel produced in the Ruhr cannot be assured if this matter is removed from the sphere of the Control Council. This distribution of Ruhr resources must be effected, not by Great Britain and the United States alone but by the Control Council, in which all four Allied Powers are represented.

As to other states having access to the Ruhr industrial area, everything at present is being done to suit the convenience solely of Great Britain and the United States. These two strong Powers are indeed assured wide opportunities in the Ruhr and throughout Western Germany generally. This, in the final analysis, is the purport of the separate fusion of the British and American occupation zones in Germany. But this situation accords neither with the interests of the other Allied countries, nor with the Allies' duty of developing a peaceable and democratic Germany. We should strive, not to ensure the domination of one or another great Power in the Ruhr industrial area, but to establish real international cooperation, which should reckon with the rights and interests of large Allied states as well as small, and give due attention to the German nation itself and its urgent needs. If one or two Allied

Powers continue to have their own way in the Ruhr, without regard for other Allied states, they maybe will ensure certain interests of their own, but it is a situation which does not conform with the basic agreement of our four Powers respecting joint control in Germany, apart from the fact that it fundamentally does not conform with the spirit of normal international cooperation.

Besides the Ruhr, the statement of the American delegation also dealt with the economic resources of Upper Silesia, which has been transferred to Poland. This is another impermissible attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of another Allied state. The Soviet delegation does not consider it possible to make this sort of proposal a subject of discussion.

I shall not at this juncture dwell on the territorial claims advanced by Czechoslovakia, Belgium and other neighbours of Germany. These are matters which require further study, and we shall return to them later.

STATEMENT MADE DURING THE DISCUSSION  
OF THE DRAFT OF A QUADRIPARTITE  
TREATY ON THE DISARMAMENT AND  
DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY

*At the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
April 14, 1947*

Today we are examining the American draft of a four-Power treaty on the demilitarization of Germany, which was presented by Mr. Byrnes last year. This treaty is to be signed by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government's views on this draft were already stated by me on July 9 of last year. I then also made proposals as to the way the draft ought to be amended. But at that time discussion of the treaty was not completed and the draft remained unamended.

In view of this, the Soviet Government today proposes concrete amendments to the American draft. I have a few explanatory remarks to make in this connection.

1. BASIC PURPOSE OF THE TREATY

The American draft proposes "to ensure that the total disarmament and demilitarization will be enforced as long as the peace and security of the world may require." The

draft says, in addition, "only this assurance will permit the nations of Europe and the world to return single-mindedly to the habits of peace." The purpose is thus to create guarantees that the nations of Europe and the world may for a long period to come devote themselves single-mindedly to peaceful pursuits. The desire to create such guarantees can only be welcomed.

Can it be said, however, that the draft presented would create such guarantees? No, this cannot be said, unless substantial amendments are made in the draft. Suffice it to say that the American draft treaty on the demilitarization of Germany treats the problem of guarantees of international security and general peace in an entirely different way from that in which it was treated by the Allied Powers in, say, the decisions of the Crimea conference or the Potsdam conference.

Let us recall what the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the Soviet Union said in the decisions of the Crimea conference, to which France adhered. They said:

"It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world."

The Potsdam conference declared in the Agreement on Germany:

"The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world."

On both occasions, in the Crimea as well as at Potsdam, where these decisions were adopted unanimously, the Allies recognized that the preservation of world peace required the extirpation both of German militarism and of German

fascism (Nazism). The American draft, however, follows a different line. It speaks only of the demilitarization of Germany, and even of that it speaks inconsistently, and it altogether ignores the task of extirpating Nazism, which means that it ignores such a decisive task as the reconstruction of the German State and of all German public life on a democratic and peaceful basis.

Only recently it was clear to all of us that the security of the nations of Europe and of the world cannot be assured merely by the disarmament of Germany, that, in addition, it was necessary to reconstruct Germany on democratic lines. This was the essence of the decisions of the Crimea and Potsdam conferences on Germany, which should not be forgotten.

The draft treaty presented to us proceeds from a different standpoint. It creates the illusion that in order to guarantee the world against new German aggression it is sufficient merely to disarm Germany, without taking care to ensure her denazification and democratization. If we create such illusions, it will certainly not provide a real guarantee of the peace and security of the nations of Europe. This is why the Soviet Government considers that we must continue to adhere to the line towards Germany which found expression in the decisions of the Crimea and Potsdam conferences. Otherwise, we shall not achieve the noble purpose we have set ourselves—that of enabling the nations of Europe and the world to devote themselves entirely to peaceful pursuits.

These remarks relate primarily to the preamble of the treaty. And in conformity with these remarks, the Soviet delegation proposes its amendments to this part of the treaty.

## 2. ADDENDA ON THE QUESTION OF DEMILITARIZATION

Article 1 of the American draft deals with measures for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. This article conforms in the main to the declaration on Germany's defeat signed by the governments of the four Powers on June 5, 1945, in Berlin. At that time, when the Allied troops had just entered Berlin and no authority existed in Germany, the Allies' main tasks were to effect the complete disarmament of the German troops and the establishment of order. At that time, naturally, not much attention was as yet paid to the elimination of Germany's war-industrial potential and to the institution of Allied control in this field. But in the treaty we are now discussing specific provisions on this point must be introduced.

In this connection, I request you to give your attention to two addenda which the Soviet Government proposes should be included in the treaty, in the form of Article 3. Here is the text of this article:

"In order to prevent the utilization of German industry for military purposes the High Contracting Parties agree that:

"a) the Ruhr industrial region, as the principal base of German armament production and the main industrial support of German militarism, shall be placed under the joint control of Great Britain, the United States of America, France and the Soviet Union in order that the resources of the Ruhr may be utilized for the development of Germany's peaceful industries and for meeting the needs of the European nations that have suffered from German aggression;

"b) there shall be completed at the earliest date the liquidation of German combines, cartels, syndicates, trusts

and the banking monopolies that control them, which were the instigators and organizers of German aggression; the enterprises that belonged to them shall be transferred to the ownership of the German State, and the re-establishment of monopolistic industrial and financial associations in Germany shall henceforth be prevented."

If we wish to have Germany demilitarized for a long time to come, we cannot but raise the question of instituting control by the four Allied Powers over the Ruhr industrial region, which everyone knows to be the principal base of German armament production and a powerful support of German militarism. It must never be forgotten that control of the Ruhr is most closely bound up with the security of Germany's neighbours and of other nations. If this proposal is acceptable in principle it will, of course, not be difficult to agree on the forms and duration of such Allied control of the Ruhr industrial region. At the same time we hold that the Ruhr resources, and primarily coal, must be used not only for the development of Germany's peace industries, but also for satisfying the needs<sup>1</sup> of France and other European nations which suffered German aggression.

There is no need to prove that the combines, cartels, syndicates, trusts and other German monopolies played an exceptionally important role as the instigators and organizers of German aggression. The Allies long ago recognized the necessity to decartelize German industry. The Soviet Government proposes that the enterprises of the German monopolies be taken away from them and transferred to the German State, the democratization of which is being effected under the control of the four Allied Powers. From the point of view of the security of nations, especially of Germany's neighbours, these measures will have a very positive effect.

Thus, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the demilitarization of Germany cannot be confined simply to disarming the German armed forces and preventing the formation of new military and para-military organizations in Germany, as well as prohibiting certain war plants, as the American draft proposes. Such steps must be taken in regard to German industry—its decartelization and the institution of quadripartite control in the Ruhr—as will inspire all nations with confidence that new aggression on the part of Germany will actually be prevented.

### 3. DEMOCRATIZATION

It will be clear from what I have said that in the matter of preventing German aggression, the Soviet Government attaches the utmost importance to measures for the democratization of Germany. We accordingly propose that Article 4 of the treaty be formulated as follows:

"With the aim of destroying the roots of German aggression and of transforming Germany into a peaceful and democratic state, the High Contracting Parties agree that:

"a) measures shall be taken to uproot the remnants of German Nazism and German aggressive nationalism in other forms and to obviate the possibility of the resurgence in any shape of the Nazi party, Nazi organizations and institutions; all Nazi and militarist influence in Germany shall be completely eliminated and Nazi and militarist activities and propaganda shall not be permitted in the future;

"b) the German people shall be accorded every assistance in the establishment of a democratic order on the basis of a democratic German Constitution approved by the German people; this should guarantee the German people

freedom of speech, press, religious beliefs, assembly, freedom of activity for democratic parties, trade unions and other anti-Nazi organizations on an all-German scale, with due safeguards for the rights and interests of the working population and with consideration for the need to maintain security;

"c) a land reform shall be effected throughout Germany in order to transfer to the peasants the lands of the large Junker landowners, who have always been the instigators of German aggression and have produced the most dangerous German militarists."

After all I have said there is no need to give a detailed motivation of these proposals. The Allies long ago recognized that prevention of German aggression demands the extirpation of the remnants of Nazism and the taking of such steps for the democratization of the German State and German public life as would enable the German people to live in freedom and really to enjoy the fruits of their labour.

In this connection it is necessary to stress the importance of land reform, which should take the land away from the big Junker landowners, who have always been the mainstay of German militarism, and transfer this land to the peasants, in order to increase the supply of agricultural produce and food in Germany itself. This would help greatly to improve the food situation in the German cities.

#### 4. CONDITIONS FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE OCCUPATION

The American draft treaty also deals with the question of the termination of the occupation of Germany. The Soviet Government agrees that the conditions for the termi-

nation of the occupation ought to be specified in the treaty we are discussing.

However, we cannot agree with what the American draft says on this subject, since it makes the discontinuation of the occupation conditional solely on the acceptance by Germany of the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the American draft relative to the prohibition of military formations and war plants in Germany, which is extremely vague and liable to give rise to misunderstandings. Our proposal on this point is that the occupation of Germany shall be discontinued when the Allied Powers recognize that the basic objectives of the occupation of Germany have been achieved.

We therefore propose that *Article 5* of the treaty be formulated as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that when they regard the fulfilment of the basic objectives of the occupation of Germany as ensured, namely:

"a) the completion of Germany's demilitarization, including the liquidation of her industrial war potential, in accordance with the orders of the Allied Powers;

"b) the re-establishment and consolidation in Germany of a democratic order;

"c) the fulfilment by Germany of the established reparations obligations, as well as of other obligations to the Allies,

the Allied Powers shall consider the question of discontinuing the occupation of Germany."

When the Allies are in a position to say that the basic objectives of the occupation as regards demilitarization and democratization, as well as the fulfilment of the established reparations and other obligations toward the Allied countries, have been assured, then the occupation should be terminated. The sooner Germany fulfils these conditions,

the sooner will the occupation be terminated. Unless Germany fulfils these conditions, we cannot agree to the termination of the occupation.

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These are our principal observations on the American draft treaty on the demilitarization of Germany.

It is clear now that the very title of the treaty ought to be somewhat modified. The Soviet Government considers that the treaty under examination be called a "Treaty on the Demilitarization of Germany and Prevention of German Aggression." In that form, it will better accord with the purpose set.

As is known, the Soviet Government last year proposed that this treaty be concluded for a term of forty years, instead of twenty-five. This proposal has already been accepted, and the treaty should be correspondingly amended.

In submitting its observations and amendments to the American draft, the Soviet Government is guided by the desire that the purpose set be really achieved—namely, to enable the nations of Europe and the world "to return single-mindedly to the habits of peace."

With the amendments I have proposed; the draft treaty will take the form of the document I shall now hand to the members of the Council.\*

The Soviet delegation requests that its proposals be examined.

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\* See Appendix No. 1, p. 601.

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## STATEMENT MADE DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT FOUR-POWER TREATY ON THE DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY

*At the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
April 15, 1947*

The American draft treaty on the demilitarization of Germany has set lofty aims—to create guarantees against new aggression on Germany's part so that the nations of Europe and all the world may devote themselves single-mindedly to peaceful pursuits. It is in accordance with these aims of the treaty that we should examine the means of assuring them envisaged in the draft.

Yesterday I presented the Soviet delegation's view on the American draft. Now I want to confirm that the Soviet Government agrees to the proposals in the draft treaty regarding Germany's demilitarization, but considers it necessary to make a number of additions and amendments.

Among them are our proposals regarding quadripartite control of the Ruhr industrial area, which is the principal base of German armament production and the main support of German militarism. They also include measures to liquidate the cartels and other German monopolies, which were the instigators of German aggression. They likewise include a proposal on land reform, involving confiscation of the land of the German Junker militarists, which is

necessary in order to weaken the main cadres of German militarism and revanchism. Unless we introduce such amendments and additions, the treaty cannot be a reliable guarantee of international security.

At the same time, the Soviet delegation considers that the French delegation's proposals should be carefully studied. No one, so far, has commented on these proposals. Yet the French delegation has made such important proposals as, for instance, economic and scientific disarmament, proposals regarding the Ruhr, and so on, which ought to be thoroughly examined. At all events, we cannot brush them aside if we recognize the need for serious discussion of a treaty aimed at preventing a repetition of German aggression.

It is particularly necessary to consider the question of Allied control of the Ruhr. In this connection, I would call to mind that in June of last year Mr. Bevin likewise declared in favour of international control of the Ruhr industry. At that time it was clear to Mr. Bevin that the problem of the Ruhr was closely bound up with international security.

We are told that the proposals made by the Soviet Government with regard to the treaty under consideration were already examined when we discussed the Control Council's report. But we then examined only those questions which directly relate to the present moment and the immediate future. But this does not mean that some of the problems under consideration, which are closely connected with the task of preventing a recurrence of German aggression, should be ignored by us now, when we are discussing a treaty for the security of the nations of Europe for a full forty years.

We are told, on the other hand, that some of the questions raised by the Soviet delegation should be dis-

cussed in connection with the peace treaty, or be referred to the jurisdiction of the United Nations. But if these arguments were correct, they would equally apply to the problem of the demilitarization of Germany. Yet the American draft proposes to make the question of Germany's demilitarization the subject of a special treaty of the four Allied Powers, and none of us objects to this. In that case, we can with every reason consider that the Soviet Government's proposals, aimed at securing a fuller guarantee of the demilitarization of Germany as well as at the implementation of the measures for her democratization, also relate to the problems that must be embraced by the quadripartite treaty.

The American draft treaty raises the question of the *termination of the occupation*. But it considers it only in conjunction with the problem of demilitarization. We hold that the question of terminating the occupation of Germany cannot be decided irrespective of the complete demilitarization, as well as of the democratization of Germany, or regardless of the need to ensure the fulfilment by Germany of her reparation and other obligations to the Allied states. At the Crimea and Potsdam conferences the Allies adopted definite decisions as to the purposes of the occupation of Germany. According to these decisions, the purpose of the occupation is to effectively demilitarize and democratize Germany, as well as to ensure that she discharge her reparation and other obligations to the Allies. It is our bounden duty to carry out these decisions which we adopted in common accord.

If what we want is to replace the decisions of the Crimea and Potsdam conferences by new and narrower decisions, and confine the whole thing to a half-way demilitarization of Germany, then we should say so. But if we do not want to substitute for the decisions of the Crimea and

Potsdam conferences new, half-way measures, then we must consistently carry these decisions into effect.

I do not think any of our governments wants to renounce the decisions of the Crimea and Potsdam conferences. That being the case, we must ensure their fulfilment. And the draft treaty of the four Allied Powers under consideration must correspond to these objectives.

We are all mindful of the services rendered by the United States of America and by the millions of American soldiers who, together with us, fought and sustained great sacrifices in behalf of the liberation of the nations of Europe from Hitlerism. This fight demanded tremendous efforts from the British people and the British soldiers. France and the French people experienced German occupation for several years, and will never forget those bitter times. The Soviet people and the Soviet Army bore the brunt of the struggle in this war to save European civilization from the Nazi enslavers. The countless sacrifices caused by the German invasion of our country, and the blood shed by millions of Soviet people, as well as the sacrifices sustained and the blood shed by other nations which suffered German aggression, demand that we approach everything related to the prevention of new German aggression and to the security of the nations of Europe and of the world with the utmost seriousness.

It was this object of preventing a recurrence of German aggression and safeguarding international security that dictated the decisions of the Allies at the Crimea and Potsdam conferences. We therefore consider it necessary to stand firmly by these decisions now, when we are considering a draft treaty of the four Powers designed to prevent German aggression in the future.

The Soviet delegation considers that the French delegation is right when it recommends that the American

draft and the proposals of the other delegations relating to this draft should be thoroughly studied within the coming months, pending the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. It would be well in this connection to set up a special committee to study the American draft and the other proposals made in connection with the draft.

I accordingly submit the following proposals:

1. The Council of Foreign Ministers recognizes the necessity of concluding a quadripartite treaty for the demilitarization of Germany and for the prevention of German aggression.

2. A Special Committee shall be instructed to examine the draft treaty proposed by the American delegation for the demilitarization of Germany, the amendments and addenda of the Soviet delegation and the proposals of the French delegation, as well as other possible proposals, and to submit its recommendations to the Council of Foreign Ministers at its next session.

3. In studying the draft treaty the Special Committee shall proceed from the necessity of ensuring the fulfilment by Germany of the obligations imposed upon her by the Crimea and Potsdam decisions relative to the demilitarization of Germany and the prevention of German aggression.

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## REPLY TO THE STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION ON THE QUESTION OF THE DRAFT TREATY ON THE DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY

*Made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
April 24, 1947*

Mr. Marshall said in his statement of April 23 that the United States Government interpreted the attitude of the Soviet Government towards the American draft treaty on the demilitarization of Germany as a rejection of the treaty. This statement puts the position of the Soviet Government incorrectly and contradicts the facts.

It is known that, far from rejecting the proposal to conclude a quadripartite treaty for the demilitarization of Germany, the Soviet delegation, already in July of last year, proposed that such a treaty be concluded, not for twenty-five years, as proposed by the United States, but for forty years, and this was accepted.

At the same time the Soviet Government believed and still believes it necessary to introduce a number of additions into the American draft treaty with the aim of improving it. The main purpose of these additions is to eliminate the discrepancy between the American draft and the decisions of the Potsdam conference concerning the prevention of a repetition of German aggression.

In these decisions prevention of a recurrence of German aggression is considered as being dependent on the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. The American draft, however, confines the problem of preventing German aggression merely to the demilitarization of Germany, and totally ignores so important a task as democratizing Germany.

The Soviet additions are primarily designed to rectify this basic defect of the American draft. Failure to rectify this defect may be taken to signify that the Allies no longer regard democratization as one of the fundamental conditions for preventing a recurrence of German aggression, which is in obvious contradiction to the Potsdam conference decision.

The additions proposed by the Soviet delegation are designed, secondly, to have the treaty reaffirm that Germany is responsible for the fulfilment of her obligations towards the Allies, and, above all, of her reparation obligations, which fully conforms with the decisions of the Crimea and Potsdam conferences, and rejection of which would amount to a violation of the decisions of these conferences.

As to such additions proposed by the Soviet delegation as the establishment of quadripartite control over the Ruhr, decartelization of German industry, and abolition of Junker landownership—these proposals are closely bound up with the fundamental problem of demilitarizing and democratizing Germany. Existing differences on these issues can be overcome, and it is to this purpose that the efforts of the Soviet delegation are directed. The refusal of the American delegation, on the other hand, to consider such questions is not calculated to promote a reconciliation of the views of the Allies, and can only be indicative of an attempt to impose its will upon the governments of other countries, which will be productive of no good.

The purpose of the Soviet proposals is to repair these omissions of the American draft.

We know that a number of the Soviet amendments have been received favourably, by the French delegation, for instance. Moreover, the French delegation has also deemed it necessary to propose amendments to the American draft.

All this indicates that the American draft cannot be accepted without substantial additions. And to demand that the American draft be accepted without additions or amendments is something absolutely unwarranted, to which no self-respecting government will agree.

To say after all this that the Soviet Government has rejected a treaty for the prevention of German aggression is to make an assertion which does not correspond to reality, and which can only hinder a businesslike examination of the submitted draft and of additions and amendments thereto. The fact is not that the Soviet delegation has rejected the treaty, but that the American delegation has refused to discuss proposals of the Soviet Government designed to improve that treaty.

The Soviet delegation reaffirms its declaration of last year regarding the necessity of concluding a quadripartite treaty on the demilitarization of Germany and the prevention of German aggression, and proposes that the Council of Foreign Ministers continue the examination of the American draft treaty and the Soviet delegation's addenda.

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## REPLY OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE U.S.A. DELEGATION ON THE TREATY WITH AUSTRIA

*Made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
April 24, 1947*

Throughout the discussion of the Austrian treaty the Soviet delegation has exerted its efforts to achieve agreement. This explains why the Soviet delegation withdrew a number of fully warranted proposals which it had put forward. It also stated that it was prepared to seek agreement upon the other points of the treaty which still remained unsettled.

At the same time the Soviet delegation has repeatedly stated that Article 35, dealing with German assets in Austria, and Article 42, which is connected with it, are of particular importance to the Soviet Union.

Article 35 and the issues connected with it are important because it has a bearing on Germany's reparation obligations. For the Soviet Union, a great part of whose territory suffered German occupation, attended by tremendous devastation and the plundering of millions of families, the receipt of reparations from Germany is extremely important and reflects the lawful demand of the entire Soviet people.

In accordance with the decision of the Potsdam conference, German assets in Eastern Austria are to be transferred to the Soviet Union, while German assets in the remaining part of Austria are to be transferred to the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the other Allied states. The point is that this decision should not remain merely on paper, nor be nullified by interpretations of what constitutes German assets.

The proposals hitherto advanced by the delegation of the U.S.A. regarding German assets would, in fact, deprive the Soviet Union of a large part of the reparations due to it from Germany under the Potsdam decision pertaining to Eastern Austria. This would be all the more incorrect since the question of German assets in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland was settled in accordance with this same Potsdam agreement and evoked no objections on the part of the United States.

Already at the Potsdam conference the Soviet Government renounced its claim to reparations from Austria. Contrary to the statement of the American delegation, the Soviet Government did not claim and does not now claim reparations from Austria or any Austrian property. As to Austria's sovereignty and independence, the Soviet Army, as the Austrian Government itself admits, was the first to assist the restoration of a sovereign, independent and democratic Austria. No one will succeed in distorting these facts.

But the Soviet Government insists that all German property in Austria be used for the meeting of Germany's reparation obligations. Austrian or non-Austrian property owners in Austria who transacted with the Germans after the Anschluss and reaped big advantage from this by transferring their property to Germans, cannot be allowed to lay claim to this property now and have the protection

of the United States of America in their claims. This would be rendering direct support to servitors of the Germans and violating the rights of the Soviet Union and other Allies, rights recognized by the Potsdam conference.

If the proposals of the U.S.A. are designed to safeguard the interests of American and British oil companies in Austria whose property had been transferred to Germans without any objection on the part of the United States and Great Britain, then these claims should be addressed to Germany and should not be met at the expense of the Soviet Union and other Allies.

The proposal that the United Nations General Assembly be requested to give its recommendations on the question of German assets in Austria is baseless, nor can Article 14 of the Charter be cited in support of it. It would be wrong to approach the United Nations on this question, since such questions do not come within the competence of the United Nations. The procedure of preparing the treaty with Austria should not differ from the procedure we followed in preparing the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

For its part, the Soviet Government proposes the establishment of a commission composed of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, with instructions to examine all outstanding questions relating to the Austrian treaty, paying special attention to a detailed consideration of Article 35 and the appropriate part of Article 42, with a view to harmonizing the standpoints of the Allied Governments represented on the commission, and to submit its report to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

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## ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS PUT BY AMERICAN JOURNALIST JOHANNES STEEL\*

1. *Question:* Do you believe that the American proposals for the political organization of Germany will lead to the dismemberment of that country?

*Answer:* Such a danger does exist.

2. *Question:* What, in your view, would be the consequences of such a development?

*Answer:* The consequences of such a development would be undesirable, as they might give an opportunity to the German militarists and revanchists to take the cause of the unification of Germany into their own hands, as was the case, for instance, under Bismarck.

3. *Question:* Do you believe that a compromise is possible between the Russian proposal for German unity and the American proposal for "federalization"?

*Answer:* I do not preclude such a possibility, if it would be possible to reach agreement about letting the German people themselves decide the question of federalization by a plebiscite.

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\* Published in the Moscow newspapers, April 5, 1947.

4. *Question:* Will ten billion dollars of reparations from Germany cover any substantial part of the damage suffered at the hands of the German invader?

*Answer:* Of course, this would be too little for the Soviet Union. But still it could give some satisfaction to the Soviet people.

5. *Question:* Is reparations primarily an economic or a moral question?

*Answer:* Reparations are important in both respects.

6. *Question:* Who has received more reparations so far, Great Britain, the United States or the Soviet Union?

*Answer:* There is no doubt that the U.S.S.R. has received much less than the Allies.

7. *Question:* How can German peacetime production best be raised so that reparations may be paid out of current production?

*Answer:* By means of a certain rise in the level of Germany's peace industry, so that part of the production (metal, coal, etc.) be used to pay reparations to the victim countries.

8. *Question:* How can democracy best be restored in Greece?

*Answer:* The best way is by renouncing foreign interference in the internal affairs of Greece.

9. *Question:* Do you believe that President Truman's proposed American policy on Greece will restore democracy to Greece?

*Answer:* I doubt this very much, just as many others do.

10. *Question:* Do you believe that the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers has served a useful purpose and will bring some concrete results?

*Answer:* It is desirable that the Moscow conference should be of the maximum benefit to our common cause, but this does not depend on the Soviet delegation alone. In any case, the Soviet delegation will do everything in its power in order that the conference should yield good results.

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**STATEMENTS AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE  
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE U.S.S.R.,  
FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN**

*June-July 1947*



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## TASKS OF THE CONFERENCE

*Statement Made at the Conference  
of Three Foreign Ministers  
June 28, 1947*

Yesterday M. Bidault stated the position of the French Government in respect to the tasks of this conference. Mr. Bevin expressed his general agreement with this position. I consider it necessary, therefore, to set forth the view of the Soviet Government.

As is known, the Paris conference was called in connection with the speech delivered by the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall, at Harvard University on June 5.

In this speech Mr. Marshall expressed apprehensions with regard to the economic conditions prevailing in the European countries following the second world war. He pointed to the grave consequences of the war, which caused immense losses in manpower and the destruction of towns, factories, mines and railways, and he pointed also to the postwar difficulties in the economic life of the European countries. He observed that the quantity of commodities now being produced is inadequate, that there are shortages of food, raw materials and fuel, and that machinery has become badly worn out, especially in the years of war. Noting that the requirements of certain European countries in food and other necessities, now being received

chiefly from America, far exceed their present ability to pay, he said that "the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world."

Going on to the possibility of America's rendering economic aid to the European countries, Mr. Marshall said that the countries of Europe should themselves ascertain their needs and arrive at some kind of agreement among themselves, assuming the initiative in this matter. He said in this connection that "the role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so."

Quite obviously, the reconstruction and further development of the national economies of the European countries could be facilitated if the U.S.A., whose production capacity—far from declining—considerably increased during the war, gave the economic assistance which those countries need. At the same time, it is known that the U.S.A. is likewise interested in using its credit possibilities for expanding its foreign markets, especially in view of the approaching crisis.

When, in connection with Mr. Marshall's speech, the French and British Governments suggested a conference of the three Ministers, the Soviet Government received this proposal favourably, despite the fact that the system of planning on which the socialist national economy in the U.S.S.R. is based precludes the possibility of the diverse crises and economic convulsions mentioned by the American Secretary of State in his speech.

Naturally, the present conference will achieve its object only if it correctly defines its tasks and methods of work.

A definite plan of work prepared by the French Government and endorsed by the British Government has

been presented at the conference. The Soviet delegation has expressed serious doubts with regard to this plan.

It is one thing to ascertain the economic needs of the European countries for American aid in the form of credits and goods by means of estimates drawn up by the European countries themselves. This is acceptable and may prove useful to the European countries. It will be an entirely different matter if the conference engages in drawing up a comprehensive economic program for the European countries, as the French draft suggests, and only in passing ascertains their needs of American economic aid. If the conference strays on to this path, it will digress far from the tasks it has been set, and will fail to yield positive results.

It has been said here that France has an economic plan of her own, and the French Government hopes for favourable results from this plan. Great Britain also has an economic program. It is widely known that in the Soviet Union the rehabilitation and development of the national economy is based on a state socialist plan. The Soviet people have already carried out more than one five-year plan. At present they are successfully carrying out their postwar Stalin Five-Year Plan. This ensures a steady improvement of their material and cultural well-being.

It is also known that certain other European countries are now likewise engaged in rehabilitating their national economies on the basis of two-year and three-year plans. And no mean successes have already been achieved in the carrying out of these plans.

Hitherto it has been taken for granted that each nation should decide for itself how best to secure the rehabilitation and development of its economy. No European government intends to interfere and say whether the Monnet plan is good or bad for France. This is the affair of

the French people themselves. But the same applies to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and every other European country.

That is how the matter is understood in the Soviet Union, which more than once has repelled attempts at foreign interference in its affairs. It was considered perfectly obvious that internal economic matters are the sovereign affair of the peoples themselves, and that other countries must not interfere in these internal affairs. It is only on this basis that the normal development of relations among countries is possible. Attempts at outside interference in the economic life of various countries have not yielded favourable results, nor can they yield them.

If this is true, then an attempt to compel the conference to engage in drawing up a comprehensive economic program for the European countries, which will inevitably entail interference on the part of some states in the affairs of other states, cannot be accepted as a basis for cooperation among the European countries. There is such a tendency just now on the part of some Powers, but it is doomed to failure and will only damage their international prestige.

The conference is faced with the task of ascertaining the needs of the European countries for American economic aid, by receiving appropriate applications from the countries concerned and subjecting them to a joint examination. Moreover one must suppose that the task of the conference is to establish cooperation among the European countries in formulating their applications for the American economic aid they need, to ascertain the possibility of obtaining such economic aid from the United States and to assist the European countries in obtaining this aid. This is no easy task and will require considerable effort. But if the conference copes with it successfully, an important step will have been made in developing cooperation among

the countries of Europe and at the same time in cooperation between the countries of Europe and the United States of America.

Which European countries should cooperate in this undertaking? In this respect also the standpoints of individual countries are at variance, since it would be wrong if the Allies did not make the differentiation they should between Allied, ex-enemy, and neutral states.

The Soviet Government maintains that the ascertaining of the needs (applications) of the European countries for American economic aid cannot be the concern of only the three countries taking part in the present conference. Other European countries, too, should be invited to take part in working on the problems involved. Furthermore, account should first be taken of the needs of those European countries which were subjected to German occupation and contributed to the common cause of the Allies in defeating the enemy. These countries should be the first to be invited to take part in the economic cooperation in Europe which is now being planned. Their needs should be given special attention when the question of American economic aid comes under consideration. As to the ex-enemy countries, they must be invited for appropriate consultations.

The question of Germany is quite a special one. As we know, the Allied countries have not yet achieved agreement on such fundamental problems as the creation of a central German government, the payment of reparations by Germany, Germany's industrial level and so on. These problems are under consideration by the Council of Foreign Ministers, of which besides these three countries, the U.S.A. also is a member. For this reason the German question is one for consideration by the Council of Foreign Ministers and not by the present conference.

As to the methods of examining the problems at this conference, the Soviet delegation believes it desirable to set up appropriate committees composed of representatives of the three countries, and also to invite representatives of the other European states, first of all the afore-mentioned Allied countries, to take part in these committees. It is also necessary to consider the relations which should be established with the European Economic Commission.

In accordance with these considerations the Soviet delegation submits the following proposals concerning the agenda of the present conference:—

1. Establishment of the requirements of European countries for American economic aid.
2. Methods for the consideration of applications of European countries in respect of American economic aid.
  - (a) Creation of *ad hoc* committees.
  - (b) Relations with the European Economic Commission.
3. Ascertainment of the possibilities, nature and conditions of American economic aid to Europe.

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## FOR DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

*Statement Made  
at the Paris Conference  
of the Three Foreign Ministers*

*July 2, 1947*

The Soviet delegation has closely studied the French delegation's proposal of July 1. Like the earlier British proposal, the French project suggests that an economic program be drawn up for the whole of Europe, although, as we know, most of the European countries as yet have no national economic programs of their own. For the purpose of working out such a comprehensive European program, it is proposed that a special organization be set up, to be charged with the task of ascertaining the resources and needs of the European states, and even of determining the development of the key industries in those countries—and only after that ascertaining the possibility of obtaining economic aid from America.

Thus the question of American economic aid, regarding which, moreover, nothing definite is as yet known, has served as a pretext for the British and French Governments to insist on the creation now of a new organization standing above the European countries and interfering in their domestic affairs, and even determining what direction the

development of the key industries of those countries should take. Moreover, Britain and France, together with the countries closely associated with them, claim a dominating position in this organization, or in what is called in the British project, a "Steering Committee" for Europe.

Verbal reservations are now being made to the effect that this organization will allegedly not interfere in the internal affairs of the states in question or violate their sovereignty. But it is perfectly obvious from the tasks set before this organization, or before the "Steering Committee," that the European countries will become subsidiary states and will forfeit their former economic independence and national sovereignty in favour of certain strong Powers. At any rate, it is now proposed to make the possibility of any country's obtaining American credits dependent on its obedience to the above-mentioned organization and its "Steering Committee."

Where may this lead?

Today pressure may be exerted on Poland to make her produce more coal, even at the cost of restricting other Polish industries, just because certain European countries may be interested in it; tomorrow it will be said that Czechoslovakia must be asked to increase her agricultural output and curtail her machine-building industry, and obtain her machinery from other European countries which are desirous of selling their commodities at dearer prices; or, as the newspapers recently wrote, Norway will be forced to refrain from developing her steel industry, because this would better suit certain foreign steel corporations, and so on. What will then remain of the economic independence and sovereignty of such European countries? How will small countries, and weaker states generally, be able to protect their national economy and state independence under such circumstances?

The Soviet Government certainly cannot take this course. It still adheres to the proposals it submitted to this conference on June 30.\*

Nor does the Soviet Government share the illusions regarding foreign support revealed in the latest French project.

When the object is that Europe should primarily help itself and develop its economic potentialities, and when the object is commerce among countries, this is in accord with the interests of the European countries. When, however, it is said, as the French proposal does, that the decisive part in the rehabilitation of the economic life of the European countries should be played by the United States of America, and not by the European countries themselves, such a course is contrary to the interests of the European countries, because this may lead to renunciation of economic independence, which is incompatible with the preservation of national sovereignty. The Soviet delegation believes that internal measures and the national efforts of each country should be the decisive thing for the European countries, rather than expectation of foreign aid, which should be a secondary thing. Even under the most difficult conditions the Soviet Union always counted primarily on its own resources and, as is known, it is advancing steadily along the road of economic progress.

There are two forms of international cooperation.

One form of cooperation is based upon the development of political and economic relations among equal states, without their national sovereignty being prejudiced by foreign interference. This is the democratic principle of international cooperation, which draws nations closer

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\* See Appendix No. 2. p. 609.

together and facilitates mutual assistance. There is another form of international cooperation, which is based on the domination of one or several strong Powers over other countries, which are reduced to something in the nature of subordinate states, bereft of independence. It is perfectly obvious that the first form of cooperation among states, in which they act as equal parties, differs fundamentally from the second form of international cooperation, in which this principle is not observed.

Standing, as it does, for the promotion of international cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect for the interests of the contracting countries, the Soviet Government cannot help anyone arrange his affairs at the expense of others, at the expense of weaker or small countries, inasmuch as this has nothing in common with normal cooperation among states. Considering that the Anglo-French plan for setting up a special organization to coordinate the economy of the European countries will lead to interference in the internal affairs of European states—especially those which stand in greatest need of outside assistance—and that this can only complicate the relations of the European states and hamper cooperation among them, the Soviet Government rejects this plan as wholly unsatisfactory and incapable of producing good results. On the other hand, the Soviet Union favours the utmost development of economic cooperation among European and other countries on a sound basis of equality and mutual respect for national interests. The Soviet Union has itself invariably encouraged and will continue to encourage this by expanding trade with other countries.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Franco-British proposals raise the question of Germany and her resources. It is suggested that the above-mentioned organ-

ization, or the "Steering Committee," also examine the question of utilizing German resources, although everyone knows that the just reparations claims of Allied countries which suffered from German aggression still go unsatisfied. Consequently, not only is no special concern shown for the countries which made the greatest sacrifice in the war and contributed largely to the Allied victory, but it is proposed at their expense to use Germany's resources for other purposes, only not for reparations.

On the other hand, nothing is being done to expedite the formation of a central German government, which would be better able than anyone else to take care of the needs of the German people. On the contrary, in the Western zones of Germany the policy of federalizing Germany is being persisted in, as well as the policy of increasingly severing the Western German territory from the rest of Germany, which is incompatible with the effective restoration of Germany as a united democratic state and a member of the family of peace-loving states of Europe.

Where would it lead—this Franco-British proposal to create a special organization, or "Steering Committee," for the drawing up of a comprehensive European economic program?

It would lead to no good.

It would lead to Great Britain, France and the group of countries which follow them separating themselves from the other countries of Europe, which would split Europe into two groups of states and create fresh difficulties in the relations between them. In that case American credits would serve not the promotion of the economic recovery of Europe, but the utilization of some European countries against other European countries in a manner which cer-

tain strong Powers striving for domination considered advantageous to themselves.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to warn the Governments of Britain and France against the consequences of such actions, which aim not at uniting the efforts of the European countries for their postwar economic recovery, but at entirely different purposes that have nothing in common with the true interests of the peoples of Europe.

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## THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

*Speech at a Celebration  
Meeting of the Moscow Soviet  
November 6, 1947*

Comrades,

Today the peoples of the Soviet Union are celebrating a date of notable significance to the working people of the whole world, the 30th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

We, Soviet people, are not alone these days in the joy we experience on the occasion of the grand victories of Socialism in our country. Not only in the countries friendly to us are there millions of devoted friends of the U.S.S.R. Wherever capitalism rules, oppressing men of labour or enslaving the toilers of the colonies and dependencies, people with awakened minds see in the achievements of the Soviet Union the approach of their own emancipation from oppression and enslavement. There is no country in the world where among the working class, among the working peasants and in broad democratic circles the Soviet Union does not already have numerous friends imbued with warm sympathy and faith in our cause.

That is why today, on the 30th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, our October banner, the victorious banner of Lenin and Stalin, waves so high aloft. (*Stormy applause.*)

## SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R.

Thirty years have passed since the events of October 1917. Our enemies in the bourgeois camp prophesied in those days, and later too, that the Soviet regime could not maintain itself in Russia, that it was doomed to inevitable and speedy collapse. The Bolsheviks were not daunted by these prophecies and boldly entered the fight for the seizure of power by the working class, and, having smashed the oppressive capitalist system, have now for thirty years been building with triumphant success a Socialist State, a new society on communist principles.

The path we have traversed may be divided into three periods.

The first period was from the victory of the power of the Soviets to the outbreak of the second world war. The second period was the period of the Great Patriotic War. The third period, which has only just begun, is the period of postwar development.

The first period embraced twenty-three and a half years. Of them more than three years were spent in armed struggle against the forces of intervention and the White-guard bands who strove to smash the power of the Soviets and to destroy the young Soviet State. These plans of the capitalists and landlords ended in a complete fiasco, but they reduced our country to a state of extreme ruin and exhaustion. Many years were required before the prewar level of production in industry and agriculture was restored.

After this, the progress and development of the country's national economy proceeded on the basis of the celebrated Stalin Five-Year Plans.

Towards the end of 1928 we were able to proceed to the realization of the First Five-Year Plan, which, as you know, was fulfilled ahead of time. After this, we accomplished the Second Five-Year Plan and proceeded to carry out the Third Five-Year Plan, which we were unable to consummate owing to the German attack.

Thus we were able to work on the three Stalin Five-Year Plans only short of thirteen years. Yet in this brief period our country was metamorphized.

Industrially backward Russia was transformed into an advanced industrial state, and already by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan our country held first place in Europe for volume of industrial output. With every year, right down to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, our industry continued to make rapid strides, to create new branches of production and progressively to increase the volume of industrial output. In 1940 large-scale industry in our country produced a little under twelve times as much as in 1913.

Our agriculture underwent an even greater transformation. The small and little-productive peasant farms, mostly working the land only with the help of primitive ploughs, sickles and scythes, by combining into collective farms, converted our agriculture into large-scale progressive farming which, with the help of the state machine and tractor stations, received, along with the state farms, abundant technical equipment in the shape of tractors, harvester combines, motor trucks and diverse new kinds of agricultural machinery. In spite of the still considerable lag in livestock breeding, gross output of agriculture in 1940 was nearly twice as great as in 1913.

Reviewing the prewar period of development of Soviet economy, Comrade Stalin said last year:

"This unprecedented growth of production cannot be

regarded as the simple and ordinary development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherland became transformed from a backward country into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country."

This means that our Socialist State, smashing the traditions of bourgeois states and overcoming the resistance of the class enemy and of wavering elements, effected a genuine revolution both in industry and in agriculture. Thanks to this the national economy of the U.S.S.R. was in a brief period reconstructed on the basis of up-to-date technique, which no other country could or can boast of.

We achieved these results primarily by pursuing the Bolshevik policy of industrializing the country, laying prime stress on the development of heavy industry. This was all the more necessary, since, living as they were in a hostile capitalist encirclement, our people had always to bear in mind that they must be ready for resistance in the event of attack.

We effected a radical reconstruction in agriculture by pursuing the policy of collectivization. A whole decade was spent preparing the way for this reconstruction, which involved the necessity of overcoming the fierce resistance of the kulaks. But in the very first years of the transition to the five-year plans our Party was able to persuade the peasants to take a new path—that of the complete reorganization of peasant farming on the basis of collective farming. And this created the conditions for a hitherto unparalleled expansion of the productive forces of agriculture, equipped with powerful, modern machines and armed with all the achievements of agricultural science.

As a result of the first period of the building of Socialism, the national economy of our country was reconstructed on a socialist basis, the exploiting classes were completely

ly eliminated and the moral and political unity of the Soviet people was created.

Mention must be made of one of the cardinal achievements of this first period in the building of Socialism.

We were able to secure a *steady and uninterrupted* expansion from year to year of our national economy, and above all of its leading branch—socialist industry. Of course, natural calamities, such as droughts, say, and the concomitant crop failures, occurred in this period too, but even this did not halt the steady forward movement. Under all conditions Soviet industry continuously progressed, increasing its output from year to year. This continuous industrial progress of the Soviet Union, in contradistinction to the capitalist countries, became one of the most important indications of the progressive principles underlying the planned organization of the entire national economy.

We also know that the continuous expansion of industry led long ago to the complete elimination of unemployment in our country. This made possible a steady rise in the standard of living of the working class, a progressive improvement in the material and cultural conditions of the industrial and office workers of the Soviet country. If it had not been for the war, our cities and industrial regions would today be demonstrating vast and unprecedented achievements in the improvement of the material and cultural conditions of the working people.

The reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of collective farming led to the disappearance of the village poor, who under capitalism are always doomed to live in hopeless misery. Broad opportunities for a prosperous and cultured life were opened up to every collective farmer. From year to year our agriculture grew stronger, nourished by the life-giving sap of collective labour. If it had not been for

the war, which devastated many of our finest agricultural districts, we should today be far better supplied with everything needful than any country in Europe, and not in Europe alone.

The wise peace policy of Lenin and Stalin ensured the Soviet people, after the end of the civil war and intervention, an opportunity to engage in peaceful socialist construction for twenty years.

The attack of fascist Germany interrupted the peaceful period of our constructive labours.

There began the four-year period of the Great Patriotic War, which was a supreme test for the Soviet Union, because, as Comrade Stalin so rightly said, it was "the fiercest and most arduous war ever fought in the history of our Motherland." We all remember what incredible hardships our people lived through in these years.

Suffice it to say that the Hitler occupation embraced an area of Soviet territory which before the war had a population of 88,000,000. This area accounted for 33 per cent of the country's industrial output. The Hitlerites occupied a territory the crop area of which constituted 47 per cent of the total crop area of the Soviet Union, and where nearly half of our total livestock was concentrated. During the war, 1,300 industrial plants, whose operation was needed for the satisfaction of the urgent requirements of the front and rear, were evacuated from the Western and Southern regions and reassembled in the East.

The second period in the history of the Soviet Union, which comprises the years of the Great Patriotic War, demonstrated even more convincingly the enhanced might and progressive force of our multinational Socialist State.

Before the Soviet Union entered the war, Hitler played the master in Europe as in his own house. Some countries, fascist Italy, for instance, became his obedient satellites.

other European countries, France, for example, thanks to the pro-fascist servility of her ruling circles, lay prostrate under his heel. Over Britain, on whose territory no foreign enemy had set foot for many centuries, hovered the grave threat of German invasion.

The situation radically changed only when the Soviet Union reconstructed itself on a war footing, and when the Soviet Army passed to the offensive along the whole front against Hitler's hordes.

Another fact of great importance was the formation of the anti-fascist coalition of the Allied Powers, in which the U.S.S.R. held a leading position.

All this ensured the defeat of fascism in Europe.

Already on the 27th anniversary of the October Revolution, Comrade Stalin paid tribute to the services of the Soviet people in words known to the whole world, when he said:

"Now that our Patriotic War is drawing to a triumphant close, the historic role played by the Soviet people stands out in all its grandeur. Everybody admits now that by their self-sacrificing struggle the Soviet people saved the civilization of Europe from the fascist pogrommongers. This is the great historic service the Soviet people have rendered mankind."

In the eyes of the peoples of the whole world recognition of the fact that the *Soviet people saved the civilization of Europe* from the fascist vandals is also recognition of the exceptional services of the leader of Communism and the great captain of the Soviet Union, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

Our multinational Soviet State proved strong and unbreakable in face of all the trials of the war. The Great Patriotic War cemented the Soviet people more firmly than ever in the fight for the achievements of the October

Revolution, in the fight for the happy future of our country.

With the end of the war, the Soviet Union entered a new period in its development. Since the beginning of last year we have been working in accordance with the program of the new, postwar five-year plan. Comrade Stalin defined our new objectives as follows:

"The main tasks of the new five-year plan are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the prewar level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent."

The targets set by the Party and the Government in rehabilitating and developing the national economy inspired our people to fresh heroic efforts and feats of labour. The whole country is now fired by the ambition not only to fulfil, but to overfulfil the new five-year plan.

Agriculture at the beginning of the new five-year plan was handicapped by the drought which last year afflicted important agricultural areas. However, the ability of our country rapidly to overcome the economic difficulties it encounters is well known. This was again demonstrated by the fact that, thanks to the measures taken by the Party and the Government, the gross grain crop this year is 58 per cent above that of last year.

Last year, which was the first year of the postwar five-year plan, we already secured a big increase in industrial output. However, last year's program was fulfilled by industry only by 96 per cent, due to the fact that its reconversion to peace had not yet been completed.

On the other hand, this year Soviet industry is overfulfilling its program. In the first three-quarters of the current year, industry fulfilled its nine months' program by 103 per cent. The whole country is expressing its joy at the fact that our glorious Leningrad is now again

marching in the front ranks, and that already in October Leningrad's industry overfulfilled its program for the whole second year of the five-year plan. (*Applause.*) All this warrants the statement that the unfulfilled part of the program of the first year of the five-year plan will be made good in the second year, and, hence, that the program for the first two years of the five-year plan, taken together, will be fulfilled by the end of the current year.

In all branches of industry and agriculture, as well as in transport, we are marching confidently forward, although much still remains to be done to heal the wounds and repair the damage inflicted by the war. We are already mining more coal than before the war, but we have not yet brought the rehabilitation of the iron and steel industry and the output of oil up to the prewar mark. All branches of industry producing consumer goods and foodstuffs are being restored and developed. We have no branch of industry which is not striding forward and which has not a plan for increase of output for several years ahead. The constant concern of the Soviet Government to introduce new machinery in all branches of industry, transport and agriculture is a reliable guarantee of the further all-round progress of our socialist economy.

The volume of industrial output is increasing from month to month. Suffice it to say that in the month of October just completed the gross output of our large-scale industry already reached the average monthly output in 1940. (*Applause.*) In other words, our industrial output has already attained the *prewar level*. (*Applause.*)

This only goes once again to prove that all the conditions have been created in our country for a rapid rise in the standard of living of all the people and for the further enhancement of the might of the Soviet State. We are not threatened by economic crises, which are so de-

structive to industry and from which no capitalist country is immune. There is no unemployment, or the impoverishment of the population that goes with it, in our country, nor will there be. The Soviet system ensures every opportunity for a continuous expansion of productive forces and a continuous rise of the standard of living of the workers of town and country, such as do not exist and cannot exist in any capitalist country.

Compare old Russia with the Soviet Union created by the revolution.

We know that bourgeois-landlord Russia was beaten by Japanese imperialism in 1904-05. We also know that tsarist Russia proved impotent against and unable to withstand Wilhelm's hordes. Since then the situation has radically changed. The victory over German fascism in Europe and the defeat of the armies of the Japanese empire in Manchuria that followed it vividly demonstrated how far our country has progressed since the days of old tsarist Russia.

The attempts to rejuvenate and revive Russia failed both in the revolution of 1905 and in the revolution of February 1917. The Great October Socialist Revolution alone brought the long-awaited rejuvenation and created the conditions for the powerful revival of our country. (*Applause*) The Soviet Revolution alone, a genuine revolution of the people, of which the Party of Lenin and Stalin took the lead, made our country the great and foremost power it is today. (*Applause*). The greatness of the Soviet Union was created by the Socialist Revolution, and is now recognized by all the nations of the world.

Is it not obvious that if thirty years ago the Bolsheviks had not succeeded in wresting our land from the hands of Kerensky, the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Constitutional-Democrats and the other servitors of the

bourgeoisie, it would have lost its independence and would now be languishing in misery.

Compare the Soviet Union with the most highly developed capitalist countries in Europe.

Take Britain, which since times of old has legitimately been considered a highly-developed industrial country, and even the "workshop of the world." In the period between the two world wars, only in rare years did Britain's industrial output rise above the level of 1913; most of the time it was considerably below that level. That being the case, it can hardly be said that British industry made any progress between the two world wars. And even now, as you know, Britain is in serious economic difficulties and is relying more and more upon the aid of Uncle Sam.

In France, in the same period, industry made no better progress, although there were individual boom years. Suffice it to say that before the outbreak of World War II France's industrial output was only 6 per cent above the level it had reached before World War I. It may be said that throughout the whole period between the two world wars French industry was stagnant. Today France too is passing through a period of economic difficulties and, like Britain, is pinning her hopes on help from abroad.

How is this striking contrast between the development of industry in the U.S.S.R., on the one hand, and the state of industry in Britain and France, on the other, to be explained? How is it to be explained that whereas industrial output in the Soviet Union in the period of respite between the two world wars increased almost twelvefold, the industry of Britain and France made no progress, registering a slight rise in some years but in most years stagnation and even decline?

To unbiased persons who desire to understand modern developments, the answer is suggested, above all, by a comparison of facts.

The fundamental difference between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other, is well known: the industry, like the entire national economy, of the U.S.S.R. is built on the foundation of Socialism. But the industry, like the entire state edifice, of Great Britain, and that of France too, rests on the old pillars of capitalism. Moreover, both science and practice graphically show that while the foundation of Socialism in the Soviet Union is growing firmer with every passing day, the pillars of capitalist society in Europe have long been rotten through and through. It is now more evident than ever how ripe the conditions for Socialism already were in our land thirty years ago, when the victorious Socialist Revolution led our country into a new path—the path of revolutionary rejuvenation.

Thirty years ago, on the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin passionately argued that, in the historical conditions of the time, it was impossible to go forward without taking steps towards Socialism, and that the material requisites for Socialism already existed in our country. He said:

“It is *impossible* in Russia of the twentieth century, which has won a republic and democracy in a revolutionary way, to advance without *advancing* towards Socialism, without taking *steps* towards it....

“The dialectics of history is such that the war, by extraordinarily expediting the transformation of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism, has *thereby* extraordinarily advanced mankind towards Socialism.

“Imperialist war is the eve of socialist revolution. And this not only because the horrors of the war give rise to proletarian revolt—no revolt can bring about Socialism if

the economic conditions for it are unripe—but because state-monopoly capitalism is a complete *material* preparation for Socialism, the *prelude* to Socialism, a rung in the ladder of history between which and the rung called Socialism *there are no intermediate rungs.*"

It goes without saying that both in Britain and France, already then—thirty years ago—the material conditions for the passage to Socialism were no less favourable than in our country. But, as we know, material conditions alone are not enough even for the solution of those problems which have already become a historical necessity.

World War II dealt another blow to the capitalist system, and still further shook its position in Europe. The new democracies—Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania—with the support of the broad masses of the people, have carried out bold democratic reforms, among them, the elimination of the landlord class and the transfer of the land to the peasants, the nationalization of large-scale industry and the banks, and so forth. These countries are taking steps towards Socialism in their own, independent ways, having created for the working people a life that is free from capitalist bondage, and are defending their national independence against the attempts of foreign imperialists to get these countries into their power and to impose their will upon them.

## II

### THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

From the very first day of its existence the Soviet Union took a place of its own in international affairs by assuming the lead of the struggle for peace.

The October Revolution wrested our country from the first world war by proclaiming peace and unreservedly renouncing the imperialist policy both of tsarist Russia and of the government of the pseudo-Socialist Kerensky set up after the February Revolution. In spite of this, for a number of years our people were unable to return to peaceful labour.

With the purpose of strangling the October Revolution and restoring to power the landlords and capitalists who had fled the land, the Entente Powers organized a series of armed interventions against our country. The responsibility for these crimes falls upon the imperialists of Britain and France, on their American and Japanese allies, and their satellites of the time. This piratical policy, which was imbued with the bestial anti-Soviet enmity of Churchill, Clemenceau and other reactionaries towards the revolutionary Russian people, failed ignominiously. The Soviet people upheld their independence, secured a respite, and set out on the road of the victorious peaceful construction of Socialism.

You know that even after that the machinations against our country did not cease. What did the imperialists of the West and East not do to frustrate the peaceful constructive labours in our country!

Things were carried so far that Britain and France united with fascist Italy and concluded the shameful Munich agreement with Hitler Germany in order to spur the German fascists to attack the Soviet Union more speedily. However, the British and French imperialists miscalculated. They got caught in their own snare, and Stalin's wise peace policy brilliantly ensured another postponement of war for the Soviet Union. (*Applause.*)

But when Hitler Germany attacked the U.S.S.R. after all, the hopes of our enemies revived.

We know that shortly after this a report appeared in the London newspapers to the effect that the British Minister, Moore-Brabazon, discussing the situation on the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1941, did not hesitate to voice the wish that the Soviet and the German armies would mutually exhaust one another, while Britain would enhance her might and become the dominating Power. And there were prominent men in America too who were anxious not to be one whit behind Moore-Brabazon. In June 1941 *The New York Times* printed the following statement by a most prominent American: "If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible...."

Nevertheless, in the war against Hitler Germany, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States successfully cooperated against the common enemy, the common enemy of all democratic countries.

As soon as the war ended the Soviet Union set to work on the new Stalin Five-Year Plan. Parallel with this, we now have to draw up a plan for several five-year periods to come. Comrade Stalin, as we know, defined these new objectives as follows:

"As regards plans of longer term, our Party intends to organize another powerful uplift of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of prewar industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of pig iron, up to 60,000,000 tons of steel, up to 500,000,000 tons of coal and up to 60,000,000 tons of oil."

This should be enough to show how interested the Soviet Union is in stable and lasting peace. All sincere friends of peace—and they constitute the vast majority of

the people in any country—may rest assured that the Soviet Union will uphold the interests of universal peace to the utmost. (*Prolonged applause.*)

In conformity with this peace policy, the Soviet Union stands for the all-round development of international co-operation. Comrade Stalin gave a thorough explanation of our foreign policy in his talk with the well-known American, Stassen:

"They—the Soviet Union and the United States—certainly can cooperate. The difference between them is of no essential importance as far as their cooperation is concerned. The economic systems in Germany and the U.S.A. are similar, and nevertheless war broke out between them. The economic systems of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are different, and yet they did not fight each other but cooperated during the war. If the two different systems could cooperate during the war, why can they not cooperate in peacetime? It is certainly understood that given a desire to cooperate, cooperation is perfectly possible even with different economic systems. When the desire to cooperate is lacking, states and people may start to fight each other even though having the same economic systems."

The Soviet Union has invariably pursued and pursues a policy of peace and international cooperation. Such is the attitude of the Soviet Union towards all countries that manifest a desire to cooperate.

The policy outlined by Comrade Stalin is now being opposed by another policy, a policy based on entirely different principles. And here one must speak, first and foremost, of the foreign policy of the United States of America, as well as of Great Britain.

It is possible that there does exist in the U.S.A. a program for the economic development of the country for some time ahead. However, nothing has ever been said

about it in the press, although press conferences are not infrequent in that country.

On the other hand, a lot of advertisement is being given to various American projects connected now with the "Truman doctrine," now with the "Marshall plan." Reading about all these American plans of "aid to Europe," "aid to China," and so forth, one might think that America's domestic problems have already been solved long ago, and that all that remains is for her to order the affairs of other countries by prescribing for them her own policy and governments of such composition as she finds desirable. Actually, this is not so. If the domestic affairs of the U.S.A. were not causing its ruling circles great uneasiness, especially in connection with the approaching economic crisis, there would not be such an abundance of economic projects for United States expansion, which, in their turn, are based on the aggressive military and political plans of American imperialism.

No secret is now being made of the fact that the U.S.A.—not infrequently in conjunction with Great Britain—is constantly setting up new naval and air bases in all parts of the globe, and is even adapting whole countries for such purposes, especially those lying near to the territory of the Soviet Union. Who nowadays does not complain of the pressure of American imperialism in this respect! If the governments of certain big states in Europe, Asia and America are preserving a respectable silence on this score, some of the smaller countries are evidently beginning to find it absolutely unbearable. Denmark, for instance, try as she will, cannot secure the restoration of her national sovereignty over Greenland, from which the Americans do not wish to withdraw after the end of the war. Egypt is legitimately demanding the withdrawal of British troops from her territory. But Britain refuses to do so, and

America supports the British imperialists in such matters too. It is obvious, however, that the creation of military bases in various parts of the world is not designed for purposes of defence, but as preparation for aggression. It is also obvious that if the Anglo-American combined military staff created during World War II is still being preserved, it is not from peaceable motives, but with the object of intimidating others with the prospect of new aggression. It would be a good thing if the American people knew about all this, because under the so-called "Western" freedom of the press, when practically every newspaper and broadcasting station is in the hands of a handful of aggressive capitalists and their hired servants, it is difficult for the people to get to know the real truth.

As we know, a sort of new religion has become widespread among expansionist circles in the U.S.A.: having no faith in their own internal forces, they put their faith in the secret of the atomic bomb, although this secret has long ceased to be a secret. (*Prolonged applause.*) The imperialists apparently need this faith in the atomic bomb, which, it is generally known, is not a means of defence but a weapon of attack. Many are outraged by the fact that the U.S.A. and Great Britain are preventing the United Nations from adopting a final decision banning atomic weapons. Twice this year British scientists have protested against this; they have twice published statements on the subject, expressing discontent at the fact that Britain is merely seconding the United States in this matter. And that is quite understandable, for the peoples of America and Britain are no less interested than others in having both atomic weapons banned and inflated armaments reduced generally. It should be realized that the refusal to ban the atomic weapon covers the imperialists with shame and sets all honest people, all nations, against them.

Or take the question of warmongers. In spite of all the protests of the American and other expansionists, the General Assembly, although grudgingly, adopted a decision condemning propaganda of a new war. The debate, however, showed that it is necessary to intensify the fight against the warmongers and their patrons, who are carrying out the will of the aggressive and profit-lusting top level of capitalist billionaires and ignore the interests of their people. We know that in between the two world wars United States industry expanded, although its development was extremely uneven and output twice fell considerably below the level of 1913. On the other hand, during World War II, American industry swelled rapidly and began to yield enormous profits to the capitalists and national revenues which American state-monopoly capitalism is now putting into action and using as a means of pressure everywhere—in Europe and China, in Greece and Turkey, in South America and in the Middle East. Of course, there are plenty of lovers of war booms. But what has this to do with the interests of the people? The interests of the people, it goes without saying, differ fundamentally from the interests of the fomentors of a new world war.

All these facts are indicative of the desire of American imperialism to exploit the postwar difficulties of certain states in order to impose its will upon them, under the guise of uninvited American leadership, and to pave the way for the world supremacy of the United States. This is by no means conducive to the realization of the expectation that it may be possible to escape the growing domestic difficulties and prevent the onset of a profound economic crisis and the widening split of the United States into two major groups: an imperialist group, which is at present making so much noise on the forestage, and a democratic group, to which the future belongs. There is no limit to

the appetites of the imperialists, and for the attainment of their selfish ends they are prepared to trample with an iron heel upon democratic rights in their own country, as well as the rights and sovereignty of other countries. Evidently, the lesson of the collapse of fascist Germany, which suppressed the democratic forces and overreached herself in striving for world supremacy, has been wasted on those who are now being driven so blindly by an urge to dominate the whole world.

Today the ruling circles of the United States, as well as of Great Britain, head an international group which has made it its purpose to strengthen capitalism and to establish the domination of these countries over other nations. These countries lead the imperialist and anti-democratic forces in international affairs, with the active support of well-known Socialist leaders in a number of European countries.

The policy of the Soviet Union is founded on directly opposite principles, the principles of respecting the sovereignty of big and small states and of not interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries. Take the German question, for example.

If in the postwar period America and Britain adhered to those principles—such as the democratic principles of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on the German question, say—which made cooperation between the great Allies against Hitler Germany and for the purpose of eliminating the survivals of fascism possible and fruitful, then cooperation between the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain would yield good results now too. But the U.S.A. and Britain have departed from these democratic principles and have violated the jointly adopted decisions. This may be said of such fundamental issues as the democratic reconstruction and demilitarization of Germany and the

payment of reparations to the countries that suffered German occupation. As a result of the Anglo-American postwar policy, the British and American zones of occupation in Germany have been merged into a jointly administered bizonal territory, which has come to be known in the press as "Bizonia," in order that an Anglo-American policy may be pursued there unilaterally, and independently of the Control Council, on which all the four occupying Powers are represented. Virtually speaking, our representatives in Germany now deal solely with the Soviet zone. A situation has arisen which cannot but cause uneasiness to the German people as well, since as a result of the Anglo-American policy there is "Bizonia" and there are other zones, but there is no Germany as an integral German State. The Soviet Union considers that the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on the German question, which envisage the restoration of Germany as an integral, democratic state, must be put into effect. It is fully realized in the Soviet Union that "Bizonia" is not Germany, and that the German people have a right to their own state, which must, of course, be democratic, and must not create a threat of new aggression to other, peaceable states. There is today an Anglo-American plan to pacify the population of the Anglo-American zone of Germany by throwing them a few sops, to rely upon the former German capitalists who but so recently were supporting Hitler, and with their help to utilize "Bizonia," with its Ruhr industrial region, as a threat to those countries which do not display slavish subservience to the Anglo-American plan to dominate Europe. But these adventurous plans regarding Germany can lead to no good, and will of course be rejected by democratic Europe.

This example of Germany shows how far the present principles of Britain and America diverge from those of

the Soviet Union, inasmuch as the British and American principles are imbued with frank imperialism, while the Soviet Union firmly adheres to the principles of democracy.

The Soviet Union, as well as other democratic countries, stands for peace and international cooperation on democratic lines. Under present conditions this demands the unity of all the forces of the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, in Europe and outside Europe, in order to erect an impregnable barrier to imperialism, which is growing ever more active, and to its policy of new aggression.

If the democratic forces weld themselves together and boldly fight imperialism and its plans for new warlike ventures this will unite the peoples into a mighty army, the like of which cannot be possessed by imperialism, which denies the democratic rights of peoples, tramples on the sovereignty of nations, and bases its plans on threats and reckless adventures. Uneasiness and alarm are growing in the ranks of the imperialists, for everyone can see that the ground is shaking under the feet of imperialism, whereas the forces of democracy and Socialism are growing stronger with every passing day.

What can the policy of imperialism hold out for the nations? Only greater oppression, revivification of the vestiges of detested fascism, and fresh imperialist gambles.

The eyes of the peoples must be opened to this, and all the democratic and anti-imperialist forces must be united in order to thwart any and every plan for the economic enthralment of nations, and any and every new adventure on the part of imperialism.

The historical experience of the Soviet Union has corroborated the words of the great Lenin that a people which has taken the power in its own hands is invincible.

"No one will ever conquer a people whose workers and peasants have in their majority realized, felt and seen that they are defending their own, Soviet government, the government of the toilers, that they are defending a cause whose victory will ensure them and their children the opportunity to take advantage of all the blessings of culture, all the creations of man's labour."

The task today is to unite all the anti-imperialist and democratic forces of the peoples into one mighty camp, cemented by common vital interests, against the imperialist and anti-democratic camp and its policy of entralling nations and of new reckless gambles.

At the same time, a sober view of the matter will show that nowadays to indulge in new imperialist gambles is to play a dangerous game with the destiny of capitalism. Certain cabinet ministers and senators may not realize this. But if the anti-imperialist and democratic camp unites its forces and avails itself of all its opportunities, it will compel the imperialists to be more sensible and restrained. (*Applause.*) It is to be presumed that capitalism has no interest in expediting its own downfall. (*Laughter. Applause.*)

### III

#### THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM

Entering on the thirty-first year of the Great October Socialist Revolution, we look back with satisfaction on the path we have traversed and face the future with confidence.

The achievements of the Soviet State are great indeed. Socialism has deeply penetrated into our whole life. In Soviet times a new generation has grown up and is beginning to spread its eagle wings.

It must be admitted that one of the greatest achievements of our revolution is that new spiritual make-up, that intellectual growth of our people, as Soviet patriots. This is true of all the Soviet peoples, in town and in countryside, of those engaged in physical labour and those engaged in mental labour. That is, indeed, a supreme achievement of the October Revolution, an achievement of epochal significance.

The Soviet people today are not what they were thirty years ago.

The spiritual make-up of the Soviet people of today is revealed, above all, in a conscientious attitude towards their work, as a matter of social importance and as a sacred duty to the Soviet State. Today there are stakhanovites, men and women, in every plant. Socialist competition has spread to all the collective farms. All take part in socialist competition, workers and collective farmers, office workers, engineers and technicians, artists and scientists. Today the scope and content of competition serve as a criterion of the level attained by Soviet people in the communist attitude towards work. The nation-wide character of this competition makes it a highly important instrument in raising productivity of labour.

A new movement has now become widespread: individual workers undertake personally to fulfill their yearly programs, and five-year programs as a whole, ahead of time, which was not the practice before the war. This movement is developing by leaps and bounds in Moscow, in Leningrad, in the Donbas and all over the country, testifying to the socialist mentality of workingmen and workingwomen. But this is only one of a number of effective instruments for raising productivity of labour in our country.

This year the grain procurement plan is being fulfilled ahead of schedule. The state will receive roughly as

much grain as in the best prewar years, although the grain area and the amount of machinery available are as yet considerably less than before the war. This achievement is due to the socialist competition that has developed so widely between republic and republic, territory and territory, region and region, and especially to the active part taken in the competition by the entire body of collective farmers, by the many millions of men and women on the collective farms.

We had a hard time of it in the early period of the war, until we reconstructed all our work to adapt it to the new conditions. The devotion of our workers in the rear and the heroism of our army at the front, which are without parallel in world history, were a manifestation of a lofty Soviet patriotism—and this ensured our victory over the enemy. (*Applause.*) The current upsurge of Soviet patriotism serves as a notable expression of the present ideological and spiritual development of our Soviet people.

It cannot be denied that the survivals of capitalism in the minds of men are very tenacious. That is why the Party is constantly reminding the Soviet people of the need for all-round criticism and self-criticism aiming at the elimination of these pernicious survivals of the past. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that we now have vast opportunities to conduct the struggle for the elimination of these survivals with success.

The cultural level of our people has risen in all respects. The number of students, the number of books published, educational work among the masses, have long ago attained proportions unequaled in any other country. Our intellectuals, the workers in the field of culture, our scientists and artists, are imbued with Soviet patriotism as never before. It is by no means fortuitous, that nowadays

the finest literary productions come from the pens of writers who are conscious of their inseverable ideological bond with Communism. In our country Communism animates people to inspired labour, to heroic endeavour for their country, to creative effort imbued with lofty ideas. (*Applause.*)

During the war bourgeois hacks abroad ventured to prophesy that when, in their military campaigns, Soviet people familiarized themselves with the order and culture of the West, when they had been in many cities and capitals of Europe, they would return home with a desire to install a similar order in their own country. But what happened? Demobilized soldiers and officers, on returning home, set about with still greater ardour to strengthen their collective farms, to promote socialist competition in factory and workshop, and took their place in the foremost ranks of Soviet patriots. (*Applause.*)

Not all of us have yet rid ourselves of obsequious worship of the West, of capitalist culture. It was not for nothing that the ruling classes of old Russia were often in a state of such profound spiritual dependence on the capitalistically more highly developed countries of Europe. This facilitated the cultivation among certain circles of the old intelligentsia of a slavish consciousness of inferiority to and spiritual dependence on the bourgeois countries of Europe. Unless one rids oneself of these shameful survivals one cannot be a real Soviet citizen. That is why our Soviet people are filled with such resolute determination to put an end as quickly as possible to these survivals of the past, to mercilessly criticize all and every manifestation of obsequious worship of the West and of its capitalist culture.

You remember the historic words of Comrade Stalin on the subject of the Soviet citizen:

"The humblest Soviet citizen, being free from the fetters of capital, stands head and shoulders above any high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears the yoke of capitalist slavery."

The better our Soviet people understand this appeal of Stalin to the consciousness and honour of the Soviet citizen, the faster will we advance towards our great goal.

Like the sun on a clear day, the ideas of Marxism-Leninism have illuminated our path all these thirty years. Our progress was founded on the strategy and tactics of Lenin and Stalin. Our road was no easy one. Enemies were active without and within. Even within the Bolshevik Party the enemy had his agents in the person of the trotskyites, Rightists and other traitors and treasonmongers. The Bolshevik Party, founded by Lenin and Stalin, emerged from all these trials strengthened; it purified its ranks and welded itself into a mighty force, which is the supreme embodiment of the moral and political unity of our people, who are confidently marching towards a communist society, and which, led by the great Stalin, is now pointing the way to universal peace and deliverance from bloody wars, the way to the overthrow of capitalist slavery and to the great progress of nations and of all mankind.  
*(Stormy, prolonged applause.)*

Experience has shown that the communist movement today has grown to such dimensions and strength in many countries that it can no longer be directed from one centre. In this we see one of the outstanding achievements of Communism in our day. At the same time, experience has shown that the Communist parties, and especially the stronger of the Communist parties in Europe, must have a uniting body through which to effect continuous exchange of views and, when necessary, to coordinate the activities of the Communist parties by mutual accord. This

will help to promote the further growth of the communist movement and to strengthen its influence among the masses. The Bolshevik Party hails these ripe measures of the Communist parties and wishes them every success. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Thirty years ago the Bolshevik Party was only a small section of its people. But at that time the Party of Lenin and Stalin defined the matured historical needs of the country with scientific accuracy, found a mighty support among the masses of the people, and the people, led by our Party, won the revolutionary victory. Today everyone can see the fruits of this victory of Socialism and their supreme international significance.

Today the united forces of democracy and Socialism, in Europe and outside Europe together, are incomparably stronger than the opposing anti-democratic camp of imperialism.

Capitalism has become a brake on human progress, and the continuation of the reckless policy of imperialism, which has already brought about two world wars, constitutes the major danger to the peace-loving nations. The Great October Socialist Revolution has opened the eyes of the nations to the fact that the age of capitalism is drawing to a close, and that reliable roads have been opened to general peace and the great progress of nations. The convulsive efforts of the imperialists, under whom the ground is swaying, will not save capitalism from its approaching doom. We are living in an age in which all roads lead to Communism. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

The great Lenin laid the foundations of the Soviet State and led our people into the path of Socialism, which has put an end to the age-long exploitation of man by man. The path of Lenin leads to the freedom and happiness of the nations, to the freedom and happiness of mankind.

The great Stalin has led and is leading our people along the glorious path to Communism. The name of Stalin, surrounded by the boundless respect and love of the peoples, is a symbol of the greatness of the victorious Soviet Union and a call to the struggle for a happy future for mankind. (*Stormy and continuous cheers.*)

Comrades!

The Bolsheviks always have been and always will be the vanguard of their people.

\* The Soviet people march in the vanguard of progressive humanity, full of faith in the lofty aims of the October Revolution.

Hail the 30th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution! (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

Under the banner of Lenin, under the leadership of Stalin, forward to the triumph of Communism! (*Stormy, prolonged ovation. All rise. Cheers: "Hurrah for the Great Stalin!" "Long live the great leader of the Soviet people, Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the Party of Lenin-Stalin!" "Long live our Soviet Government!"*)





**SPEECHES AT THE LONDON MEETING  
OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS**

*November-December 1947*



## THE PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY

*Speech at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
November 26, 1947*

We have decided to examine six questions, and have placed them on our agenda. They include several questions concerning Germany and the Austrian treaty. These questions are not of equal importance.

The Soviet delegation proposes that first place on the conference agenda should be given to the question of the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany. Since it appears that there are objections to this, I shall give our reasons in greater detail.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany must not be postponed any longer. Suffice it to say that more than two and a half years have already elapsed since Germany's surrender, yet the question has made no progress at all.

We gave no little time to preparing the five peace treaties with Germany's former allies. That work was eventually completed, and, in general, successfully. The peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland have already come into force. Prospects of peaceful development have opened up before the peoples of these countries, and this accords not only with the aspirations of these peoples

themselves, but with the interests of the establishment of lasting peace in Europe.

Now the time has come to decide the question of the peace settlement for Germany. Nobody would understand it if the Council of Ministers postponed the decision of this question and put it down among the secondary matters of our conference.

At the same time, we must also decide the Austrian question. That, too, is one of the tasks of the present meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Council.

We have decided to consider at this meeting a number of questions relating to Germany. They include important questions of a current nature. They must be given serious attention. But the fundamental question for Germany is the peace treaty. It was difficult to engage in the preparation of this treaty until now, since the Council was busy with a number of other urgent matters. But, on the other hand, to postpone this question any longer would be impermissible.

The question of the peace treaty with Germany is, as we all know, a question of Germany's destiny, and at the same time a question of the complete restoration of peace in Europe. This peace treaty is needed not only by Germany. It is needed by all the peoples of Europe, and not only of Europe. Can one deny that the peoples of Europe want enduring peace to be established at last throughout Europe? And that is quite understandable, since without the full establishment of peace in Europe there can be no lasting general peace.

Of course, the question of the peace settlement for Germany is not a simple one, and divergences of one kind or another will arise among us during its examination. But postponement of the question will certainly not improve matters.

Nowadays, after the war, divergences, as we know, not infrequently crop up on various questions of international

significance between the Soviet Union and the democratic countries friendly to it, on the one hand, and the United States and certain Western European Powers, on the other. In this respect there is a big difference between what we had during the war and what we have since the war. How are these present divergencies to be explained? What do they spring from?

In the second world war, Great Britain, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and other democratic countries formed the anti-Hitler coalition and together waged a war of liberation against the camp of the fascist states, which were out for world domination and the establishment of the fascist system throughout the world. And this struggle united them, making it possible successfully to solve many complex problems of international importance. It is enough to point to such facts as the conferences of the three Allied Powers at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, the celebrated decisions of which have been an important contribution to the history of nations.

The situation changed after the end of the second world war, when it became clear that in the establishment of the postwar peace the former partners in the anti-fascist coalition were pursuing different aims.

It then became clear that some countries were striving for a *democratic peace*—a peace based on the equality of nations and recognition of the sovereignty of all states, big and small. Such a peace would make it possible to promote peaceful cooperation among countries, despite differences of social system and differences of ideology. The establishment of democratic peace would also mean that the vanquished countries, too, would have the right to free democratic development, and to the full restoration of their independence.

It also became clear that other countries were striving for the establishment, not of a democratic but of an im-

*perialist peace*, which would mean that certain strong Powers would dominate over other nations, large and small, without consideration for their rights and national sovereignty. It is not difficult to understand that the establishment of an imperialist peace would inevitably lead to the division of countries into two categories: dominating Powers, on the one hand, and subservient and enslaved states on the other; and that in turn would lead to new international conflicts and wars, which would harbour the danger of a third world war.

The striving for an imperialist peace could not, of course, but meet with the resistance of many democratic countries. I do not conceal that the Soviet Union stands fully on the side of those who are striving for a democratic peace, and opposes the foisting of an imperialist peace upon the nations. An imperialist peace cannot be lasting. Only a peace which rests on democratic principles can be lasting.

From this it will be seen what the basis is of the divergencies between the allies of yesterday.

And this relates also to the question of the peace settlement for Germany. The peace treaty with Germany must determine the future of Germany for a long period to come. The question naturally arises as to whether this treaty is to be based on the principles of a democratic peace or of an imperialist peace.

For the Soviet Union, which is pursuing the Lenin-Stalin policy of peace, the answer to this question is clear. The answer can only be that the peace treaty with Germany must be founded on the principles of a democratic peace, and must contribute to the economic recovery of Germany and her rehabilitation in the future as an independent democratic state. In short, the peace treaty with Germany must be founded on the principles which underlay the Yalta and Potsdam conference decisions of the Allied Powers on

the question of Germany. In pursuance of these decisions, we must ensure the demilitarization and democratic reconstruction of Germany and, at the same time, the fulfilment by Germany of the obligations to the countries which suffered from Hitler aggression. A peace treaty drafted on this basis will make it possible for Germany herself, after having overcome the present temporary difficulties, firmly to set foot on the path of economic recovery, and the development of Germany as a democratic, peace-loving state. The four Powers that control present-day Germany bear the main responsibility for the proper solution of these problems, which are of momentous significance for all the nations of the world.

But there is evidently another plan for Germany, one designed to prevent her economic recovery, for fear that Germany might become a rival in the European and world market. Hand in hand with this plan goes a policy of weakening Germany economically and destroying her as a united state, although this may not be stated openly. In that event, endeavours to utilize Germany will be made by those Powers which need one or other piece of German territory primarily as a base for the development of a war industry, and Germany's reactionary forces as a support for a policy of dominating over the democratic countries of Europe and opposing the development of the democratic movement in the European countries liberated from fascism.

It is clear that this policy reflects a striving to establish an imperialist peace in this case too. This is a dangerous plan from the standpoint of democracy and peace in Europe. Directed against the restoration of Germany as a united democratic state, and against the vital interests of the German people, this plan is only calculated to encourage the reactionary German revanchists, who are prepared to take the cause of the unification of Germany into their own hands

and exploit it for their revanchist aims, lured by the dream of rebuilding an aggressive imperialist Germany.

There should be no supporters for such a plan for Germany among the democratic countries. Still less should there be among the democratic countries, supporters of a plan which would involve an attempt to utilize a part of Germany as a military or war-industrial base for future military gambles in Europe, or as a bulwark of the reactionary forces of Europe as against the progressive and democratic forces in Germany and other European countries.

Only supporters of an imperialist peace can countenance such a plan for Germany. But it is bound to meet with the resistance of many democratic countries. Naturally, one of the consistent opponents of this plan for Germany is the Soviet Union, which has always undeviatingly championed and will continue to champion, the cause of democratic peace in Europe and outside Europe.

In preparing the peace treaty with Germany we shall have to decide first of all two major questions. Preparation of the peace treaty with Germany will be successful if correct decisions are made, first, regarding the creation of an all-German democratic government, and second, regarding the future peace conference for the examination of this treaty. Of course, there are also other questions connected with the preparation of the peace treaty. But these two major questions are all-important.

And, in fact, we have a basis for the settlement of these questions.

The Potsdam conference said outright, when the Council of Foreign Ministers was instituted, that "the Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany, a corresponding document to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established." This decision of the Potsdam

conference must be implemented. The question of the formation of an all-German democratic government cannot be postponed any longer. Postponement would not only be harmful to the German people; it would be harmful to other peoples of Europe, who are interested in the speedy establishment of lasting peace throughout Europe.

As to the Peace Conference, we ought to agree now as to its composition. Last year, at the New York meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, we unanimously laid down which countries should be invited to the preliminary consultations in connection with the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany. It was then decided that, besides the five great Powers, the Allied states neighbouring on Germany, as well as other Allied states which had taken part in the war against Germany with their armed forces, should be invited to the consultations. Since then proposals have arisen which are in direct contradiction to this decision taken by the Foreign Ministers' Council in New York. If we do not wish to disrupt what has been agreed upon among us, then we must abide by the afore-mentioned New York decision. And then the question of who should participate in the consultations in connection with the preparation of the peace treaty, and the question of the composition of the Peace Conference itself, will not be difficult to decide.

All other questions relating to the preparation of the peace treaty could be decided without great delay if these two major questions were settled, and unless they are settled it will be impossible to complete the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany.

All I have said has had the purpose, first, of demonstrating the importance of the decision we took yesterday, namely, to discuss the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany, and second, of drawing the Council's attention to

the main questions arising in connection therewith. In view of the importance of the matter, the Soviet delegation insists that this question should be the first of the questions relating to Germany to be examined.

I would remind you that way back in April 1946, the Government of the United States of America insisted that the peace treaty with Germany be prepared as speedily as possible. The British and French delegations supported this proposal.

At that time, however, this was impossible to do, because attention was entirely concentrated on preparing the first five peace treaties. But now, at the close of 1947, we are fully in a position to tackle the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany in all earnest, and not to postpone this important matter any longer on one excuse or another.

The Soviet Government deems it essential to expedite the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany, and proposes that this question be placed ahead of all other questions at the present meeting of the Council. We proceed from the conviction that the Soviet Union is not the only one interested in speeding the establishment of peace throughout Europe. Other peoples of Europe, and not only of Europe, are, of course, interested in this. All this gives me reason to hope that our proposals will be supported by the other delegations.

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## PREPARATION OF THE GERMAN PEACE TREATY

*Speech at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
November 27, 1947*

The Soviet delegation considers the question of Germany's frontiers one of the major questions of the peace treaty with Germany. The decisions of the Potsdam conference, as we know, defined only the eastern frontiers of Germany. With this decision of the heads of the three Governments—of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the Soviet Union—France subsequently associated herself.

The frontiers of Germany with other states than Poland were not considered by the Potsdam conference. Nor did the Foreign Ministers' Council adopt decisions on this question. The Council, however, possesses declarations of Allied states bordering on Germany which contain territorial claims against Germany, namely, from France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet delegation understands the desire of the French delegation to raise the question of the frontiers at the present meeting of the Council. This question should be considered carefully by the Council. But this problem is connected with a number of other important problems relating to the German treaty. He must examine these questions when we deal with the separate sections of the draft peace treaty.

When we speak of Germany we have obviously in mind that territory over which the jurisdiction of the Control Council in Germany extends. Consequently, there is no lack of clarity in this respect, even if we do not decide today all the questions relating to the problem of the German frontiers.

The Soviet delegation shares the opinion of the British delegation that the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany makes it necessary to decide the question of the creation of an all-German government. We must also clearly say whether we are for the unity of a democratic Germany or for the liquidation of Germany as a united and integral state.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it remains for me to say once more: it must be firmly decided that the unity of democratic Germany is essential. The absence of a clear answer to this question may also be understood as an answer, but only in another sense, in the sense of a rejection of the idea of a united German State.

The absence of a clear answer to this question will only help the German revanchists in the German militarist camp, who would like to take the cause of German unity into their own hands and exploit it in order to restore the old, aggressive Germany, which we resolved not to allow when we adopted the decisions in Yalta and Potsdam. We must help those German democrats who are striving for the creation of a peace-loving democratic Germany uniting the German people in a single state.

Now permit me to pass to what the Soviet delegation considers most important and urgent.

Two and a half years have passed since the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe. More than two years have passed since the surrender of Japan and the end of the second world war.

In spite of this, the preparation neither of the peace treaty with Germany, nor of the peace treaty with Japan has been begun. Yet establishment of enduring general peace will be impossible unless a peace settlement is arranged both for Germany and for Japan.

Guided by the earlier joint decisions of our governments, the Council of Foreign Ministers should recognize the urgency, inasmuch as it concerns Europe, of proceeding to prepare a peace treaty with Germany and, in this connection, examine both questions relating to the procedure of preparing the peace treaty with Germany and the major questions of the treaty itself.

The Soviet delegation proposes that the Council of Foreign Ministers examine in the first place the following basic questions connected with the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany: a) formation of a central German democratic government; b) peace conference for examination of the draft peace treaty with Germany; c) principal directives for the drafting of the peace treaty.

In this connection the Soviet delegation submits the following proposals: 1) That the urgency of forming a central German democratic government, in conformity with the decisions of the Potsdam conference, shall be recognized. 2) That at the Peace Conference the German Government shall be given the opportunity to state its views on the peace treaty. 3) That the peace treaty shall be signed by the German Government and submitted for ratification to the German parliament. 4) That the Peace Conference shall be composed of representatives of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the U.S.A., France, China and of representatives of Allied states bordering on Germany, as well as of Allied states which participated in the common struggle against Germany with their armed forces, to wit: Albania, Australia,

Belgium, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. 5) That the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences shall be made the basis of the German peace treaty.

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## ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES FOR GERMANY

*Statement Made at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
December 5, 1947*

Mr. Marshall quoted here the last three paragraphs of his statement. But it seems to me that the main purport of the American delegation's statement is contained in the following words of Mr. Marshall: "Before the Council decides on the kind of government to be set up in Germany, we must agree on common principles in Germany necessary to enable a government to function effectively. In my opinion, these include: the basic freedoms for the individual; the abolition of zonal boundaries, except as delimitation of occupation areas, with no hindrance to the free flow of persons, ideas and goods throughout the whole of Germany; and a clear determination of the economic burdens the German people are to bear."

Thus one can say that the main idea of this statement amounts to the following: before deciding the question of the formation of a German government it is necessary to secure, irrespective of the existing zones, the free flow of goods throughout the whole of Germany, as well as to determine Germany's economic obligations.

It is evident from Mr. Marshall's statement that the American delegation would postpone the question of the

formation of a German government, and give first place to the question of the free flow of goods throughout the whole of Germany.

In this connection it is necessary to draw attention to the Harriman report on the situation in Germany, drafted by a committee appointed by the President of the United States. A month ago the Harriman report was published, and it includes the following assertion: "It has been clear to all observers that German life cannot be restored without the establishment of some form of German government." Consequently, the view is expressed in this report that without the formation of a German government it is not possible to restore the economic life of the German people.

It may appear at first sight that there is a direct contradiction between the viewpoints of Mr. Marshall and Mr. Harriman. But before drawing such conclusions it is necessary to analyze carefully whether this is so.

I will continue quoting from the report made by the Harriman Committee: "Only thus can there be developed within Germany responsible agencies with powers and scope adequate to handle nation-wide problems. So long as we have to rely upon local governments or independent zones operating at cross purposes, there is little hope of general economic revival in the country."

I shall have to continue quoting from the Harriman report: "Two years ago it would have been highly desirable to aim at forming a federalized [i.e., all-German] government embracing the Russian as well as the British, French, and American zones. At the moment this seems almost impossible. Delay is too costly. The start must be made in the West with what we have."

This statement by Mr. Harriman shows that the U.S. Government recognizes the necessity for the speediest formation of a German government, regarding this as an es-

sential condition for Germany's economic recovery. Yet Mr. Marshall's statement introduces what appears to be a different view.

However, it is not so difficult to understand this contradiction. It can be seen from Mr. Harriman's more outspoken statement that, while two years ago the U.S. Government considered the creation of a federal (all-German) government desirable, it now no longer believes in the achievement of agreement between the four countries on this question. Therefore Mr. Harriman says frankly that "the start must be made in the West with what we have," which can only be understood to mean that the question of the creation of a government for the Western zones has already been decided by the United States of America.

After this it is understandable why, at the present meeting of the four Ministers, the American delegation does not seem interested in reaching an agreement on the formation of an all-German government. If the question of the setting up of a government for "Bizonia" has already been decided and this has been published for general information, then it is understandable that the American delegation at our meeting does not set itself the aim of reaching agreement on the formation of an all-German government.

Hence, the mention of an all-German government in Mr. Marshall's statement was made, apparently, only as a matter of form, because it would have been awkward not to speak of it at all. While Mr. Harriman says that it is necessary to begin to set up a government "in the West," and declares that it is not possible to hope for the formation of an all-German government, Mr. Marshall expresses the same idea, only in another, less outspoken, form. Evidently, it is precisely for this reason that today's statement of the American delegation says that there is no reason to wait for the formation of an all-German government, but that it is

necessary to take up the question of the free flow of goods throughout the whole of Germany.

The same idea was also expressed in the British delegation's proposal of March 31, in support of which Mr. Bevin spoke today. We now know from Mr. Marshall's statement that the American delegation supports the British proposal.

As for this British proposal, it contains much that is unacceptable. The adoption of this proposal would disrupt, for example, the fulfilment of reparations by Germany. The British proposal also aims at clearing the way for the flow of goods throughout the whole of Germany. And what is more, since at present Germany produces few goods, it evidently chiefly envisages facilitating the sale of goods imported from other countries. For those with unsaleable goods on their hands, this, of course, is convenient. But, while the production of goods inside Germany itself remains at a low level, neither the German people nor the other peoples of Europe will derive any benefit from the acceptance of such a proposal.

The afore-mentioned British draft of March 31 bears the name "Supplementary Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany." It deals with many questions contained in the decisions of the Potsdam conference. The draft supposedly aims at supplementing these Potsdam decisions, but in point of fact it is directed towards replacing them by totally new decisions, which in many cases grossly violate the interests of the Soviet Union and certain other states. It is obvious that the Soviet Government cannot agree to such a substitution of the Potsdam decisions by the new British proposals.

Everyone knows that in some respects the Potsdam decisions are being carried out unsatisfactorily. The Soviet Government is seeking for a more correct implementation of these decisions. It cannot agree to their revision without the

governments which adopted them establishing exactly which of the earlier decisions are subject to modification.

No one can deny that all is not well in regard to the economic restoration of Germany. The Soviet Government considers that this arises, first and foremost, from the fact that the economic decisions of the Potsdam conference are not being carried out.

What is taking place in practice?

In March, 1946, a decision was adopted concerning the level of German industry. Subsequently the Soviet Government more than once spoke of the need to revise this inadequate decision and to establish a higher level of industrial development for Germany. We examined this question in detail at the Moscow meeting of the Council, but failed to reach agreement, although the proposals of the Soviet Union and Britain were sufficiently close to each other. The American delegation at that time did not give its agreement to these proposals, nor did the French. Yet, immediately after the conclusion of the Moscow meeting, the British and Americans published in Germany a bilateral decision revising the level of German industry for their own two zones, for "Bizonia." In doing so, the British and American delegations ignored the existence of the Control Council for Germany, omitted to submit the question of revising the level of German industry for examination by the Control Council, where, one year previously, with their consent, a totally different decision had been adopted. In this case again, the Governments of the United States and Great Britain adopted the course of separate action, revising a previously agreed decision without the participation of the Soviet Union and France.

The separate actions of the British and American representatives in Germany have gone too far. For more than a year already there has existed a united Anglo-American

zone, separated from all the rest of Germany. It is now time to examine the results of this separatist Anglo-American policy in Germany.

When the British and American zones were merged we were told that this was being done to accelerate the economic recovery of Germany. But what are the results? Perhaps the fusion of the British and American zones has, indeed, improved their economic situation? Let us see what is said on this score in the report of Mr. Harriman, U.S. Secretary of Commerce, which I have already mentioned.

That report says that the index of industrial production in the united Anglo-American zone in the middle of 1947 was 35 per cent of the figure for 1938. Such a low level of industry is not to be found today in any country of Europe. This 35 per cent is evidence of the total failure of the economic policy pursued in the British and American zones.

The zones were fused in 1946, but did the economic situation in the British and American zones of Germany improve in 1947? On the contrary, in the majority of industries, with the exception of coal-mining, it remained as before and in some cases even became worse. This unsatisfactory situation exists in the Western zones of Germany in almost all branches of German civilian industry, the improvement of which we should not seek to slow down and which must not be strangled. On the contrary, it is our duty to enable German civilian industries to develop, recognizing that this is in the interest both of the German people and of the other peoples of Europe who previously obtained goods from Germany.

Despite all the difficulties of the development of industry in the Eastern zone of Germany, where war devastation was more considerable and where measures to

eliminate war industry have already been taken, the level of industry in the Soviet zone has reached 52 per cent of 1938. At the same time, there is a tendency towards a further industrial increase, and the Soviet administration makes it its duty to render all possible assistance in accelerating the progress of industry in this zone of Germany. As we see, so far the Soviet zone has nothing to learn from the Anglo-American zone in the matter of promoting Germany's industry.

The British proposals concerning the economic situation in Germany have been elaborated in fair detail. The American delegation finds them acceptable. The French delegation has presented a proposal approximating to the British draft. The Soviet delegation considers that there is much that is unacceptable in these proposals.

One of the chief shortcomings in the British proposals is that much is said in them of the free flow of goods and of all manner of obligations of Germany, particularly towards the Western Powers, but at the same time the German people themselves are overlooked—the Germans, on whom the economic recovery of Germany depends, have been overlooked. This, too, is one of the main defects of the economic measures of the Anglo-American authorities in the Western zones. Yet it should be recognized that no measures whatsoever of the occupation authorities will yield good results in promoting the recovery of Germany's peace economy if they fail to provide conditions which will give the Germans themselves an incentive to engage in the active rebuilding of Germany's economic life.

We must arrange matters so that the Germans, the German industrialists—but on no account the capitalist monopolists—the German workers, German farmers, German artisans, can themselves engage in the restoration of the peace industries, agriculture and transport.

If we ignore the German people in this matter we shall achieve no good results. If in the work of restoring Germany's economy we rely on capitalist monopolies and on the former Hitlerite bosses in industry, and not on Germany's democratic forces, we shall not achieve good results, we shall not succeed in realizing the aims formulated in our joint decisions.

If, however, the Germans are afforded broad opportunities in the work of restoring peace industry, agriculture and transport, and if the democratic forces of the German people are given the necessary support, then, with the maintenance of control by the four Powers for a definite period, we can arrive at positive results in the restoration of Germany's economy and in the development of her foreign trade, which accords with the interests of other peoples.

We should not be afraid of the Germans wanting to restore their economy, industry, food resources and transport. This is essential for alleviating the position of the German people. It will also ensure the payment of the expenditure incurred by the occupation authorities of the four Powers in Germany. And it will lead to German goods appearing in other countries which are in need of industrial products. Such a position, perhaps, will be disadvantageous to the monopolists of one or other country, but the peoples of our countries will not suffer as a result, and will only benefit.

We must demand that the Germans fulfil their obligations to the Allies as regards reparations and payment of occupation costs. We must take care that the Germans will neither restore the war industry nor create a new one, but will strictly fulfil the decisions of the four Powers on demilitarization and disarmament. Neither must it be allowed that Germany's economy, let us say the Ruhr indus-

try, or any other German industry, shall become dependent upon foreign capital and be used as a base for the regeneration of Germany's war-industrial potential, or as a bulwark of reaction in Europe.

At the same time, it is essential that the German people be afforded an opportunity of themselves getting to grips with the restoration of their civilian economy. Not only must we not hinder this, it is our duty to assist Germany's economic recovery and the improvement of the material living conditions of the German people. We shall then firmly ensure the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations, and create the premises for the establishment of good relations between Germany and other democratic countries.

There is no need to fear competition from the Germans. There is at present a shortage of goods everywhere in Germany, which compels the Germans to fall further and further into debt, leads Germany to the loss of economic independence and promises the peoples of Europe nothing good in the future. Confidence must be shown towards all those Germans who are engaged in the rebuilding of the peace economy for the satisfaction of the requirements of their own people and of trade with other countries. At the same time, proper four-Power control must be ensured over the economic and political development of Germany.

It remains for me to draw the conclusion from what has been said.

The practice of separatist actions which lead to splitting Germany must cease. Experience demonstrates the lamentable results to which this leads.

Germany's economic unity will be restored if we carry out the decisions of the Potsdam conference, which provide a splendid basis for the maintenance both of the economic and political unity of Germany. Without the restoration of Germany's economic unity it is impossible to alleviate the

position of the German people or to fulfil the tasks laid down in our joint decisions at Yalta and Potsdam with the aim of creating a democratic and peaceable Germany.

It has to be recognized that Germany's economic unity cannot be ensured without the active participation of the German people themselves. This means that it is necessary to create all-German economic bodies, in which Germany's democratic forces can display their initiative and organizational capacity. It is necessary to create all-German administrative departments for industry, finance, trade, agriculture, food, transport and communications, as envisaged in the decisions of the Potsdam conference and in subsequent decisions.

There must be no delay in creating these all-German departments, which will provide the Germans with an opportunity for active participation in the work of economic recovery in all zones of Germany. At the same time, this would be an important step forward towards solving the problem of the creation of an all-German government.

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## ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, LEVEL OF GERMAN POSTWAR ECONOMY AND REPARATIONS PLAN

*Statement by the Head of the Soviet Delegation  
Distributed to the Members of the Council  
of Foreign Ministers Before the Sitting  
December 8, 1947*

On December 6 the Council of Foreign Ministers was unable to begin the consideration of economic questions relating to Germany because no agreement had been reached on procedure of discussion.

Three of the delegations—those of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France—insisted that the British draft of March 31 last, entitled “Supplementary Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany,” be taken as the basis for discussion in spite of the fact that the delegation of the U.S.S.R. stated that this draft contained much that was unacceptable.

The Soviet delegation proposed that the economic questions relating to Germany be considered in the same way as at the Moscow meeting of the Council. The Soviet delegation agreed, furthermore, to consider any proposals without beforehand taking the draft of any delegation as a basis, because no one delegation or even three delegations can be permitted to impose their views on any other delegation. It was not through any fault of the Soviet delegation that agreement was not reached.

The Soviet delegation refused to accept the British draft as the basis for discussion for the reason that it is designed to supersede the principles of the Potsdam conference by new principles or, as Mr. Bevin's draft says, by "supplementary principles," which run contrary to the Potsdam decisions and infringe upon the legitimate interests of the states which suffered from German aggression and occupation.

First of all, it is impossible to agree with the proposition in the British draft that "where there is any inconsistency between the principles contained in the Potsdam agreement and the principles contained in the present (British) statement, the latter shall prevail." This the Council of Foreign Ministers cannot do also for formal reasons, inasmuch as the Potsdam agreement was reached by the heads of governments and it cannot be abrogated or modified by a conference of Foreign Ministers.

In contradistinction to the British proposal, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to insist on the fulfilment of the Potsdam agreement and on the elimination of existing violations of that agreement.

Abrogation of the Potsdam agreement is needed by those who do not want to fulfil that agreement and who intend to free their hands for separate actions in disregard of the Potsdam agreement.

Separate actions of the American and British authorities, as well as of the French authorities, in the Western zones of Germany have gone too far as it is, impeding the economic rehabilitation of Germany and hampering the urgent establishment of enduring peace in Europe.

These separate actions of the Anglo-American authorities have led to the actual division of Germany, and this finds expression in the severing of the western part of Germany from the rest of the country and from Berlin, the

capital of the German State. A new centre for the Western zones of Germany has in fact already been created at Frankfurt-on-Main, where the Anglo-American authorities are acting separately and independently of the Control Council in Berlin.

Such a state of affairs is having a most harmful effect on the economic rehabilitation of Germany.

In 1946, when the British and American zones were being fused, it was said that the fusion was necessary for the rehabilitation of the German economy. Over a year has elapsed since then and yet industry in the Anglo-American zones, far from getting back on its feet, is still in a state of decline, wretchedly languishing and failing to produce the goods necessary for the population and for export to other countries. Furthermore, industrial stagnation inevitably leads to the destruction of the means of production themselves, to the deterioration of machinery, to say nothing of the fact that equipment which is not renewed becomes obsolete. Nor can an increase in the output of coal ensure the economic rehabilitation of Germany, since the rehabilitation of Germany's other industries is being retarded.

Agriculture is also in a state of decline, and the small peasants have still not received land at the expense of the estates of the Junkers and the big landowners, land on which they counted in view of promises to carry through a genuine land reform. And this in its turn creates difficult conditions for supplying the cities with food.

The policy that is being pursued in the Western zones acts as a brake on economic rehabilitation, instead of contributing to the rehabilitation of civilian branches of industry, of agriculture, transport and trade, without which the living conditions of the German people cannot be improved.

On the other hand, the Anglo-American authorities, by separate action, and disregarding the quadripartite Control Council, are carrying through their decision concerning the one-sided restoration of certain branches of heavy industry, for instance, the steel industry, enlisting the services for this of old Hitlerite bosses, former members of German war-industry cartels and trusts.

Thus the Anglo-American authorities have already proceeded to restore the war-industrial potential in the western part of Germany, relying on the support of old Hitlerite circles of industrial monopolists hostile to democratic Europe, and preventing the Control Council from supervising this activity, which is a flagrant violation of the Potsdam agreement.

Such a policy, far from having anything in common with the rehabilitation of Germany's economy and with the participation of Germany in the economic rehabilitation of the European countries, creates opportunities for certain foreign circles to make use of the western part of Germany, and above all the Ruhr, as a strategic base for the purpose of achieving supremacy in Europe.

This policy also finds expression in various forms of pressure on the democratic countries of Europe who are defending their national independence and at the same time the interests of peace and democracy.

It has now become known from M. Bidault's statement that the French delegation has also associated itself with the Anglo-American policy in Germany.

The American plan for the carrying out of this policy is now known. It is proposed to execute this plan in the form of so-called "aid," reckoned in dollars. However, since it is not desired to render this "aid" on the usual credit terms, as the interests of expediting economic rehabilitation demand, and since, instead, this is being done by

imposing a definite policy, according with the narrow purposes of certain foreign circles, the execution of this plan is fraught with grave dangers for the German people and for the other nations of Europe.

The external dollar debt of the western part of Germany continues to grow, and this is being done without the consent of the Germans themselves, while the possibilities of repaying these debts remain extremely restricted. Due to the fact that industry there is not being developed, and the conditions required to increase German exports, in order to cover the import of the necessary foreign goods, are not being created, the burden of foreign debt continues to grow and to progressively increase the financial and economic dependence of the western part of Germany on the United States of America, as well as on Great Britain.

It will be seen from statements made by official representatives of the United States that it is intended to crown this policy with the setting up of a government for the western part of Germany. That would be the consummation of the policy of splitting Germany, which is aimed at liquidating Germany as an independent state. It is perfectly obvious that such a policy has nothing in common with the establishment of democratic peace in Europe. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union cannot bear any responsibility for such an anti-democratic policy.

The hope that such a policy can succeed is groundless.

It is impermissible to ignore the vital interests of the German people, who cannot be deprived of their legitimate right to their own independent state. Nor is it permissible to ignore the views of the democratic circles in the European countries, which have always recognized the need for restoring Germany as a united state, provided that it develops on democratic lines and is deprived of the possibility of renewing the policy of aggressive German imperialism.

The fundamental significance of the Potsdam agreement lies precisely in the fact that it provides the states which control Germany with a general line in the joint work of rehabilitating Germany as a peaceable and democratic state. The Soviet Union continues to regard this political basis as a correct one and cannot agree to its revision.

For the reasons stated, the Soviet delegation cannot accept the British draft, which purports to revise the Potsdam agreement, as a basis.

In order to meet the other delegations, the Soviet delegation proposes that the Council proceed to consider the economic questions relating to Germany, taking equally both the British proposals and the proposals of the Soviet delegation as working documents, and without binding itself by accepting either document as a basis.

Lancaster House, London  
December 8, 1947

## GERMANY AND REPARATIONS

*Statement at the Sitting  
of the Council of Foreign Ministers  
December 12, 1947*

The day before yesterday, Mr. Marshall made a statement on behalf of the United States Government, designed to put an immediate stop to reparation deliveries to the Soviet Union from Germany. Mr. Bevin associated himself with that statement on behalf of the British Government. He was followed by M. Bidault who associated himself with the statement on behalf of the French Government. Thus, the three delegations have now united in a common front against reparation deliveries to the Soviet Union.

However, it is not difficult to see that these statements are groundless. Furthermore, they completely contradict those made by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France during the war, when they resolved to support the Soviet Union and other allies on the question of reparations from Germany.

Again recalling the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, I must state that the Soviet Union is not asking, but demanding that the question of reparations at long last be decided. The Soviet Union insists that the agreements regarding reparations shall not remain a dead letter, but shall be carried out as was decided.

The difference in this respect between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, for instance, is generally known. Direct damage alone, inflicted by the Hitlerites on the Soviet territory they occupied, has been estimated at 128 billion dollars. Nobody can deny the enormous damage caused to the Soviet people by German occupation.

Quite different is the case of the United States of America which, fortunately, was not subjected to enemy occupation, and, what is more, enriched itself during the war. Published data testify to the fact that the profits of big property owners in the U.S.A. reached unprecedented proportions during the war years. Under these circumstances the representative of the American Government may, perhaps, object to the payment of reparations to the Soviet Union. But in order that this objection may be recognized as well-founded and just, it must be shown that it rests at least on some sort of moral basis. It is all the more obvious that this objection is groundless since it contradicts the obligations assumed by the United States Government, as well as by the Government of Great Britain, at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.

## I

### HOW THE MATTER OF REPARATIONS STANDS

The Government of the U.S.A. proposes to us that reparation deliveries from current industrial production should cease. But nothing is said as to how matters stand with regard to reparations on account of equipment deliveries. This omission is not accidental. Suffice it to say that the Potsdam agreement envisaged reparation deliveries of equipment from the Western zones of Germany to twenty Allied countries, but in the whole period ending

November 1, 1947, these twenty countries, including the U.S.S.R., received such equipment to the amount of only 33 million dollars. It is evident from this that in actual fact reparations from the Western zones have been disrupted. Is such a situation admissible? Is it not a mockery that, in the course of two and a half years, the twenty Allied countries entitled to reparations from the Western zones have together received reparations to the amount of 33 million dollars in all? Is this the proper way to carry out obligations assumed, given that the wish to carry them out is there?

As long as allies were needed in the war against the common enemy, they mattered; quite substantial promises were made to them, and obligations were entered into. But that was during the war. But when the time came for peace-making, little of these promises was left. Is that the way to establish a democratic peace, which demands that the rights and interests of nations be respected, and that obligations undertaken be firmly observed? The establishment of a democratic peace, as distinct from an imperialistic peace, is incompatible with neglect of the rights and interests of other nations and with violation of obligations undertaken.

I have quoted data showing how reparations in the form of equipment deliveries from the Western zones of Germany are being carried out. Actually, nothing has been done to fulfil these obligations, and the results have been very meagre indeed. The main attack is now being launched against reparation deliveries from so-called current production. And here, too, the American delegation is resorting to arguments which are quite groundless.

However, let us look at the facts. No current reparation deliveries are being made from the Western zones, yet the level of industry in the joint Anglo-American zone

is only 35 per cent of the 1938 level. Current reparation deliveries are being made from the Soviet zone of Germany, and the level of industry there has already reached 52 per cent of the 1938 level. Thus, the index of industrial output for the Soviet zone, although conditions there for the rehabilitation of industry are more difficult, exceeds one and a half times the index of industrial output of the Anglo-American zone.

It follows that reparation deliveries, far from hindering the rehabilitation of industry, facilitate it. Indeed, the Soviet authorities in the Eastern zone of Germany are making every effort to assist the rehabilitation of German civilian industry. A different policy is being pursued by the Anglo-American and French authorities in their zones.

The question arises, what policy should be pursued in respect to German industry, bearing in mind that under no circumstances should we allow the restoration of war industry?

One policy is to stimulate the development of civilian industry so as to increase industrial production in the Western zones from 35 per cent to at least 70 per cent of the 1938 level, i. e., to raise the level of industrial reconstruction to double that reached to date in the Anglo-American zone. In this case the allocation of 10 per cent for current reparation deliveries will leave the Germans with 60 per cent of production instead of the present 35 per cent. As a result, current reparation deliveries will be carried out, and furthermore, the Germans themselves will get almost twice as much industrial goods.

And yet efforts should be made to achieve a level of German industry even higher than 70 per cent of the 1938 level. It only needs to clear the way and make it possible for German industry to get going ever so little—under the control of the four Powers, of course—and the problem

of allocating a part of industrial production for reparation deliveries will be easily solved, and at the same time the satisfaction of the needs of the German people will be considerably increased, as well as the possibility of exporting German commodities to other countries.

Neither should it be forgotten that after a certain period the reparations will have been paid by the Germans, and then the whole industrial output will remain in their own hands, and their industry will also have gathered considerable strength. With such an attitude towards German industry, all the talk about current reparation deliveries lowering the standard of living of the German people becomes baseless and only obscures the real state of affairs.

The Soviet Union considers that the only correct policy is one which makes a positive approach to the rehabilitation of German peace industry. There can be no doubt that this progressive policy will meet with due support from the German people also.

The other policy is to retard the rehabilitation of German industry and to prevent the Germans from restoring the production of machines, clothing, foodstuffs, the chemical industry and other branches of peace industry. This policy facilitates, of course, the sale of foreign commodities in Germany, but it rests on an unsound basis. If the restoration of German industry is hindered for fear that it may become a competitor of certain American, British and French industrial monopolies, then, of course, its restoration will be further retarded and obstacles will be put in the way of its recovering and getting back on its feet. But such a policy is at variance not only with the interests of the German people, but also with the interests of other European nations. It will inevitably end in failure, and will discredit those who pursue such a reactionary policy.

What do we get?

Countries which suffered from German aggression were promised reparations in the form of surplus German equipment. In fact, however, these deliveries have been reduced to nil. On the other hand, no conditions are being created for the efficient use of the enormous amount of equipment possessed by German industry. As a result, the equipment of many German plants has been standing idle for over two years; it is not being repaired, is deteriorating and falling into ruin. The overwhelming majority of German plants are unable to begin normal production, in spite of the efforts of many manufacturers, while workers, technicians and engineers are unable to obtain the work they want. Only individual industrial monopolists with appropriate foreign connections receive support from the occupation authorities in the Western zones of Germany.

This cannot go on much longer. The policy of hindering German industry must be abandoned. Only then will the necessary restoration of economic life in the western part of Germany begin and the living standard of the German population rise.

## II

### WHAT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE WESTERN ZONES

Mention is frequently made here of those limited reparations the Soviet Union is receiving in order to make good at least a small part of the damage caused to the Soviet people by the German occupation. But the hidden reparations and economic privileges which the British, American and French authorities, and their industrialists and banks, are receiving in the Western zones are usually passed over in silence. Justice, however, requires that this should not be forgotten.

I have already had occasion to speak about the coal industry. Until now Ruhr coal has been bought at cheap rates in the British zone and exported to other countries. The British authorities have secured enormous profits by acting as middlemen in these transactions. The same thing is happening with the export of timber from the Western zones. Hundreds of millions of dollars have already been earned in these operations. But this is not called reparations. Actually, however, it is in no way different from reparations, but nobody demands that an account be given of these reparations.

Foreign bankers and industrialists are now taking yet another advantage of the difficult position of the German industrialists. Many plants and whole concerns are being bought up from German industrialists cheap. American and British capital is penetrating into German industry on a wide scale, and without control; it is already beginning to sway the coal, iron and steel, chemical and other industries. The enormous profits made in this way are going to various lucky foreigners, if one may put it so.

The longer the present stagnation of German industry in the Western zones lasts, the easier will it be for foreign owners to buy up German enterprises and make enormous profits in the process. But can such a state of affairs be considered normal, and can German industry be left any longer in this unsightly condition?

Or take the question of credits given to the Germans, say, by the United States and Great Britain. It has already been said here that German indebtedness to the U.S.A. alone amounts to 600 million dollars a year, and together with Great Britain, to 700 million dollars, and these debts continue to mount. Yet the Germans themselves are not being asked whether these credits are acceptable to them on the terms laid down by foreigners.

At the present time it is not only the food Western Germany needs that is being brought from the United States. Kitchen utensils and beds, cleansing liquids and mops, as well as wine and cake are being imported. Of course, there are foreign merchants who have an interest in this. But under present conditions this leads to an enormous inflation of foreign debt, which lies as a burden on Germany. Yet the Germans can produce all this themselves, and a great many other things besides, without getting into dollar debt. All that is needed is that the rehabilitation of the peace branches of German industry should not be hampered.

Under the American plan it is proposed, furthermore, to render so-called "financial aid" in the coming year to the extent of 1,150 million dollars. But again, the Germans are not being asked whether the terms of these new credits are acceptable to them. And since industry in the Western zones is not being developed, the Germans have no possibility of paying back these credits. The German debt in the Western zones will soon reach several billions of dollars. For the German people, these obligations will be harder to bear than any reparations. If the hampering of industry and the disintegration of idle industrial equipment is not brought to an end, and the debts go on increasing, an intolerable burden of foreign debt will fall on the shoulders of the Germans.

The growth of dollar indebtedness in the Western zones places the whole economy of the western part of Germany in a state of dependence on other countries, especially the United States. Germany's industry is to an ever increasing degree becoming subordinated to American and other foreign monopolies. The dependence of the economic life of the western part of Germany on the United States is increasing from day to day, and it is no longer possible

to speak of any independent development of German economic and political life in the Western zones. Financial aid from the United States is becoming such a burden, and is leading to such grave economic consequences, that the German people will have to pay for it for a long time to come. American aid of this kind is becoming a dangerous obstacle to the restoration of Germany's economic and political independence.

Other Powers want to use Germany in their own interest, by promising her financial assistance, and so on. There even exist plans to use the western part of Germany as a base for the exertion of political pressure inside and outside Germany in furtherance of the interests of certain foreign reactionary circles and, in the future, as a strategic base against European democratic states. These calculations are built on sand.

It would be one thing if Germany were forbidden to restore her war industry but were enabled to develop her peace industry and to export part of her industrial output to other countries. She would then be able to procure the import commodities she needs and to repay credits without falling into bondage and putting herself in a position of dangerous economic dependence on this or that strong Power. There would then be no talk about the taxpayer, since the taxpayer's interests would be safeguarded by the punctual repayment of credits by Germany.

But what we have at present is quite different. At present, even the elementary conditions for the restoration of German industry are not being provided. As a result, the daily increasing foreign indebtedness of the western part of Germany is placing Germany in a position of complete dependence on other countries, especially on the U.S.A., where no little power is wielded by those who are not at all concerned about the German people, but who would

like to use Germany, or at least her western part, for the furtherance of their expansionist aims, and as a strategic base for aggressive plans of this kind. Severance of the western part of Germany from the rest of Germany—with fresh measures towards the accomplishment of which we are continually being confronted—gives a free hand to those who are anxious to lord it in the West.


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The German problem can be properly solved only if the economic and political unity of Germany is preserved. For this purpose German economic departments should be created forthwith as the nucleus of an all-German government. To this end, it is necessary to proceed at once to establish a German Advisory Council, composed of representatives of the Lands, of the democratic parties of the whole of Germany, and of representatives of the free trade unions and other large anti-Nazi organizations.

In that case there would be someone who could be asked what the Germans themselves think about this or that economic assistance to Germany, about the acceptability of the terms of foreign credits to be granted, about the necessity of importing any particular foreign goods, and so on. And in that case, too, punctual fulfilment of Germany's reparation obligations would be ensured.

The day before yesterday it was argued here that the Germans should repay foreign credits before meeting all their other obligations, and before paying reparations. It goes without saying that these claims are unfounded and unjust.

The Soviet delegation insists that the question of reparations be settled without delay, in accordance with the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.



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## THE RESULTS OF THE LONDON MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

*Statement to Soviet Press  
Representatives\**

In reply to questions put by correspondents of *Izvestia* and *Pravda* regarding the results of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and in connection with the statements made on this subject by U. S. Secretary of State Mr. Marshall and British Foreign Secretary Mr. Bevin, V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., made the following statement:—

Both the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held last spring and the London meeting were called principally for the purpose of considering the German problem. The materials of both these conferences provide sufficient data to form a judgment of the attitudes of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in regard to Germany.

Agreement on the German problem was not achieved in London. The trouble, however, was not the various minor matters to which reference has sometimes been made in recent statements. Agreement was not reached on two basic issues: firstly, on the peace treaty with Germany, and, secondly, on the re-establishment of Germany's unity.

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\* Published in the Moscow newspapers, December 31, 1947.

The Yalta and Potsdam agreements, concluded by the heads of the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. in 1945, furnish a solid basis for the solution of both these problems. If not only the Government of the U.S.S.R., but also the other governments which signed these agreements adhere to the decisions adopted, general agreement on the German issue will be achieved despite existing differences. On the other hand, the Soviet Government has always declared that it would not depart from these agreements and would not go along with those who do not want to implement them and who are at present trying to impose a different policy with regard to Germany, a policy that is at variance with the principles of democracy and the security of nations which were made the basis of the Yalta and Potsdam decisions on the German question.

## I

### PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY

The question of the peace treaty with Germany is important not only for Germany but for all European nations seeking to establish enduring peace. The peace settlement with regard to Germany will mean the termination of the present indefinite situation and the full establishment of peace in Europe. Not only the European, but all other peace-loving nations are interested in this. If we really wish to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Europe we must proceed to prepare the peace treaty with Germany, as well as to settle all matters involved in the convocation of the peace conference on the German problem. This was the attitude of the Soviet delegation, which, however, did not receive the support of the other three Ministers at the London meeting.

There is, as we know, another attitude. Early this year the U.S.A. proposed the adoption of a provisional statute for Germany, which would have meant shelving the peace treaty with Germany indefinitely. The Soviet Government was opposed then, as it is now, to the proposal for a provisional statute for Germany, which could only hinder the establishment of enduring peace in Europe.

At the London meeting the Soviet delegation urged that the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany be begun, and not postponed any longer. Our delegation insisted that the Council of Foreign Ministers should tackle its main task, for which it had been set up. When the Council of Foreign Ministers was instituted, the Potsdam conference laid down that its main task was to conduct "the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements," by which was envisaged not only the West, but also the East, and it was because of this that China was included in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

It was decided at Potsdam that the Council should first draft the peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland; and this was done last year. The decision of the Potsdam conference, however, also said that "the Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany, a corresponding document to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established." It is perfectly obvious that the time has now come for the Council of Foreign Ministers to focus its attention on the problem of the peace settlement for Germany in the West and the problem of the peace settlement for Japan in the East. This is the sure road to the consolidation of general peace.

It is known that last year the Government of the U.S.A. also believed it necessary to begin preparation of the peace

treaty with Germany. The American delegation submitted a proposal to this effect already in April, 1946, at the Paris meeting. But at that time, attention was diverted to the preparation of other peace treaties, which made it impossible to proceed to the peace treaty with Germany. But now the situation is different. Now that the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland have not only been signed but have entered into force, it is to be considered that the time has come to tackle the peace treaty with Germany. Nevertheless, it is the U.S.A. that is at present offering the most stubborn resistance to this. The attitude of the U.S.A. has changed, and now, in contradistinction to last year, the Government of the U.S.A. is no longer anxious to accelerate the settlement of this problem. The London conference showed that Great Britain and France are following the same course.

The representatives of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France did not regard the problem of the peace settlement for Germany as one of actual moment for the London meeting. They sought either completely to remove it from the agenda or to postpone it and class it with other secondary matters. From the totality of this problem they artificially singled out the question of Germany's frontiers. This was not dictated by businesslike motives, but was a sort of playing on the Germans' nerves. Naturally, this issue can be settled only in the course of examination of the whole problem of the peace settlement for Germany, which, however, our partners did not want to do. Besides, in one of its previous decisions, the Council of Foreign Ministers had already deemed it necessary to set up a special committee for frontier affairs, along with other special committees for preparing the peace treaty with Germany.

It is now being alleged that the discussion on the preparation of the German peace treaty at the London session

was fruitless, although this does not correspond to fact. This session—chiefly thanks to the efforts of the Soviet delegation—adopted a number of decisions in which progress was made towards reconciling the positions of the four governments in regard to the procedure of preparing the peace treaty with Germany. For some reason this is now being passed over in silence. Consideration of this matter was not, however, completed, since the American delegation took hurried measures to disrupt the entire work of the London meeting.

Why the U.S.A., which last year invited us to speed up the preparation of the peace treaty, does not consider this problem to be of actual moment now, is something nobody has explained! Yet it is perfectly obvious that without a peace settlement for Germany the establishment of peace in Europe cannot be completed.

The facts bear out that it was the Soviet Union alone that insisted that the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers should expedite the preparation of the peace settlement for Germany. It is perfectly obvious that this accords with the interests of all nations which are anxious for the consolidation of general peace.

## II

### RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF GERMANY'S UNITY

Along with the problem of the peace settlement for Germany there arose the question of a German government, and, in connection with this, the question of the re-establishment of Germany's unity.

It is clear how important the re-establishment of Germany's unity is for the national development of the German people. On the other hand, it is important for all

democratic and peace-loving countries that the principles of the democratization and demilitarization of Germany adopted by the anti-Hitler coalition at the Potsdam conference should be practically implemented throughout the whole of Germany. And this is possible only if Germany's unity is re-established and not a single part of Germany remains outside the joint control of all the four Powers charged with implementing these principles. The fulfilment by Germany of her obligations toward the Allied countries which suffered Nazi aggression and occupation likewise to no small extent depends on the re-establishment of Germany's unity.

At the London meeting no one openly objected to the unity of Germany. Statements were even made to the effect that the re-establishment of Germany's unity was the principal task of the meeting of the four Ministers. It transpired, however, that the representatives of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France wanted to reduce this task merely to the arrangement of certain agreements among the occupation authorities concerning the elimination of zonal barriers, for the purpose of facilitating the movement of goods and so forth, ignoring the participation of the German people themselves and of their democratic forces in the restoration of the unity of the German State. It consequently appeared that here, too, the concern was for the convenience of foreign export companies in selling their goods in Germany rather than for the actual re-establishment of the unity of the German State.

Fundamentally different from this was the attitude of the U.S.S.R. delegation.

For, indeed, can one seriously speak of re-establishing Germany's unity in conformity with the Potsdam agreement without the active participation of the German people themselves and their progressive democratic forces? It is

not difficult to answer this question: it is impossible to re-establish Germany's unity on a democratic and peaceful basis without the active participation of the democratic forces of the German people. Therefore, at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet delegation made the proposal to proceed to the organization of an all-German government in compliance with the decision of the Potsdam conference. It is perfectly obvious that had this proposal been accepted, the re-establishment of Germany's unity would have been placed on a firm foundation. However, the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France rejected the Soviet proposal to set up a provisional central German government.

Our delegation made another proposal as a first step towards the formation of a central German government. It proposed that, at the least, the decision of the Potsdam conference should be carried out regarding the creation of central German departments for finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry, as well as for agriculture and food. The formation of such economic departments for the whole of Germany would indisputably constitute a practical step towards the re-establishment of Germany's economic and political unity.

Lastly, the Soviet delegation proposed that a German advisory council be set up in Berlin, composed of representatives of the Lands and of the democratic parties of the whole of Germany, as well as of representatives of the free trade unions and other major anti-Nazi organizations. This would also constitute a practical contribution towards the re-establishment of Germany's unity, and would open new prospects for the German people.

The proposals of the Soviet Union concerning an all-German government, German economic departments and a German advisory council in Berlin indicated an effective

way of re-establishing Germany's unity. Indeed, Germany's unity cannot be re-established without the participation of the German people themselves, without enlisting their democratic forces in this matter. The democratization and demilitarization of Germany in accordance with the Potsdam agreement calls for the formation of central German economic and political bodies, and consequently for the active participation of Germany's democratic forces in this matter.

However, the proposals of the Soviet delegation did not meet with the support of the Western Powers. The attitude of these Powers at the London meeting rendered all progress in re-establishing Germany's unity impossible.

All this indicates that there are two basic political attitudes towards the re-establishment of Germany's unity: the one maintained by the Soviet Union, and the other by the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, although among the latter there are certain differences in the formulation of their common position. The Soviet Union alone consistently stands for the re-establishment of Germany's unity. As to the other three Powers, their attitude in this matter signifies a policy of disintegrating rather than uniting Germany, a policy of separating the Western zones from the rest of Germany, which has already resulted in the actual splitting of Germany.

The policy of disintegrating Germany finds expression in the Anglo-Franco-American proposal that "all power should be vested in the Lands," with the exception of certain minor functions which are to remain within the competence of the central German bodies. This policy is dictated by the desire to see Germany split up, both politically and economically. The effect of such a policy would be that Germany's democratic forces would not be able properly to unite for the defence of the just national

interests of their people. This policy is dictated by the fear that Germany will re-establish herself as a serious competitor in the world market, over which the American monopolies and their affiliations in Europe are seeking to hold undivided sway and to dictate their will. Such a policy can attract only narrow groups of German monopolists allied to industrial and banking monopolists in other countries. This policy may also be exploited in their own interests by German reactionaries from among the revanchists of every description, including the old militarists, who would like to take the idea of German unity into their own hands and to exploit it for their own anti-democratic and imperialist ends. This policy contravenes the Potsdam agreement, it has nothing in common with the interests of German democracy, and is alien to the interests of the nations which are anxious for the consolidation of peace and democracy in Europe.

This anti-democratic policy is now being pursued in practice in the Western zones of Germany. The creation of an Anglo-American Bizonia has facilitated the carrying out of this policy, since Bizonia is in point of fact not under the control of the four Powers but is subordinated to an Anglo-American administration.

The Soviet Union's repudiation of federalization prevented the extension of this policy to the whole of Germany. But the Anglo-American authorities have not hesitated to take the course of splitting Germany, so long as they can create a field for the application of their own policy, even if only in the Western zones.

A year and a half ago the U.S.A. put forward the idea of a separate fusion of the two zones—the American and the British. Economic considerations were given as the motive. It was chiefly said that the desire was to reduce the expenditures of the occupying Powers in the Western

zones, despite the fact that a considerable part of these expenditures did not, and does not now, go to benefit the German population but for the upkeep of so-called "displaced persons," many of whom actively assisted the Hitlerites in the war against the Allied states, and for the upkeep of whom these same Germans now have to pay. It is no longer concealed that the separation of Bizonia from the rest of Germany also serves political purposes. Much has been written in the American and British press in recent months to the effect that Anglo-American Bizonia needs a government of its own, under one name or another, that Bizonia must have its own constitution, that a separate currency reform must be carried out there and its own currency issued, and the like. Thus, all the practical activities of the American and British authorities in their united zone are aimed at completing the division of Germany which was begun last year. Preparations are also in progress for incorporating the French zone into the Anglo-American zone, which would transform Anglo-American Bizonia into Anglo-French-American Trizonia.

All this shows that the statements of the British and American representatives in favour of re-establishing Germany's unity are in utter contradiction with the practical activities of the Anglo-American authorities in the Western zones. In actual fact, the policy of the Anglo-American authorities, as of the French authorities in their zone, is tending to widen the division of Germany, which, however, cannot but result in undermining the prestige of those who pursue such a policy. The bankruptcy of this policy is inevitable, because it contradicts the historical development of Germany and meets with condemnation throughout democratic Europe.

### III

## CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE LONDON MEETING

The London meeting demonstrated that the differences on the subject of the peace treaty with Germany and on the subject of the re-establishment of Germany's unity are not fortuitous. They reflect two different approaches to the solution of the German problem.

It is now known that there is an intention to make Germany, or at least Western Germany, the object of a definite American plan in Europe. Germany is promised thousands of millions of American dollars, ostensibly for her economic recovery, food supply and the like. Germany's affairs are judged and decided by American Senators and American businessmen of every description, who boss it in the Western zones and help the American monopolies to penetrate ever deeper into the industries and banks of Western Germany. It is now known that actual power in Anglo-American Bizonia is shifting from the united Anglo-American bodies directly to the Americans, who have amassed the most dollars.

All this is being done ostensibly for the sake of Germany and not for the sake of definite foreign plans. The German people, however, remain isolated from what is actually being done in furtherance of these plans. They are not consulted on anything by those who lord it on German territory and who are already seeking to arrange economic and political conditions for many years to come, at least in the western part of Germany. The size of credits for Germany are fixed and the political and economic terms of these credits dictated, without it being asked whether these terms and these credits are acceptable.

The professions of a desire to assist Germany's economic rehabilitation are blatantly at variance with the actual conditions in Anglo-American Bizonia. This year, as last, industry in Western Germany is languishing miserably, and two-thirds of it are still idle. The index of industrial output has attained to only 35 per cent of the 1938 level, which is considerably below the industrial index in the Soviet zone, despite the fact that there conditions for the rehabilitation of industry are considerably more difficult. The policy pursued in the Western zones is not one of assisting the rehabilitation of civilian industry, but of hindering its development and causing it to stagnate, as a result of which the unused plant is progressively losing its value, deteriorating and falling to pieces. Virtually no land reform has been effected in the Western zones. The small peasants have received no addition to their holdings, as they have in the Soviet zone, at the expense of the rich Junkers and big landowners, who constituted the mainstay of German militarism and Nazi aggression. Anglo-American credits to Bizonia, of which the Anglo-American authorities themselves have disposed at their own discretion, have become a heavy burden on the German population of the Anglo-American zone, without benefiting its economic rehabilitation.

At present the American plan provides for billions of dollars of credit to Bizonia over a period of years. These billions will bring the German and American monopolists still closer and render the position of the small and medium industrialists still more difficult, not to speak of the bulk of the German population, whose opinion nobody consults in this case either. These credits are not directed to the development of the numerous peace industries in Western Germany, but principally to the development of industries producing raw materials, such as coal mining

and, in part, the iron and steel industry. Much of what Germany could produce in her own mills and factories will again be imported into Germany from other countries, and it is intended above all to secure an increase of imports from America! The economic dependence of the western part of Germany on foreign capital will grow still greater, although not a few German plants have already been bought for a song by foreign monopolists. It will not be difficult to deal with an economically weakened Western Germany at the discretion of the American creditors, especially in the absence of a central German government.

This plan to a great extent reflects the desire to convert the western part of Germany into a base for extending the influence of American imperialism in Europe. The American plan embraces a number of European states, whose rehabilitation is made dependent on definite economic and political terms dictated to them too by the U.S.A. Undivided sway of American imperialism in the western part of Germany is designed to facilitate the strengthening of its influence in other European countries as well. And the development in Bizonia of such industries as iron and steel and coal mining creates the prerequisites for exploiting Western Germany as a strategical base for the reckless and aggressive plans of American imperialism.

It should also be said that the American plan by no means envisages the fulfilment by Germany of her reparation obligations towards the states which suffered German aggression and occupation. It does not reckon with their interests, and disregards the decision of the Potsdam conference on this subject. Allegations that the settlement of the problem of reparations for the U.S.S.R. is hindered by the absence of information from the Soviet zone are, of course, utterly unfounded. The Soviet Union has always expressed and still expresses its readiness to present full

information on this subject, if the Western Powers are prepared to proceed to the settlement of the reparations problem in deeds and not in words. As to the other Allied states to which reparations from Germany's Western zones are due, it is an open secret that Anglo-American and French policy has reduced the provisions of the Potsdam agreement practically to naught as far as those countries are concerned.

Thus the American plan for Germany utterly disregards the interests of other states which participated in the anti-Hitler coalition. It is aimed at abolishing the Potsdam agreement, which conforms to the interests of peace and the security of the nations of Europe. The present American plan is a reflection of the interests of definite American circles, and the western part of Germany is in this case merely an object which is being exploited in the interest of American expansion.

After this, it is clear why the U.S.A., which is engaged at present in carrying out its plan in Europe, shows no interest either in the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany or in the re-establishment of Germany's unity.

By maintaining for as long as possible the present unsettled position, in which the state of war with Germany has not yet been terminated, it is possible without scruple to prescribe to the Germans any medicine for the German economy, to impose upon the Germans any obligations in payment for the so-called "aid." Both the peace treaty and the re-establishment of Germany's unity call for the formation of a German government. But it is easy to see that the formation of a democratic German government would compel the payment of greater heed to the interests of the German people, which apparently does not come within the present plan of so-called "aid." The longer such a government does not exist, the "freer," as the saying

goes, will be the hand of those who are carrying out the American plan—at least in that part of Germany to which they have access. Only this can explain the unwillingness to deal in the Council of Foreign Ministers either with the peace treaty, or with the re-establishment of Germany's unity, or with the formation of a provisional German government.

We are told that either the proposed American plan for Germany is carried out, or else not even "paper agreements on the peace treaties" will be concluded. Such frankness is useful for clarifying the present situation. It follows that the U.S.A. makes the full restoration of peace in Europe, as well as the re-establishment of the unity of the German State, without which the peace treaty with Germany cannot be concluded, conditional upon the acceptance of the American plan for Germany and Europe. Either accept this anti-democratic plan unreservedly, as it is dictated by the American expansionists, or there will be no agreement concerning the peace treaties—that is, the restoration of peace in Europe will not be completed. This policy of dictation could not but meet with rebuff from the Soviet Union. It was this policy of dictation on the part of the U.S.A. which led to the breakdown of the London meeting.

The London meeting ended in failure. No few attempts were made to lay the responsibility for this on the U.S.S.R. Nothing came of it. The responsibility for the breakdown of the London meeting lies with the ruling circles of the United States of America. This time, too, both Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault followed the lead of Mr. Marshall.



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## SPEECH DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

*February 4, 1948*

Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen.

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance which has just been signed is a significant milestone in the history of the relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Rumania. The Soviet-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance has become possible now that all disputable frontier issues have been eliminated between our states, now that Rumania has joined the ranks of the democratic states and, like the Soviet Union, is imbued with the desire to consolidate peace and good-neighbourly cooperation. In our country everyone sees in this another success of the Stalin foreign policy and an important contribution to the strength of the international forces of peace and democracy.

Gone are the times when the enemies of peace and progress hampered the establishment of friendly relations between the neighbour states—the Soviet Union and Rumania—and, against the will and interests of the Rumanian people, endeavoured to transform Rumania into a hotbed of anti-Soviet intrigue. The time has come when, as a

result of the demolition of German fascism, Rumania has obtained the opportunity to pursue her own independent policy and build her relations with other states in conformity with the true interests of the Rumanian people. The Soviet people will welcome with great satisfaction this Treaty, which puts an end to the misunderstandings of the past and seals the friendly and good-neighbourly relations that have grown up since the time of the joint struggle against Hitlerism and the laying of the foundations of democracy in Rumania, which has now become a People's Republic. This Treaty creates firm foundations for the further development of political, economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and democratic Rumania.

The peoples of the Soviet Union, engaged in the realization of the postwar Stalin Five-Year-Plan, and the Rumanian people, who are concentrating upon the rehabilitation and development of their economy, are vitally interested in the maintenance of general peace and the security of nations. It is in the interest of our states, just as it is in the interest of all peace-loving peoples, to do everything in their power to eliminate all danger of a repetition of aggression on the part of Germany or of any other state which might unite with Germany in a policy of aggression.

The present Soviet-Rumanian Treaty clearly reflects the desire of the Soviet Union and Rumania to cooperate, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations, for the purpose of ensuring peace and the security of nations, their readiness to make their contribution to the realization of these lofty aims. For this reason the Soviet-Rumanian Treaty will be acclaimed with satisfaction not only by the peoples of the Soviet Union and Rumania but also by all true friends of peace in other countries. The conclusion of such a treaty, which is designed to ensure the

peaceful cooperation of two neighbour states and the peace and security of nations, is especially important now, when the fomenters of a new war from the imperialist camp are endeavouring to form military-political blocs directed against the democratic states and attempting to prevent the development of peaceful cooperation among nations. The Soviet-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance will constitute another strong barrier against all plans of new aggression and predatory imperialism.

I congratulate you, Mr. Prime Minister, upon the signing of the Treaty, which will help the promotion of friendly relations between our countries and the furtherance of general peace.

Long live the alliance and friendship between the Soviet Union and democratic Rumania!

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## SPEECH DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE HUNGARIAN REPUBLIC

*February 18, 1948*

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen.

The signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and democratic Hungary will be hailed with profound satisfaction in our country. This Treaty will serve to promote lasting fellowship and close cooperation between our peoples on the basis of mutual respect for each other's independence and national sovereignty. At the same time it provides another important means for consolidating peace and security in Europe.

If the lessons of World War I proved insufficient, the lessons of World War II must help the peace-loving nations of Europe to prevent a repetition of aggression on the part of Germany or any other state which might unite with her in a policy of aggression. It is in accordance with this that the present Treaty, which conforms to the aims and principles of the United Nations, has been concluded.

With the conclusion of this Treaty, the Soviet Union will have pacts of friendship and mutual assistance with all the states on its western frontier—from the Black Sea

to the Baltic. In this we, Soviet people, see an important achievement in the implementation of the Stalin foreign policy, which aims at strengthening friendship with all neighbouring states and consolidating general peace.

Permit me to express the conviction that in democratic Hungary too this Treaty will be received with satisfaction and an understanding of its historic significance.

On behalf of the Soviet Government, I congratulate you, Mr. President, and you, Mr. Prime Minister, on the signing of the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

May the alliance and friendship between the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Republic flourish and grow stronger!

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## SPEECH DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

*March 18, 1948*

Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen.

The Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed today cements the friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria which have taken firm shape within the past few years and which have deep historical roots. This Treaty is founded upon respect for the principles of state independence and national sovereignty and will serve to promote democratic peace and security in Europe.

The purpose of this Treaty is to prevent a repetition of German aggression, which in the past few decades twice violated the peace of nations and unleashed two world wars. It is but natural that the Soviet Union, which shouldered the great burden of fascist aggression, acclaims with particular satisfaction every new step toward preventing, and preparing for the repulsion of, possible fresh attempts at imperialist aggression.

At the same time the governments of our countries today proclaim with fresh force their desire comprehen-

sively to develop friendly relations between our peoples, to strengthen their economic and cultural ties.

All who sincerely stand for peace and the strengthening of friendship among nations cannot but acclaim this Treaty.

I take this opportunity to wish the fraternal Bulgarian people every success in the building of the new democratic Bulgaria. True to the Lenin-Stalin principles of its policy, the Soviet Union has rendered and will continue to render its unfailing support to the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Long live the inviolable alliance and friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria!

Permit me, Mr. Prime Minister, to congratulate you upon the signing of the historical Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty.

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## SPEECH DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND FINLAND

*April 6, 1948*

Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen.

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Finland signed today constitutes an important stage in the development of Soviet-Finnish relations. This Treaty is aimed at preventing a repetition of German aggression and will serve to promote the development of friendly relations between our countries and the consolidation of peace in Europe.

It must be admitted that the time was ripe for the conclusion of such a treaty. Accordingly, the letter addressed by J. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, to Mr. Paasikivi, President of Finland, expressed the desire "to create the conditions for a radical improvement of relations between our countries with a view to consolidating peace and security."

In this connection, negotiations were conducted in these past days between the Soviet Union and Finland for the conclusion of the Treaty, and the draft submitted by the Government of Finland was taken as the basis for this

Treaty. In the course of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland necessary amendments and addenda were made in accordance with the proposals of both parties.

The Soviet Government expresses its confidence that the present Treaty will contribute to broad and amicable co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and Finland, and that the signing of this Treaty will be received with satisfaction not only by the peoples of our countries but by all friends of peace and progress.

May the alliance and friendship between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and Finland flourish and grow stronger!

Permit me, Mr. Prime Minister, to congratulate you and the entire Finnish Government Delegation on the signing of the Treaty, which lays a new foundation for Soviet-Finnish relations.

## SPEECH ON LEAVING WARSAW

*After the Conference  
of the Foreign Ministers of Eight States*  
June 25, 1948

Citizens of Warsaw,

Permit me to greet you on behalf of Moscow and the Soviet Government, and to express satisfaction that I have had this opportunity to visit the glorious capital of the Polish people, a city that has suffered such exceptionally grave trials.

We all remember the words of the great Stalin on the occasion of the conclusion of the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between our countries, to the effect that in recent years a radical change has taken place in Soviet-Polish relations, that the old, unfriendly relations have been replaced by relations of alliance and friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland. This was achieved after surmounting tremendous difficulties over a long period of years—the years of struggle against German aggression. It was thanks to the unswerving desire of the Soviet Union for the establishment of fraternal relations with democratic Poland, and thanks to the fact that the foremost people of Poland, those who voice the thoughts and sentiments of the Polish people, have become imbued with similar noble aspirations with regard to the Soviet people, that we have achieved this. Now it is evident that our Polish friends

are right when they see in Soviet-Polish friendship the best guarantee of the independence of the Polish People's Republic, of its might and prosperity.

The declaration of the Foreign Ministers of eight countries on the recent London conference on Germany, drawn up at the Conference in Warsaw, was published today. This declaration speaks of that which the nations of Europe, including the German people, must not permit to happen if they want to avoid a repetition of German aggression; the declaration speaks also of that which is essential for the peoples in order to cement peace and hasten the postwar economic recovery of the countries of Europe. Only the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, as is evident from the declaration, could have put forward a program on questions pertaining to Germany that conforms to the interest of all nations and really serves the cause of peace, democracy and Socialism.

In conclusion, permit me to express my gratitude to the Polish Government and personally to you, Mr. Prime Minister, to you, Mr. Foreign Minister, and particularly to thank you, citizens of Warsaw, for the warm and hospitable welcome accorded the Soviet delegation and the representatives of other friendly countries who took part in the Conference in Warsaw.

Long live the new, independent, friendly Poland!

Long live the capital of the Polish people, Warsaw!

May the alliance between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic flourish and grow stronger!

Long live the friendship of peoples united by the same desire for progress as the peoples of the Soviet Union and of people's democratic Poland!



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## XXXI ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

*Speech Delivered at  
a Celebration Meeting of the Moscow Soviet  
November 6, 1948*

Comrades,

We are today celebrating the 31st anniversary of the Socialist Revolution in our country.

The working people of the Soviet Union meet this anniversary of the Great October Revolution with a glorious record of victories achieved in the third, decisive year of the postwar five-year plan. Socialist competition is spreading and developing among the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia, multiplying from day to day the achievements of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the work of building Communism. The constructive efforts of the Soviet people are concentrated on the realization of the great plans for the advancement of industry and agriculture, plans of hitherto unprecedented scale and significance. The economic might of the Soviet Union is growing and the material welfare of our people steadily rising before our eyes. Ever firmer grows the friendship among the peoples of the U.S.S.R., who are inspired by Soviet patriotism and imbued with unbounded confidence in and love for the Stalin leadership of our country.

The October Revolution marked the beginning of the collapse of the capitalist system, but for nearly three decades the Soviet Union was the sole socialist country. After the second world war there fell away from capitalism such European countries as Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Yugoslavia. In the dependent and colonial countries the movement for national liberation is making giant strides. In spite of all obstacles, the democratic forces are growing and becoming steeled and tempered in the struggle against the forces of reaction in the capitalist countries. The U.S.S.R. is continuously gaining in international prestige as the main bulwark of the democratic and anti-imperialist camp, opposed to the camp of imperialism and aggression.

Under the great banner of Lenin and Stalin our people are marching forward. They look back with satisfaction on the past years of heroic struggle and glorious victories, and are full of confidence in their future.

## I

### ON A NEW UPGRADE

All efforts of our people since the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War are guided by the well-known directing principles outlined by Comrade Stalin:

"Having terminated the war with victory over the enemies, the Soviet Union has entered a new, peaceful period in its economic development. At the present time the Soviet people are confronted with the task of advancing further ahead to a new economic upsurge after having consolidated the positions gained. We cannot limit ourselves to consolidating these positions, for that would lead to stagnation—we must advance further ahead in order to

create the conditions for a new powerful upsurge in the national economy. In the shortest possible time we must heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the enemy and restore the prewar level of development of the national economy, in order considerably to surpass this level in the nearest future, raise the material well-being of the peoples and still further strengthen the military and economic might of the Soviet State."

Everyone can now see that the Soviet people are successfully carrying out this Stalin program of firmly consolidating the positions won and continuing to advance to a new economic upswing.

Whereas the program of the first year of the postwar five-year plan was not completely fulfilled, since in the first year after the war much effort was spent on the reconversion of industry from a war to a peace footing, and also because of the additional difficulties which arose in connection with the drought and crop failure of 1946, already in the second year of the five-year plan the position improved along the whole economic front. In 1947 our industry not only fulfilled but considerably exceeded its year's program. The effect of this was that the combined programs of the first two years of the postwar five-year plan were completely fulfilled. It must be reckoned as a great achievement of the Soviet people that already by the end of last year our industrial output had reached the level of the prewar year of 1940.

Under these circumstances, the present, third year is of decisive importance for the fulfilment of the postwar five-year plan. On the success of our efforts, on the efforts of the Party organizations, trade unions and Young Communist League depends the fulfilment of the five-year plan as a whole and, what is especially important, the possibility of fulfilling it ahead of schedule. And we know

that the idea of fulfilling the five-year plan ahead of schedule has taken a deep hold on the minds of the working class.

Last year the working men and women of Leningrad addressed an appeal to the working men and women of the whole country to fulfil the five-year plan in four years. This appeal met with the broadest response. Thanks to our efforts, in the first quarter of this year the usual decline of industrial output as compared with the last months of the previous year was not in evidence. This year our industry is steadily exceeding its targets from quarter to quarter. In the first nine months gross output of industry showed an increase of 27 per cent as against the corresponding period of last year. This fact alone indicates how rapidly the postwar rehabilitation and economic progress of our country are proceeding. This is also borne out by the fact that in the current year industrial output is proceeding at a level 17 per cent higher than that of the prewar year 1940. (*Applause.*)

Together with the recovery and growth of industry, the material prosperity of the working class is also rising. This year the aggregate payroll of factory and office workers is nearly double that of 1940. The building of houses, schools, hospitals, rest homes and cultural institutions is proceeding on a broad scale. The extensive program of improvement of the living and working conditions of the people adopted in the five-year plan is being effectively realized.

Of course, we shall not rest content with the successes achieved. Nor shall we forget that a number of branches of heavy and light industry, where the destructive effects of the war period are still being felt, have not yet attained the prewar level, and that not infrequently due effort is not being made to improve quality of industrial output.

Nevertheless, the achievements already obtained enable us to accelerate the progress of the lagging branches of industry and to ensure the fulfilment of the postwar five-year plan for industry ahead of schedule. The Party enjoins us to advance—still better to organize and develop the systematic struggle in factory and collective farm to fulfil the five-year plan in four years.

In the Soviet Union we are witnessing a general and steady expansion of industry which is directed by the Socialist State. This too is the path now taken by the people's democracies. But this cannot be said of the capitalist countries, although they suffered immeasurably less from the war than the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies.

In the United States industrial output is not even 80 per cent of the level of 1943, when, nourished by enormous war contracts, it reached its peak. In spite of this, the profits of American corporations continue to grow. Whereas in 1939 they amounted to 6,400 million dollars, and at the height of the war exceeded 24,000 million dollars per annum, last year the profits of the American monopolies reached nearly 30,000 million dollars. On the other hand, the wages of the American workers in these past years have been lagging heavily behind the rise of prices, which signifies a serious deterioration in the condition of the working class. While, according to official reports, the number of unemployed in the United States barely exceeds two million—which, there is much data to show, is greatly underestimated, the actual figure being at least three times larger—the number of semi-unemployed, those not working a full week, already amounts, even according to official statistics, to over eight million.

Or take France, where the condition of the working class is focusing general attention. The real wages of the French workers, owing to rising prices of commodities,

have in postwar years fallen to one-half. Published figures reveal that in the first half of this year the profits of the French capitalists amounted to 43 per cent of France's total national income, whereas the wages of the workers and office employees comprised only 39 per cent of the national income. These figures show that the profits of the French capitalists considerably exceed the total wages received by all the workers and office employees of France.

Whereas the progress of our industry is entirely based upon our internal resources and on the labour effort of the Soviet people, in the capitalist countries of Europe everything is based on the expectation of receiving credits from "Uncle Sam."

Everybody is familiar with the stir raised in Europe over the Marshall Plan. This plan is advertised as the factor of salvation for the postwar recovery of Europe's economy. To listen to certain British or French statesmen, without American credits under the Marshall Plan the economic recovery of the European countries is impossible. However, the American dollars which flowed this year into the pockets of the European capitalists under the United States credit plan were not productive of any real revival of industry in the countries of capitalist Europe. Nor can they result in such a revival—because the American credits are not being given in order to restore and expand the industries of the European countries which compete with the United States, but in order to provide a broader market for American goods in Europe, and to place these countries in economic and political dependence on the capitalist monopolies which dominate the United States, and on their aggressive plans, in disregard of the interests of the European peoples themselves.

In contradistinction to this, the postwar recovery and expansion of industry in the U.S.S.R. are not dependent

upon any capitalist country and entirely serve to satisfy the needs of its own people.

Both industry and agriculture in the Soviet Union have entered on a new and powerful upswing.

Here are a few facts.

This year the gross grain harvest has already reached the level of the prewar year 1940. We achieved this in spite of the fact that the crop area has not yet attained the prewar level, and that the heavy loss of tractors and farm machinery sustained by agriculture in the period of enemy occupation has not yet been repaired. All the greater is the significance of the fact that, thanks to more efficient use of available machines, and to considerable improvement in the organization of the labour of the collective farmers, the grain yield this year exceeded that of the prewar year 1940. We are now fully aware that our principal task in agriculture is to achieve a further increase in the yield of grain and other crops.

Everybody knows how successfully the grain deliveries proceeded this year, to which our Government has always attached the utmost significance. The competition which developed between region and region, and district and district, as well as between republic and republic, yielded valuable results. You know of this from the numerous letters addressed to Comrade Stalin which have been published in our press. In spite of the drought which afflicted a large part of the Volga area, the fulfilment of the plan for grain deliveries this year is successfully nearing completion. A whole number of regions and territories have delivered to the state far more grain this year than last year, and more than they did in prewar years. Suffice it to say that 131 million poods of grain were delivered this year more than last year in the Ukraine, 77 million poods in the Northern Caucasus and 40 million poods

in Siberia. Not only is the current supply of bread-stuffs to the population now fully ensured, but necessary government stocks have been built up for the future.

With a view to accelerating the progress of agriculture—the production of grain, cotton, sugar beet and other crops—as well as to creating a fodder base for the all-round advancement of animal husbandry, the state is initiating broad measures for the advancement of scientific methods of agriculture in the collective farms and state farms, for the supply of mineral fertilizers and of all necessary machines. With the support of the state, the collective farms will now be in a position to expand all branches of collective animal husbandry, and at the same time increase its productivity. This year agriculture will receive from the state three times as many tractors, twice as many motor trucks and twice as many agricultural machines as in the prewar year 1940. The state is continuously initiating new measures for the all-round extension of the technical facilities of agriculture, for lightening the labour of the collective farmers and enhancing its productivity.

This year competition on the collective and state farms attained unusually wide scope, for which our Party organizations primarily deserve the credit. At the same time the collective farmers have begun more effectively to combat idlers and disorganizers of collective labour, and this will contribute to a further improvement of the organization of collective-farm production and to the growing prosperity of the collective farmers. Last year's decision of the Government to award decorations for outstanding achievements in agriculture was a powerful stimulus to the development of socialist competition in the countryside. We now have thousands of Heroes of Socialist Labour in the collective farms and among state farm workers. Tens of thousands

of men and women collective farmers have been awarded orders and medals for outstanding achievement in agriculture. This year it has been decided to raise the requirements entitling to government awards for achievements in agriculture and stock breeding and in mastering agricultural technique. It need not be doubted that this year the number of recipients of decorations, far from diminishing, will greatly increase. This is indicated by the scope of competition and the growing labour enthusiasm on the collective farms.

Only a few days ago a decision of the Party and the Government was published, adopted on the initiative of Comrade Stalin, introducing a plan for the planting of shelter belts, development of lea rotation and building of ponds and reservoirs for the purpose of ensuring big and stable crops in the steppe and forest-steppe areas of the European part of the U.S.S.R. The objective envisaged is to utilize the great practical experience and achievements of agricultural science so that the collective farms and state farms of the steppe and forest-steppe districts, armed with advanced technique, may in the next few years make a big spurt in the development of agriculture and animal husbandry. Particular importance is attached to the development of the travopolye system and to the large-scale planting of windbreaks to protect the fields. The realization of this majestic state plan—with the adoption of which war has been proclaimed on drought and crop failure in the steppe and forest-steppe areas of the European part of our country—will lead our agriculture into the highroad of big and stable crops, will render the labour of the collective farmers highly productive, and will greatly enhance the economic might of the Soviet Union. Our confidence that this epoch-making plan will be fulfilled is indicative of the speed with which our strength, our achieve-

ments and our potentialities grow when we follow the path mapped out by the Communist Party, by the Great Stalin. (*Stormy applause*.)

In view of the fact that the task of directing the national economy has become more complicated, we are faced with new problems in the field of state planning, organization of supply of materials and the introduction of advanced techniques in all branches of economy.

In the field of national-economic planning special importance now attaches to the work of coordinating and expediting the development of the various branches of production. As you know, the plans of production and construction are now drawn up for plants on the basis of progressive technico-economic standards of utilization of equipment and materials—which helps to accelerate the progress of industry, transport and other branches of the national economy. The purpose of control over the way plans are being fulfilled is not simply to ensure the achievement of the total planned volume of gross output, but also, and as an essential requirement, the fulfilment of programs in respect to the main classes of goods, assortment, and improvement of quality.

Upon the proper organization of supply of materials, the creation of necessary material stocks, and the economical utilization of the state resources largely depends the speed of development of our economy. In view of the present vast scope of production and construction, efficient organization of supply, and control to ensure that the established standards of expenditure of materials are observed, are of paramount importance to the state.

Accelerated mechanization of laborious processes and the introduction of up-to-date technique in all branches of industry, transport and agriculture have always been considered a paramount task of the Bolshevik Party. Comrade

Stalin has said in connection with our economic objectives that "... mechanization of labour processes is for us the new and decisive factor, without which we shall be unable to maintain either our tempo or the new scale of production." Our potentialities in this respect have grown immensely. The industries of the Soviet Union can now produce any machine, and the scale of machine building has, moreover, already far surpassed the prewar scale. The number of machine tools in our country has greatly increased as compared with 1940, and within a short period may be increased still further. The systematic introduction of up-to-date technique in all branches of the national economy is a powerful lever for enhancing the might of the Soviet State.

One highly important measure introduced in our country since the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution was the currency reform, coupled with the abolition of the ration system of supplying the population and the establishment of uniform and reduced state prices for manufactured goods and foodstuffs. This decision helped rapidly to eliminate the pernicious effects of the excessive amount of money in circulation, a heritage of the war period, and created favourable conditions for accelerating the progress of the national economy. As a result of the reduction of state retail prices for foodstuffs and manufactured goods and the accompanying reduction of prices in cooperative trade and on the collective-farm market, the purchasing power of the ruble increased twofold. Thanks to this, and also to the growth of money wages, the real wages of workers and office employees have more than doubled as compared with last year. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Thus the currency reform and the government's measures to improve trade have greatly contributed to raising the standard of living of the workers and office employees.

These measures became possible already two years after the end of the war, during which the fascist invaders had inflicted untold misery and ruin on our country. This fact is a demonstration to the world of the vast forces and internal potentialities at the disposal of the Soviet State.

At the same time, following the abolition of the ration system, new tasks have arisen in all their urgency in the sphere of Soviet trade, both in town and country. Everything must be done to expand the production of consumer goods to the utmost, and to improve their quality and assortment, and also to improve service to the consumers by the trading organizations—both state and cooperative.

On the other hand, the favourable results of the currency reform can be ensured to the full only if we observe the strictest economy in everything, do not tolerate extravagance and take care of the Soviet pennies. Consciousness of the importance of these simple duties has now penetrated to the broadest sections of the Soviet public.

This year has seen the birth of a new patriotic movement among the working masses—a movement for the mobilization of internal reserves, for rendering our enterprises profitable and for accumulations in excess of plan. In the first nine months of this year total economies above plan resulting from reduction of production costs exceeded 4,000 million rubles. The competition which has developed in this field permits us to hope that by the end of this year total accumulations above plan will have increased by at least 50 per cent. Competition in this field furthermore leads to more efficient utilization of machines and of equipment generally in the plants and facilitates better organization of production, which deserves the encouragement of all our directing bodies. This is a movement which now embraces many thousands of the country's plants and has

acquired nation-wide importance, thanks to the initiative of the communist organization and the working people of our capital, Moscow, which this time too has justified the high appreciation accorded to it by Comrade Stalin when he called it the "standard bearer of the new, Soviet epoch."  
*(Prolonged applause.)*

We are living at a time when our factory and office workers and the collective-farm peasants throughout the country are taking part in socialist competition. There are not, and there should not be now, any mill or factory or collective farm which does not take part in competition, or does not strive to increase the number of those participating in socialist competition within the enterprise or collective farm. "Competition is a communist method of building Socialism," Comrade Stalin has said. And now we see that this communist method of building Socialism has been adopted by the entire mass of the working people of our country. This is an achievement of the October Revolution, whose vastness cannot be overrated.

The immortal Lenin said:

"Socialism does not extinguish competition; on the contrary, it for the first time creates the opportunity for employing it on a really *wide* and on a really *mass* scale, for actually drawing the majority of the population into an arena of labour in which they can display their abilities, develop their capacities, reveal their talents, which are an untapped spring among the people, and which capitalism crushed, suppressed and strangled in thousands and millions.

"Now that a Socialist Government is in power our task is to organize competition."

Lenin further said:

"Only now is the opportunity created for the truly mass display of enterprise, competition and bold initiative.

Every factory from which the capitalist has been expelled, or in which he has at least been curbed by genuine workers' control, every village from which the landlord exploiter has been smoked out and his land confiscated, is now, and has only now become, a field in which the working-man can reveal his talents, unbend his back, straighten himself, and feel that he is a human being. For the first time after centuries of working for others, of working in subjection for the exploiter, it has become possible to *work for oneself* and moreover to employ all the achievements of modern technique and culture in one's work."

Lenin wrote these lines in December 1917, i.e., more than thirty years ago. Everyone can now see for himself the fundamental and practical significance of Lenin's great tenets.

The scope and profundity of socialist competition show that the entire Soviet people have become a closely knit family of working people, regardless of national or religious distinction. The dispatches and reports addressed to Comrade Stalin daily published in our newspapers, telling of the labour achievements of factories and collective farms, construction jobs and scientific institutions, districts and cities, whole branches of industry and transport, regions, territories and Soviet Republics—all this testifies that our country has become a closely knit family of nations, which displayed its unbreakable solidarity and invincibility in the years of the Patriotic War and is now from day to day, by its participation in the front of labour, demonstrating the growing power of the moral and political unity and socialist consciousness of the Soviet people. (*Applause.*)

In our country all are workers, there are no idlers or parasites, nor should there be. It is sometimes said abroad

that by dislodging these gentry from their snuggeries we acted not quite democratically. But the results have not proved to be bad. Just because we are a state of workers—where there is no room for idlers or parasites—we today constitute a closely knit multinational labouring family, and at the same time a strongly organized, mighty and invincible army. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

Lenin and Stalin teach us not to get swell-headed and not to rest content with what we have achieved. Comrade Stalin incessantly explains the importance of the method of criticism and self-criticism for our progress, for workers of all ranks without exception.

The work of our organizations on the cultural front is steadily growing in scope and significance. We have 730,000 university students and, in addition, 270,000 university correspondence course students and over 34 million secondary, elementary and technical school pupils. Our press and our cultural organizations are carrying on an immense work of scientific education among the masses. Let that capitalist state come forward which would like to vie with the Soviet Union in the field of cultural progress! (*Applause.*)

We are entitled to be proud of the accomplishments of the Soviet arts and, especially of late, of the accomplishments of Soviet literature (*applause*), which is no mean achievement of the guidance and direction of the Party. Our literature, cinema and other arts are being increasingly enriched with productions whose characters and images reveal the inward meaning of events and the endeavours of the people of the Soviet epoch. True art appeals and leaves deep traces in the minds of the people. Hence the great importance of the present afflorescence of the Soviet arts for the further development of what has been accom-

plished in the communist education of the Soviet people. Soviet art penetrates far beyond the borders of our country, telling of the life and deeds of our Homeland, which the capitalist press strives to conceal from or distort in the eyes of the working people.

Of great fundamental and practical importance for the promotion of scientific theory was the recent discussion in scientific circles on questions of biology.

The discussion on the theory of heredity raised profound and fundamental questions relating to the struggle of genuine science, founded on the principles of materialism, against reactionary idealistic survivals in science, such as the Weismann doctrine of unchangeable heredity, which denies that acquired characteristics can be transmitted. This discussion stressed the creative significance of materialist principles for all branches of science, and this should help to accelerate the progress of scientific theory in our country. We should recall the task set our scientists by Comrade Stalin, the task of "not only overtaking but outstripping in the nearest future the achievements of science outside our country." (*Prolonged applause.*)

The discussion on biological questions was also of great practical significance, especially for the further advancement of socialist agriculture. It is not fortuitous that this struggle has been headed by Academician Lysenko, whose services in our common effort to promote socialist agriculture are well known. The keynote of this discussion was Michurin's famous motto: "We cannot wait for favours from Nature; we must wrest them from her." This injunction of Michurin's, it may be said, is infused with the Bolshevik spirit, and is a call not only to scientific workers but also to the millions of practical farmers to engage in active creative work for the benefit and glory of our people.

The scientific discussion on biological questions was conducted under the guiding influence of our Party. Here too Comrade Stalin's guiding ideas played a decisive part, opening new and broad vistas for scientific and practical work.

Our country is on a new upgrade.

This is borne out by the labour fervour and the improving conditions of the ordinary Soviet people, by the achievements of scientists and artists, and by the accomplishments of socialist construction which we observe daily, in which we share each according to his strength and ability, and of which we have a right to be proud. Only yesterday our enemies were attempting to convert vast areas of our country into a "desert zone," demolishing and destroying everything in their path. We have still not healed many of the wounds of war, have not rebuilt a number of cities, have not built all the buildings and houses we need in order to eliminate the aftermath of the incursion of the fascist barbarians. But we are conducting this work successfully and are advancing ever more rapidly and confidently, and have already left behind many an achievement of prewar days.

Great is the progress being made now by our country, where the family of Soviet nations is cemented by friendship and common effort for the benefit of the Homeland, displaying examples unparalleled in history of cooperation and fraternity among the peoples of the multinational Soviet Union. (*Applause*).

We are united and animated in the struggle and are led forward by the Bolshevik Party and the great leader of the Soviet people, Comrade Stalin. (*Stormy cheers*.)

## IN THE VANGUARD OF THE STRUGGLE FOR ENDURING DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Four years ago Comrade Stalin, defining the tasks of the postwar period, said:

"To win the war against Germany means consummating a great historical cause. But winning the war does not yet mean ensuring the peoples a durable peace and reliable security in the future. The task is not only to win the war, but also to prevent the outbreak of fresh aggression and another war, if not for ever, then at least for a long time to come."

In order to assist the effective realization of these aims, the U.S.S.R. took an active part in the elaboration of a number of international agreements while the second world war was still on.

Everybody will recall how the agreement was elaborated between the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain, to which China and France adhered and which later was taken as a basis for the Charter of the United Nations organization. Of utmost importance were the agreements between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain on the German question adopted at Yalta and Potsdam. We also know that the Potsdam decisions defined the general line of the postwar settlement not only in Europe. The special Potsdam declaration on Japan, together with the Cairo declaration and the Yalta agreement, should serve as the basis for the peace settlement in the Far East as well. It should not be forgotten that these international agreements were sealed with the blood of our peoples, who bore countless sacrifices and made it possible for us victoriously to end the war against fascism and aggression in Europe and Asia.

Since then the Soviet Union has invariably insisted that the obligations undertaken under these agreements must be sacredly adhered to and implemented by all the states.

It cannot be said that these obligations have remained only on paper. It is sufficient to recall that the international organization of the United Nations has been created and is functioning, although it is often attempted to give its work a direction which does not correspond with its fundamental purposes. Five peace treaties have been concluded—with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland—which are an important contribution to the peace settlement in Europe.

On the other hand, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the peace treaty with Germany is making no headway. At the same time, in the American, British and French zones of occupation in Germany, which in contravention of the agreements between the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France, have been removed from quadripartite control, people who were prominent under the fascist regime are being restored to key positions in industry and administration. Moreover, many democratic organizations are deprived of the opportunity of functioning normally, which the Soviet Union considers arbitrary and impermissible.

Nor is the peace treaty with Japan making any headway.

Naturally, the Soviet Union is insisting that the work of framing the peace treaties for Germany and Japan be expedited, in conformity with that which was envisaged in Allied agreements. This means that the framing of the said peace treaties must have the purpose of preventing the resurgence of Germany and Japan as aggressive Powers and, consequently, must help to promote the

demilitarization and democratic reconstruction of these countries. In conformity with this, the Soviet Government insists upon the complete disarming of Germany, and on the implementation of the plan of international control of the industrial region of the Ruhr, as the principal base of Germany's war industry. In conformity with this, too, the Soviet Government insists that war industry be completely banned in Japan, and that proper international control be established to prevent the restoration of war industry in that country. But at the same time, the Soviet Government considers that peace industry must not be stifled either in Germany or Japan. Both the German and the Japanese peoples must be given the opportunity to secure everything their own peace industries can provide.

If we want to be true to the obligations we assumed with regard to the peace settlement with Germany and Japan, this is the course we must follow. Only those who want endlessly to protract the occupation of Germany and Japan, disregarding the legitimate interests of their peoples, can evade fulfilling the aforesaid international agreements.

This is how matters stand regarding the chief tasks of the postwar settlement.

Another major issue in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is the struggle against the new forces of aggression and, consequently, against propaganda for a new war and against instigators of a new war.

With this purpose in view, as early as 1946 the Soviet Union submitted to UNO its well-known proposal for a general reduction of armaments and prohibition of the atomic weapon. In spite of the resistance of the aggressive elements, this proposal was in the main accepted by UNO.

Last year the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to the General Assembly for the adopting of measures against

war propaganda and instigators of a new war. After all sorts of reservations and limitations had been introduced into our draft, UNO adopted a decision on this matter. The General Assembly's resolution was so thoroughly washed and scrubbed that it contained not a word of reference to instigators of a new war. Only in the title of the resolution did there remain any mention that it was aimed against instigators of a new war. Nevertheless, even this resolution is of positive value in the eyes of all honest supporters of international security, since it condemns all forms of propaganda having the purpose of creating, or capable of creating, or hastening, a threat to peace, a violation of peace, or an act of aggression.

In order that the resolution on reduction of armaments and prohibition of the atomic weapon should not remain a dead letter, the Soviet Union this year made concrete proposals in extension of the aforesaid decision of UNO.

The Soviet Union proposed a reduction by one-third within one year of all existing armed forces and armaments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China—the five countries which, as the permanent members of the Security Council, bear the chief responsibility for the maintenance of international security. This proposal directly affects only the great Powers, and does not apply to the armaments of any other state. Furthermore, the Soviet Union proposed that the atomic weapon be prohibited, as a weapon designed for aggressive purposes and not for purposes of defence. In order to exercise supervision and control over the implementation of the measures for reduction of armaments and armed forces and prohibition of the atomic weapon, we proposed that an international control body be set up within the framework of the Security Council, to which the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., France and

China would have to submit full official data relative to the state of their armaments and armed forces.

This question was debated in the General Assembly and its committees for over a month. The great Powers resorted to every excuse not to agree to a reduction of their armed forces and armaments or to the prohibition of the atomic weapon, and secured the passage by the General Assembly of a resolution which suited their wishes.

Particularly unfriendly was the reception the representatives of the United States and Great Britain gave to our proposal to prohibit the atomic weapon. They cannot refute the incontrovertible statement that the atomic bomb is a weapon of aggression and not of defence, that it is designed for the mass destruction of peaceful citizens and, chiefly, of big cities, and that, not representatives of free nations, but only fascist fiends can dream of employing such a weapon. But those whom Comrade Stalin has called Churchill's obedient "pupils in aggression" are seeking every excuse to prevent the prohibition of the criminal atomic weapon.

In this connection two major camps of public opinion are becoming more and more clearly defined.

In the United States the recently formed Progressive Party, headed by Wallace, has come out in favour of prohibiting the atomic weapon, as also have quite a number of American scientists and public figures, not to mention the millions of working people whose voice is not reflected in the venal and mercenary organs of the yellow bourgeois press. In the summer of last year, in the so-called Working Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission of the Security Council, the majority of the states, including Great Britain, pronounced in favour of destroying atomic bombs, although, owing to the pressure of the

United States, they did not adhere to this position very long. It has long been known that many British scientists consider the position of the Soviet Union in this matter the correct one. There can be no doubt that in every country the supporters of prohibition of the atomic weapon constitute the overwhelming majority of the people, although this does not find reflection in the General Assembly.

The more stubbornly the aggressive elements resist prohibition of the atomic weapon, the wider will become the split between the forces of aggression and imperialism, on the one hand, and the forces standing for the promotion of general peace and democracy, on the other. From this it follows that the partisans of the atomic weapon will with every day become more and more isolated from world public opinion. From this it also follows that, in leading the struggle for the prohibition of the criminal atomic weapon, the Soviet Union stands at the head of all peace-loving nations, of all progressive men and women throughout the world. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Until the second world war, the capitalist world was divided into bourgeois-democratic countries and fascist countries. At that time the chief instigators of aggression were the fascist and militaristic countries—Germany, Italy and Japan, which formed the so-called anti-Comintern bloc. It was they that unleashed the second world war, which ended in ignominious fiasco for all fascists.

Long before the second world war the Soviet Union called upon all non-aggressive countries to unite in order to resist fascist aggression, and it has always condemned deals by individual great Powers with aggressive fascist countries at the expense of other peace-loving nations, such as the shameful Munich compact at the expense of Czechoslovakia.

When the second world war broke out the Soviet Union did not have to change its policy upon entering the anti-Hitler coalition together with Great Britain and the United States. This was a natural sequence to the foreign policy the Soviet Government had been pursuing before the second world war.

The dangerous threat overhanging Europe, and not only Europe, which emanated from fascist Germany and aggressive Japan, with their lunatic plans of world supremacy and of crushing all states that opposed this, compelled the ruling circles of Great Britain and the United States to unite with the Soviet Union against the forces of aggression and fascism. Thanks to this alliance between the U.S.S.R. and the democratic countries, the aggressive Powers were vanquished and important agreements were concluded with regard to the postwar settlement.

The Soviet Union now too holds by these agreements, which were designed to protect the interests of democracy and to prevent new aggression. The Soviet Union legitimately demands that these agreements be implemented, and that new questions which may arise in connection with this be also settled by mutual agreement between the interested Powers. No one can deny the consistency of the Stalin foreign policy of the Soviet Government, nor that it fully accords with the interests of international security.

The whole point is that since the end of the second world war changes have taken place in the policy of the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain which virtually imply repudiation of the agreements concluded jointly with the U.S.S.R. aimed at the establishment of a stable democratic peace after the war, and which reflect the desire of these circles to impose their peace, an impe-

rialist peace, upon other countries—which is incompatible with the liberating aims of the anti-Hitler coalition of the Powers.

They evidently consider that, since the danger of war has passed for them, they may ignore the old agreements with the U.S.S.R., disregard their existence. Among the ruling circles of these countries there are many who hanker to start realizing their predatory plans, plans aimed at establishing the world supremacy of the Anglo-American bloc. They believe that with the victory over Germany and Japan the ground has been cleared for the realization of their plans of domination over all other nations, although they cannot say so openly. The press of the imperialist circles attacks our country with ever-mounting shrillness and vociferousness, for it is known to all that the Soviet Union is an irreconcilable foe of the predatory plans of imperialism.

After this it will be clear why major international agreements concluded with the participation of the Soviet Union are being violated at every step, and why, for instance, the Berlin question, in spite of the agreements reached between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, Great Britain and France, still remains unsettled.

Comrade Stalin gave a profound explanation of this policy of the ruling circles of the U.S.A. and Great Britain:

"The thing is that those who inspire the aggressive policy in the U.S.A. and Great Britain do not consider themselves interested in agreement and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. What they need is not agreement and co-operation, but talk about agreement and cooperation, so as, having frustrated agreement, to put the blame on the U.S.S.R. and thus 'prove' that cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is impossible. What the warmongers who are striving to precipitate a new war fear most of all is agreement and

cooperation with the U.S.S.R., because a policy of agreement with the U.S.S.R. would undermine the position of the warmongers and render the aggressive policy of these gentry futile and purposeless."

Comrade Stalin defined this policy when he said that "the policy of the present leaders of the U.S.A. and Great Britain is a policy of aggression, a policy of unleashing a new war."

In the light of this, it is clear why new American military bases are being created in all parts of the globe, why the American authorities want to maintain their troops in so many countries, and why America's military budget has been inflated this year to wartime dimensions and to eleven times the size it was, for instance, in the prewar year 1940. In the light of this, it is also clear why in Washington there is being preserved to this day the Anglo-American military staff which was set up during the second world war, and which is now working on new plans of aggression secretly from both the American and British peoples.

There is quite a lot of talk of late about the creation of all sorts of "unions" and "blocs" of Western states, although they are not being threatened by any other states. All this agitated formation of "Western unions" "Atlantic alliances," "Mediterranean blocs" and the like is camouflaged by defensive declarations by which only excessively naive people can be taken in. In reality these "alliances" and "blocs" have as their purpose preparation for new aggression and the precipitation of new wars, in which definite ruling groups are interested, but certainly not the peoples of the United States, Great Britain or any other country. In the case of Great Britain and France, they are al variance with the pacts of friendship and mutual assistance which these countries have with the U.S.S.R.

Comrade Stalin has also pronounced his weighty word on how the policy of the instigators of a new war is likely to end. He said:

"It can only end in ignominious failure for the instigators of a new war. Churchill, the chief instigator of a new war, has already managed to forfeit the confidence of his nation and of the democratic forces of the whole world. A similar fate lies in store for all the other instigators of war. The horrors of the recent war are still too fresh in the memory of the peoples, and the social forces standing for peace are too strong for Churchill's pupils in aggression to overmaster them and swing them towards a new war."

Comrade Stalin's statement should have a sobering effect. It shows that the anti-Soviet intrigues in which various agents of the instigators of a new war are now engaged are under the vigilant observation of the Soviet Union and the democratic forces of the whole world. (*Applause.*) Everyone knows that such things do not love the light. But the time has passed when the peoples were blind tools of one or another ruling clique. (*Applause.*)

The elections in the United States on November 2 resulted in a victory for the Democratic Party and President Truman. The defeat of the Republican Party and Dewey, who came forward in the elections with a frankly reactionary and outspokenly aggressive program, indicates that the majority of the American people reject this program.

The second world war, which ended with the defeat of fascism, led to substantial changes in Europe, and not only in Europe.

The weight of the strengthened Soviet Union in international affairs has been further enhanced. A number of people's democracies, with which the U.S.S.R. is bound by ties of friendship and mutual assistance, have set foot on

the road to Socialism. The treachery of the leading nationalist group in Yugoslavia has done great damage to her people, but there can be no doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, backed by its internationalist traditions, will find the way which will enable Yugoslavia to rejoin the closely knit family which embraces the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. (*Applause.*)

The Communist parties in the European countries have grown in strength and numbers. The demolition of fascism has opened broad prospects for the growth and cementation of all the forces of the democratic and anti-imperialist camp.

The situation in Asia has likewise radically changed since the second world war.

Of the two and a quarter billion people of the globe, the population of Asia comprises one billion two hundred million. The peoples of Asia have now stirred into movement, in which an ever greater part is played by the forces of national liberation. Only sworn enemies of human progress can throw spokes in the wheel of this national liberation movement.

Such is the onward march of history.

The pillars of imperialism are steadily crumbling and becoming unreliable. At the same time the forces of democracy, peace and Socialism are growing and cementing their ranks.

In this situation, the imperialist forces more and more frequently base their calculations on intensifying the aggressiveness of their policy, on creating an atmosphere of war hysteria, and so on. These methods are well known.

The noisier the warmongering gentry become, the more will they repel the millions of common folk in all countries, and the sooner will they become internationally isolated. And at the same time, the international camp of partisans

of peace and democracy, in the van of which stands the U.S.S.R., is growing stronger and stronger and becoming a great and invincible force. (*Prolonged applause.*)

\* \* \*

Our country is on a new upgrade. It is to be observed in the economic achievements, in the scope and character of cultural endeavour, in the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, which has risen to a new and higher level. The strength of the Soviet people grows from year to year. The international prestige of the U.S.S.R. and its influence in world affairs become ever stronger, confirming the correctness of the policy of our Party. And, accordingly, the Stalin foreign policy is imbued with unwavering consistency and calm confidence in the morrow.

We owe our achievements to the Bolshevik Party, to the guidance of Lenin and Stalin. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

In the summer of 1917, in the days of military defeats and economic dislocation, when our opponents declared that there was no political party in Russia that would consent to take the entire political power into its hands, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin at once retorted that there was such a party, that "... our Party does not refuse it; it is prepared at any minute to take over the entire power." In that very year the Bolshevik Party, which then numbered only 240,000 members, headed the October Socialist Revolution and led our country to the triumph of people's rule, Soviet rule. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

Then the Bolshevik Party brought the country out of the imperialist war, turned over the landed estates to the peasants, and put down the attempts at resistance of the capitalists and landlords. Then, too, we defeated the forces of foreign intervention, which had formed a puppet "al-

liance of fourteen states," and which were beaten in their attempts to restore bourgeois and landlord rule in Russia.

After this, the principal task of the Bolshevik Party was to repair the economic dislocation caused by the protracted civil war. Our enemies declared: "The Bolsheviks only know how to destroy." How often did they affirm that without the landlords and capitalists the national economy could not be restored. The Party of Lenin and Stalin retorted to these affirmations with the Bolshevik plan of socialist industrialization, with the triumphant Stalin five-year plans, which transformed our country. (*Applause.*)

After this, they prophesied that "the Bolsheviks will break their neck over the peasant question," that socialist reconstruction of agriculture was impossible. Guided by Comrade Stalin, the Bolshevik Party solved this problem too, having eliminated the kulaks as a class, brought about the collectivization of many millions of peasant farms and created unprecedented conditions for the progress of agriculture and radical improvement of the conditions of the peasantry. The outcome of these transformatory measures was that we were able to secure the elevation to a new level of the alliance of workers and peasants, which turned into the moral and political unity of socialist society, no example of which had been known to world history. (*Prolonged applause.*)

In the accomplishment of these tasks, the Party time and again encountered the resistance of agents of the class enemy, especially of the trotskyites and bukharinistes. Having purified itself of them, the Bolshevik Party became still stronger and rallied around Comrade Stalin. (*Stormy applause.*)

The events of the Great Patriotic War are fresh in the memories of all. Stalin headed the defence of our country

and took over the direction of the country's armed forces—and the Soviet people vanquished German fascism and its allies. It was thought that the U.S.S.R. would be impoverished and weakened, but it grew stronger than ever in the Great Patriotic War. It was expected that after the war the Soviet Union would be dependent on the leading capitalist states, but the Soviet State is continuing as heretofore to pursue its independent Stalin foreign policy, guided by the interests of the Soviet people and of international security. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

The war ended. We obtained the opportunity to return to our peaceful labours. The Soviet Union is fulfilling its new postwar five-year plan. Progress is likewise being made in the other countries which have taken the road of Socialism. Now all sorts of absurd "fears" are rife in ruling bourgeois circles—they are scared by our achievements, they are afraid of the gathering tempo of the U.S.S.R.'s economic progress. Naturally, this will not induce the Soviet people to relax their labour efforts, but on the contrary will animate the millions of labouring people of our country, our workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, our youth, to still greater effort.

What is the foundation of our mounting successes? This question may be answered briefly. The foundation of our successes is the guidance of the Bolshevik Party, of the Great Stalin, which has welded together the working class and the working peasants in their struggle for the triumph of Socialism. (*Stormy, prolonged cheers.*)

There are capitalist countries where much wealth and human experience have been accumulated, where there are natural resources and much else. But the outworn capitalist system itself, with its private ownership and anarchy of production and the social and political antagonisms and crises which rend it, dooms these countries to instability

and catastrophic slumps, to periodical shocks and revolutionary upheavals.

Different is the situation in the Soviet Union, where the socialist system of society stands firmly on its feet and is the inexhaustible source of the growing strength of our state, of the labour enthusiasm and spiritual progress of the Soviet people. In our country, in big things and in small, can be seen the directing and mobilizing will of the Communist Party, which recognizes no insuperable obstacles.  
*(Prolonged applause.)*

The October Revolution tested and steeled the Lenin-Stalin leadership of our Party, which has won the unbounded confidence and love of the Soviet people. Our people have come to occupy an honourable and historic place among the nations, and have demonstrated that, led by the Communist Party and the Great Stalin, they are capable of performing great deeds without end. *(Stormy, prolonged applause.)*

Long live our Soviet country—home of friendship of our peoples and shrine of their glory! *(Stormy, prolonged applause.)*

Long live the great Bolshevik Party, the Party of Lenin and Stalin, the battle-seasoned vanguard of the Soviet people, the inspirer and organizer of our victories! *(Stormy, prolonged applause.)*

Under the banner of Lenin, under the leadership of Stalin, forward to the triumph of Communism! *(Stormy, prolonged cheers. All rise. Cries of "Long live our own Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for the Great Stalin!" "Long live our Great Socialist Homeland!")*

## **APPENDICES**



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*Appendix No. I*

**ON THE DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY  
AND PREVENTION OF GERMAN AGGRESSION**

*Draft Treaty Submitted by  
the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow  
Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers*

*April 14, 1947*

On June 5, 1945, the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic declared their intention to effect the total disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. In substantial measure this intention has already been fulfilled. Nothing shall prevent or delay the completion of the process. It is necessary to ensure that Germany remains in a state of total disarmament and demilitarization as long as is required in order that Germany may never again constitute a threat to her neighbours or to the maintenance of peace throughout the world, and as long as is demanded by the task of preventing German aggression. The task of preventing German aggression cannot be carried out fully without destroying German militarism and Nazism and without a radical reconstruction of Germany's public life and state structure on a broad democratic basis. This will be a guarantee of Germany's conversion into a peaceable

state and will create favourable conditions allowing the peoples of Europe and of the whole world to devote themselves entirely to peaceful pursuits. The accomplishment of this task and the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations to the Allied Powers will give the German people the opportunity of taking a worthy place in the commonwealth of nations.

To achieve this objective, the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic agree to engage in the common undertaking defined in this Treaty.

## ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties agree that they will take steps jointly to ensure that:

(a) All German armed forces including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, all para-military forces, such as the SS, the SA, the Gestapo, and all organizations auxiliary to the foregoing, shall, at the earliest date, be and shall remain completely disarmed, demobilized and disbanded, and the re-establishment, in any form whatsoever, of the disbanded German military forces, of the organizations enumerated above, and of auxiliary units of all and every description, shall be prevented.

(b) The German General Staff and the staffs of any military and para-military organization shall be and shall remain disbanded and their re-establishment in any form whatsoever shall be prevented.

(c) No military or para-military organizations in any form or guise shall be permitted in Germany.

(d) The manufacture or production in, or the importation of military equipment into Germany shall be pre-

vented In particular, the High Contracting Parties shall prevent the manufacture, production or importation of:

(1) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, military stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds;

(2) all fissionable materials for any purpose, except under conditions approved by the High Contracting Parties;

(3) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, and auxiliary naval craft;

(4) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation equipment and devices and equipment for anti-aircraft defence.

(e) The establishment, utilization or operation for military purposes of any of the following shall be prevented: all military structures, installations and establishments, including military airfields, sea plane bases and naval bases, military and naval storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas; all remaining structures, installations and establishments of this nature shall be destroyed.

(f) Under conditions which may be established by the High Contracting Parties the demilitarization and disarmament required by this Article shall be subject to the following exceptions:

(1) The formation and employment of such detachments of German civil police, and their equipment with such types and quantities of imported small arms as may be essential to the maintenance of public security;

(2) the importation of minimum quantities of those items listed in paragraph (d) above, such as explosives or ingredients of explosives which may be essential for purposes of construction, mining, agriculture, or for other peaceful purposes.

## ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that:

- (a) all measures necessary to destroy the German war potential shall be carried out; all war plants, specialized military installations of other plants and such production capacities in other industries as are not required for the industry which shall be permitted in order to meet the needs of Germany's peace economy, shall be removed as reparations or destroyed;
- (b) the establishment, utilization or operation for military purposes of any factories, mills, workshops, research institutes, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, blueprints and inventions which are used, or intended to be used, for the production or for facilitating the production of those items listed in Article I, paragraphs (d) and (e) of the present Treaty, shall be prevented.

## ARTICLE III

In order to prevent the utilization of German industry for military purposes the High Contracting Parties agree that:

- a) the Ruhr industrial region, as the principal base of German armament production and the main industrial support of German militarism, shall be placed under the joint control of Great Britain, the United States of America, France and the Soviet Union in order that the resources of the Ruhr may be utilized for the development of Germany's peaceful industries and for meeting the needs of the European nations that have suffered from German aggression;

b) there shall be completed at the earliest date the liquidation of German concerns, cartels, syndicates, trusts and the banking monopolies that control them, which were the instigators and organizers of German aggression; the enterprises that belonged to them shall be transferred to the ownership of the German State, and the re-establishment of monopolistic industrial and financial associations in Germany shall henceforth be prevented.

#### ARTICLE IV

With the aim of destroying the roots of German aggression and of transforming Germany into a peaceful and democratic state, the High Contracting Parties agree that:

a) measures shall be taken to uproot the remnants of German Nazism and German aggressive nationalism in other forms and to obviate the possibility of the resurgence in any shape of the Nazi party, Nazi organizations and institutions; all Nazi and militarist influence in Germany shall be completely eliminated and Nazi and militarist activities and propaganda shall not be permitted in the future;

b) the German people shall be accorded every assistance in the establishment of a democratic order on the basis of a democratic German Constitution approved by the German people; this should guarantee the German people freedom of speech, press, religious beliefs, assembly, freedom of activity for democratic parties, trade unions and other anti-Nazi organizations on an all-German scale, with due safeguards for the rights and interests of the working population and with consideration for the need to maintain security;

c) a land reform shall be effected throughout Germany in order to transfer to the peasants the lands of the large Junker landowners, who have always been the instigators of German aggression and have produced the most dangerous German militarists.

## ARTICLE V

The High Contracting Parties agree that when they regard the fulfilment of the basic objectives of the occupation of Germany as ensured, namely:

- a) the completion of Germany's demilitarization, including the liquidation of her industrial war potential, in accordance with the orders of the Allied Powers;
- b) the re-establishment and consolidation in Germany of a democratic order;
- c) the fulfilment by Germany of the established reparations obligations, as well as of other obligations to the Allies,

the Allied Powers shall consider the question of discontinuing the occupation of Germany.

## ARTICLE VI

Upon the termination of the occupation of Germany, a Control Commission shall be established, functioning on a quadripartite basis, which through its officers or Committees shall conduct in any or all parts of German territory such inspections, inquiries and investigations as it may deem necessary; in the event of Germany violating her obligations to the Allied Powers the High Contracting Parties may employ means of compulsion, including such

action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to ensure the immediate cessation or prevention of such violation or attempted violation.

The Control Commission shall keep the High Contracting Parties and the United Nations Security Council informed of the results of the inspections, inquiries and investigations authorized by this Article, and the High Contracting Parties shall immediately report to the United Nations Security Council the action taken or to be taken.

The High Contracting Parties agree that simultaneously with adopting a decision on the termination of the occupation of Germany, they shall consult for the purpose of negotiating special quadripartite agreements, which, without prejudice to the obligations devolving on them under the United Nations Charter, shall provide in the greatest practicable detail for inspection, inquiry and investigation by the Control Commission; for the numbers and types of armed forces which each Party shall make available for the purposes of this Treaty; for their degree of readiness and general location, and for the nature of the facilities and assistance which each shall provide. Such special quadripartite agreements shall be subject to ratification by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

## ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of..... which shall notify all the High Contracting Parties of each act of deposit.

This Treaty shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by all the High Contracting Parties. This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of forty years from its effective date. The High Contracting Parties agree to consult each other six months before the date of expiration of this Treaty for the purpose of determining whether the interests of international peace and security require its renewal, with or without modification, or whether the German people have so far progressed in the reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis that the continued imposition of control measures is no longer necessary.

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*Appendix No. 2*

PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION  
AT THE CONFERENCE OF THE THREE  
FOREIGN MINISTERS IN PARIS

On June 30, 1947, at the Conference of the three Foreign Ministers in Paris, V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., submitted the following proposal:

The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. recognizes the great importance of the task of expediting the reconstruction and further development of the national economy of European countries disturbed by the war and considers that the accomplishment of this task would be facilitated if the United States were to render the economic aid, of which the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall, spoke in his statement of June 5.

The Conference considers that it does not come within its task to draft a comprehensive economic program for European countries, since the drafting of such an economic program for the whole of Europe by the three great Powers, even with the participation of certain other European countries, would have as its inevitable result the imposing of the will of strong European Powers upon

other European countries, would constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of these countries and an infringement of their sovereignty. Any attempts to draft such a comprehensive economic program for Europe are the more inadmissible as they would lead to the disturbance of existing economic relations between European countries and would give rise to great friction in their relations, and this would render difficult that most necessary development of economic cooperation between European countries.

The Conference of the three Foreign Ministers therefore deems it suitable:

1. That in order to ascertain the requirements of European countries for American economic aid, to determine the possibility of such aid being rendered by the U.S.A., and to assist the European countries in receiving such aid, there should be established an Assistance Committee, composed of representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. and subsequently to include representatives of certain other European countries.

2. That Sub-Committees of the Assistance Committee should be set up for the following questions:

- a) food
- b) fuel
- c) equipment.

The Sub-Committees shall include, besides representatives of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and France, representatives of two European countries especially concerned in the work of the respective Sub-Committee from among the countries which were subjected to German occupation and which contributed to the common victory of the Allies over the enemy.

The ex-enemy countries may be invited by the Sub-Committees for consultation.

The question of Germany is to be considered by the four following Powers: United Kingdom, France, U.S.S.R., U.S.A.

3. The tasks of the Assistance Committee shall be:

- a) to receive applications from European countries for the American economic aid required by them;
- b) to draft a summary program on the basis of such applications, the needs of countries which were subjected to German occupation and contributed to the Allied common victory to be provided for in the first instance;
- c) to ascertain the possibilities of appropriate economic aid from the U.S.A.

4. The Assistance Committee shall establish relations with the European Economic Commission of UNO according to the tasks entrusted to it.



